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Abstract (short version) 
 
This thesis presents a model of a narrow faculty for music - qualities that are at once universally present and operational in 
music across cultures whilst also being specific to our species and to the domain of music. The comparative approach taken 
focuses on core psychological and physiological capabilities that root and enable appropriate engagement with music rather 
than on their observable physical correlates.  Configurations of musical pulse; musical tone; and musical motivation are 
described as providing a sustained attentional structure for managing personal experience and interpersonal interaction and 
as offering a continually renewing phenomenological link between the immediate past, the perceptual present and future 
expectation.  Constituent parts of the narrow faculty for music are considered most fundamentally as a potentiating, quasi-
architectural framework in which our most central affective and socio-intentional drives are afforded extended time, 
stability, and a degree of abstraction, intensity, focus and meaning. The author contends, therefore, that music's defining 
characteristics, specific functionalities and/or situated efficacies are not demarcated in broadly termed “musical” qualities 
such as melodic contour or rhythm or in those surprisingly elusive “objective facts” of musical structure.  Rather they are 
solely the attentional/motivational frameworks which root our faculty to make and make sense of music.  Our generic 
capacities for culture and the manifold uses of action, gesture, and sound to express and induce emotion; to regulate affective 
states; to create or reflect meaning; to signify; to ritualize; coordinate; communicate; interrelate; embody; entrain; and/or 
intentionalize, none of these is assessed as being intrinsically unique to music performance.  Music is, instead, viewed as an 
ordered expression of human experience, behaviour, interaction, and vitality, all shaped, shared, given significance, and/or 
transformed in time.  The relevance of this model to topical debates on music and evolution is discussed and the author 
contends that the perspective offered affords significant implications for our understanding of why music is evidently and 
remarkably effective in certain settings and in the pursuit of certain social, individual, and therapeutic goals. 
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The central question and rationales for this thesis are outlined.  What is special about music?  What is universally present in 
music across cultures whilst also being distinct from other forms of animal and human behaviour and communication? What 
constitutes a putative narrow faculty for music? The scope and challenge of this focal question is delineated by four clear 
statements all of which are in essence, if not in the details, uncontroversial: 1) Music is, within and across cultural 
boundaries, enormously and wonderfully diverse;  2) Most features we commonly regard as being essentially constitutive of 
“music” and “musicality” – e.g. pulse, rhythm, melody, gesture, vocal affect, performance, expressivity, movement, emotion 
regulation, synchronisation, harmony – are broadly speaking present in and integral to other forms of interaction and 
communication; 3) Music appears to share common substance across cultures in terms of certain consistencies in function, 
context, setting, and efficacy, as well as in being widely prized and experienced as being intensely meaningful; 4) The full 
capacity for music is manifest of a vast interconnected mosaic of skills and abilities ranging upwards from the most basic 
perceptual, vocal and motoric functions.  I argue that, as something like music appears from our cultural vantage point to be 
recognisable as such across cultures, it is logically pursuant that some identifying features or distinct conglomerations of 
features are commonly present.  A key point here is that these traits may not be physically or knowingly/descriptively 
evident but may reflect implicitly learned ontology and/or empathy with the underlying psychological mechanisms and 
experience.  Finally I contend that understanding and asserting a theoretical model of a narrow faculty for music is an 
essential step towards understanding the emergence of music and musical capabilities during the course of hominin 
evolution as well as for interpreting its modern-day uses, functions and efficacies in social, individual and therapeutic 
settings.   Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to an enhanced applicability of - and clarity in - the ever-growing body of 
interdisciplinary research into music.   
 
SECTION I – Music and Evolution 
 
Chapter 1 reviews and critiques the current state of research into the evolution of music focusing on debates regarding the 
status of music as an evolutionary adaptation, putative rationales for the emergence of musical capabilities, universals in 
music, cross-cultural concerns, and theoretical issues concerning cross-species comparative perspectives. Brief reviews of 
key literatures on the universality of music in human culture; innate predispositions for musicality; specificities of 
neurological domains and/or networks for music; paleontological evidence for the emergence of necessary vocal and 
corporeal capacities; and the archaeology of musical artefacts from the upper Palaeolithic are also presented with particular 
note to areas of concern to the central arguments of this thesis.  This chapter also reviews and explores attempts to position 
music – biologically and culturally - within broad frameworks of animal and human communication.  Following Cross 
(2007) the notion is described of three concurrently operational dimensions of meaning and affect in music: motivational-
structural - based on global characteristics of sound with its effects originating in correlates of sound in the physical world 
and in correlations between signals and the motivational state of an individual; socio-intentional - a responsiveness to 
structural features of human interaction and attributions of intentionality ; and culturally-enactive - meaning and affect 
derived from enculturated, formal and specifically personal learning processes that are rooted in the conventional and 
institutional use of music.  I propose that the the central questions of this thesis be understood to target, in particular, the 
domain-specificities of the socio-intentional dimension.  At an even more fundamental level I posit briefly, following Porges 
(2003), that the evolution of the mammalian nervous system and anatomy putatively provide a physiological basis for links 
between visceral state regulation and both the expressive and receptive domains of social communication.  Finally 
definitional issues are considered and, in particular, Cross’s (2003) suggested definition that ‘music embodies, entrains and 
transposably intentionalises sound in time and action’.  This is seen to be a valuable functional account for an evolutionary 
framework but also to lack a degree of specificity in terms of describing features that are unique to music. 
 
SECTION II – The Narrow Faculty for Music – Musical Pulse, Musical Tone, and Musical Motivation 
 
Section Introduction - This opening section briefly introduces the work of linguist and anthropologist Charles Hockett on 
the “design features” of language.   This provides a necessary background for the prinicipal methodological inspiration for 
this thesis, which stems from more recent arguments (Hauser et al., 2002) on identifying a broad and narrow faculty of 
language – the latter being components specific to language (in a sense unique/distinct “design features”). It then outlines 
briefly the three main chapters of Section II (chapters 3, 4, and 5) which, on the basis of cross- and intra-species comparative 
analyses, provide models of musical motivation, musical pulse, and musical tone as species-specific, context-specific, and 
universal features of an ontogenetically emergent capacity for music.  Acknowledging that some musics may lack a salient 
pitch or rhythmic component, the premise is introduced that music is universally identifiable by the presence of musical 
motivation and configurations of musical pulse and musical tone.  
 
Attention is drawn to two key aspects of the methodological approach taken and their reasoning.  The first of these is a 
concentration on the psychological and attentional mechanisms involved in music rather than on the physical correlates of 
behaviour. The second point is the attempt to get to the universal core of the question by focusing on those capabilities and 
processes necessary for engaging appropriately with the ostensibly most “simple” forms of pulse, tone, and motivation.  
These are tentatively characterised as tapping an isochronous pattern, humming a sustained pitch and an intrinsic 
desire/impulse to do so.  It is noted with reference to both points that music perception is physically embodied and thus no 
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categorical distinction between perceiving/listening to and producing/performing music is made.  Finally each section is 
informed to then proceed to investigate which (if any) of the mechanisms and capabilities described are unique to music.  
 
Chapter 2 - Musical Pulse -  focuses on the psychology and physiology of pulse in music and offers a comprehensive 
comparative perspective arguing that musical pulse in the most fundamental sense can be identified by the acoustic 
correlates of engagement with a sustained, volitionally controlled, future-directed attentional pulse.  Within a temporal 
window of the psychological present this incurs awareness of a pulsed framework, is perceived unambiguously or at 
hierarchically related levels by enculturated individuals, involves engagement of the motor system in a way that enables 
management of fine & gross temporal control in ballistic and smooth movements, and involves mechanisms for period 
correction based upon the output of self or others.  A key point highlighted in this chapter is the notion that musical pulse is 
rooted indivisibly in fundamental mechanisms of timing and movement. I propose that period correction mechanisms and a 
corresponding sustained pulsed attentional framework incurring awareness and degrees of volitional control distinguish 
music from other ‘intrinsic motive pulses’ in behavioural and communicative frameworks. 
 
Chapter 3 - Musical Tone - mirrors Chapter 3 in the frequency domain by describing a concept of musical tone built upon 
the literatures on pitch perception, relative pitch processing, consonance, amusia, the evolution of vocal physiology and 
neurology in human and non-human primates, volitional control of vocalization, and studies of pitch-shift feedback 
correction.  Also considered are the use of pitch in non-musical interactions and reported incidences of “pitch synchrony” or 
“tonal synchrony” in linguistic and parent-infant interactions.  Musical tone is subsequently described as sustained 
performance and perception related to stable implicit or explicit psychological pitch centres in which loudness, pitch, and 
timbre are independently variable. Engagement putatively involves two frequency correction mechanisms - one fast and pre-
conscious, the other tied with awareness and partially intentionalisable - based upon the output of self and others and a desire 
to maintain certain frequency relationships.  Similarly to suggestions of chapter 3 I argue that the slower correction 
mechanisms could be unique to a musical context.   This again accords particular importance to music affording a sustained 
attentional framework, a degree of volitional control and awareness and a constant integration of what has come before with 
the now and predictions of what is to come. 
 
Chapter 4 - Musical Motivation - presents a discussion on the specificities of an intrinsic motivation for musical action.  
Debate is initially framed in terms of ethnomusicological discourse on uses and functions of music across cultures.  The 
psychological literature on music and emotion is reviewed and, in particular, the prevailing focus on expression and 
induction is criticised in not affording a specific, functional and/or evolutionary account of musical emotions.  Following 
Schiavio and colleagues an alternative enactive/dynamic systems approach is preferred.  Extending the line of reasoning 
from chapter 1 and a broad understanding of music as communication, I argue that structural correlates of affect are shared 
with other human, and in part non-human, communicative behaviours.  A suggestion, following Swaine, is therefore 
presented that music is perhaps better understood as communicating a strategy for interaction and /or the regulation of mood.  
Critically I suggest that music’s particular connections and efficacies with emotion can be directly linked to the specificities 
of musical pulse and tone described in chapters 2 and 3.  I argue, further, that a similar case can be presented for music’s 
effects on other cognitive capacities, social skills, and intersubjective dynamics.  Our understanding of the motivations for 
music, I contend, requires balancing the individual subjective experience with the many interaffective, interattentional, and 
interintentional drives inherent in interaction and the feelings of shared knowledge, prosociality and synchrony.  All are, in 
music, given a particular space, sustained attentional focus, and extended time within the architecture of musical pulse and 
tone.  Importantly I propose that it the same mechanisms that extend and intensify individual experience that also root our 
capacity and motivation to synchronise and harmonise in group interaction.  This is discussed with particular reference to the 
universal use of music in ritualistic ceremony. I conclude from the previous three chapters that components of a narrow 
faculty for music – the specificities of musical motivation, and configurations of musical pulse and musical tone - provide a 
sustained attentional structure for managing personal experience and interpersonal interaction.  They afford a continual 
phenomenological linking of the immediate past, the perceptual present and future expectation and afford enhanced 
significance, mnemonic presence, affect, and intersubjective connectedness. 
 
SECTION III – Summary and Conclusion 
 
The concluding section concisely reviews the argument presented, and reminds the reader of its benefits over previous 
approaches in terms of providing interdisciplinary clarity, and in terms of the potentially fruitful empirically testable 
hypotheses that are suggested by the model.  I argue that the identification of the constitutive components of a narrow faculty 
for music should act as a focus or constraint on hypotheses regarding the evolution of music and the role of musical 
capabilities during the course of evolution in the hominin lineage.  Two evolutionary implications, in particular, are 
submitted.  Firstly I briefly suggest that those features that appear to be specific to music across cultures could have emerged 
exaptively from a socially motivated move towards relational processing and from developments in working memory, 
attentional capacities, consciousness, and the volitional control of action.  Music – narrowly defined – may have emerged 
functionally but non-adaptively as a technology of mind.  Secondly I make the point that the capacities for group synchrony 
and harmonization in music could have first appeared in response to individual selective pressures.  Thus we need not 
necessarily interpret music in reference to group selection models of human evolution and and can avoid many of the 
associated and embedded problems and controversies.  The potential relevance of the findings in section II to topical debates 
on music’s varied roles in modern-day society – its effects on individual well-being; fostering cooperation, affiliation, and 
group identity, in communicative and neurological therapy; and in education and in community settings - is also touched 
upon.  In particular, I suggest that the specificities of our faculty for music identified in this thesis highlight that future 
progress in understanding music could come from increased research focus on issues of absorption and attention.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In a world such as ours,... it is necessary to understand why a madrigal by Gesualdo or a Bach Passion, a sitar melody from 
India or a song from Africa, Berg's Wozzeck or Britten's War Requiem, a Balinese gamelan or a Cantonese opera, or a 
symphony by Mozart, Beethoven or Mahler may be profoundly necessary for human survival, quite apart from any merit they 
may have as examples of creativity and technical progress. It is also necessary to explain why, under certain circumstances, 
a “simple” “folk” song may have more human value than a “complex” symphony. 
John Blacking (1973: 116) 
 
While most Western definitions of music stress attributes such as combinations of tones, beauty, intelligibility, and 
expressiveness and suggest that these attributes are criterial in judging whether something constitutes ‘‘music”,… there are 
societies and musics where these criteria make no sense at all. 
Bruno Nettl (2005: 18)  
 
Time and measure are to instrumental Music what order and method are to discourse; they break it into proper parts and 
divisions, by which we are enabled both to remember better what has gone before, and frequently to forsee somewhat of what 
is to come after: we frequently forsee the return of a period which we know must correspond to another which we remember 
to have gone before; and according to the saying of an ancient philosopher and musician, the enjoyment of Music arises 
partly from memory and partly from foresight. 
Adam Smith ([1777] 1982: 204) 
 
 
In a brief scene from the recent historical drama ‘The Crown’ we see a depiction of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 
1953 from the perspective of the former King Edward1 watching it unfold on the television from a crowded room in Paris.  
During the procession to the altar, the assembled choirs of Westminster Abbey, St Paul's Cathedral, the Chapel Royal, Saint 
George's Chapel, Windsor and the Royal School of Church Music, together with a full orchestra, conducted by Sir Adrian 
Boult, perform Handel’s Anthem ‘Zadok the Priest’.  He offers the following commentary with a brief interjection from a 
guest: 
 
Edward: “The oils and oaths, orbs and sceptres, symbol upon symbol. An unfathomable web of arcane 
mystery and liturgy blurring so many lines no clergyman or historian or lawyer could ever untangle any of 
it” 
 
Guest: “It’s crazy” 
 
Edward: “On the contrary, it’s perfectly sane. Who wants transparency when you can have magic, who wants 
prose when you can have poetry?  Pull away the veil and what are you left with? An ordinary young woman 
with modest ability and little imagination. Wrap her up like that, anoint her with holy oil and hey presto, 
what do you have? A Goddess!” 
 
In the following scene we cut to Prince Edward, alone in his garden playing a Scottish folk tune on the bagpipes.  Here no 
verbal commentary is offered. 
 
So in a just a short space of time, on one particular day in history, within one complex cultural setting and from just one 
individual’s viewpoint we have already two vastly contrasting manifestations of music.  In the former, we witness grandeur, 
ceremony and global proliferation through the medium of live television on a previously unprecedented scale.  The choice of 
Anthem, composed in 1727 for the coronation of George II and performed at every monarch’s coronation since, suggests 
historical stability and institutional permanence in what is in fact a time of transformation.  The few words direct us - the 
people -  decidedly towards rejoicing the occasion while the somewhat incongruent, some might argue paradoxical, 
conflation of human institution with sublime blessing is given truth in the forceful declaration ‘Zadok the priest and Nathan 
the prophet anointed Solomon King’ and again in the following ‘May the King live forever, Amen’.  The compositional 
structure is also perfectly suited to the occasion with a calm harmonically driven string introduction of simple chordal 
arpeggios being followed by a sudden rousing forte tutti entrance signaling a period of transition and the arrival of a new and 
glorious reality.  Most of all, however, the coordinated performance of 480 singers and musicians imbues ineffably a sense of 
scale, unity, and importance. Without needing to explicate the discursively problematic, it engenders appropriate and 
convergent emotional states in the performers and audience and a sense of collective togetherness – a phenomenological 
sense of having shared in a meaningful experience.  As such the music not only reflects the affective qualia of the event, it is 
an active, indeed essential, component in the creation of a new national truth. 
 
In the later solitary scene the Prince plays the Scottish military lament ‘Flowers of the Forest’, an ancient folk tune originally 
written to commemorate the defeat of the Scottish army of James IV at the Battle of Flodden in September 1513.  It was 
played at the funeral of H.M. Queen Victoria in 1901 after which it gained substantially in popularity.  Thus it could, one 
imagines, have had personal significances as well as associations with issues of regiment, royalty, public occasion and loss.  
On the day of the coronation these would no doubt have weighed on his mind.  However, it seems likely that any symbolic 
references would have been subconscious or perhaps a secondary motivation at this time.  His face is visibly full of genuine, 
                                                 
1 Following his abdication as King in 1936 his formal title was HRH the Duke of Windsor. 
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powerful and complex emotion that defies simple linguistic categorization.  The music seems to afford a space in time for 
reflection, for processing the events of the day and the consequences of his own complex history and values. It is a form of 
personal regulation, a therapeutic strategy, an experience that is necessarily beyond the scope of words.  Indeed, whereas in 
the first example language could give coarse pointers and articulate some of what was going on, in this context, it could only 
interfere, impede attention and diminish the ineffable quality of the experience felt and portrayed. 
 
In both cases it is crucial to appreciate that the musical performance and practice is an active integral part of human 
experience and reality.  It is individually and collectively embodied as well as being socially reflective and generative.  Its 
meaning and significances necessarily emerge and project in symbiosis with culture, the intricacies of interaction and the 
individual experience from which they are born. As we broaden our view from this individual take on a single day to 
considering a world full of musics spanning recorded history we find that this observation generalizes profoundly and 
thoroughly.  It applies whether it be to infant-directed singing in the !Kung people of the Kalahari Desert (Konner, 1974) or 
the Hazda of North Central Tanzania 2(Knight et al, 2003), a Senoi Temiar Shaman’s  accompanied healing song in 
peninsular Malaysia (Roseman, 1991), coordinated panpipe playing at a festival in Conima in the Peruvian Andes (Turino 
1993), A Karelian lament in Eastern Finland (Tolbert,  2008), or Children’s play songs or ’Tshikona’  - national dance -  of 
the Venda People in South Africa (Blacking, 1969; 73).  In all of these, and the countless and multifarious other uses of 
music across time and geographical divides, we find music to be functioning in regulating emotional, cognitive and 
physiological states; mediating between ‘self’ and ‘other’; representing cultural symbolisms; and/or in coordinating 
individual, dyadic or group actions (see Clayton, 2016).   
 
Music is, within and across cultures, not only active and abundant but also wonderfully diverse ranging from Gesualdo 
Motets to Bob Dylan, an Indian Classical Alap, Mongolian throat singing and Japanese Taiko drumming to mention but a 
very few.  Indeed, such contrasting physical manifestations of music can appear to reveal little if any definite and observable 
common ground.   Further challenging any generalizable account of music is the fact that neither practical nor analytic 
musical skills, beyond an appreciation of basic levels of surface structure, translate across divides of cultural style, 
immersion and learning.  It can only ever be appropriately and fully heard, felt and understood with a corresponding 
practice, knowledge and experience of its complex histories, values, conventions, institutions and technologies (See Cross, 
2001). If one may perhaps postulate cases where music is seen to be something valued yet separate, commercialisable, 
and/or purely aesthetic in quality then, at the very least, we can counter that these are extremely rare and afforded by very 
recent technological advances and cultural quirks.  Certainly, they could not provide a suitable basis for a generalizable 
philosophy and understanding of music as a constituent component of human biology, behavior and culture. 
 
If we widen our lens yet further to more broadly incorporate colloquially termed expressions of “musicality” we find an even 
more encompassing ubiquity.  To avoid potentially contradictory statements we should perhaps understand these more 
precisely to be widespread features of behavior and interaction that are given particular salience and attentional focus in 
music.  Regardless, it is clear that many, if not most, of music’s seemingly integral and most significant features are - 
perhaps extended or abstracted - but certainly not unique to music.  They are seeded in common pre-dispositions and 
ontogenetic trajectories, manifest in our earliest developmental explorations and are dynamically shaped throughout our 
lifespans.  Fundamentally in movement we are continually creating rhythmic and quasi-melodic shapes, sensing, 
engendering and expressing our individual and collective vitalities (See Stern 2004). In terms, at least, of semantically 
describable categories of emotion music seems to share with vocal communication in general a common ‘code’ or set of cues 
(Juslin & Laukka, 2003). Physical posture and gesture too are inextricable parts in any fully manifest and successful 
communication (Kendon, 2004), with joint actions and moments of synchronicity providing empathic attunements and 
generating points of agreement and accord (Gill, 2016).   Mutually negotiated intrinsic motive pulses (Trevarthen, 1999) and 
tonal synchronies (VanPuyvelde, 2015) provide coordinative frameworks for interpersonal interaction, intersubjectivity, 
attachment, participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007) and the regulation of affect in parent-infant dyads 
and beyond (Stern, 1985; 2009).  In oratory and/or poetry dynamically generated expectancies and accents can add credence 
and persuasiveness (Woodall, 1981), while meter and cadence can allow emphasis, subversions of expectations, highlight 
changes in mood of interpretation and/or aid in mnemonic retention.  Additionally, broad analogies of combinatoriality, 
embedded structure, implicitly acquired “grammars”, and recursion in music and language show further overlap both in 
terms of macro design, organizational principles and the cognitive mechanisms of learning and working memory in 
particular that afford them (see Rebuschat et al. 2012). This latter point, of course, highlights the need for manifestations of 
musicality to also be understood in terms of the cognitive and corporeal mechanisms and capabilities from which they arise. 
 
Musicality begins, in accordance with an enactive approach to affect and cognition, at the fundamental levels of embodied 
sense-making, primordial affectivity, and selfhood; at the origins of our existence as complex bio-cultural beings (see 
Schiavio et al, 2016).  As such it emerges from and motivates the dynamic, relational, and transformative interactions 
between us as organisms and our physical and social environment.  It can be understood to be working as part of a larger 
ongoing behavioural process of maintaining adaptive, self-sustaining, dynamical stability through communication.  
Understanding musicality in this way corresponds seamlessly with broad functional models of animal communication in 
which signals arise organically from organisms’ efforts to manage and assess their surroundings.  Developing this framework 
to human communication and music in particular, Ian Cross (2011) posits that music is operational at distinct, yet possibly 
overlapping dimensions of meaning and affect.  Bearing some resemblance to Runciman’s (1998) sociologically based 
proposal for three principal categories of human behaviour – ‘evoked’, ‘acquired’ and ‘imposed’ - Motivational-structural, 
                                                 
2 Knight et al. (2003) argue that these are the two most distantly related human groups currently known. 
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socio-intentional and culturally-enactive dimensions broadly reflect iconic physical cues, specificities of the human capacity 
for culture and learned associations respectively (see chapter 1).  Significantly this perspective can accommodate the fact 
that even non-human species are responsive to a selection of generic structural features of music (McDermott & Hauser, 
2005) and that, although musics’ meanings essentially result from cultural processes and social contexts (e.g., Bohlman, 
2000), we nevertheless appear able to engage appropriately with and/or respond to some aspects of musics outside of our 
own culture (e.g., Balkwill & Thompson, 1999; Krumhansl et al., 2000; Nan et al., 2006).  It further provides a necessary 
platform for comparative perspectives on music (see section II), affording an understanding of continuities between animal 
and human communication and between ancestral forms of communication, modern-day language and music.   
 
Extending our outlook further still to accommodate the fullness of time we see that a full capacity for music is evidently the 
result of a complex evolutionary history of continuous and cumulative change. Each initially random mutation will have 
been assembled gradually upon preexisting biology and genetic coding and will have endured for specific reasons and in 
response to particular environmental and social pressures.  Arguments as to whether something akin to music was ever 
directly – adaptively – selected for will be discussed in chapter 1 and briefly revisited in the conclusion.  Regardless, it is 
demonstrably a critical constituent part of our species and essential to a full understanding of hominin evolution.  Despite 
complex debates on the cognitive and neurological specifics, it is clear that a complete faculty for music is a 
phylogenetically emergent mosaic of interwoven and mostly shared, or perhaps exclusively shared, subskills (See Foley 
2012; 2016).  Consequently music is embedded in afferent and efferent connections with more primary processes.  Its many 
regulatory, affective and psychodynamic effects and functions are necessarily contingent upon the whole and the 
gregiological process of our species’ past. Parsimonious cognitive or computer models of music perception and performance 
risk describing an ostensibly meaningless process if these rooted ancestral connections are not considered. Similarly 
observations of seemingly musical behaviours in animals can only be understood as being truly analogous to music if similar 
processes can be shown to underlie the physical correlates of the behavior. 
 
The many issues touched on above will, of course, be expanded on in the main body of this thesis but noticeably, even from 
this very brief journey opening with two individual instances of music to the broadest possible perspective, we can 
appreciate that music is both integral to and inextricably interwoven with the full scope of human experience, relationship, 
history, culture, and biology.  This both invites and frames in scope the central questions posed by this thesis: What defines 
music? Which musical capabilities are domain and/or species-specific?; What is unique about music?; And what is 
universally present in music?  Essentially what constitutes a narrow faculty for music? – those psychological, physiological, 
behavioural, and/or cultural features that are both universally present across cultures and yet specific to music3.   
 
Addressing this question has important practical as well as phenomenological and philosophical implications.  Although the 
goal here is not to provide a full definition of music, it is to an important degree a definitional question in that I am seeking 
to highlight features that are unique to music.  A lack of clarity on this issue has led to a situation whereby it is regularly 
unclear which aspects of an experimentally observed effect, modern-day use or proposed evolutionary functionality are due 
to specifically ‘musical’ traits, features particular to an individual cultural manifestation of music, and which are due to other 
broader communicative or interactive qualities.   A viable model of the constituent parts of a narrow faculty for music is an 
essential step towards clarity, understanding, testable hypotheses and theoretical rationales for the many observed, yet 
mechanistically poorly understood functions of music.  As such it could potentially enhance the applicability of empirical 
investigations and further insight into how music relates to other human and animal behaviours and broader domains of 
cognition, communication, affect, motivation, and culture.  Furthermore it could perhaps assist our understanding of how 
diverse approaches and levels of explanation (e.g. Tinbergen, 1963) are linked in cross-disciplinary studies of music.  
Specific examples that confirm the necessity for clear and decisive definitions and the potential pitfalls of their absence are 
given throughout chapter 1.  The chapter also concludes with discussion and critique of existing attempts to define music 
(e.g. Cross, 2003).  
 
Debates on neurological, psychological, and behavioural domain-specificity(ies), cross-species investigations, cross-cultural 
cognition studies and  theoretical perspectives on universals are all central to this investigation, to wider evolutionary 
perspective on music and to definitional concerns.  Each of these complex topics has amassed a considerable body of 
empirical investigation and literature in recent years all of which provides a foundation for the endeavour in this thesis.   This 
may, therefore, appear a somewhat daunting starting point.  Intense debate on all these questions has, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
been resistant to consistent findings, interpretations and opinion.  In particular, efforts to explore universals in music across 
cultures have met with severe scepticism at times.  Fortunately, however, there are also reasons to be optimistic.  First of all, 
                                                 
3 The term ‘narrow faculty for music’ takes its cue from highly influential proposals made by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) [HCF] for 
comparative investigation into the evolution of language and for a distinction between a broad faculty of language – incorporating all the 
capacities required for language – and a narrow faculty of language, which describes only capacities that are exclusively operational in 
linguistic processing and/or interaction.  The original HCF paper and related literature, and their contextual relevance, are explored fully in 
Section II Introduction (p. 62-65).  However, it is worth noting already that the need and motivation for identifying an analogous narrow 
faculty for music are equally as strong.  Arguments surrounding the evolution of music have been hotly debated, particularly over the last 
twenty years or so.  Unfortunately, the lack of a consensual model of the specificities of music – the narrow faculty for music - remains a 
source of considerable confusion and a barrier to understanding and communication between researchers.  It has often not been clear to what 
extent researchers are discussing features that are specific to particular instances of music or musical style, features that are more accurately 
relevant to broader categories of cognition and communication (e.g. constituent parts of a broad faculty for music), or features and/or 
capacities that are, across cultures, unique to music.  Particular examples and further discussion is given in Chapter 1.  In that chapter, I will 
also, repeatedly, make the point that it makes sense to focus discussion on the evolution of music predominantly, albeit certainly not 
exclusively, on features and capacities that are specific to music. 
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any effort to address theoretically any of the debates and concerns of the previous paragraph is necessarily dependent upon 
consideration of the others.  The search is, thus, not an exponentially increased challenge.  In fact, once specified, constituent 
parts of a narrow faculty for music are a more focused category.  For example, if we accept the notion of cross-culturally 
valid correlations in music between global characteristics of sound such as high tempo or descending melodic contour with 
an induced emotional pull towards high arousal and soothing respectively, this could perhaps qualify as a universal or 
‘statistical universal’.  However, they cannot be termed as being in any way specific to music as such relationships – 
assumedly originating in correlates of sound in the physical world and in correlations between signals and the motivational 
state of an individual – are widely shared in human and non-human communicative repertoires. 
 
Further ground for confidence comes from the fact that, despite the complexities, commonalities and diversity outlined in the 
previous paragraphs something that we might identify as music does appear to be share some common substance across 
cultures.  It is built on common biological constraints and a shared generic capacity for culture and is consistently prized and 
cherished, experienced as being intensely meaningful, and inextricably linked with the expression of emotion and the 
regulation of affect.  It is consistently functional and dependably purposeful in cross-culturally comparable situations and 
social settings.  In particular, it is reliably involved in the management of social uncertainty and dependably features as an 
integral component of ritualistic ceremonies and markers of social change.  Further commonalities include being 
subjectively experienced as being an “honest” signal; promoting empathy and cooperative behaviour; enabling synchronous 
group coordination; and engendering a feeling of being in a ‘virtual’ and ‘another’s’ time – ‘in communitas’ .   
 
We seem, from our particular cultural vantage point and within our individual linguistic taxonomy, to be confident in our 
ability to consistently identify a seeming abundance of music as such across cultures.   Most researchers, following Blacking 
(1976), have been confident in ascribing to it the status of being a universal component of human culture.  It seems logically 
pursuant therefore that, as we are reliably recognizing, perhaps preconsciously, a suite of behavioural repertoires as being 
“music”, they share some family resemblance – some common acoustic cues, organizational structure, interactive 
configurations of features and/or underlying psychological processes.  A key point here is that these traits may not be 
physically or knowingly/descriptively evident but may reflect implicitly learned ontology and/or empathy with the 
underlying psychological mechanisms and experience. 
 
Following on from this last point I hope to convince that some of the seeming impenetrability of certain questions regarding 
universalities and comparative appraisals stems from an unhelpful focus on the physical correlates of musical action and on 
higher-level structural features.  We need to note, first of all, that much of what is most critical and/or meaningful is not fully 
reflected in the acoustically and physically observable products of musical action. In a culture where music can be 
commercialized as a purely physical entity it may take a leap of faith for many to accept that the material surface is a 
relatively small piece of the whole and cannot demonstrate the specificities of music.  Fundamentally, pitch, pulse and 
motivation are perceptual and attentional constructs.  The latter point is important to appreciate from the outset as it is 
critical to the central argument in this thesis that music's defining characteristics, specific functionalities and/or situated 
efficacies are solely the attentional-motivational frameworks which root our faculty to make and make sense of music.  The 
reason for describing predominantly an attentional structure lies partly in the approach of focusing on psychological 
mechanism rather than observable action.  More specifically, however, it stems from the notion that attentional control 
(volitional and non-volitional) is a key mechanism through which we perceive temporally structured events and orient 
ourselves in a world unfolding through time.  According to Jones’s (1976) influential and established model we are 
constantly and dynamically building expectations as to the timing of future events based upon perceived regularities and/or 
learned patterns.  We direct attentional peaks towards these expected moments and in response to violations of expectation.  
Large and Jones (1990) describe an oscillatory mechanism (see Chapter 2) that, essentially, generates attentional “pulses”.  
Furthermore, these “pulses” are supposed to underpin all forms of perception in time and all dynamic interactions with the 
physical and/or social world.  Broadly speaking, therefore, pulse is a form of attentional structure that is ever-present in 
tracking the internal and external “rhythms” of life and living.  In all our interactions with others it is an essential social 
affordance and ultimately a key part of our capacity for culture.  An attentional pulse, in this sense, is clearly not specific to 
music.  The central question of chapter 2 therefore is not whether a pulse or “communicative pulse” is unique to music but 
rather if there are specificities in terms of the root architectural structure of attention in music and the mechanisms involved.  
Relative/beat-based timing, period correction mechanisms, and the sustained, constantly renewing nature of attention in 
music will feature heavily in addressing this question.  It is also critical to note that my position is that this question cannot 
be satisfactorily approached by an acoustic analysis.  A musical pulse is often relatively regular/steady but is not, ultimately, 
distinguished by any absolute degree of regularity (see Chapter 2).   
 
Broadly speaking, an appropriate participation and sensitivity with a musical style may involve implicitly learned 
expectancies, vocal physiological attunements, unsubstantiated action tendencies, and/or ‘hearing’ pulses or harmonic pitch 
centres that are collectively implied but not physically present or unambiguous.  Effectively a significant proportion of the 
cognitive, physical, even phenomenological experience is beyond a purely observational comparative investigation.  In terms 
of higher-level structural features, by these stages we are already far too entrenched in particular cultural constructs, learned 
specifics and a wealth of creative possibility to make absolutely generalizable statements.  Musical scales offer an interesting 
example as they have been argued to show cross-cultural constancy in terms using at least five discrete pitches, differently 
sized steps between consecutive tones, a dominance of small-integer value intervals (Dowling & Harwood, 1986; 
Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996); and tonal hierarchies (Castellano et al., 1984; Krumhansl, 1990).  However, scales are not an 
absolute requisite for pitch-based interaction to be “musical” and I would argue that the commonalities listed emerge in 
distinct cultural settings parsimoniously from the fundamental designs of our perceptual and interactional capacities (Chapter 
3).  Additionally presenting such features as statistical universals in music can risk conveying a somewhat sanitized account 
 Bispham (2018) 11 
of the particular tensions, feelings, and fragrances of specific cultural practice.  In order to encapsulate all instances of 
musical pitch (including, for example, monotone chanting) whilst addressing the issue in terms of its being a nascent 
capacity for musicality, we need to explore at the root level - the constructive foundations.  Similarly to the discussions on 
pulse in chapter 2, Chapter 3 will focus upon psychophysiological correction mechanisms involved in producing and/or 
perceiving sustained pitch.  These necessarily involve constantly integrating working memories of the recent past, the events 
of the current moment, and expectations for the immediate future.  As such, the concept of an attentional structure is again 
central to the argument.  
 
The approach taken in this thesis is, therefore, to focus on describing the core psychological, cognitive and physiological 
mechanisms required to engage appropriately with the ostensibly most “simple” forms of musical pulse, tone, and 
motivation - characterised somewhat problematically perhaps (see section II introduction) as tapping an isochronous pattern, 
humming a sustained pitch and an intrinsic desire/impulse to do so.  This is, however, certainly not aimed at providing a 
reductionist account of music.  First of all these are merely the architectural groundwork, the framework within which the 
complete gamut of human experience can be given space (see below).  Secondly, even pared down to its putatively most 
basic building blocks, we find individual and social complexity and interdependence with the whole; with fundamental 
timing mechanisms,  neurodynamic resonances and motoric and vestibular systems (chapter 2), with breath, vocalization and 
connections to the mammalian autonomic nervous system (chapter 3); and with fundamental human motivations towards 
shared intersubjective experience and the management of conscious experience and attentional focus (chapter 4).   
 
I further submit that focusing on attentional mechanisms which can be inferred from acoustic correlates but not perceived 
directly does not contradict identifications of music that rely, somewhat circularly, on our ability to recognise it, or a certain 
“musicness”.  As a species we are empathetically aware, and attuned to others to such an extent that even the seemingly 
simplest musical task imbues intersubjective, interattentional and interaffective resonance, and an implicit familiarity of 
human interaction and motivational states.  The methodological approach of focusing on psychological mechanisms 
addresses a thorough representation of musical involvement and is true to the inherent nature of music and musical 
experience and to how music is integrated and embedded into the fullness of individual and cultural experience. It, 
furthermore, spans widely across demonstratively active or passive engagements with music dissolving any false 
dichotomies between “performer” and “audience”. 
 
Building the following argument primarily on the available theoretical models in music psychology and cognition, the 
principal premise of this thesis is that components of a narrow faculty for music - features that are both universally present 
and specific to the domain of music - are exclusively the motivational and attentional frameworks which root our faculty to 
make and make sense of music.  Musical pulse; musical tone; and musical motivation are described here as providing a 
framework for interpersonal interaction and a structure for the individual or social management of attention, motivation 
and/or affect.  In particular, I will highlight the proposal that music is distinguished from other communicative contexts by 
the sustained, constantly renewed nature of attention and by associated correction mechanisms of pitch and period that seem 
to incur awareness of change and of the underlying construction.   
 
Of course it is precisely this particular attentional architecture that also enables persons and groups of people to come 
together in sustained musical interaction and group synchrony.  It is tempting, perhaps, to overstate music’s capacity to 
provide shared subjectivity, an ability to break through dualistic separation between subjective, inner experience and 
objective, external world.  It can appear at times to enable a complete empathic attunement and understanding of how others 
feel and embody in sound and movement.  However, rather than arguing for something so absolute it is more faithful to 
describe music enactively as providing a sense of having shared an experience (see Schiavio 2015b).  It is a space in time in 
which dynamic regulatory negotiations of affect and mood can be played out. It can efficiently inspire a convergence of focal 
point, emphasis, motivation and emotional states without needing necessarily to align completely individual position, past, 
accounts, interpretation, and/or experience.   
 
Viewing music’s specificity in this way has a range of implications for how we understand the human capacity for music, its 
character in our many personal theatres and social histories, and for how we provide a truthful and encompassing advocacy 
for the role of music in education, therapy, and society.  Understanding music as a particular suite in wider models of 
behaviour and communication counteracts any well-meaning, but perhaps naively expressed, notion of the “power of music” 
or of music having a distinctly direct connection to emotion.  Music need not be skilled, aesthetically fashioned, concordant, 
nor even necessarily particularly pleasant.  Bohlman (2000) argues persuasively that music need not be beautiful and indeed 
that this ascription to it only began to make sense when technologies in the West made it possible to reproduce music as a 
commodity, a product in which the object, ‘beauty’, could lodge.  He goes as far as to suggest even that “the more 
extensively a group community, or society participates in musical performance, the more beauty might serve to encumber its 
practices and presence.”  (Bohlman, 2000: 30).  It is easy also to romanticize – privileging times when music provides 
personal inspiration, transcendence and/or peak experience - and ignore the observation that music is commonly 
unremarkable.  It generally results directly from the ontological condition of embeddedness.  As Bohlman (2000: 30) notes: 
“(M)usic is so much part of other social practices that there is no need to separate it from them or to attribute special 
qualities to it”.  We should not, furthermore, assume a priori that music is intrinsically something positive (e.g. Brown and 
Volgsten, 2005). We can perhaps posit that features specific to music inherently structure and predispose it towards social 
interconnectedness, prosociality and a degree of emotional stability.  Ultimately, however, its efficacy needs be understood in 
terms of alignments between the intrinsic drives, vitalities and intersubjectivities of a particular instantiation and any 
desirable motivational, emotional and/or therapeutic outcomes.   
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It follows of course that a full analysis and understanding of any musical action or performance needs to be individually 
resultant from a complete and balanced interdisciplinary study of the specificities of history, culture, cognition, behavior, 
psychology and phenomenology.  Ideally, semiotic, observational, and scientific perspectives as well as applied practice and 
subjective knowledge all need to be given equal space and weight.  A crucial point that is not often voiced is that the fullest 
possible understanding actually requires a degree of academic restraint and judgment in neither prioritizing features that lend 
themselves to neuroscientific exploration or experimental paradigm, nor endeavouring to articulate the ineffable.  It is 
inevitably consistent that the latter can only restrict the scope of the experience and contribute to a bias towards the 
verbalisable.  The temptation to add further philosophical obfuscations can in these instances only widen the divide between 
the academic and experience. To quote Wittgenstein in his philosophical investigations: “in the end, when one is doing 
philosophy, one gets to the point where one would just like to emit an inarticulate sound” (1953/2010 p. 99). 
 
Blacking (1995, p. 224-225) succinctly described “Music” as being “both the observable product of intentional human action 
and a basic mode of thought by which any human action may be constituted… its value inseparable from its value as an 
expression of human experience” (emphasis added).  Given the possibility of encapsulating selectively from a full breadth of 
human experience it seems futile to expect any stable commonalities in terms of the themes and substance given space in 
music.  Music has variously been shown to fit comfortably as principal subject in broad models of communication, 
interaction, therapy, practice, performance, aesthetic experience, ritual, culture and/or social action.  However the extent to 
which each of these is given prominence can vary extensively.  Indeed none, I would argue, are definitively critical to 
identifying something as being music.   Rather than being collectively defined by the interior particulars - the multifariously 
varied manifestations of action and behavior given time within a musical framework - it is, instead, the specific sustained 
attentional structures that renovate it into something else, connected yet distinct, mundane yet somehow heightened and 
meaningful. 
 
Essentially I am arguing that what is definitional and unique about music is that it provides a particular attentional 
framework for managing individual experience and for structuring dyadic and group interaction.  It affords an extended 
experience - a continual phenomenological linking of the immediate past, the perceptual present and future expectation   
Features that appear unique to the context of musical engagement do not in and of themselves express or affect anything. 
Rather they offer a sustainable socio-intentional coordinative strategy – a temporal space in which our our most central 
human drives towards emotional experience, expression, and regulation; intersubjectivity; social alignment; communicative 
vitality; cultural belonging; and communitas are afforded a degree of stability and reinforced focus.  It can be understood as 
an educational or therapeutic playground, a protracted, liminal, and enhancing field that allows a memorable event – a 
ritualization and intensification of emotion and meaning.  Music is, in accordance with Blacking’s description of it as a 
primary modelling system of human thought, an indispensable tool of consciousness, a transformative technology of the 
mind. 
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SECTION I – Music and Evolution 
 
Chapter 1 – Music and Evolution: A review and critique 
 
There is so much music in the world that it is reasonable to suppose that music, like language and possibly religion, is a 
species-typical trait of man.  Essential physiological and cognitive processes that generate musical composition and 
performance may even be genetically inherited, and therefore present in almost every human being. (Blacking, 1973 p.7)  
 
As neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least use to man in reference to his 
daily habits of life, they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed. (Darwin, 1874 p. 365) 
 
Interest in the evolution of music and musicality has blossomed in the past 20 years or so and is reflected in an increasingly 
substantial and widespread presence and focus of attention in academic debates and publications (e.g. Wallin, Merker, & 
Brown, 2000; Balter, 2004; Cross & Morley, 2007; Vitouch, 2007; Morley, 2013).  A key enabling factor of these debates 
has been the growth and ever-increasing value - both intrinsic and in terms of its relevance to wider investigations - 
accredited to what can be broadly characterized as the field of music psychology (see Cross, Hallam & Thaut, 2016; 
Deutsch, 2013).  While ethnomusicological ethnographic work (e.g. Titon et al. 2009/2016), has extensively highlighted the 
fact that musics are extensively a product of, and functional within, cultural settings, studies of, for example, innate 
predispositions for musical perception (Trehub, 2003; Trehub & Hannon, 2006) or the neuroscientific correlates of musical 
engagement (e.g. Peretz, 2003; Patel 2010), also suggest a concept of musicality as a biologically grounded capacity.  A 
diverse and growing body of cross-disciplinary research into varied aspects of music and musicality (e.g. Avanzini et al., 
2005; Clayton, Herbert, et al. 2003; Cross & Rohrmeier, 2007; Miell et al. 2005; Peretz, 2006) have greatly enhanced our 
understanding of music and, significantly, have allowed for an understanding of music as a concurrently biological and 
cultural phenomenon, potentiating a more comprehensive evolutionary perspective (see Cross, 2003).  In addition to the 
intrinsic benefits to musical scholarship, inter-disciplinary research involving music also offers invaluable insights and 
further understanding in other fields related to human cognition, psychology, sociality, and culture (e.g. Boyd & Silk, 2014; 
Foley & Lewin, 2013). Put succinctly there is an increasing convergence upon the notion that music and musical capabilities 
are embedded in the whole of our experience and history - they are key features of who we – Homo sapiens – have evolved 
to be. 
 
A primary motivation for engaging with debates on music and evolution has, of course, been a desire for a more complete 
understanding of hominin evolution and the pressures – environmental and social -  and inherent selective advantages that 
may have led to the evolution of musical and/or proto-musical capabilities in our species and beyond (e.g. Fitch, 2006; 
Mithen, 2005).  However, evolutionary theory has long ceased to be of interest merely in and of itself.  Such is the consensus 
within academic circles as to the central tenets of Darwin’s original hypothesis (Darwin, 1859) and such its widespread 
applicability and relevance that philosophical debate in almost all fields related to human behavior and psychology appear 
incomplete without recourse to, at least, the basic principles of evolutionary theory.  Even our most complex and discernibly 
defining behaviours such as language (e.g. Aiello and Dunbar, 1993; Chomsky et al., 2003; Dunbar, 1998; Pinker, 1994 
Tallerman, 2005); culture (e.g. Dunbar et al., 1999); intelligence and cognition (e.g. Barkow et al., 1992; Byrne 1995; Carter 
1998; Deacon 1997; Dennett 1998); and even spirituality and religion (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Atran, 2002; Bulbulia, 2004a; 
2004b) have been the subject of heated debate from an evolutionary viewpoint.   
 
Crucially these debates highlight the fact that an evolutionary perspective on features of human behaviour and psychology 
not only provides philosophical substance but also a framework for integrating multiple perspectives on a given area of 
investigation.  This makes it particularly valuable in terms of understanding music and the current developments in music 
research.  With specific regard to music, Cross (2003b) explains that the great strength of this viewpoint is that “by focusing 
upon phylogenetic relationships and the attributes that may allow a gene, a behaviour, an organism or an interpersonal/group 
dynamic to be functional, evolution uniquely offers an integrated framework for comprehending music both biologically and 
culturally within the wider context of human behavior” (p. 21).  This thesis is partially motivated by this theoretical strength 
and by the need for clarity of understanding and theoretical consensus in interdisciplinary research into music.  The focal 
questions posed here - What defines music? Which musical capabilities are domain and/or species-specific? What is unique 
about music? And what is universally present in music? - necessarily require a multi-disciplinary approach and the unifying 
framework that an evolutionary perspective can provide.   
 
However, an evolutionary perspective is more than a practical and unifying decision.  It is an essential stage and context in 
addressing these queries.   Understanding the history, the process by which the mosaic capacity for music emerged, is 
fundamental to appreciating how musical capabilities are embedded in and emerge from broader or more primary 
mechanisms and behaviours.  The point here is that, although we could perhaps attempt to address the question of what is 
special about music without recourse to evolutionary history, it would inevitably be incomplete, lacking a central thread of 
enquiry, and would fail to encapsulate fully the complex entrenched nature and qualities of musical experience.  Music 
perception and performance needs to be understood in terms of the many connections that are rooted in the gradual processes 
and amalgamations of our evolutionary history.  Music’s efficacies come fundamentally from how our capacities to perceive, 
make sense of and produce music are structured and from the corresponding associations to broader and more generalizable 
capacities.  Even if, as seems very likely, modern-day uses for music have been transmuted from original functions and the 
selection pressures that helped to forge the emergence of individual musical capabilities, it is parsimonious to assume that 
they have not been dissociated entirely in the modern mind and body.  Ultimately music has purpose not because of intrinsic 
physical characteristics of any particular piece or performance but because of who we are, because of our individual and 
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cultural experience and our genetic history.  In address to Darwin’s quotation at the top of this chapter, it is we rather than 
music specifically that remain the central mystery. Music as a whole cannot be fully divorced from the sum of human 
experience, emotion, our communicative repertoires, and the functions and processes of our past.  Thus a constant theme 
throughout this thesis will be that, despite the apparent search for something separate, distinct and distinguishable, neither 
the whole nor the individual components that make up the complex mosaic that is our faculty for music can ever be analyzed 
or described fully in isolation. 
 
We need also, at this early stage, to be open to the possibility that none of the individual subskills of a full capacity for music 
are exclusive to music or that music may, broadly speaking, constitute sites on continua of communicative affective 
potential, referentiality, ambiguity and intention (See Cross et al, 2013). A vast majority of the individual sub-skills required 
for a full capacity for music are, of course, in particular shared with pre-linguistic communications with infants and with 
mature language.  It is unsurprising therefore that a number of researchers have argued for shared precursor to both in the 
form of some kind of protolanguage or enhanced affective communication (Darwin, 1871; Brown, 2000; Mithen, 2005; 
Morley 2013).  There remains however, in my opinion, some considerable confusion in such scenarios as to what might 
distinguish music from the ancient communicative precursor.  Mithen, for example, argues for a precursor common to both 
music and language in the form of a mode of communication that is Holistic - lacking compositional structure and 
combinatoriality; Manipulative - concerned with affecting the behaviour of others; Multi-Modal - involving voice and 
gesture; Musical - making use of rhythm and melody and involving synchronisation and turn-taking; and Mimetic - imitative 
and involving intentional representations: in short, ‘‘Hmmmmm’’ (Hm5).  Unfortunately in his proposal music is never 
clearly distinguished from Hm5 and is all too often located in contexts, concepts and ideas that are profoundly ethnocentric.  
The very description of something being “musical” before the advent of “music” seems contradictory and certainly 
problematic if not unpacked further.  One of Mithen’s fundamental assumptions seems to be that everything needed for 
music is present in Hm5. This conflation of identities persists throughout his argument as we are asked to imagine hominids 
(who are, according to Mithen’s argument, utilising Hm5) synchronising vocalisations in a communal song at FxJj50 or 
confirming social bonds through communal Hm5 singing at Atapuerca. Perhaps even more extreme is Mithen’s response to 
Blacking’s statement (1995) that the world would be a better place if we were all able to communicate unselfconsciously 
through music. ‘‘I agree’’ says Mithen: ‘‘bring back Hmmmmm!’’ (p.271).  Others have, notably, been more careful and 
aware of these potential pitfalls.  However, the problem of music’s specific distinguishing features in this context and 
beyond remains to be addressed satisfactorily. 
 
Essentially the literature is lacking, and in want of, a psychologically, physiologically, behaviourally, and culturally 
grounded conceptualisation of music that both distinguishes and relates it to other human and animal behaviours and broader 
domains such as cognition, communication, affect, motivation, and culture.  Cross-cultural definitional issues and a search 
for universals have often been dismissed as unrealistic due to the sheer magnitude of cultural variability in music 
(Ethnomusicology, 1971 vol. 15(3); The World of Music, 1977 vol. 19(2)) or as an unnecessary inconvenience. The first of 
these points highlights the central and sizeable challenge presented and will be extensively addressed in this thesis.  
However, the latter point lacks any valid justification.  A surprisingly common view in debates on the evolutionary origins of 
music is that definitions of music are superfluous as ‘we all know what we’re talking about’ (and by extension that we all 
know what everyone else is talking about) and that we are better off spending time on more productive empirical research 
(e.g. Hauser & McDermott, 2006; Mithen, 2006).  A review of the literature and of the surrounding interdisciplinary 
research, as well as broad debates with colleagues, however, makes it all too clear that this is simply not the case.  Equally 
serious is the fact that a lack of clarity on this issue has led to a situation whereby it is regularly unclear which aspects of an 
experimentally observed effect or proposed evolutionary functionality are due to specifically ‘musical’ aspects, features 
particular to an individual cultural manifestation of music, and which are due to other aspects of the engagement .  As we 
shall see throughout this chapter this has been a constant weakness in arguments regarding the evolutionary status of music 
and its putative functional rationales.   
 
I argue that, rather than taking time away from empirical research, a good and viable model of the specificities of musicality 
– the narrow faculty for music - can offer clarity, understanding, and testable hypotheses to evolutionary debates and cross-
disciplinary studies thus greatly enhancing the efficiency and applicability of empirical investigations. Before moving to the 
central section (II) where these questions will be addressed directly, this chapter will first selectively review and critique the 
principal areas of debate in studies of music and evolution focusing on areas of particular relevance and short-comings that 
result from lacking a consensual model of features that are specific to music. 
  
Music and Evolution – key questions 
 
The question of whether musical abilities have arisen as a result of natural or sexual selection – as an adaptation - or whether 
they emerged as an indirect consequence of evolutionary pressures towards other human abilities – as an exaptation – has a 
long, albeit until recently sporadic, history. Spencer (1858) and Darwin (1871) presented opposing views in the literature. 
Spencer argued that music originated in the prosodic features of emotional speech whereas Darwin, conversely, argued that 
music preceded language (providing the basis for “impassioned speech”) and evolved from animal mating calls by processes 
of sexual selection. In ‘The Principles of Psychology’ (1890), James argues for a non-adaptionist origin of music, describing 





 Bispham (2018) 15 
Music as a spandrel 
 
In more recent times research into the evolutionary origins of music was given reactionary impetus by Pinker’s (1997) 
description of music as no more than auditory cheesecake - a pseudo-communicative and non-adaptive activity that merely 
tickles senses and capacities that evolved as a result of other, more survival-oriented, evolutionary pressures, in particular, 
language.  Pinker contends that ‘music appears to be a pure pleasure technology, a cocktail of recreational drugs that we 
ingest through the ear to stimulate a mass of pleasure circuits at once’ (p.528).  He builds his brief argument with reference 
to supposed parallels between music and language, auditory scene analysis (e.g. Bregman, 1990); emotional calls (e.g. 
Darwin, 1872); habitat selection (i.e. environmental sound contours); motor control (Clynes & Walker, 1982; Epstein, 1994; 
Jackendorff; 1994) and ‘something else’.  With regard to language he argues that both share, at least the concept of, a 
hierarchically structured universal grammar (Bernstein, 1976; Chomsky, 1993; Lerdahl & Jackendorff, 1983); the metrical 
structure of strong and weak beats, the intonation contour of rising and falling pitch, and the hierarchical grouping of 
phrases. His provocative position on music is that “compared with language, vision, social reasoning, and physical know-
how, music could vanish from our species and the rest of our lifestyle would be virtually unchanged” (1997, p.528) and he 
formulates his challenge to those who may disagree by asking ‘what benefit could there be to diverting time and energy to 
the making of plinking noises, or to feeling sad when no one has died?” (p.528). 
 
 The primary problem, however, is that this is quite simply the wrong question.  Making plinking noises and feeling sad is 
not what ‘music’ as a generic feature of human behaviour is about.  Pinker’s view of music as little more than patterned 
sound experienced through audition for hedonistic pleasure, a specialized and passive activity, is severely ethnocentric and at 
odds with a broad and psychologically grounded view of musical engagement.  As we have already highlighted in the 
introduction, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, music is, instead, something we actively engage in that has a 
wide range of important and culturally constructed meanings (e.g. Cross 2003a).  Of course it is important to point out that, 
although this completely undermines Pinker’s argument, it does not deny the possibility of a non-adaptive origin of music.  
Another, perhaps more surprising, voice arguing for a non-adaptive origin is music psychologist Bruno Repp (1991) who 
argues that “there is no reason to believe that there is a universally shared, innate basis for music perception” (p. 259). He 
continues to argue that “music has not been around long enough to have shaped perceptual mechanisms over thousands of 
generations. Clearly, music is a cultural artefact, and knowledge about it must be acquired. Moreover, in contrast to speech, 
this knowledge is acquired relatively slowly and not equally by all individuals of a given culture” (p.260).  However, as 
pointed out by Morley (2003 p.185), this statement is only correct “if we consistently substitute the word “music” with 
something akin to “the culturally-specific manifestations of musical activity”.  Repp fails to consider that music cross-
culturally may be built upon some universal, ontogenetically emergent, and biologically/psychologically grounded music-
specific capabilities (see chapters 2-4) and that evidence for musical activity and the emergence of proto-musical capabilities 
easily dates far enough into the past for genetic selection to have occurred (see below; Morley, 2003; 2013). 
 
Another form of quasi-non-functional argument for music we touched on earlier is proposed by Mithen (2005) who claims to 
be countering Pinker’s hypothesis primarily on the basis that music is too different from language to be adequately explained 
as an evolutionary spin-off (p.26) and states, in accordance with the approach taken in this thesis, that ‘‘our ultimate concern 
is with the evolved physical and psychological propensities that provide the capacities for language and music in our 
species.” (p.11) Mithen’s argument, however, supports aspects of Pinker’s view in that music is still described as nothing 
more than entertainment - a relic of a previously adaptive communicative medium that has been rendered useless by the 
dominance and power of language.  As mentioned in the chapter introduction, he argues, following previous musilanguage 
and protolanguage models (e.g. Darwin 1871; Brown 2000; Wray 1998; 2000), for a precursor common to both in the form 
of a mode of communication – Hmmmm (see above).  Mithen reasons that only mimesis distinguishes this communicative 
form from communication systems in non-human primates and that with the advent of language Hm5 was no longer required 
but that ‘‘there remained a compulsion among modern humans to communicate with music’’ (p.272). However, one of 
Mithen’s fundamental assumptions seems to be that everything needed for music is present in Hm5. This conflation of 
identities and often reiterative use of the term ‘music’ persists throughout the course of his argument.  As explained more 
extensively in Bispham (2006a) it once again appears that the central problem lies in a failure to account for the possibility 
of features that are specific to and/or definitional of music and musical capabilities across cultures (see below). 
 
It is noteworthy and perhaps indicative of weaknesses in the existing argument, that non-adaptionist claims regarding music 
and language have also been proposed the other way around.  Some authors (e.g. Livingstone, 1973; Vaneechoutte and 
Skoyles, 1998) have argued, conversely, that language is constructed in part upon features that were originally selected for 
‘music’.  What seems most likely, however, is that music and language share a common foundation in the form of a shared 
ancestral communicative medium (Brown, 2000; Morley, 2003) with both diverging and emerging for different reasons and 
possibly at different times in the course of hominin evolution.  By now a wide range of evolutionary musilanguage (M) 
and/or protolanguage (L) platforms have been proposed in the literature (e.g. Wray 1998; 2000 (L); Brown 2000 (M); Huron 
2001 (M) Mithen 2005; Tallerman 2007; 2008 (L); Botha 2008 (M); Fitch 2013 (M); see Smith (L) 2012).  Without getting 
into the specific disagreements between the various proposals listed at this stage we can at least conclude, as stated by Huron 
(2001), that “if music is an evolutionary adaptation, then it is likely to have a complex genesis. Any musical adaptation is 
likely to be built on several other adaptations that might be described as premusical or protomusical. Moreover the nebulus 
rubric music may represent several adaptations, and these adaptations may involve complex co-evolutionary patterns with 
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Music as Adaptation 
 
The assertion that music may have emerged merely as a by-product of adaptations towards other abilities has been strongly 
opposed (e.g. Cross 1999; Huron, 2001) and many researchers have accepted that the majority view is that “the evidence is 
enough to suggest that an adaptive model for music should be the default hypothesis” (Foley, quoted in Balter, 2005, p. 
1121).   An abundance of putative rationales for the evolutionary fitness of music capabilities have been suggested in the 
literature.  These can be broadly categorised as relating to mate attraction (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Miller, 2000; Merker, 2000); 
coalition signaling (e.g. Hagen & Bryant, 2003; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2007); altriciality and mother-infant interaction (e.g. 
Dissanayake, 2000, Falk, 2004); cognitive development (Cross 1999; Papousek 1996); and group cohesiveness (e.g. 
McNeill, 1995; Roederer, 1984; Brown, 2000a; Brown, 2000b; Freeman, 2000; Cross, 2007).  Although these have now 
been extensively reviewed in other publications (e.g. Bispham, 2006b; Cross 2011; 2016; Morley 2013) they represent a 
necessary background for the thoughts and views expressed in the further course on argumentation in this thesis on the 
functionalities of music in evolution and modern-day motivations.  Therefore, the following section briefly reviews and 
critiques the main ideas and supporting arguments.  It is worth bearing in mind that although, as we shall see, some have 
considerably more empirical backing than others, these rationales are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  It is possible that 
each may have been more or less relevant at different times in response to different pressures and as such may represent a 
functional scene in the eclectic story of the development of musical capabilities.  Crucially, if some partial truth is inherent 
in any one scenario it would seem parsimonious to expect that functionalities and connections are still embedded in the full 




Darwin's own hypothesis for the adaptive strength of music was that it was used as a means of enhancing an individual's 
reproductive success, stating that “it appears probable that the progenitors of man, either the males or females or both sexes, 
before acquiring the power of expressing their mutual love in articulate language, endeavoured to charm each other with 
musical notes and rhythm” (Darwin, 1871, pp. 880).  More recently Miller (2000) extended this hypothesis incorporating 
Zahavi's “handicap” hypothesis (1975; 1997) that indicators have to carry high costs to be reliable, and Fisher's theory 
(1930) of runaway sexual selection, in which both courtship traits and mate preferences are heritable4.  Miller's argument is 
built upon the facts that musical engagement and practice, although seemingly without survival function, is energetically and 
cognitively demanding and upon anecdotal evidence that American rock, jazz, and classical musicians produce ten times 
more albums that female musicians, tend to create most productively during ages of peak mating effort, and are often highly 
promiscuous.  Additionally he follows Darwin's assertion (1871) that the vocal organs, particulary in complex displays, are 
primarily used and perfected in relation to the propagation of the species.  The analogy is particularly drawn to bird species 
where it is well-established that song is predominantly sung solo by males and functions as a courtship display (e.g. 
Catchpole & Slater, 1995; Martin-Vivaldi et al. 1998; Hofstad et al. 2002).  However, this is perhaps the wrong analogy, as 
non-human evidence for interactive vocalisation (i.e. cases in which there exists an observable relationship between the 
output of two or more individuals) in a subset of 'dueting' avian species (e.g. Faraburgh, 1982; Mann, Marshall, & Slater, 
2003; Hall, 2004) and in Gibbons (e.g. Geissmann & Ordeldinger, 1999; Geissmann, 2000) appears to suggest, instead, 
correlations with monomorphism (in the avian examples), pair bond strength, monogamous social structure, and territoriality 
(see also Chapter 2).  Other aspects of Miller's argumentation also fail to hold up in the face of criticism.  The central 
problem is one of ethnocentrism.  A more complete cross-cultural assessment of the hypothesis paints a very different 
picture (e.g. see Bolt, 2007).  Generically music rarely figures in human courtship and hardly at all outside of large cultures 
(Brown 2000b e.g. Aka Pygmies, Arom & Khalfa, 1998).  It is engaged in equally voraciously by men and women (although 
gender differences, reflecting social structures, in the contextualisation of music are common across cultures) (Bolt, 2007).   
Further criticisms that have been directed at a sexual selection hypothesis for music include that it lacks specificity and fails 
to account for the extraordinary diversity of music – contextually and behaviourally.  To quote Foley (Balter, 2005, p. 1121) 
“[i]f it was sexual selection, it would be a lot more restricted. We would see it more in courtship and less in other activities. 
Musical ability and activity are too widespread”.  This does not necessarily imply that sexual selection played no role in the 
evolution of music.  However, any music-specific evidence is to date virtually non-existent and it certainly appears unlikely 
that sexual selection was, at any point in time, the primary selective force for music.  Alternative sexual selection hypotheses 
have been posited in conjunction with synchronous chorusing (Merker, 2000; Merker et al. 2009) and coalition signaling 
(Hagen & Bryant, 2003; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2007).  These are, however, mechanistically and structurally less analogous 
than the authors suggest and will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
   Altriciality and parent-infant interaction 
 
Contrary to the above given hypotheses, Dissanayake (2000) has argued that human music originated in perceptual, 
behavioural, cognitive, and emotional competencies and sensitivities that developed from primate precursors in survival 
enhancing affiliative interactions – ritualized packages of sequential vocal, facial, and kinesthetic behaviours – between 
mothers and infants under six months of age.  An increasing period of altriciality appears to have been a continual feature of 
hominin evolution (e.g. Leakey, 1994; Morgan, 1995; Joffe, 1997) and hence, Dissanayake assumes, resulted in an intense 
selection pressure for proximate physiological and cognitive mechanisms to ensure longer and better maternal care.  She 
argues that “the solution to this problem was accomplished by coevolution in infants and mothers of rhythmic, temporally 
patterned, jointly maintained communicative interactions that produced and sustained positive affect – psychological brain 
states of interest and joy – by displaying and imitating emotions and motivations of affilitation, and thereby sharing, 
                                                 
4 In the absence of conflicting pressures the two can propel each other to extraordinary exaggerations of a given trait (e.g. the peacock tail). 
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communicating, and reinforcing them” (p. 390).  In essence mother-infant interactions are presented as being 'proto-musical' 
in the sense that they are composed of many elements that are 'musical' such as prosody; rhythmic regularities and varieties; 
dynamic variation in intensity, rate, and timbre; expectancies; cross-modalities; and a conjoining of movement and sound.  
Dissanayake lists the benefits of early mother-infant interaction that go beyond physical protection and care as follows: 
 
• They direct and modulate the infant's state or level of attention and arousal; for example, alert, soothe, praise, please 
(Fernald, 1992: 420). 
• They offer emotional regulation and support, thereby assisting the infant to achieve a coherent homeostatic 
equilibrium (Hofer, 1990). 
• They provide acquaintance with the expressive (or prosodic) features of language by which even adults gain 
important information about others, such as sex, age, mood, and probable intentions (Fernald, 1992; Locke, 1996) 
• They give exposure to the prototypical and meaningful sounds and patterns of spoken language (Fernald, 1992). 
• They develop cognitive capacities for recognising agency, object, goal and instrumentality, a narrative-like mode of 
thought and perception or 'protonarrative envelope' (Stern, 1995: p. 92-32), and predispose the infant generally to 
intellectual and social competence, including intentionality, reciprocity and expansion.  Just one note of caution: just 
as this is not language, it is also not music.  Nevertheless, this is undoubtedly a crucial factor/pressure in the move 
from animal to human forms of communication. 
• They reinforce neural structures predisposed for socioemotional functioning (Schore, 94; Trevarthen & Aitken, 95). 
• They introduce cultural norms of appropriate behaviour. 
• They assist in establishing physiological and emotional dyadic attunement and reciprocity, enabling the pair to 
anticipate and adjust to each other's individual natures (Beebe et al., 1992) and the foundation for later Bowlbian 
attachment (p. 393). 
 
   Group cohesiveness 
 
The role of music in superstitious or sexual rites, religion, ideological proselytism and military arousal clearly demonstrates 
the value of music as a means of establishing behavioural coherency in masses of people. (Roederer, 1984) 
 
The view that music functions to enhance group cohesiveness and bonding has been presented diversely by scholars with 
backgrounds in history, musicology, cultural anthropology, neuroscience, music psychology and ethnomusicology.  
McNeill’s (1995) historically grounded argument, in particular, has been influential in suggesting that ‘keeping together in 
time’ (e.g. marching) functions as a means of muscular bonding5 thus generating feelings of solidarity.   
 
More recently a wealth of studies have supported the positive and functional connections between music, synchronized 
gesture, and/or joint pulse-based actions and enhanced empathy, social context, prosociality, cooperative behavior, altruism; 
social perception, connectivity, compassion, non- aggression, and physiological attunement in human adults and children 
(Mogan et al., 2017; see chapter 4).  However, neither these, nor structural or neurohormonal6 views of music as a social 
bonding system (e.g. Benzon, 2001), are in themselves sufficient to explain fully music’s ability to promote group-level 
cohesion.  Ethnomusicological and/or sociomusicological research, of course, highlights the fact that music very rarely, if 
ever, stands alone.  Generically, it is always about other things, a component of wider social activities and culturally 
constructed meanings (e.g. Tolbert, 2001).  One of its predominant contextualizations in all cultures – ranging from small 
communities to large industrialized societies (Lomax, 1968) - is that of ritualized group ceremonies that act as markers of 
culturally important events.  This has led many to the conclusion that music is primarily functional in providing a temporal 
framework, collective emotionality, a feeling of shared experience, and cohesiveness to group activities, thus supporting the 
efficacy of ritualistic ceremonies and the creation of alternate realities and belief systems (e.g. Roederer, 1984; Bispham, 
2006; see also chapter 4).  Freeman (2000) theorised that oxytocin release in the brain during group music-making loosens 
synaptic connections in which prior knowledge is held and thus “clears the path for the acquisition of new understanding 
through behavioural actions that are shared with others” (p. 411).  This view is scientifically somewhat contentious but the 
underlying idea chimes well with the fact that music is consistently employed in achieving an altered state of consciousness 
                                                 
5 Muscular bonding is a term used by McNeill to describe the kind of social connection that occurs as a result of shared physical action. 
6 In recent literature Robin Dunbar and members of his research team at the University of Oxford have advocated a view that sees group 
music making as a neurohomonal extension of primate social bonding through physical grooming.   Intense and extensive grooming in our 
primate cousins is thought to be functionally underpinned by the release of endorphins (and most likely other neurohormones) which in turn 
promotes emotional closeness between the individuals involved (Keverne et al., 1989; Machin & Dunbar, 2011).  In humans, however, 
communities have expanded significantly (e.g. Dunbar, 1998) and it is worth nothing that modern-day hunter-gatherers even periodically 
aggregate and maintain ties with other groups to form ‘mega-bands’ numbering several hundred individuals (e.g. Zhou et al., 2005; 
Hamilton et al., 2007).  We effectively operate considerably beyond corresponding models of group size and brain encephalisation in other 
species (see Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar, 2003, 2014) and beyond available time constraints for facilitating bonding through grooming 
(Dunbar, 1991; 2010; Lehmann et al., 2007).    
Launey and colleagues (2016) therefore propose that “synchrony-based activities” (e.g. dance, prayer, marching, music-making) 
cause the release of neurohormones and as such were developed by hunter-gatherer ancestors to act as “a primal and direct social bonding 
agent in large-scale human communities, providing an alternative to social bonding mechanisms such as grooming” (p. 780).  The research 
team have supported this hypothesis with evidence showing that synchrony and exertion during dance independently raise pain thresholds 
(Tarr et al., 2015; see also Tarr et al., 2016) and that in singing changes in connectivity and pain threshold occur as a function of group size 
(Weinstein et al., 2016a; 2016b) (increases in pain thresholds are generally understood as a proximal indicator of endorphin release).  
Presumably these forms of bonding relate to feelings of group identity and belonging rather than an intraindividual connection (see Pearce, 
2014; Pearce et al., 2015; 2017). 
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(Rouget, 1985; Thayer, 1994; Huron, 2001), in group ceremony, in times of social and political change (Gregory, 1997), and 
often coincides with totemic representations of cultural knowledge (e.g. Durkheim, 1912).  Cross (2001) offers an alternative 
but complementary approach arguing that music's ubiquity and efficacy in encounters with the numinous are best accounted 
for by reference to proto-music's polysemy, its "floating intentionality" (see discussion on ‘transposable intentionality’ 
below). With reference to Sperber’s notion (1996) of relevant mysteries - situations where beliefs or mental representations 
arise which are contradictory but are each separately related to (and hence relevant in respect of) other mental 
representations and beliefs – Cross explains that music, like religious ideas, are distinguished from everyday beliefs by their 
paradoxicality and their relevance, by their broad applicability and their ambiguity. He concludes that “by virtue of these 
attributes music may thus be particularly appropriate as a means of amplifying, exemplifying or reinforcing in the course of 
ongoing experience just these attributes of belief that are interpretable as religious; music's indeterminacy may suit it for use 
as a means of pursuing and perhaps even parsing the numinous” (p.37).  Crucially the creation of collective alternate realities 
or beliefs is prospectively functional at the group level by endowing the actions of others with a degree of predictability 
(Shennan, 2002). 
 
Clearly one of the principal proximal functions of music is to promote group cooparation, coordination, and cohesion (e.g. 
Merriam, 1964).  Musical engagement is consistently operational in promoting group identity (e.g. Stokes, 1994; Ellis, 1985; 
Levi, 1994, Nettl, 2005; Negus, 1994); group cognition – the transmission of group history and the planning for group 
action; group coordination; and group catharsis.  However, we should be clear to note that this is not in itself sufficient to 
propose an ultimate group selection model for music7.  As observed by Cross & Morley (2009, p. 76) “[t]he potential role of 
music in selection at the level of the group needs to be assessed in the light of the extensive debate within recent 
evolutionary thinking on the nature, and existence, of mechanisms of selection at the group level” (e.g. Williams, 1966; 
Wade, 1978; Wilson & Sober, 1994; Sober & Wilson; 1998; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1994; Durham, 1991; Bowles & Gintis; 
1998; Shennan, 2002).  This issue will be briefly discussed further in the conclusion of this thesis in light of the descriptions 
of music’s narrow faculty for music offered. 
 
Music as an Exaptation 
 
Others have remained unconvinced by an adaptive origin of music but have provided more positive, functional arguments 
that see music as having emerged as an exaptation from the acquisition of other, more primary, abilities.  Livingstone and 
Thompson (2009), for example, accredit the advent of music to the acquisition of theory of mind – the ability to attribute 
mental states to self and others, whilst Panksepp (2009) views the emotional power of music as being rooted in the evolution 
of basic motor and emotional systems of the brain. The prior proposal, the importance of theory of mind, as well as its role 
and minimal requirement in musical performance is relevant to discussion in chapter 4.  The latter (Panksepp, 2009), of 
course, has many implications for the emotional embeddedness of music and, as such, is a useful background for much of the 
discussion in this thesis.  However, it fails also to account for any specificities of music as opposed to emotionality and 
emotion communication in general. 
 
Music as play 
 
Another argument that is strengthened by increasing periods of infant altriciality in the hominin lineage is that music aids in 
cognitive and social development.  Cross (1999) relates Mithen’s suggestion (1996) that the course of human cognitive 
evolution is marked by an increase in the capacity to integrate information and skills across domains of individual and innate 
cognitive competencies with Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) account of children’s cognitive development in which children, after 
gradually mastering implicit behaviour in individual cognitive domains, iteratively redescribe these into increasingly explicit 
and this domain-general terms.  He suggests that music or proto-musical behaviours, by virtue of being a multi-domain 
activity, being flexible to multiple interpretation and also being somewhat ambiguously intentional, may play a functional 
role in general development - and by implication, in cognitive evolution.   Music can thus be understood as a form of 
functional yet consequence-free  play – “a cognitive capacity arising from an infant’s propensities to search for “relevance” 
in, and mastery over, itself and its world and from early elements in that search, particularly the interactions with the primary 
caregiver” (p.14).  It is effectively a safe space in which social forms and capacities can be explored and in which the 
development of individual minds and affording structures for their interactions in society can be facilitated.  As such Cross 
argues “it may have contributed to the emergence of one of our most distinguishing features, our cognitive flexibility” and 
may even “have been the single most important factor enabling the capacities of representational redescription to evolve” 
(p.31).  Ultimately therefore this perspective suggests that our human capacity for culture (see Tomasello, 2010) is 
necessarily dependent on the capacities that underlie our faculty for music both ontogenetically and phylogenetically and 
vice versa (see also chapter 4). 
 
 
                                                 
7 The only prominent author to explicitly argue for a group selection model for music is Brown (2000a, 2000b).  He lists ten points – Group 
size, Functionality (the context-specific performance of functional song types, e,g. anthems); Both sexes; All ages; Group exclusivity; 
Collectivist context; Collectivist content; Pitch Blend (e.g. Brown, 2007); Teamwork and coordination in performance; and Meter - to 
illustrate that performance and cognitive features of music reflect the group nature of human music making.  With reference to an earlier 
article describing a common ancestor to music and language musilanguage (Brown 2000a), argues that pitch blend and metric rhythms are 
‘design features’ of music that ‘reflect music’s origins as group selected trait’.  Whilst it lacks comparative validation and psychological 
grounding in Brown’s writing, the last three points of his list mirror the conclusions of chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis that musical tone and 
musical pulse are generically operational in providing a music-specific coordinative framework for interaction. 
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Music as attention 
 
Another exaptive possibility for music that has somewhat surprisingly not been given its own space in the literature on 
rationales for music in evolution is enhanced working memory (EWM) in the hominin lineage (e.g. Wynn & Coolidge 2005; 
2007; 2010).  Morley (2003; 2013) is a welcome exception arguing that musical instruments themselves are good candidates 
for the types of technologies that provide evidence for EWM and that ‘the act of performance itself, of formally structured 
‘pieces’ at least, requires complex feedback between attention and procedural and declarative memory (2013, p. 303 
emphasis added).  However he also argues that while some specific forms in formalized contexts would require EWM 
capacities, the “efficacy of musicality and its access to those cognitive foundations do not themselves rely on a EWM 
capacity” (Ibid, p.303).  His contention that less formalized musical behaviours would be possible without EWM contrasts 
with some of the arguments I will present in the further course of this thesis.  Although perhaps referring more specifically to 
the phonological loop component in models of working memory, the constant linking of the immediate past, perceptual 
present, and dynamic expectation in all music is seen to be dependent upon skilled working memory and attentional 
capabilities.  
 
Music as a technology of the mind 
 
Another interesting functional account that views music as having evolutionary significance but in this case without a direct 
biological/genetic origin is Patel (2008; 2010) who describes music as a “biologically powerful human invention” – a 
“transformative technology of the mind”. Patel uses the example of the invention of fire-making (e.g. Wrangham, 2009) to 
demonstrate that universality need not imply biological adaptation and interprets the available neuroscientific literature on 
music as suggesting that music can have lasting beneficial effects on nonmusical, pre-existing brain functions within an 
individual lifespan rather than originating via natural selection processes. Patel (2008; 2010) argues that the available 
evidence fails to challenge a null hypothesis that assumes no natural selection for musical abilities. Conversely he argues that 
the available evidence for linguistic abilities is sufficient to reject a corresponding null hypothesis. Either or both views may 
well turn out to be correct. However, a comparison of the evidence he gives to support these contrasting views is not entirely 
convincing. In support of the case for an adaptive origin of language Patel draws on ten principal sources of evidence: 
Babbling; anatomy of the human vocal tract; vocal learning; precocious learning of linguistic sound structure; critical 
periods for language acquisition; commonalities of structure and development in spoken and signed language; robustness of 
language acquisition; adding complexity to impoverished linguistic input; fixation of a language-relevant gene; and a 
biological cost of failure to acquire language. My reading of the literature, howeverm given in an earlier publication is that 
 
 “the first eight of these sources of evidence are at least equally valid for music or have corresponding parallel evidence 
in psychological studies of music8. Furthermore the specificity of the FOXP2 to linguistic capabilities is not completely 
clear9 and I would argue that it is far too early to suggest that there is no biological cost of failure to acquire musical 
abilities10. Crucially, just as it has proved difficult to define “music”, it is currently unclear what constitutes a generic 
failure to acquire musical abilities. Despite some anecdotal evidence for a form of musical “arrhythmia”11, neurological 
studies of individuals identified as being “amusic” have almost exclusively dealt with deficits in fine-grained pitch 
perception (Peretz, 2006; see chapter 3). Many “amusic” individuals are able to engage appropriately with other 
important aspects of music and retain strong emotional connections to music. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if the 
results of studies of “amusia” are applicable across cultures (Cross 2010)”. (Bispham, 2012 p. 134/5) 
 
The Nature of the Evidence 
 
I have previously argued (Bispham 2006b) that the main statements and assertions in the literature that need to be assessed in 
evaluating the evolutionary status of music are as follows: 
 
• Every known human society has what trained musicologists would describe as ‘‘music’’ (Blacking, 1995 p.224), 
hence we can expect that music accompanied Homo sapiens out of Africa (Cross, 2003a).  
• 6-month-old infants are capable listeners (e.g. Trehub, 2003a) and display proto-musical abilities from birth 
(Papousek, 1996).  
• Peretz and colleagues argue for the existence of specialized brain structures for music, with reference to the 
existence of Amusics who retain emotive and referential linguistic abilities is suggestive (Peretz, 2003; Peretz and 
Coltheart, 2003). 
                                                 
8 The one possible exception is finding a suitable parallel for sign language. However, I am unaware of any evidence suggesting that the 
reapplication of a behavioural trait in a different modality is indicative of adaptive evolution. Furthermore it is worth noting that individuals 
with acquired deafness have continued to perform (for example, the percussionist Evelyn Glennie has been profoundly deaf from the age of 
12 [Glennie, 1993]) and compose (e.g. Beethoven) music at very high levels.  It is worth clarifying from the outset that music is a 
intrinsically a multi-modal activity in which sound and movement are intrinsically linked from early developmental stages onwards (Bahrick 
& Lickliter, 2004; Philips-Silver & Trainor, 2005; Thaut, 2005). 
9 Alcock et al., 2000 have, for example, reported significant detriment to musical rhythmic capabilities in affected members of the “KE” 
family. 
10 An additional point worth making is that even if this were shown to be the case, it need not necessarily imply that a loss of musical ability 
would not have been biologically costly at an earlier stage of human evolution. 
11 Also, fascinating anecdotal accounts of cerebro-vascular accidents resulting in a lost interest in music (which is described by subjects as 
being “flat” or “emotionless”) have been reported (e.g. Griffiths et al, 2004). 
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• Music has been around for a long time. The earliest archaeological evidence for music comes from Geissenklosterle 
36,000 years ago (Morley, 2003; D’Errico et al., 2003). We should expect, however, that the use of nonfossilizing 
instruments (e.g., bamboo, wood, etc.) and the voice preceded considerably any archaeological evidence (see 
Morley, 2003; 2013). 
 
Notably, in the last decade or so, the questions of infant capabilities and domain-specificity in particular have become vastly 
more explored and complex and more extensive lists in support of an adaptive status have appeared.  Cross and Morley 
(2009), for example, offer a valuable discussion on this subject.  More recently Honing and Ploeger (2014) conclude, 
following suggestions for a nomological network with eight basic modes of evidence that evolutionary psychologists can use 
to support their theories (Schmitt and Pilcher, 2004), that there are strong indications that musicality is an adaptation.  They 
present the sources of backing as 1) existing theoretical rationales (Darwin, 1871; Miller, 2000; Dissanayake, 2008; Cross, 
2007; Merker, 2000; Patel, 2010; Honing, 2011a); 2) psychological evidence (Trehub, 2003; Trehub & Hannon, 2006; 
DeNora, 2001; Saarikallio & Erkkila, 2007; Seeger, 1987); 3) medical evidence (Peretz et al 2002; Peretz 2002); 4) 
physiological evidence (Patel, 2008; Peretz & Coltheart, 2003; Winkler et al., 2009); 5) genetic evidence (Ukkola, Onkamo, 
Raijas, Karma, & Järvelä, 2009); 6) phylogenetic evidence (Fitch, 2006; Hauser & McDermott, 2003); 7) hunter-gatherer 
evidence (Conard, Malina, & Münzel, 2009; Rouget, 2004); and 8) cross-cultural evidence (Thompson & Balkwill, 2009; 
Huron 2009).   
 
I would agree that these all constitute the principal sources of enquiry against which proposals and rationales concerning 
music’s role in human evolution need to be tested.  However, while all the individual subject areas can boast some 
considerable supporting evidence, all are highly complex and none of the can be considered to fully indicate preferentially 
towards an adaptive origin for music (cf. Bispham 2006b).  Accordingly, it seems that meeting the determinants for an 
adaptive trait in terms of identifying corresponding innate constraints and domain-specificities (see Justus and Hustler, 2005) 
remains beyond our current interpretative scope.  It is perhaps surprising, for example, that whilst infant predispositions for 
musicality are generally regarded as evidence for an adaptive model of music evolution two of the leading figures in this 
field are currently of the opinion that a comparative perspective on infant musical capabilities suggests that “the most 
parsimonious interpretation of the available evidence is that infant skills are a product of general perceptual mechanisms that 
are neither music- nor species-specific” (Trehub & Hannon, 2006, p. 19).  They prefer instead the view that the biological 
significance of music is built upon special-purpose motivational mechanisms (e.g. Merker, 2006) that perpetuate musical 
behaviours in all human societies with general-purpose mechanisms accounting for the perceptual foundations of music.  A 
key point in this argument is that issues that address subjective values (e.g. infant preferences for consonant vs. dissonant 
intervals) reflect motivational concerns that may simply not be of relevance to non-human species.   
 
To keep stressing the principal motivation and goals of this thesis, it is unclear to me how these sources could even possibly 
swing the argument definitively one way or another without a partially definitional model of the putative specificities of the 
behaviour in question.   Rather than extend fully the discussion at this point, indications from psychological, physiological, 
neurological, phylogenetic, and interdisciplinary sources will be broached as they become pertinent in the course of 
comparative proposals in chapters 2-4 on musical pulse, tone and motivation.  The topic of the evolutionary and proximal 
functions of music will be also be briefly readdressed in light of the central suppositions of section II on the constituent parts 
of a narrow faculty for music.  Regardless of debates on the direct or more complex exaptive evolutionary origins of music 
we can safely argue that its emergence was an important and consequential event in our genetic history.  The rest of the 
chapter will therefore briefly discuss the universal pervasiveness of music, the issue of universals in music, innate 
predispositions for musicality, some theoretical matters regarding domain-specificity, evidence of its long history from 
archaeology and palaeoanthropology, its position within broad models of animal and human communication, as well as some 
definitional concerns. 
 
Music as a universal feature of human culture 
 
It seems, by now, almost customary in discussing the universal presence of music to bring up the quotation from 
ethnomusicologist John Blacking (originally published in 1984) that “every known human society has what trained 
musicologists would describe as ‘‘music’’” (1984/1995, p.224)12.  This carefully worded phrase has been widely accepted 
despite the fact that our terminological distinctions are not shared with other cultures. Some societies have terms for 
individual musical genres but not a generic term for music (e.g. [Keil, 1979]; the Basongye of Zaire, or the Tiv of Nigeria, 
Navaro [McAllester 1954]), some distinguish between ‘recitations’ of religious texts or ‘devotional song’ and ‘music’ (the 
Judaic ‘ta’ameh ha-mikrah’ or the Islamic ‘qira’ah’ Baily, 2005),  while others do not distinguish in their language between 
music and dance (e.g. Sanskrit sangıta, Thai wai khruu  and nkwa of the Igbo of Nigeria) or between music and religion 
(Candomble Afro-Brazilian religion, Maring of Papua New Guinea at the Kaiko festival)13. Trehub and colleagues (2015) 
quote Stone in noting that “honest observers are hard pressed to find a single indigenous group in Africa that has a term 
congruent to the usual Western notion of ‘music’” (p.7). He argues that the isolation of musical sound from other arts - 
                                                 
12 We should note, however, that although this is a supposition widely accepted in the field of music psychology it is also one that should be 
continually challenged.  Colin Turnbull (1979) writing about the Ik describes a thoroughly depressing account of a society in profound 
decay, where music, and most other human attributes, such as empathy, does not seem to figure at all. While we can perhaps explain this 
instance of absence as a symptom of a complete cultural failure, I am aware of at least one recent field investigation which reports an 
absence of any suite of behaviours that resembly our notion of music in a small and remote forest community.  The authors wish not to give 
details at this stage but it is certainly a possibility we should remain open to. 
13 For a more in-depth discussion of these points from an ethnomusicological standpoint see Nettl 2005. 
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singing, playing instruments, games, dance, and/or performance - proves to be a Western abstraction.  Klaus Wachsmann 
contends likewise that what ethnomusicologists and others may identify as “music” are more precisely “phenomena that 
sufficiently resemble the phenomena which I am in the habit of calling music in my home ground” (p. 384).  Cross (2010) 
notes further that the notion that ‘music’ constitutes a mode of human interaction that is clearly distinct from language also 
appears absent in some emic cultural conceptions (e.g. Mbendjele hunter-gatherers - Lewis (2009)).  It is therefore critical 
that Blacking’s popular quotation is understood in full and within its wider context and intended argument.  The 
philosophical questions inherent in this statement are integral to the point being made and frame much of the further course 
of argument in this current thesis.  The full paragraph reads as follows: 
  
Although every known human society has what trained musicologists might recognize as music, there are some that 
have no word for music or whose concept of music has a significance quite different from that generally associated 
with the word “music” or whose concept of music has a significance quite different from that generally associated 
with the word “music”.  Nevertheless “music” is a convenient gloss word that has a similar analytical function to 
Max Weber’s concept of “ideal types”.  As such “music” can encompass both the enormous range of “musics” which 
members of different societies categorize as special symbol systems and kinds of social action, and an innate, 
species-specific set of cognitive and sensory capacities which humans are predisposed for communication and 
making sense of their environment.  “Music” is both the observable product of intentional human action and a basic 
mode of thought by which any human action may be constituted. The most characteristic and effective embodiment 
of this mode of thought is what we call “music” but it may also be manifested in other human activities, and even in 
the organization of verbal ideas, such as Martin Luther King’s famous “I have a dream” speech or se of the poetry of 
Gertrude. (1995, p. 224-225) 
 
We can see that Blacking anticipates a view of music as a universally present biocultural human phenomenon (Cross, 2003b) 
but also the concept of musicality as an organizational principle that is inherent - albeit perhaps not fully instantiated - in 
communicatively intentionalised behaviours beyond the context of music. He goes on to discuss the difficulties of defining a 
given behaviour as being “music”. 
 
To understand “music” as a human capability, as a species-specific set of cognitive and sensory capacities, we must 
begin by treating the definition of “music” as problematic… but not only must we be able to incorporate in a general 
theory of “music” the characteristics of all different musical systems, or “musics”; we must also account for the 
many different ways in which individuals and social groups make sense of what they or someone else regard as 
“music”. (p.225) 
 
He continues to illustrate this point with the example of a Kenyan university student who was, in his opinion unfairly, 
criticized for producing an “incorrect”, albeit entirely logical (in terms of the structural features he chose to stress) analysis 
of Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata and concludes that 
 
Just as musicologists must take note of alternative readings of the sacred texts, so they, as “music”-making beings, 
have a right to disagree with indigenous classifications.  For example, Muslims do not classify Qur’anic chant as 
music, but it has features in common with Gregorian and other types of chant which many musicologists regard as 
“music”, and so it can be included in the evidence against which a general theory of “music” must be tested. (p.226) 
 
Furthermore, and in contrast to some writers who view the apparent lack of musical ability in modern Western cultures as 
evidence that musical ability is somewhat sparse in distribution (Barrow, 1995), Blacking argues that, not only is music 
present in all cultures, but that musical ability is ubiquitous amongst almost all members within society.  In his seminal book 
How Musical is Man? (1976) Blacking notes that the almost universal distribution of musical competence in African 
societies suggests that musical ability is a general characteristic of the human species rather than a rare talent14.  This is not, 
of course, supposed to suggest that we possess a generic cross-culturally transferable musical ability, but rather than we each 
are born with inherent predispositions and an ontogenetically emergent capacity for musicality that finds fruition within 
individual cultural settings.  Blacking’s example of an obviously fine musician failing another culture’s assessment of 
'musicality' due to incongruent values and musical concepts anticipates the substantial challenge presented to music 
psychologists striving to undertake empirical cross-cultural research (e.g. Eurola et. al., 2006).  Furthermore, Blacking not 
only anticipates a view of music as a universal biocultural human phenomenon but also the concept of musicality as an 
organizational principle that is partially inherent - albeit perhaps not fully instantiated - in communicatively intentionalised 
behaviours beyond the context of music.  Crucially he contends that, whilst respecting that others may note alternatively 
valid readings of our musics, we have a right to disagree with indigenous classifications and that behaviours that fit our 
understanding can be included in ‘the evidence against which a general theory of “music” must be tested’ (p.226).  
 
Before moving on it is worth mentioning that music is an activity that we, as a species, also spend a lot of time and energy 
on.  Huron (2001) supports this point with reference to two diverse cultures arguing that from an ethological perspective 
                                                 
14 Of course, any suggestion that in modern Western culture musical ability is the province merely of the trained few is misplaced.  Many 
people do not consider themselves to be 'musical' and may rarely actively produce music. However, almost all of us have the ability to 
engage with music in culturally appropriate ways (e.g. dancing at the disco, singing along with hymns at church, listening/engaging 
emotionally with recorded musical performances).  The total lack of ability to engage with music – “amusia” - is extremely rare and even 
when exhibited may represent a narrower inability to engage with specific cultural manifestations of music (see below). 
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activities that consume large expenditures of energy, such as primate grooming (e.g. Dunbar, 1997; Spruijt, Hooff, & 
Gispen, 1992), are more likely to be optimised and have a serious or critical purpose.  Huron chooses the examples of the 
Mekranoti Indians – a group of hunter-gatherers who live in the Amazon rain forest - and the modern United States of 
America.  In Mekranoti Indian culture women lay banana leaves on the ground every morning and evening where they then 
sit and sing for between one and two hours.  The men sing every morning typically around 4.30, but sometimes as early as 
1.30am.  The men, in particular, employ a highly energetically demanding technique that involves holding their arms in a 
cradling position, swinging vigorously and singing raucously and with heavy glottal attacks.  This continues for up to two 
hours and is sometimes repeated more briefly at sunset (Werner, 1984).  In modern United States of America, also, a large 
proportion of available resources appear to be allocated towards music.  In this case it is money that acts as the best index 
and, although this is not an ideal ethological measure, Huron (2001) notes that the music industry is substantially larger in 
monetary terms than the pharmaceutical industry.  In truth Huron could have chosen any cultures for his argument as music 
is generically a crucial facet of human cultural and individual existence, universally being employed at times of personal and 
cultural transition, during ritualistic ceremony and cultural encounters with the divine (Nettl, 2000), as a means of 
transforming experience (McAllester, 1971) and in the management of self-identity, interpersonal relationships and mood 
(Hargreaves & North, 1999). 
 
Innate predispositions for musicality 
 
Infants come into the world extraordinarily well equipped to process their surrounding sound world with extremely fine-
tuned resolution of frequency (e.g. Olsho, Schoon et al., 1982; Werner, 1992), timing (e.g. Trehub, Schneider & Henderson, 
1995; Werner, Marean, et al., 1992) and timbre (e.g. Clarkson & Clifton, 1995; Trehub et al., 1990).  They appear, also, to 
be equipped with essential generic abilities/predispositions for more specific engagement with musical stimuli.  Studies into 
infant music perception and musical predispositions have been spearheaded by Sandra Trehub and colleagues at the 
University of Toronto.  The reader is referred to her own review papers on the matter (Trehub, 2000; 2003a; 2003b; Trehub 
& Hannon, 2006) for a full complement to the current discussion that aims to focus on the findings and related discussions 
that are of most significance to an evolutionary perspective.  Specific studies of rhythm, pulse, pitch, and harmonisation in 
infancy will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively as they become relevant.  Particular attention will be given to 
evidence of overlap between infant and adult processing abilities suggesting predispositions for musicality and innate 
constraints on cultural manifestations of music. 
 
Music and domain-specificity 
 
Investigations and studies supporting or countering arguments for domain-specificity or particular neural networks in music 
will also be appropriately slotted in to the course of discussion in chapters 2-4.  However, it is worth briefly covering some 
of the broad theoretical concerns in approaching the issue of domain-specificity here in order to avoid repeated cautioning in 
regard to the interpretative scope of the studies mentioned.  Critically a search for domain-specificity in music implies, not 
the search for a full-blown neurally specific or neuroanatomically separable 'music module', but the search for individual 
components that may reflect unique features of a broad faculty for music which in itself incorporates broad features of 
human cognition and behaviour (Coltheart, 1999).   It is also worth briefly clarifying some central issues regarding 
specialization, domain-specificity, brain localization, and innateness.  In Fodor's (1983) original conception of mental 
modules these four concepts were explicitly linked as essential and interdependent components of what he termed a mental 
module  and together have been viewed as evidence for adaptive evolution of a given trait (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides. 1992).  
This latter point, however, has been heavily criticized, amongst others, by Fodor (2000) himself who argues that it unduly 
ignores debates in evolutionary biology on the differences between adaptation (original purpose) and exaptation (modern 
use) (e.g. Williams, 1966; Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould & Vrba, 1982; Jamieson, 1986).  Justus and Hutsler (2005) add 
that this distinction is perhaps better understood in terms of phenotypic and genotypic changes and they reserve the term 
“secondary adaptation” for genotypic changes resulting from changes of phenotypic use.  The crucial point to make here, 
however, is that although specialization, domain-specificity, brain localization, and innateness are linked in Fodor's original 
publication - Modularity of the Mind (1983) - and have often been confounded in debates and the literature, they are 
dissociable and need to be studied independently (Peretz, 2006).  A case in point is Hannon and Trehub's (2006) argument, 
discussed above, that innateness need not imply domain-specificity and localization.  Similarly a special-purpose/domain-
specific mechanism for music need not be confined to a focal neural network but may instead employ a wider distributed 
network with cross-domain and general components and some domain-specific, neurally separable components (Peretz & 
Coltheart, 2003).  Peretz (2006) argues, with reference to studies of face recognition (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998) 
and voice processing (Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard, 2004) that “localization of such essential modules is possible” but that a 
review of the current literature indicates that “[p]resently we cannot make similar claims about music” (p. 20).  Of course a 
substantial part of the difficulty is that musical ability and experience are reflected in considerable brain plasticity (see, 
Muente et al., 2002).  For a recent overview of the literature and debates on the neuroscience of music the reader is referred 
to Peretz & Zatorre, 2003 and Peretz & Zatorre (2005).  However, in terms of the current context, the key question is that of 
domain-specificity.  Following Justus and Hutsler (2005) it is evidence for a combination of both innate constraints and 
domain-specificity that would most clearly suggest that aspects of music were shaped by natural selection.    In essence, the 
issue is complicated by the fact that domain-specificity may occur as a result of general learning mechanisms that can be 
guided by innate constraints or by an extraction of general principles such as statistical regularities in the environment (e.g. 
Oram & Cuddy, 1995; Saffran, 2001).  Furthermore, Elman et al (1996) argue that domain-specificity may be related to five 
distinct levels – tasks, behaviours, representations, processing mechanisms, or genes.  Hence, even where studies add weight 
to an argument for an adaptive origin for music, some cautionary restraint is always required in interpreting the evolutionary 
significance of reported evidence of domain-specificity.   
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Musical universals 
 
Inherent in Blacking’s quotation at the top of this section is the existence of some universally distinguishing characteristics, 
or a family of resemblance (Wittgenstein 1953), that distinguish “music” from language and other communicative 
repertoires.  The history of investigation into musical universals is marked with brief pockets of interest.  A widespread 
reluctance has, however, been the norm with the dominant opinion, particularly from ethnomusicologists, being that music is 
too varied and is inter-culturally constructed, interwoven and embedded to such a degree that the pursuit is simply not 
realistic or constructive.  However, in conjunction with the reigniting of interest in the origins of music, Bruno Nettl (2000; 
2005) has been an influential voice renewing explicit discussion on universals in the literature.  He describes a ‘concentric 
circles’ approach with absolute universals in the centre – those features which are present in music at all times and in every 
moment of musical existence.  He is, however cautious saying that, at best, we would be able to describe them as having a 
“certain “musicness” which we cannot define further except to say that it is distinct from “speechness” and maybe from 
other sound phenomena”.  There is, in Nettl’s opinion, little in a practical way that we can do with this kind of theoretical 
abstraction.  The next set he posits putatively contains features which occur in all music or in the music of every society.  He 
argues, however that this set is necessarily restricted and invalidated by our incomplete (albeit increasingly substantial) 
cross-cultural and historical sampling set.  He argues therefore that we can at best describe ‘statistical universals’.  He 
reasons further that “accepting the idea of statistical universals means abandoning the principle that there is a significant 
difference between universality and popularity”.  Brown and Jordania extend Nettl’s approach describing ‘conserved 
universals’ – features that apply equally to other acoustic processes, like speech or animal song; ‘statistical universals’ – 
predominant patterns, ‘common patterns’ – present in many systems and styles; and ‘range universals’ - gradient 
descriptions of categorizing surface features.  As the authors acknowledge the term universals is a misnomer.  More 
precisely their approach represents cross-cultural trends or typological generalizations (Good, 2008).  Steeped in an interest 
in (re)-invigorating the discipline of comparative musicology what they describe is akin to an updated proposal for 
cantometric classification and will perhaps be of more considerable value as such.  
 
Nettl is of course correct to point out our ignorance of the many musics present and many more past. Nevertheless, we can 
perhaps be more optimistic in approaching absolute universals – features common to all phenomena we hear as “music” - if, 
instead of comparing observable correlates of engagement, we focus on underlying mechanisms.  Other authors have 
variously structured their arguments, at least in part, upon psychological systems and on innate predispositions.  Stevens and 
Bryon, for example, highlight auditory grouping and segmentation, perceptual and cognitive constraints, hierarchical 
organization and relational processing, implicit learning/knowledge, temporal entrainment and multimodal integration.  My 
proposed approach - written with the intent also to identify features specific to music (see Section II) - goes further in 
suggesting that music's defining characteristics are solely the attentional frameworks which root our faculty to make and 
make sense of music.  This has some notable advantages over the long list of components itemized in Brown and Jordania’s 
categorical structure.  For example, they describe an association with dance as a ‘common pattern’.  If we, instead, consider 
music more broadly to be rooted in dynamic attentional mechanisms that are inextricably linked with our motor systems, we 
not only avoid problematizing on the indissolubility of music and dance, but we are, arguably, closer to describing the 
vitalities of engaging with music and we more fully encapsulate the breadth of musics and musical experience world-wide. 
 
Music as a species-specific trait 
 
Cross-species comparative perspectives are, of course, a crucial component in any evolutionary debate.  Experimental 
studies (particularly with primate species) and some behavioural accounts will form a crucial part of the argumentation 
throughout Section II.  Hence, as with domain-specificity and infant dispositions above it is worth briefly introducing some 
broad methodological concerns.  Tecumseh Fitch sets out an agenda for and a review of the field of biomusicology 
advocating four foundational principles: Musicality encompassing multiple components; explanatory pluralism – the need to 
consider all of Tinbergen’s explanatory levels; a comparative principle embracing homology and analogy; and an ecological 
priniciple seeking broad ecological validity.  He then structures his review on ‘four core components of musicality: ‘Song’: 
complex, learned vocalizations; Instrumental music: percussion and drumming; Social synchronization: entrainment, duets 
and choruses; Dance: a core component of musicality.  Selected studies for each component, and studies on other areas of 
comparative cognition, will be discussed in Section II, but it worth noting now that, by focusing on wide inclusive 
definitions of each component and on observable phenomena, Fitch casts a wide net and provides a stark contrast to the 
focus of this thesis.  His approach has some definite theoretical and practical advantages.  In a scientific environment 
predicated on that which can be seen, measured and objectively described, it is a prudent method.  However, the distinction 
between observable behaviour and underlying mechanism is important in comparative music cognition too, with significant 
implications for how we evaluate cross-species studies.  As submitted above (see Introduction), there can be a considerable 
difference between seemingly similar observed phenomena and genuine psychological and structural overlap resulting from 
a parallel underlying mechanism.  How an act is produced, perceived, and processed can, at times, be as functionally 
significant as the resultant behavioural correlate. Indeed, this seems to be particularly the case with aspects of music 
cognition and music-making.  At all levels of musical structure its effects, implications, values, and resultant transformations 
are linked, psychodynamically, to how sounds and actions are perceptually ordered, constructed and perceived.  Fitch 
acknowledges this point, to some extent, by advocating explanatory pluralism.  Nevertheless there remains a theoretical 
discussion to be had whether or not observations of components of musicality in nature can correctly be regarded as 
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Music’s long history – archaeology, genetics, neurology, and physiology 
 
The previous section established music’s ubiquity across cultures and that it can, from our cultural lookout, be distinctly 
identified.  Music’s long history is also evidenced in the archaeological record, and in sources from genetics, neurology and 
paleoanthropology.  A brief summary is a necessary background for an understanding of the methodological rationale in this 
thesis and the often referenced embedded nature of musical capabilities and experience.  However, for a much more 
extensive exposition and discussion on these issue readers are referred to Iain Morley’s thesis (2003) and book (2013) on the 
subject which provide a much more thorough account. 
 
Archaeological evidence for music 
 
Considerable interest in the archaeology of music resulted from the finding of the proposed “Neanderthal flute” from Divje 
Babe Cave in Slovenia (Fink, 1996; Turk, 1997; Turk et al., 1997).  This bone “flute” was found in the middle Paleolithic 
layers of the cave and was hence thought represent the world’s oldest musical instrument.  However is has since been 
persuasively argued that the holes on the bone are more likely to have resulted from carnivore damage (d’Errico, 1998; 
d’Errico et al. 1998a; Chase & Nowell, 1998).  Upper Paleolithic sites, and particularly sites in Isturitz France (e.g. Lawson 
& d’Errico, 2002), and Geissenkloesterle, are, however, replete with clear evidence of complex musical instrumentation.  
Perhaps most unequivocal are bone flutes/pipes but we also find evidence for pierced phalanges - “phalangeal whistles”; 
bullroarers (Dams, 1985; Scothern, 1992); bones with parallel grooves – “rasps” (Huyge, 1990).  Even caves have been 
interpreted to represent “musical” spaces (Glory, 1964, 1965; Dams, 1984; 1985; Reznikoff & Duavois, 1988; Dauvois, 
1989).  For a full review of findings from the upper Paleolithic the reader is referred to Morley, 2013; 2002 (chapter 3) and 
d’Errico et al. (2003).   Reasonably assured evidence comes in the form of flutes/pipes from the Hohle Fels Cave and 
Geissenkloesterle sites in Germany.  Findings from the latter have been dated to 36’800 +/- 1000 years BC and were found 
in context with Aurignacian II split bone points (Hahn and Münzel, 1995; Turk and Kavur, 1997; Richter et al., 2000).  Even 
older still are a largely complete flute and two small flute fragments that were found in the oldest Aurignacian layer at Hohle 
Fels Cave in the Swabian Jura (Conard et al., 2009).  The flute is made from bird bone, and dates from the early 
Aurignacian, 40,000 years ago.  Crucially it must be assumed that musical behaviour and the use of musical instrumentation 
considerably predates these findings.  First of all the flutes are highly complex in design (Scothern, 1992) and are hence 
unlikely to represent the first instance of material objects for musical engagement.  Furthermore, ancient societies would, as 
is the case in modern-day hunter-gatherer societies, most likely have produced music primarily vocally and percussively 
employing biodegradable materials (see Morley, 2002).  Experimental and methodological work on the potential sound-
producing properties and analyzable traces of intentional sound production on lithic archaeological materials has also been 
argued to indicate instrumental behaviour in prehistory (Cross et al., 2002; Blake, 2006). 
 
Music out of Africa 
 
It appears safe to suggest that musical behaviour is a considerably ancient human capacity.  As a universally present 
behaviour (see above) we can expect that musical capabilities were present circa 150,000-287,000yrs ago in the 6900 or so 
individuals ancestral to the modern-day world population (e.g. Reich & Goldstein, 1998) and certainly at the time of the last 
dispersal out of Africa circa 60-80,000 yrs ago (e.g. Lahr & Foley, 1994).  The molecular data strongly support a common 
origin for all extant humans somewhere around 100,000 – 200,000 years ago (Ayala & Escalante, 1996; Wood, 1997; 
Bergström et al., 1998; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 2003). The so-called ‘Mitochondrial Eve’ (Cann et al., 1987; Saville et 
al., 1998; Cavalli-Sforza, 1998), the putative common ancestress of all modern humans, was at the forefront of this 
molecular wave. She has since been joined by a corresponding ‘Y-chromosome Adam’ (Fu et al., 1996; Dorit et al., 1995; 
Pääbo, 1995), as well as by data from non-sex-linked genes (Fischman, 1996), and from X-chromosomes (Disotell, 1999)15.  
Following Johansson (2005) it follows that the origins of biologically grounded behaviours such as language and music can 
almost certainly not be more recent than 100,000 years ago. 
 
   Prehistory of musical capabilities 
 
A full perspective on the prehistory of music necessarily incorporates evidence on the palaeoanthropology of vocal control 
and perception, neurological evidence, vocal physiology, the evolution of breath control, and auditory perception.  Once 
again specific details of some of these arguments will be evidenced at appropriate points in the main section of this thesis 
(chapters 2 and 3).  It is worth noting, though, Morley’s (2002; 2013) conclusion that the paleoanthropological evidence 
supports the view that adaptations without which musical engagement would not have been possible, start to be exhibited in 
Homo ergaster 1.75 Mya.  He concludes that from the time of Homo heidelbergensis, hominins in the lineage leading to 
modern-day humans would, most likely, have possessed modern vocal and perceptual versatility and would have been able 
to produce complex, varied, and planned vocal sequences.  Of course, this need not imply that they were engaging musically. 
The nature of the paleoanthropological evidence cannot possibly distinguish whether or not these capabilities were 
instrumental in a musical form, propositionally intentionalised or used in some other form of communicative medium.  In 
fact, most of the sources discussed were first proposed as supportive evidence in discussions of the evolution of language.  
However, the evidence does strongly confirm that at least these components of the modern capacity for musicality have a 
very long evolutionary history and that capabilities employed conglomeratively in modern musical engagement evolved, at 
different times and for different reasons, as a complex mosaic (Foley, 2004).  Whatever the transitional stages may have 
been it seems almost certain, especially in conjunction with evidence for a complementary co-evolution of vocal and 
                                                 
15 See Jobling et al., (2013) for further discussion on human origins and evolutionary genetics. 
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auditory capacities (see chapter 3), that these capacities were in service of pressures towards increased sociality and were 
primarily communicative in function. 
   
Music as Communication 
  
An evolutionary perspective on music necessarily is predicated on and requires a view that music emerged operationally as a 
particular strand in the evolution of communication.  Music need not be “art”, nor need it even be particularly beautiful or 
aesthetically attractive. It is overwhelmingly not autonomous (or “pure”) and cannot be separated from the whole of our 
individual or collective experience and consciousness.  Outside the modern and industrialised Western world in which music 
can sometimes appear as a commodity – a commercialisable physical object – it can have no independent existence or 
origination.  Music is fundamentally an active and shared social behaviour (e.g. Small, 1998) - a communicative act. 
 
As such music has shared fundamental origins in ancient mammalian evolution, in important phylogenetic changes in the 
neural structures regulating the autonomic nervous system.  Porges, (2001; 2003; 2007) proposes a polyvagal theory in 
which the evolution of the mammalian autonomic nervous system provides the neurophysiological substrates for the 
emotional experiences and affective processes that are major components of social behaviour.  A crucial part of his model is 
that the area of the brainstem that regulates the heart (i.e., via the mammalian or myelinated vagus) also regulates the 
muscles of the head, including those of the face, middle ear, mouth, larynx and pharynx. Collectively, these muscles function 
as an integrated ‘Social Engagement System’ that controls looking, listening, vocalizing and facial gesturing.  Effectively he 
posits that there exist direct connections between control of the sympathetic nervous system via a vagal brake on the heart 
and our primary means of communication.  Effectively mammalian communication is inextricably embedded in an 
evolutionarily ancient functional origin in physiological regulation16.  Evidence of the continued relevance of this model, 
despite some inconsistent findings and questions of interpretation, to music today can be found in studies showing effects of 
music on heart rate variability (e.g. Ellis & Thayer, 2010; Manzano et al, 2010; Nakahara et al, 2009; Zhou et al, 2010; 
Krantz et al, 2011; Riganello et al 2010; Orman 2010; VanPuyvelde et al., 2014).   
 
In general it is also important to note and understand that communication does not principally denote a directional 
conveyance of a propositional ‘message’ or emotional ‘expression’.  Broadly understood communication can be viewed 
functionally as being part of something beyond oneself, as part of how we engage and enact dynamically with our 
environment (see Schiavio et al 2014; see chapter 4).  Indeed models describe animal communication as being principally 
directed to managing and assessing one’s physical environment (Owings & Morton, 2004; Seyfarth and Cheney. 2003) and 
human communication as being additionally operational in the social, intersubjective and even the mentally projected 
realities of our interactional and cultural - ‘virtual’ - truths.    
 
Cross (2007a; 2007b) extends these models in positing the generic existence of three dimensions in music: A motivational-
structural dimension based on global structural features such as rate, loudness, pitch and intensity with affect and meaning 
originating in the fundamental nature of sound  in the physical world and in correlations between signals and the 
motivational state of an individual;  a socio-intentional dimension describing specificities of human interaction that derive 
from partially innate, partially learned sensitivities to structural features of human interaction incorporating attributions of 
intentionality – i.e. ‘narrative interpretations’ (Bruner, 1986); and a culturally-enactive dimension which encapsulates 
meaning and affect derived from enculturative, formal and specifically personal learning processes that are rooted in the 
conventional and institutional use of music as well as the frequency of co-occurrence of music and personal or social 
situations.  This proposed framework bears some resemblance to Runciman’s (1998) sociologically based proposal for three 
principal categories of human behaviour – ‘evoked’, ‘acquired’ and ‘imposed’ – as well as to proposals made specifically on 
the roots of emotional experience in music17.    The framework suggested by Cross (2007a), however, can be considered 
different from previous schemes in that the dimensions are not considered to be types of behaviour (as in Runciman’s model) 
and in that “the dimensions of meaning in music are intended to separate out the properties of music as experienced that bear 
on both emotion and meaning and to ground these within a biologically and culturally viable framework” (ibid p.18).  As 
such this framework offers a crucial quasi-reference point for the comparative perspectives taken in this thesis (see below 
and Section II) and is, hence, worth explicating and exploring in some more detail. 
 
The motivational-structural dimension - The concept (and the term itself) of a motivational-structural dimension of meaning 
and affect in music follows from Owings and Morten’s (1998) model of animal vocal communication in which 
communication is thought to occur as a result of individuals’ attempts to ‘manage’ and ‘assess’18 their environment based 
upon biologically relevant information.  A key component of the model is that global structural features of vocalisations can 
be seen to be indicative of the physical nature and motivational state of the animal.  In other words an ‘assessor’ of a signal 
that is low pitched, has a fast rate, and increasing loudness may do well to be predisposed to ‘assess’/react to this in a manner 
that would be appropriate of action when faced with a large, highly aroused animal that is getting ever closer – i.e. most 
likely run away, fast!  Equally a social animal faced with a dangerous situation could be expected to benefit from managing 
                                                 
16 This origin in regulatory function has particular relevance to the discussion in chapter 4 on music as a form of emotion regulation. 
17 Sloboda and Juslin (2001) describe music emotional connotations and affect in terms of features that are ‘iconic’, ‘intrinsic’ (based on 
specifically ‘musical’ features e.g. expectancy and tension [e.g. Meyer, 1956]) and ‘associative’.  Lavy (2001) also prefigures the approach 
taken by Cross in describing the emotional reaction of classical music listeners in terms of music processed as sound, utterance, context and 
narrative. 
18 The terms ‘send’ and ‘receive’ (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003) are similarly offered but connote, most likely unintentionally, a less functional 
account. 
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the behaviour of conspecifics and/or kin by emitting high frequency, high rate signals that act to direct their attention and 
heighten arousal levels.  Indeed this is exactly what has been shown to occur in Californian ground squirrels (Owings & 
Hennessy, 1984); marmots (Blumstein & Armitage, 1997); vervet monkey alarm calls (e.g. Owren & Bernacki, 1988); 
macaque “barks” (e.g. Fischer, 1998); and baboon “lost” calls (e.g. Rendall et al., 2000).  Crucially this view of 
communication need not imply any form of intentionality, reciprocity, or propositionality, but simply implies that animals 
are predisposed to react in certain ways in certain situations and/or to stimuli and that their predispositions in turn become 
part of the physical environment of others. As such the management and assessment mechanisms of a group of ‘interacting’ 
species may be subject to dynamic evolutionary pressures to exploit each other’s communicative and behavioural 
repertoires.  In other words conflicts between the interests of managers and assessors are to be expected and signals need not 
be directly or verifiably expressive of physical structure or internal states.  Instead it is more precise to suggest that 
communication evolves dynamically from direct structural-motivational correlations and that these act as a constraint on 
communicative repertoires and levels of communicative ‘dishonesty’ (see Fitch & Hauser, 1995).  A common and 
widespread example of both ‘dishonesty’ and biological constraints are exaggerated expressive size symbolism and 
signalling of willingness to fight in potential conflict situations (e.g. Ryan & Brenowitz, 1985; Enquist, 1985; see Bradbury 
& Vehrencamp, 1998; Johnstone, 1997).  A good practical example of the dynamic nature of Owing’s and Morten’s model – 
as well the potential complexities that can emerge from its basic principles - is that of male frogs’ (Psysalaemus pustulosus) 
mating signals in Panama.  These frogs face contrasting selective pressures to exploit female mating preferences for low 
‘chuck’ sounds (Capranica, 1977; Ryan et al., 2001) and to avoid bats that, in turn, have putatively adaptive sensitivities to 
frog ‘chuck’ sounds.  Male frogs thus balance ‘chuck’ and ‘whine’ sounds depending on the proximity of females and/or 
bats producing what appear to be rather complex vocal displays (Ryan, 1980; 1985; Rand & Ryan, 1981).Cross (2007a, p.6) 
notes that “it would be surprising if such motivational-structural principles did not account for significant aspects of the 
human response to sound given the extent to which we share appetitive, reproductive, sensory and limbic systems with many 
other species. Hence in terms of music as sound a close relationship can be postulated between the motivational states of 
listeners and the global structural characteristics of musical sound”19.  
 
Empirical studies have - despite considerable variation in the experimental paradigms employed20 - consistently supported 
this supposition showing that global characteristics of sound in music such as tempo, loudness and pitch are correlated with 
emotion recognition and elicitation both in terms of categorical (e.g. Ekman, 1992; Oatley, 1992; Plutchik, 1994; Power & 
Dagleish, 1997) and dimensional (e.g. Russell, 1980; Thayer, 1986) approaches to emotion (see Gabrielsson & Lindstrom, 
2001; Juslin, 2001 for reviews; Husain et al., 2002; Cross & Kronhaus, in preparation).  Significantly, the most unequivocal 
correlations appear to be related to arousal/energy levels and, to a slightly lesser degree, valence.  Additionally 
psychophysiological cues such as tempo, complexity levels, and loudness appear to generalise across cultures (Balkwill & 
Thompson, 1999)21.  Evidence reported by Huron and colleagues (2006), for example, adds weight to the suggestion that 
music incorporates biologically significant signals.  Following cross-cultural and ethologically grounded suggestions by 
Bolinger (1964), Ohala (1984) and Morton, (1994) they report that higher-pitched non-vocal melodies are generally 
interpreted to be less ‘threatening’ than lower-pitched equivalents. 
 
The above-mentioned studies in themselves present a considerable weight of evidence in support of an operational 
motivational-structural dimension in music.  Nevertheless it is important to note the motivational-structural model primarily 
describes a functional code.  Hence it is not surprising that the clearest evidence for its operation in music comes from 
correlations of form and functional context that are generalisable across cultures, and across the full range of human and 
non-human communicative behaviours.  It is well established that ‘melodic’ contours (direction of F0) are consistently and 
cross-culturally functional in affecting conspecifics’ arousal levels in adult human vocal communication (Scherer, 1986; 
Bachorowski & Owren, 1995; Scherer et al., 2003); ‘intuitive parenting’ (Papousek et al., 1991; Papousek, 1996); 
professional animal handlers (McConnell, 1992); and in monkey communication (Newman & Goedeking, 1992).  These 
correlations appear to generalise to music and in particular to cross-culturally manifest ‘functional song types’ such as infant 
play songs (e.g. Trainor, 1996; Rock et al., 1999) and/or lullabies.  The latter have been particularly well studied and have 
been shown to be cross-culturally distinguishable – both by adults and infants – from other types of song purely on the basis 
of structural features of the music such as low levels of complexity and a predominance of descending intervals22 (Unyk et 
al., 1992; Trehub et al., 1993a; Trehub, 1993b).  Additionally, and in full accordance with a functional interpretation, infant-
absent23 and infant-present recordings are distinguishable cross-culturally by infants and mothers on the basis of physical 
acoustic measures (Trainor et al., 1997)24.  Salient ‘performative’ cues include increased ‘jitter’, more ‘resonant’ timbres, 
slower tempi, and more pronounced structural boundaries in infant-present versions.  Crucially in terms of the current 
discussion structural and performative cues mirror those in other similarly functional parent-child (Fernald et al., 1984; 
Papousek et al., 1985) and adult interactive contexts (Fonagy, 1978; Trainor et al., 2000).  Structural features such as 
                                                 
19 Cross argues in support of this that it is global structural features of film musics (e.g. Jaws, Psycho) that account for a large portion of its 
affective functionality (Cohen, 2001). 
20 Gabrielsson and Lindstrom (2001) describe five main methodological categories that have been employed: I. Free descriptions and choice 
among descriptive terms (e.g. Gilman, 1891; Gundlach, 1935; Rigg, 1937; Watson, 1942); II. Rating and Multivariate analysis techniques 
(e.g. Kleinen, 1968; Wedin, 1969; Gabrielsson, 1973; Nielson & Cesarec, 1981); III. Continuous recording of emotional expression 
(Krumhansl, 1997; Schubert, 1999; 2001); IV. Non-verbal responses (e.g. Clynes, 1977; Clynes & Walker, 1982; DeVries, 1991); V. 
Specially composed music (e.g. Thompson & Robitaille, 1992). 
21 Interestingly in this study pitch levels did not contribute to cross-culturally consistent correlations.  This may be related to a music-
specific ‘production code’ (following Gussenhoven, 2002) and will be discussed again in chapters 3 and 4. 
22 The only non-significant (although suggestive) result was in comparison to love songs (Trehub et al., 1998). 
23 Significantly singers were instructed to sing ‘appropriately’ and with ‘feeling’ so as to minimize any deliberate intentional biases. 
24 Both mothers and infants predictably showed a preference for infant-present versions (Trainor, 1996). 
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descending frequency patterns and a slow rate are even generalisably associated with low arousal cross-taxa (e.g. 
McDonnell, 1991).   The evidence, in short, strongly suggests that aspects of music are functionally rooted in biologically 
grounded biases and processes of a motivational-structural communicative code25. 
 
The socio-intentional dimension - Despite the clear support given to the notion of an operational motivational-structural 
dimension of affect and meaning in music, it is equally clear, for example, in the situated performance of a lullaby that 
further operational aspects of the interaction go beyond the confines of animal communication models.  Most crucially a 
mother’s performance is largely initialised, built upon, and affected by inferences regarding the mental and physiological 
state of the infant.  One way of viewing this would be to argue that this reflects an extended human-specific motivational-
structural code in which inferential awareness and a desire to manage not only the physical and biological environment, but 
also the cognitive environment of others (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1986) becomes part of an individual’s motivational state.  
However, this would perhaps not capture the magnitude of importance that should be attached to this fundamental 
distinction.  Cross therefore argues for a second dimension of meaning and affect – the socio-intentional - in human 
interaction.  This he argues “is rooted in shared, generic, yet solely human, characteristics of our engagement with the world 
and particularly with each other”.  He continues with specific regard to music that “this dimension [is] oriented towards 
attributions and interpretations of intention and intentionality in engagement with music” (p. 8).  Importantly, Cross views 
the socio-intentional dimension as being rooted in a generic human capacity for culture.  To quote Sperber and Hirshfeld 
(1999) “it is generally agreed among cognitive and social scientists that cultural variation is the effect, not of biological 
variation, but of a common biological, and more specifically cognitive endowment that, given different historical and 
ecological conditions, makes this variability possible” (p. 115).  Despite debates as to definitions of culture26 and evidence 
for the presence of certain cultural phenomena in non-human primates (e.g. McGrew, 1998; Whiten, et al., 2001) it seems, 
following Cross (ibid.), that a human capacity for culture is, uniquely, evidenced in “shared ways of understanding the 
world, of understanding each other as ourselves, and of acting together in and on the world, that are transmissible by non-
genetic means” (p. 3., italics in original).  This quotation derives its content from an influential paper by Tomasello and 
colleagues (2005) in which they “propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the 
ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality” (abstract).  
This appears, on the basis of a considerable body of comparative evidence, to be a more precise formulation than previous 
suggestions regarding the specific nature of a human cultural capacity and theory of mind (e.g. Tomasello, 1999; see 
Gopnik, 1999).  The concept of shared intentionality, as well as other features that may construe a universal human socio-
intentional motivation for music, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The culturally-enactive dimension - Merriam (1967) opens his ethnography of Flathead music with the statement that “all 
people, in no matter what culture, must be able to place their music firmly in the context of the totality of their beliefs, 
experiences, and activities, for without such ties, music cannot exist” (p.3).  The veracity of this statement is widely accepted 
among ethnomusicologists.  Even functional song types that are imbued unequivocally with biologically grounded affect, 
such as the lullaby (see above), exhibit considerable variation across cultures27.  Although there appear to be some features 
of music that people can engage with across cultures, appropriate engagement is largely contingent upon cultural knowledge 
and immersion.  Empirical evidence is unsurprisingly sparse given the difficulties inherent in such an approach.  However, a 
few existing studies show that ‘correct’ engagement with pitch hierarchies (e.g. Castellano et al, 1984), and metrical 
structure (Stobart & Cross, 2000) for example, are dependent upon knowledge of culturally constructed structural schemas.  
Even individuals with considerable expertise in one cultural style can fail – in spite of tuition and a degree of cultural 
immersion – to perform seemingly simple tasks appropriately.  Blacking’s efforts to drum the beat as part of a Venda 
ceremonial musical performance, for example, were considered to be incorrect and even detrimental to the efficacy of the 
occasion (Blacking, 1973).  Only after a considerable amount time spent with the Venda did he manage to engage more 
successfully.  He notes, succinctly, that “to play Venda music you have to be a Venda” (p.92).   
 
Crucially, cultural and associative processes go beyond conditioning an individual’s ability to demonstrably engage with 
particular musical styles, but also relate to the meanings and affects attributed to music by individuals within a particular 
culture.  An aspect of this is the ‘darling-they’re-playing-our-tune’ phenomenon (Davies, 1978) which denotes the role of 
past experiences and co-occurring reference points in an individual’s emotional reactions and attributed significance to 
musical songs (see Sloboda & Juslin, 2001).  However, the term culturally-enactive implies much more than that and intends 
to encapsulate the fact that music’s significance is not only affected by individual and social experience, but is also an active 
and generative component of culture.  Cross clarifies that meaning and emotion in music are characteristics that “emerge 
from inter- and intra-personal processes that are shaped by – and that in turn may come to shape – the contingencies of their 
specific cultural matrix” (p.4).  This mirrors equally crystallised quotations by Blacking (1969/73) who - with reference to 
                                                 
25 To be clear cross-taxa correlations are suggestive of common biologically founded motivational-structural correlations. However, they are 
not an essential prerequisite in the identification of motivational-structural principles.  Different evolutionary pressures may drive 
communicative repertoires in different directions and underlying biological ‘codes’ must be expected to be, in part, species-specific relating 
to, for example, particular anatomical features of the animal. 
26 Tylor’s (1871), for example, defines human culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom, 
and any other capacities or habits acquired by man as a member of society”.  This remains a useful and operationally valid description and 
would appear to encapsulate what is being addressed here. 
27 Trehub and colleagues (1993b) show that, despite considerable cross-cultural similarity, North-American mothers tend to be much more 
blatant and demonstrative in terms of the affective content and structure of their lullabies.  This correlates strongly with studies of ID speech 
which show that North-American mothers show greater intonational changes than mothers from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
China (Fernald & Marikawa, 1993; Papousek & Papousek, 1991) and has been seen as a reflection of North-American mothers’ greater 
expressiveness and of the suggestion that some societies value soothing interactions more than arousing interactions (Toga et al., 1990). 
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the various individual and sub-culturally contingent roles and means of engaging (or not) with musical performance adopted 
by participants in Venda initiation ceremonies - notes that “music cannot make people act unless they are already socially 
and culturally disposed to act” (1969, p.39).  In a later publication he explains that “rules of musical behaviour are not 
arbitrary cultural conventions and techniques of music are not like developments in technology” (1973, p. 99). Musical 
behaviour, he continues, “may reflect varying degrees of consciousness of social forces, and the structure and function of 
music may be related to basic human drives and to the biological need to maintain a balance among them” (Ibid,  p.100).  
Effectively musical styles and their individual and collective significances are as varied and as complex as culture itself.  
The complex dynamic interplay between culture and music needs, in each instance, to be thoroughly understood in specific 
analysis and ethnography28.   
 
Applicability and relevance of the model - Perhaps the greatest strength of the dimensional model proposed is that it provides 
a clear and relevant reference point for broad biological and cultural comparative perspectives on music and other human 
and non-human communicative behaviours and repertoires.  Broadly speaking we can expect the motivational-structural 
dimension to refer to communicative features/concepts that are applicable across a wide range of species.  By contrast the 
socio-intentional can be interpreted as encapsulating human-specific yet universal/innately constrained facets of human 
communication.  The culturally-enactive dimension in turn describes aspects of human communication whose meaning and 
affect result from generative and associative, culturally- and individually-specific processes and histories.  A strong proviso, 
however, is that the model – as currently presented - doesn’t attempt to identify specifically musical features and could 
equally be applied to other human forms of communication.  Whilst it is the generative whole and interactions between 
dimensions that potentiates a complete functional account of music, it is one of the central assertions of this thesis that an 
evolutionary perspective on music – with its requisite for describing human- and context-specific universals - needs to be 
focused on and around features that distinguish the specificites of a musical socio-intentionality.  What is it that motivates us 
to structure the “communicative musicalities” of our dynamic mediations with others and the flow of our individual 





It seems logical to conclude that if music is innately constrained, universally present and universally identifiable as “music” 
then it must, at least theoretically, be comprised of some universal features (or a family of resemblance) that identify and 
define it as such.  Nevertheless, a clear and consensual definition of music has proved remarkably elusive and problematic.  
This, and even a reluctance to give operational definitions, remains a consistent problem in discussions relating to the 
role/significance of music and musical capabilities during the course of recent hominin evolution and, indeed, in the majority 
of cross-disciplinary investigations involving music.  As we have seen from the above discussions music appears to be able 
to embody a multiplicity of functions and to have emerged as a combined result of a series of evolutionary adaptations.  
Hence it seems nonsensical to discuss the adaptive functionality of music or its status as an adaptation, exaptation or 
spandrel without first defining the matter for debate and its potentially unique features.  It is these features (if any) that need 
to provide the primary basis for argumentation regarding the evolution and putatively adaptive qualities of musical 
capabilities.  Otherwise, we are at constant risk of falsely attributing functionalities to ‘music’ that are in fact more precisely 
attributable to broader categories, such as, affective vocal communication.  As discussed in the introduction the view, held 
by some researchers in the field (e.g. Hauser & McDermott, 2006; Mithen, 2006), that an actual verbalisable definition is 
unnecessary as we all know what we mean when we use the term ‘music’  is simply not tenable.  Worse still, it operates as a 
barrier to clarity of understanding and the applicability of their own research as well as, if perpetuated, that of the field in 
general.  
 
 In general, authors writing broadly in the field of music psychology have been contented to give definitions of music to 
frame their particular article or argument.  For example Stevens and Bryon (2016), discussing universals in music 
processing, define music as “temporally structured human activities, social and individual, in the production and perception 
of sound organized in patterns that convey non-linguistic meaning” (p. 15).  This is, in many ways, a reasonable practical 
approach but one can easily imagine behaviours that would putatively qualify the definition but nevertheless would not be 
termed as music (e.g. mother-infant interactions).  Alternately to frame their field of study ethnomusicologists have, for 
example, at times defined music simply as human communication outside of the scope of language.  Bruno Nettl (2005) 
points out that such a wide net has enabled articles on such ‘non-musical” events as Koran reading, African drum signaling, 
whale and dolphin sounds, and Mexican Indian whistling speech to appear in the journal Ethnomusicology.  Discussing 
many of the functionalities of music he offers a broad definition that is “intended to delineate those attributes that, in every 
community, appear to distinguish music from other spheres of human activity”.  Readers are directed to the original articles 
for further specifics but he argues that something that might be identified as 'music' “appears to have some general attributes 
- roots in sound and movement, heterogeneity of meaning, a grounding in social interaction and a personalised significance, 
together with an apparent inefficacy” (p. 23). 
 
A notable effort to define music functionally and in a way that highlights its significance to an evolutionary context, guards 
against ethnocentric conceptions of music, and enables its relationships to cultural and biological processes to be evaluated 
has been provided by Ian Cross (see below).  He offers a definition that stresses three key features of music: embodiment, 
                                                 
28 A particularly interesting and significant example is Svanibor’s description (1997) of the dynamic interface between music, context, 
identity, and culture in Croatia during recent turbulent political times.  For a recent compilation of ethnomusicological approaches to musics 
in or as culture see Post, 2005. 
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entrainment, and transposable intentionality, which will be discussed separately below.  This is, significantly, presented as an 
operational definition, without the objective of being to be either constitutive or essentialist.       
 
Embodiment - Although this denotes broader conceptions of music being ‘physicalised’, the most overt demonstration that 
music is embodied comes from the fact that musical engagement, whether it is ‘active’ or ‘passive’, compels us to move.  
This is true to the extent that there is no dance without music (Nettl, 2005) and even to the extent that our cultural separation 
of dance and music can be seen to be an ethnocentric quirk (Arom, 1991).  In all styles of music bodies produce music and in 
most (especially improvised styles) body actions are as much a determinant of the melody and rhythm produced as is any 
'choice' of pitch patterns (e.g. Afgani dutars, Baily, 1985; blues guitar, Nelson, 2002).  Equally choreography, whether it be 
directed toward sound production or not, is an essential component of performance and the creation of meaning (e.g. 
Japanese Taiko drumming).  It appears that the connection between music and movement is so strong that even seemingly 
passive listening (cross-culturally, not the focal mode of engagement with music) activates areas of the brain associated with 
motor behaviour and sequencing (Janata & Grafton, 2003).  This connection is, possibly, due to musical (in particular 
rhythmic) and timed and untimed motor behaviours sharing at least a subset of internal oscillatory mechanisms (Bispham, 
2003; see chapter 2).  In effect, music may be affective at a physiologically grounded level that is arguably not similarly 
accessible through other forms of communication. 
 
Entrainment - In short, the process that allows us to be and to act together in time.  In music, internal oscillatory mechanisms 
attune to regularities and periodicities in external stimuli providing reliable expectations as to the timing of future events and 
thus maintaining a co-dependent temporal relationship (e.g. Clayton et al., 2004).  Entrainment has also been argued to 
provide a framework for interaction and expression in mother-infant and linguistic interactions (e.g. Malloch, 1999; Webb, 
1972; Auer, 1999).  However, degrees of regularities in music, and a constant coupling of action with perception, arguably 
endow the entraining phenomenon with a unique degree of permanence and unambiguity.  While entrainment has been 
proposed as the root or enabling feature of human and animal temporal perception (Jones, 1976), sustained periodically 
structured synchronicity is rare in the animal kingdom (Merker, 2000). Additionally, it seems that we are the only species 
able to substantially and volitionally alter the temporal rate at which we synchronise (Repp, 2004).  Similarly to 
embodiment, this form of action-perception coupled entrainment can be viewed as sharing overlapping internal oscillatory 
mechanisms with the motor system (Bispham, 2003).  Through this connection and by providing a degree of interpersonal 
coupling (e.g. Benzon 2001), entrainment enables or least provides the foundations for a physiologically grounded group co-
regulation of state.  These issues, too, will be discussed in much greater detail in chapter 2. 
 
Transposable Intentionality - Tolbert (2001, p.84) explains that 'music's power is not derived solely from syntactical or 
semantic referents, arousals and expectancies, or from its indexical relationships to a particular cultural context, but rather 
through its immediacy as a performance of socio-emotional essence and embodied gesture’. Effectively, and despite lacking 
direct linguistic referentiality, music would seem, nevertheless, to 'mean' something.  Music can, for example, refer to 
communication with the spirits/dead (Feld, 1982), signal social transformation (Blacking, 1976), describe geographic 
associations (Will, 2002) or cultural narratives (Slobin, 1993).  The key point that Cross is making by ascribing transposable 
intentionality to music is that meaning in music is both culturally constructed and individually flexible (depending on, for 
example, experience, social status or mood).  In other words, it retains a high level of ambiguity and can mean different 
things to different people whilst remaining collectively meaningful (Cross, 2005).  Cross quotes Goehr in suggesting that 
ambiguity is valuable within social and political contexts, as it ‘can be used to envision an alternative culture and political 
order while escaping the scrutiny of censor’ (Goehr, 1993).  This resonates well with Turner's view (1974, 1991) that 
ritualistic or totemic acts occur most prevalently at moments when verbal description would highlight paradox and also 
explains music's cross-culturally prevalent role in ceremony and at times of political and social change.  Coupled with its 
ability to create a co-regulation of states, music's transposable intentionality allows it to create feelings of togetherness and 
of shared experience in a way and in contexts that language, due largely to its referentiality, is unable to achieve (chapter 4). 
 
In its most succinct form Cross (2003) proposes that “music embodies, entrains, and transposably intentionalises time in 
sound and action.”   This definition is a welcome addition to the literature and certainly appears to broadly encapsulate 
biological and cultural perspectives and to be applicable to - and descriptive of crucial components of - all known musics.  
However, it does not, perhaps, clarify sufficiently the specificities of music and fails, in the manner it is presented, to 
account for specifically “musical” means of engaging with pitch.  None of the three constitute parts are in and of themselves 
peculiar to music.  Language, poetry and ritual are all, to varying degrees, flexible to interpretation of meaning; entrainment 
is, broadly defined, inherent in a range of interactions and coordinated group behaviours; and embodiment is also a 
necessarily broad concept.  As such, it could perhaps be interpreted as a substantive statement rather than as a definition per 
se.  The statement offered by Cross effectively serves a very different function than a resultant narrower definition focused 
on the central aim of this thesis to identify and describe the constitent parts of the narrow faculty for music – those 
psychological, physiological, behavioural, and/or cultural features that are both universally present and yet specific to music.  
This thesis aims therefore to build on this proposed statement by adding an increased degree of specificity and aims to 
contribute towards addressing and extending those partially definitional questions I posed in the title to an article on rhythm 
(Bispham, 2006): What is Music? Who has it? And Why? 
 
Debates and hypotheses on music and evolution need to be focused on, grounded in, and informed by, an 
understanding of the specificities of musical interaction and engagement – the narrow faculty for music. Otherwise, 
we are at constant risk of falsely attributing functionalities to “music” that are in fact more precisely attributable to 
broader universal categories of relevance.  
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SECTION II – The Narrow Faculty for Music - Musical Motivation, Musical Pulse, and Musical Tone 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Hockett’s “Design Features” 
 
A complex communicative form such as language or music is, necessarily, an intricate mosaic of capacities.  Individual traits 
may have influenced evolutionary fitness for direct adaptive consequences of that particular complex behaviour or not.  
Nevertheless at some point in time capacities emerged according to and in response to evolutionary principles and pressures.  
An important background to the methodological approach in this thesis comes, therefore, from the literature on the evolution 
of communication, in particular the influential contributions of Charles Hockett on language.  Hockett proposed a “design-
feature”29 approach to comparative linguistics in which he endeavoured to identify the similarities and differences among 
animal communication systems and human language.  In a paper published in 1959 - Animal ‘Languages’ and Human 
Language - he initially proposed seven features.   These were gradually augmented until, in perhaps his most well-known 
exposition of this approach - “The Origin of Speech” (1962) - he settled on 13 design-features: Vocal-Auditory Channel; 
Broadcast Transmission and Directional Reception; Rapid Fading (transitoriness); Interchangeability; Total Feedback; 
Specialization; Semanticity; Arbitrariness; Discreteness; Displacement; Productivity; Traditional Transmission; Duality of 
Patterning30.  He argued that only human spoken language utilized all 13 concurrently but that all human and animal 
communication systems share some of the 13 design features. He further posited that these could differentiate human spoken 
language from animal communication and other human communication systems such as written language. Traditional 
transmission and duality of patterning, in particular, were regarded as being key to human language.  Hockett’s system was 
highly influential in comparative studies of communication.  For example, many ethologists in the 1970s applied the design-
feature approach to the study of a range of animal communication systems (e.g. Marler 1970; Thorpe 1972; Hinde 1975).  
Hockett’s classification system also appeared frequently in broad semiotic and biosemiotic literatures as a foundational 
attempt to systematically differentiate between human and non-human communication (see e.g. Danesi and Perron 1999: 
109–111; Martinelli 2010: 221; Nöth 1990: 155–156).  As such, although this thesis is pursuing a different goal of specifying 
features that are specific to music (in essence unique “design features”), it is fundamental to my argument that language and 
music can be described as a conglomerate of “design features” that can individually be subject to comparative analysis.  
Notably, there have been some dissenting voices.  Everett (2005), for example, presents a detailed linguistic analysis of the 
Pirahã language and argues that this challenges a direct application of Hockett's design features by showing that 
interchangeability, displacement, and productivity may be culturally constructed and constrained. Also of particular 
relevance, in terms of similar methodological concerns regarding music, is Wacewicz & Żywiczyński’s assessment (2015; 
Wacewicz 2012) that highlights and critiques “a focus on the means at the expense of content and an emphasis on the code 
itself rather than the cognitive abilities of its users” (p. 29).  They propose that  
“the field of language evolution requires and presupposes a more “cladistic” approach to language: as a suite of 
sensorimotor, cognitive and social abilities that enable the use but also acquisition of language by biological creatures” 
and note that “most of those in the field see language as a complex (or mosaic—Hurford 2003) of cognitive skills, or an 
even more multifaceted phenomenon, grounded in but transcending individual cognition (e.g. Gärdenfors 2004)” (Ibid). 
 
The Human Faculty for Language - Methodological Concerns 
 
These preceding points are addressed in a more recent, and highly influential, paper addressing broad methodological 
concerns for an evolutionary perspective on the faculty of language.  Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) suggest a 
distinction between what they term a faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) and a faculty of language in the narrow 
sense (FLN).  Essentially FLN seeks to describe capacities that are unique to humans within the context of language.  As 
such, it is a direct fit, inspiration, and methodological analogy to how a narrow faculty for music is framed in this thesis (see 
below).  FLB includes an internal computational system (FLN, see below) combined with at least two other organism-
internal systems; ‘sensory-motor’ and ‘conceptual-intentional’.  The sensory-motor system is posited to include skills such 
as vocal imitation and invention; neurophysiological systems of action-perception; discrimination language-relevant sound 
patterns;  potentialities of vocal tract anatomy; and the modalities of language production and perception.  The conceptual-
intentional system in turn incorporates capacities to attribute others’ mental states (‘theory of mind’); the capacity to acquire 
nonlinguistic conceptual representations; referential vocal signals; intentional and rational imitation; and intentional 
voluntary control over signal production.  Accepting that opinion is divided on the precise nature of these systems, and 
whether they are substantially shared with other vertebrates or uniquely adapted to the exigencies of language, the authors 
take as uncontroversial ‘the existence of some biological capacity of humans that allows us (and not, for example, 
chimpanzees) to readily master any human language without explicit instruction’.  FLB includes this capacity but excludes 
organism-internal systems that are necessary but not sufficient for language such as memory, respiration, digestion, and 
circulation.  Leaving the door open to more inclusive definitions31 the authors hypothesise that FLN includes a 
                                                 
29 A dictionary definition of design features in an evolutionary context may describe, for example, “an organismal trait that can influence 
rates of death and reproduction, and hence Darwinian fitness” (McGraw-Hill, 2003). 
30 In conjunction with anthropologist Stuart Altmann 3 more were added in a report presented in 1968:  
Prevarication: A speaker can say falsehoods, lies, and meaningless statements. 
Reflexiveness: Language can be used communicate about the very system it is, and language can discuss language 
Learnability: A speaker of a language can learn another language 
31 Lieberman (1996), for example, has argued that the sensory-motor systems were specifically adapted for language and thus should be a 
part of FLN. Recursive structure vs process – so in practice not really recursion ad infinitum but perhaps an extended form of working 
memory (see Read 2008) 
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computational system (narrow syntax) that generates internal representations and maps them into the sensory-motor interface 
by means of the phonological system and into the conceptual-intentional interface by means of the (formal) semantic system.  
They suggest that the crucial component of FLN is recursion, which they identify as a computational system operating 
primarily over the syntactical domain.  FLN thus takes a finite set of elements and yields a potentially infinite array of 
discrete expressions32. According to the authors this core recursive aspect of FLN appears to lack any analog in animal 
communication and possibly other domains as well. 
 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch strongly favour a comparative approach to studying the evolution of the faculty of language and 
promote the quest to explore both direct evolutionary homologies resulting from shared ancestry and analogies occurring as 
traits emerge in separate lineages as similarly resultant functions in response to comparable selective pressures.  They 
propose, on the basis of a wide range of comparative empirical data that only FLN is uniquely human and hypothesise that 
most, if not all, peripheral components of FLB are based upon mechanisms shared with other animals, with differences of 
magnitude or quality rather than kind.  On the other hand, FLN - the computational mechanism for recursion - is viewed as 
being recently evolved and unique to humans.  The authors explain that  
 
“according to this hypothesis much of the complexity manifested in language derives from the complexity in the 
peripheral components of FLB, especially those underlying the sensory-motor and conceptual intentional interfaces, 
combined with sociocultural and communicative contingencies.  FLB as a whole has an ancient evolutionary, long 
predating the emergence of language and a comparative analysis is necessary to understand this complex system.   By 
contrast, FLN as a uniquely human capacity must have evolved in the last 6 million years since our divergence from the 
last common relative of chimpanzees and humans.”  (p. 1570) 
  
Importantly, the authors recognise that both FLB and FLN may have evolved for plausible communicative precursors or for 
reasons outside of linguistic/communicative contexts such as numbers, navigation and social relations.  They propose 
therefore that comparative studies might look for evidence of such computations outside of the domain of communication33.  
Furthermore they view shared mechanisms across different cognitive domains (in particular music) as a valuable source of 
information about the structure of the faculty of language.  An important point to make is that they distance this suggestion 
from debates and potential criticisms of the so-called minimalist program in linguistics, preferring in this instance be remain 
largely non-committal as regards the virtues and faults of the various flavours of generative grammar currently available. As 
they later clarify “the only assumption made in HCF [Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch] and here, about syntactic theory is the 
uncontroversial one that, minimally, it should have a place for recursion” (Fitch et al., 2005, p. 183). 
 
In this later paper (Ibid), in response to some criticisms from Jackendorff and Pinker (2004), they also emphasise the central 
impetus for the original article in a quotation that is directly pertinent and, hence, worth quoting here in full: 
 
The primary motivation for writing HCF was the recognition of some pervasive confusions that have led to 
persistent and unnecessary misunderstandings among researchers interested in the biology and evolution of 
language. Such misunderstanding has polarized debate unnecessarily, has helped to fuel dogmatic and even hostile 
stances, and has generally acted to block progress in this field, including especially the severing of possible 
collaborative projects between linguists, psychologists and biologists. It has contributed to a situation in which 
animal researchers interested in language almost automatically consider themselves anti-linguist, or anti-generative, 
while some linguists feel justified in being anti-cognitive or anti-evolutionary. The FLN/FLB distinction, we 
hoped, would help the field to see that there is no incompatibility between the hypotheses that FLB is an adaptation 
that shares much with animals, and that the mechanism(s) underlying FLN might be quite unique (p.193). 
 
It is this motivation as well as the proposed methodological need to fractionate language into its component mechanisms; the 
need for an empirical approach to test individual hypotheses about these mechanisms; the value of comparative data from 
                                                 
32Recursion is perhaps not the most precise term to use as it implies infinity.  However, we (as the authors recognise) are restricted by other 
organism internal factors such as lung capacity, working memory, concept formation and motor output speed and hence exhibit a limited 
capacity for recursion. Effectively they are describing a process rather than a recursive structure which may in practice reflect an extended 
form of working memory (see Read 2008). 
33 Implicit, although not explicitly mentioned, in this approach is the notion that linguistic ability requires processing information across 
different cognitive domains as well as across modalities.  In other words for a faculty of language to operate it requires not only the 
individual components but also some form of integrative fluidity.  Mithen (1996) has suggested, following Fodor’s distinction between 
innate, specialised cognitive competencies and a general, central, intelligence, that the course of human cognitive evolution is uniquely 
characterised by an increase in the capacity to integrate information across domains and to transfer information or skills between domains.  
Mithen, with the support of the archaeological record, describes three evolutionary phases: 
 
Phase 1:  Minds dominated by a domain of general intelligence - a suite of general-purpose learning and decision-making rules. 
Phase 2:  Minds in which general intelligence has been supplemented by multiple specialized intelligences, each devoted to a specific 
domain or behaviour, and each working in isolation from the others. 
Phase 3:  Minds in which the multiple specialized intelligences appear to be working together, with a flow of knowledge and ideas between 
behavioural domains (p.64). 
 
The flexibility of phase 3, which according to Mithen characterises the modern mind, is seen to have emerged only within the last 100,000 
years and becomes most evident in the archaeological record with the “cultural explosion” that occurred some 30,000 to 60,000 years ago.  
Although music is not explicitly mentioned by the author in the original exposition, it has particular relevance to music as musical ability 
also requires processing information across domains and modalities (see Cross, 1999).  
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diverse animal species; and the need for collaborative, inter-disciplinary work in this endeavour that inspires the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis.  Broadly speaking the same concerns are shared in the study of music in 
evolution.  The particular theoretical conclusions and detailed discussions on the evolution of language are beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  Nevertheless, by way of ingesting some further interpretational guidance and understanding some potential 
analogous theoretical complications and pitfalls it is worth very briefly considering the proposal that FLN is characterized 
solely by recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language.   
 
Interpreting the evidence – theoretical concerns 
 
A first challenge is that although the authors describe FLN as being “composed of those components of the overall faculty of 
language (FLB) that are both unique to humans and unique to or clearly specialized for language”, (2005, p. 182) it is 
debatable whether recursion can be considered as having arisen as an adaptation for language, music perhaps, or something 
else.  In fairness the authors made this point clear stating also that “something about the faculty of language must be unique 
in order to explain the differences between humans and other animals—if only the particular combination of mechanisms in 
FLB” (2005, p. 182) (emphasis added).  They also note that the contents of FLN are as yet to be empirically determined.  
Critically, it is not just a question of curiosity whether the contents of FLN are shared with other domains.  Eventually 
proposals on this matter and subsequent debates inevitably collide with fundamental philosophical perspectives of what 
language is and ultimately to the core of who we are.  Is language merely a form of communication - an extension of prior 
systems - or is it in essence a fresh mode of being and consciousness? Is it, for example, the by-product of, or even an aspect 
of, the evolution of symbolic representation (e.g. Deacon, 1997)?  Or is it even primarily a mode of thought – an internal 
language with its uniqueness captured in the uniqueness of its generative nature of thought, its universal grammar (Chomsky, 
2010).  Is it instead, as Daniel Dor (2015) suggests, definable as a ‘sharing of experience’, as the communication of thought 
with its distinction deriving from the nature of the ideas we wish to communicate? Alternately again, could languages be 
best conceived as tools to solve the twin problems of communication and social cohesion? – “Tools shaped by the distinctive 
pressures of their cultural niches - pressures that include cultural values and history and which account in many cases for the 
similarities and differences between languages” (Everett 2012, p. 6).   
 
Even if we were to accept the proposal that recursion is the core component of FLN it would still leave many of these 
centrally reflexive questions unresolved, especially those regarding the sequence, niches, and pressures of evolutionary 
adaptation.  Corballis (2014) argues, for example, that it was the emergence of the capacity for recursion that first 
distinguished us in the animal kingdom and provided the foundation for subsequently defining characteristics.  In his 
argument it is recursion that enables us to conceive of our own minds and the minds of others and which gives us the power 
of mental "time travel".  It affords, in his view, the ability to insert past experiences, or imagined future ones, into present 
consciousness. In turn he posits that recursive structures led to the emergence of language and speech, which ultimately 
enabled us to share our thoughts, plan with others, and reshape our environment to better reflect our creative imaginations.  
To highlight further potential complications, even in this argument we can potentially be left with questions as to whether 
this represented an initial qualitative shift from working memory capacities in nonhuman species (see Read 2008; Wynn and 
Coolidge, 2007) or a more abrupt restructuring of central cognition. 
 
Many of these questions are considerably beyond the scope of enquiry in this thesis.  However, as well as drawing 
inspiration from the methodological advocacies, it is interesting to consider the scope of interpretational debates, concerns, 
and philosophical challenges that have been advanced in studies of the evolution of language.  These have interesting 
parallels and comparable complexities in music and will be important to consider carefully in future extended discussion on 
proposals made for a faculty for music in the narrow sense (FMN).  In many regards this section (Chapters 2-4) - 
constituting the central claims of the current thesis - will follow analogously the suggestions on how to describe and 
comparatively support a narrow faculty for language (FLN).  However, there are also some critical differences in our quest 
to search for the specificities of music.  These are due in part to inherent differences between music and language and in part 
to the current state of enquiry in the respective fields.  In posing the question ‘what (if anything) defines and distinguishes 
musical engagement from other forms of non-human and human behaviour?’ we are addressing and probing a potentially 
even narrower conclusion. 
 
Music and Language – a Communicative Continuum  
 
In general it makes perfect sense to follow a similar comparative method as that suggested for language.  Music and 
Language putatively share a common evolutionary past until a relatively recent divergence.  Both are complex, uniquely 
human capacities made up of a vast array of largely overlapping subskills.   The commonalities between the two domains are 
particularly abundant when we assent to a broad conceptualization of language in which the exchange or conveyance of 
semantically decomposable ‘information’ is merely a part of the whole.  It is, as music also is, primarily a multi-modal form 
of structured interaction.  Language and music both incorporate intrinsic motive pulses, gestures, affective expressions and 
regulations, subtle cues of body language, shared goals and intersubjectivities.  Both are combinatorial, generative, relational 
and concerned with the maintenance of social relations.  Both are essentially manifestations of the human capacity to 
communicate.  In fact a select group of influential researchers (Cross et al, 2013) has proposed that the two constitute a 
continuum rather than discrete domains.  This continuum is proposed to be interpreted in terms of at least two dimensions, 
the first running from definite to indefinite meanings and the second from greater to lesser affective potency.  They give the 
example of the Suya people of the Amazon (Seeger, 1987) to highlight that, although we in modern Western societies 
categorise music and language as discrete and principal communicative genres, other complex communicative taxonomies in 
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which, for example, social function and context are the primary distinguishing characteristics are possible and operational in 
traditional societies (see also Basso 1985; Feld 1982; Lewis, 2013)34. 
 
Cross et al (2013), following List (1963), argue within our contemporary Western taxonomical system that “overall, no 
single criterial attribute, save perhaps that of propositionality, distinguishes between language and music clearly and 
comprehensively.  Language, they continue, “unlike music, provides a way of sharing information about states of affairs by 
means of truth-conditional propositions and thus of coordinating action. It enables mapping between worlds, thoughts, and 
selves, the formulation and exchange of information, and the coordination of joint, goal-directed action” (p.545). They do 
also cautiously highlight that “the discrete tones and pitch sets that supply grist for the musical mill in most cultures are 
rather unique to music” and that “there are differences in the regularity of timing between most registers of speech and most 
genres of music, with the latter featuring explicit use of isochrony” (Ibid, emphasis added)35. However, pitch, pitch contour, 
“rhythmic” regularity, temporal structure and emotional expression and regulation are, broadly speaking, also critical 
features in oratory, poetry, linguistic and parent-infant interactions and also in certain animal communications.  Therefore, to 
definitely isolate music on the basis of any of these attributes we will need to be much more specific.  Essentially, as well as 
analogous inspirations for research into the faculty for language, an additional motivation for describing a narrow faculty for 
music in this thesis is also to explore if it is possible to pinpoint features that positively distinguish music from language and 
other communicative repertoires.  The alternative to addressing this impetus is that arguments regarding the role of music in 
human evolution, its modern-day functions and particular efficiencies, and our appreciation of its position within broader 
fields of human cognition and behaviour will remain, necessarily, somewhat vague and lacking in clarity and consensual 
understanding.   
 
Appoaching a Narrow Faculty for Music 
 
Seemingly not tied down by one central functionality, music is substantially more flexibly manifest than language and also 
more adaptably intentional and significant.  The wonderful variety of musics across the globe defies observations of 
common ground even as we instinctively sense “musicness” and adherence to our taxonomic enclosures.  Recent avant-garde 
experimental genres such as the musique concrète of the 1940s are among the many examples of how almost any sound 
and/or action can potentially be abstracted, shaped and transmuted into being something we regard as music. It is a central 
supposition of the argument of this thesis that the potential psychophysiological “contents” given space in musical form are 
immeasurably mutable.  In practice, of course, certain instantiations may lend themselves more readily to our socio-
intentional drives than others.  As Storr (1992) notes, although musics are indeed hugely diverse, they are less so than one 
can imagine organising sounds and movements.    Nevertheless, given the scope of potential and observed musical form 
within and across cultures it seems that any description of commonality needs to be addressed at the level of psychological 
mechanisms that anchor a musical form or structure.  As discussed in the introduction and in chapter 1, there are cogent, 
logical and bio-cultural reasons to assume the existence of distinguishing features at the very least at the level of implicit 
categorisation by musicologists.  This argument persists even if, as seems likely, we are commonly only aware empathically 
of a conjoining experience.   This latter point in particular highlights the challenge inherent in the goals of this thesis.  
Fortunately, however, combining all three comparative perspectives that are integral to the question of the constituent parts 
of a narrow faculty for music – seeking cross-cultural universalities, cross-species homologies and analogies, and intra-
species domain-specificities - rather than exponentially complicating the issue, appear to converge on similar suggestions 
thus adding weight to the conclusions reached.   
 
Another supposition posited throughout this thesis is that these universally defining features of music are shared 
psychological mechanisms that structure attention and motivation and are not always fully physicalized or observable (see 
introduction).   This approach can be envisaged, for example in how we understand findings such as the recently titled 
‘speech to song illusion’. In this paradigm repeated speech patterns start to be classified as being music by experimental 
participants.  This has been interpreted as physical evidence for a somewhat nebulous divide between ‘musical’ and 
‘linguistic’ rhythm perception.  I argue, however, that this reflects a relatively clear transition, due largely to increasing 
predictability, from one form of processing to another and an identifiable psychologically grounded specificity of musical 
rhythm.  Music ultimately happens in the mind.  It is formed and understood based on the psychological and attentional 
mechanisms which structure our thoughts, actions and interactions in time.  The approach taken in chapters 2-4 is therefore 
based primarily upon empirically grounded psychological studies of musical capabilities and engagement. The physical 
products such as the sounds produced by isochronous tapping or sustained humming are described, in turn, as acoustic 
correlates of engagement.  This has the additional benefit that perception and production - which anyway are in essence 
inseparable in music (and dance) - are mutually encapsulated in the term ‘engagement’.    
 
                                                 
34 The Suya describe three form of communication: Kaperni most closely resembles interactional “speech” with text the predominant (but 
variably so) priority’; Saren is “instructional” and more formalized declamatory or empowered human speech with a priority of relatively 
fixed texts over relatively fixed melodies; and Ngere, which we might regard as “song”, in which melody is fore fronted and in which time, 
text, and melody are set and of nonhuman liminally powerful origin (‘authorised’ for example by current power structures or past 
invocations).  Importantly these forms can leak into each other with occasionally loose demarcations between the forms.  Seeger 1989 also 
notes the different concept of Ngere to our understanding of “song” stating that “ngere means both a song (melody) and the movements that 
accompany it. Stance and dance are thus an integral part of music, all part of a single communicative act called ngere. At a more specific 
level of contrast ngere means a unison song as opposed to the akia: at a more general level ngere means “ceremony”, including the whole 
range of activities, songs and movements that characterize Suya musical occasions (p. 375). 
35 Isochrony describes a steady, almost metronomic, beat 
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I will also attempt to describe the psychological devices involved in the absolute minimal organisational and motivational 
characteristics for something to be “musical” - root capabilities involved in engaging with a simple musical pulse, a musical 
tone and the most intrinsic motivations to do so.  Without wishing to artificially restrict the scope of discussion these 
ostensibly most “simple” forms of pulse, tone, and motivation can perhaps be characterised as the capabilities needed to 
cooperatively tap an isochronous pattern, to interactively hum a matched or harmonised sustained pitch, and an inherent 
desire/impulse to do so.   It is hoped also that by focusing on such “basic” foundational capabilities we are analysing, as 
much as possible, at levels that reflect biological and ontological constraints and which operate to support cultural creativity 
rather than reflecting specific acculturations and learning.   Nevertheless, a potential caveat to note from the outset is that 
some cultural influences may nevertheless be inherent and that the overwhelming majority of experimental work in this area 
has been undertaken with Western subjects.  Acculturation has variously been shown to affect even the simplest musical 
tasks.  Arguments have even been presented for some prenatal influence (e.g. Panksepp, 2009).  Hence some caution is 
required to avoid ethnocentric interpretations and suggestions.  Such attentiveness is inherent in the further course of this 
section which, giving particular weight to (the relatively few) available cross-cultural studies, aims to offer cross-culturally 
generalisable concepts and hypotheses.   
 
It is absolutely critical to be clear, however, that this is not meant to represent a reductionist or minimalist view.  These root 
capabilities are not considered to be quasi-grammatically generative nor functional in isolation.  They are instead merely a 
psychological space, an individual or interactional framework in which a full range of human vitality and experience can be 
shaped, abstracted, transformed in time and given a particular kind of meaning and significance.  Furthermore, as we shall 
see, they are manifestly embedded in broader capabilities and the complex mosaic of our evolutionary past.  Even these 
seemingly basic skills are intrinsically embedded in and operationally dependent upon capacities for movement, 
vocalization, intersubjectivity, sociality (e.g. Himberg 2015) and culture, as well as direct and resultant affectivities.  
Ultimately, of course, it must be these connections that ground any functional account for music and its particular efficacies.  
Musicality, to quote Colwyn Trevarthen (1999/2000) “cannot be synthesised or accreted in the mind from separately 
anarchic processes, but must have one coherent and orderly rhythmic foundation” (p. 160).  One can argue more specifically, 
for example, that all of the world’s music may have ultimately arisen out of some combination of vocal utterance and 
coordinated action (Clayton, 2009).  Music in its full forms ultimately  then “communicates the mind’s essential coherence 
of purpose, a willfulness that holds its elements in a narrative form through phenomenal, experienced, time” (Malloch & 
Trevarthen 2009, p. 1). 
  
The argument is set out and structured over the next three chapters on Musical Pulse; Musical Tone; and Musical Motivation 
respectively.  A temporal organization of action (i.e. pulse and rhythm) and frequency-based order (i.e. melody and 
harmony,) are widely considered to be fundamental, descriptively and neurophysiologically distinct (see Peretz and Zatorre, 
2005), features of music.  Few, I think would argue, therefore, against an initial division into pulse and pitch as likely 
sources for music’s unique characteristics.  Brown’s musilanguage model, for example, also argues for pitch blend and 
metric rhythms as being “design features” of music that “reflect music’s origins as group selected trait” (p. 4; see chapter 1; 
Conclusion).  To fully encapsulate an inherent capacity observable in all musics, specific features of musicality are described 
as a species- and context-specific ability to engage with configurations of musical pulse and/or musical tone.  This 
incorporates the fact that not all musics employ an observable temporal pulse (Clayton, 1996); that some musics are entirely 
non-pitch based; and that an engagement with musical pitch need not imply melody, harmony or the use of scales (e.g. 
monotone chanting).  The concept of motivation, although rarely discussed in musicological literatures, must also be 
considered a crucial component of human musical engagement. In the broadest and most inescapable sense all human (and 
non-human) actions are necessarily motivated by the pursuit of certain “goals”.  In other words we are constantly motivated 
towards maintaining or altering our physical, cognitive and/or affective environment – our experiential consciousness.  
These three features are presumed to provide symbiotically a more or less invariant framework for individual experience 
and/or interpersonal interaction – a coordinating strategy36.  In short the claim made is that music is universally and context-
specifically built upon and identifiable by the enacted fundamental capabilities and acoustic correlates of engaging with 
musical motivation and configurations of musical pulse and musical tone. 
 
Drawing upon psychological and neurophysiological literature, I have previously suggested that musical pulse and musical 
tone be viewed as psychophysiological mosaics - constellations of concurrently operating, hierarchically organized subskills 
(Bispham, 2003; 2009).  I further posited that these subskills share overlapping internal oscillatory mechanisms (Bispham, 
2003) and that, as such, all subskills, as well as the resulting constellation, can be viewed as being grounded in, and as 
having exaptively evolved from, fundamental kinesthetic abilities and modes of perceiving temporally organized events.  
This may, perhaps have presented as an overly disjointed account, not fully reflecting the embeddedness and sometimes 
nebulous divides between subskills.  I should like to clarify, therefore, that these components are not intended to be 
understood as being fully autonomous.  Broadly speaking pulse and tone are integral components in all communicative 
repertoires so the question becomes one of whether there are aspects that are distinct in a musical pulse and/or tone.  
Viewing musical pulse and musical tone in this way provides an avenue for exploring useful comparisons with other types of 
human and animal behaviour as well as critically pointing toward putative evolutionary continuities.  This approach mirrors 
the proposals for the study of the evolution of language discussed above (Hockett, 1962; Hauser et al., 2002), suits ideas of 
increased cognitive domain-flexibility in the hominin lineage (Mithen 1996), and fits perfectly the predominant view in 
evolutionary theory that complex behaviours such as music evolved in a mosaic fashion, with individual components 
emerging or evolving independently or for independent reasons at times, and/or reforming with other components at other 
times (Foley, 2005; 2016).  The following cross-species and intraspecies comparative perspectives, by focusing on 
                                                 
36 The term ‘strategy’ is used to incorporate the important detail that an engagement of musicality is partially volitionally controlled. 
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individual behavioral components, are implicitly set within this constellation framework.  In the following chapters putative 
subskills will be subject to comparative analysis and discussion with a particular view to identifying those features that are 
specific to music. 
 
Extending from previous publications (Bispham 2003; 2006; 2009; Cross et al., unpublished) musical pulse is described 
comparatively in conjunction with discussion on general timing abilities; the perception of time; absolute vs. relative 
temporal processing; periodic and nonperiodic action; a coupling of action and perception; sensorimotor synchronization; 
and error correction mechanisms. In particular I will highlight the challenges of relative processing in nonhuman primates 
and the notion that reported instances of analogous pulse-based behaviour in non-human species need to be challenged with 
reference to our understanding of the psychology of sensorimotor synchronization in humans.  Perspectives that posit forms 
of structural and motive pulses in non-musical human interactions are also anaylsed accordingly.  Period correction 
mechanisms, a corresponding awareness of a pulsed framework, and the afforded sustained nature of attention will be 
considered to distinguish musical pulse from temporal structuring in other communicative domains. 
 
In similar fashion to the preceding section on pulse, musical tone will be correspondingly deconstructed into capabilities of 
controlled vocalization; pitch perception; relative pitch processing; psychophysiological correction mechanisms; frequency 
attunement; and harmonic tensions.  Structural concepts such as scales, tonal hierarchies, and harmonic systems are 
described as parsimonious cultural constructs based upon these “root” capabilities of musical tone.  Analogously to the 
conclusions on musical pulse, a desire to achieve and maintain certain frequency relationships and a resultant sustained 
stable pitch centre is seen to provide a mutually manifest framework for interaction.  It will also be argued similarly that 
correction mechanisms based on the output of self or others (and again perhaps particularly those that invoke an awareness 
of the structural framework) seem to be critical in distinguishing musical tone from uses of pitch in other modes of human 
and animal communication. 
 
The effort to describe and distinctively identify musical motivation necessarily follows a somewhat more discursive structure 
starting with ethnomusicological perspectives music’s multifarious uses and functions.  The seemingly most likely intrinsic 
motivations that find voice in music are discussed and compared to other behavioural and communicative channels.  The 
literatures on emotional expression and the individual and interactional regulation of affect in music are reviewed and 
critiqued.  Although extended and often intensified, these subjects are not viewed as being intrinsically special to music.  
Following, Juslin and Laukka (2003), comparative analysis is argued to suggest that music shares common acoustic and 
structural cues with emotional vocal communication.  A potentially specific or pronounced efficicacy of music is posited in 
the enactive regulation of mood.    Interactional intersubjectivities are also explored in terms of whether music provides 
some unique access to the mental states of others and to what extent we share in each other’s experiences and goals in 
musical performance.  The broad psychosocial implications of synchrony, entrainment, group action, and ritual are similarly 
examined. I will suggest that the specificity of musical motivation lies in endeavouring towards a sustained attentional 
structure - and extended phenomenological present – that affords an efficient regulation of mood, coordinated group 
interaction and a consequent drive towards a convergence of motivational states. 
 
Following efforts to identify features that represent a uniquely emergent capacity for music I will argue that the constituent 
parts of a narrow faculty for music – those psychological, physiological, behavioural, and/or cultural features that are both 
universally present and yet specific to music – provide a stable temporal framework for the efficient management of 
individual behaviour, dyadic and/or group interaction and are primarily concerned with sustaining attention and extending 
the experience of the perceptual present.  
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Chapter 2 - Musical Pulse 
I have previously written similarly motivated comparative accounts on ‘interpersonal musical entrainment’ (Bispham, 2003), 
‘musical rhythmic behaviours’ (Bispham 2006a; 2006b) and ‘musical pulse’ (Cross et al, 2008; Bispham 2009).  Since the 
publication of these papers the issue of pulse and entrainment in music has attracted a huge amount of interest across a wide 
range of academic disciplines and has been the subject of numerous studies and publications.  In particular some cleverly 
designed infant/child developmental studies (e.g. Philips-Silver & Trainor 2005; 2007); an increasing number of 
ethnomusicological accounts of entrainment (e.g. Clayton 2009); neurological hypotheses of neural resonance (Large et al, 
2015);  studies of neural networks in human and non-human beat perception and synchronization (Merchant et al, 2015); and 
a range of experimental investigations highlighting how even simple instantiations of pulse-based entrainment are 
functionally embedded in our central prosocial drives and motivations (e.g. Kirschner & Tomasello 2010) have vastly 
expanded and profited the literature in this area.  In parallel, research into related matters such as synchronous action (e.g. 
Gill 2016), cooperation and empathy (e.g. Rabinowitch, 2015), and physical gesture (e.g. Kendon, 2004) have also 
broadened the scope of functional interpretation regarding forms of interactional entrainment.  An increasing number of 
examples of animal ‘rhythmic behaviours’ have also been subject to much analysis and debate (see Fitch 2015; Wilson and 
Cook, 2016).  Most notable of these has been ‘Snowball’ the dancing (headbanging) cockatoo who has fascinated 
researchers, divided opinion and even caught the public imagination via youtube and appearances on popular television 
shows. 
Some authors have argued that the evidence has mounted conclusively against some of my previous suggestions.  Rouse et 
al., 2016) for example state the “phenomenon of “beat keeping” was believed to be unique to humans (Wallin et al., 2000; 
Bispham, 2006; Zatorre et al., 2007), but new findings in non-human animals have decisively put that idea to rest” (p. 257).  
However, this misrepresents my conclusions and analytical approach.  First of all, in terms of the capacity for entrainment, I 
supported evolutionary continuities from more basic temporal and motor functions arguing that “temporal processing, 
periodical behaviour, error correction mechanisms, dynamic attending and motor skill/coordination are all subserved by a 
common internal periodic oscillatory system”.  Furthermore I described that “IME (interpersonal musical entrainment) can 
operate at temporal levels below perceptual thresholds suggesting that the internal processes which control the timing of 
synchronised action are directly coupled to the sensory information without any mediation by awareness or perceptual 
judgement” (Bispham, 2003 p. 34.)   Evidence and support for this suggestion have gained considerably in over the last years 
and the fundamentally rhythmic nature of motor and sensory processes will again be discussed here.  Secondly, I did not 
propose anything as absolute as claiming that no non-human animals had any beat-keeping abilities.  Instead I was aiming to 
isolate features of a “musical” pulse that distinguished it from the many other forms of pulse and rhythmic structurings that 
are inherent in a range of human and non-human behaviours and communicative forms (Bispham, 2006).  A methodological 
concern that remains pertinent was that, in order to identify a definite homology or analogy in animal behaviours, we need to 
confirm similar psychological mechanisms as well as a similarly observable physical product.  The conclusions I put forward 
focused particularly on period correction mechanisms and a corresponding awareness of the temporal framework and the 
sustained nature of engagement.  I argue that, although the relevant literatures have advanced considerably, these suggestions 
still hold weight and will again feature here, as will the notion that musical pulse is primarily rooted in providing a temporal 
framework; collective emotionality; a feeling of shared experience; and cohesiveness to group activities and ritualistic 
ceremonies.  However, I now also propose that this perspective needs to be broadened further to include both the 
management of interpersonal interaction and individual behavioural and experience.   
The first few sections of this chapter will briefly describe our central experience of time and timing mechanisms.  I will 
highlight the notion that a musical pulse is built upon these core mechanisms, but is not distinct at these fundamental levels 
of cognition and experience.  Of particular importance is the evidence presented for a time span that commonly corresponds 
to the perception of a perceptual present.  Later argument in this chapter will show how a musical pulse and corresponding 
mechanisms for period correction afford a constantly renewing link from one perceptual present to another.  The subsequent 
section on dynamic attending theory is also critical to understanding the mechanisms involved in a musical pulse and why it 
is, in particular, an attentional structure.  This theory describes processes that are inherent in any attentional pulse.  Hence, 
these also are not, I propose, intrinsically unique to a musical pulse.  It is, instead, the particular generative features of 
attentional structure in a musical pulse that will be argued to be distinct later in the chapter.   
The Experience of Time – Temporal Ranges 
It is indicative of what music is, how it is embedded in the central features of our being and experience, that in trying to 
describe the basic building blocks of a “simple” musical pulse we are, from the outset, reliant upon describing mechanisms 
that form our essential understanding of the flow of life events and phenomenological experience.  Reflections on time and 
experience are, of course, long-standing and highly complex.  Over 2000 years ago Aristotle deduced the continuity of time 
– its infinite divisibility – from the continuity of motion.  This subsequently was deduced from the continuity of the space 
negotiated.  Time here is, as Gale describes, “made continuous by the indivisible, present-now moment, which links the past 
to the future by serving as the termination of the past and the beginning of the future” (2016, p.1).  This is only a starting 
point to intense philosophical debates, straddling our central understandings of physics and psychology, which are far 
beyond our current scope of enquiry.  However, we can understand this description of continuities being experienced in 
conjunction with our fundamental nature to perceive temporal ranges as being simultaneous, sequential, flowing/happening, 
present, experienced or anticipated.  Pöppel (1999, 1999/2000), for example, describes three basic temporal experiences: 
 Bispham (2018) 37 
simultaneity; non-simultaneity; and temporal order; and has suggested that the temporal processing of sequential information 
can be classified into four temporal ranges37.   
London (2012) offers a comprehensive discussion on the relevance of these temporal ranges in music.  The most crucial for 
understanding the structure and phenomenological experience of a musical pulse corresponds with a range categorised (e.g. 
Block and Gruber, 2014) as a time span of roughly 30ms-3-5secs.  This is both the time range within which we can feel and 
follow a “beat” in music and in which, more broadly speaking, events appear as a changing present – there is an experience 
of time flowing and experience happening.  This has been supported, for example, in paradigms of film-frames/snapshots 
being presented at increasing interstimulus intervals (e.g. men walking and bread being toasted [Gruber & Block 2013]).  
Participants generally reported that the flow of time starts to get lost at about 3secs and has completely disappeared by 7secs.  
The same authors also presented subjects with the first four notes of Beethoven’s fifth symphony and reported that people no 
longer recognised it at an interstimulus interval above 3 seconds and also reported that it didn’t sound like music (Gruber & 
Block 2013).  This all fits well with earlier research arguing that 3secs is a time constant in perceptual tasks representing a 
central neural mechanism that functions to integrate successive events into a “gestalt” in order to create a “subjective 
present” (Pöppel, 1973, 1978).  Much empirical evidence has, also, been collected to support the theoretical framework of 
the ‘psychological present’ in perception across modalities and in both perceptual and motor behaviour (see Wittmann & 
Pöppel, 1999/2000).   It is no coincidence, of course, that music and melody provide constantly an ideal example in 
philosophical discourse on the binding of temporal experience (e.g. Husserl, 1977).  It is within this temporal range that 
repetitive isochronous events have been shown to easily build perceptual expectancies towards future events (Jones, 1989; 
Large & Jones, 1999) and in which musical pulse is primarily operational (London, 2005; 2012). 
Overlapping considerably with the previous time span is the notion of the “specious present” (James, 1890) or “living 
present” [lebendige Gegenwart] (Husserl, 1991).  In the simplest sense this is a subjective experience of “now” of the 
“present moment”.  James’ original estimate for this phenomenon was that it varied in length from a few seconds to 
“probably not more than minute” (p. 642).  Block and Gruber’s review concludes that subsequent research suggests a time 
interval of about 3 secs to, arguably, about 7 secs, “during which the brain can compare and analyze very recent high 
density memories in working memory” (p. 130)38.  James famously describes that “the practically cognized present is no 
knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look into two 
directions into time” (p. 609). Further on he states that “its content is in a constant flux, events dawning into its forward end 
as fast as they fade out of its rearward one … meanwhile the specious present, the intuited duration, stands permanent, like 
the rainbow on the waterfall, with its own quality unchanged by the events that stream through it” (p. 630).  This idea that 
this “present” enables our awareness of change and sequence but is also itself a constant, invariable structural form of 
consciousness is also reflected in Husserl’s characterisation of the standing present [nunc stans].  Husserl argues, however, 
that this is “flowing” rather than static.  He concludes that “what abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow. That is 
to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout, but each phase has one and the same form” (1991, p. 118). As Dainton 
(2014, p. 391) summarises, his characterisation “combines sameness – an “absolutely abiding form” – with continual change 
and renewal… it is an invariant structural feature of our consciousness”. 
The main point with regard to the concerns of this thesis is that the range of time that generally equates to a single musical 
pulse is broadly experienced as a perceptual present.  Therefore, by operating within a pulsed framework in music, we are 
constantly and continually joining one “moment” to the next (and with reference to the prior moment).  The particular nature 
of period correction mechanisms in music will be discussed below to constitute an important psychological and 
phenomenological distinction between musical pulse and the general flow of experienced time. 
Timing Mechanisms 
It seems uncontroversial to assume that fundamental abilities to perceive and interact with the temporal structures of the 
physical world and to direct our movements in time are present in higher-order senescent animals.  Leading researchers on 
comparative timing confidently state, for example, that “humans share with other animals an ability to measure the passage 
of physical time and subjectively experience a sense of time passing” (Allwood et al. 2014, p. 743) and that “an essential 
component of primate cognitive function is the ability to extract and represent temporal information from the environment.  
The quantification of the passage of time, in turn, is crucial to coordinate motor behavior” (Zarco, 2009, p. 3192).  The 
                                                 
37 His description of the types of temporal order and the time spans involved has provoked some discussion and refinement (see Block and 
Gruber, 2014).  However, the shortest two have been accepted as being pretty clear and uncontroversial (see Eisler et al., 2008): 
• 0-2ms:  Within this temporal interval range simultaneous and non-simultaneous events are perceived to be simultaneous (Hosokawa et al., 
1981; Moore, 1993). 
• 2/3ms-20/40ms:  Events separated by this temporal range create the impression of non-simultaneity but the temporal order of events - 
which of two events came first - cannot be confidently or unerringly distinguished (Hirsh, 1959; Lotze et al., 1999; Mills & Rollman, 1980; 
Steinbüchel et al., 1996; Pastore & Farrington, 1996).  
 It is important to note that these time-ranges seem to be operational across modalities, and in both perception and performance.  Studies 
have shown, for example, that the threshold between events whose temporal order are or are not distinguishable is consistent for acoustic, 
visual and tactile stimuli (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961).  Furthermore, timing processes inherent in kinesthetic abilities is constant across a range 
of effectors (Zelaznik & Smith, 1992). 
38 Although the question of whether the processing of larger timing intervals is operated by similar or overlapping mechanisms is open 
(Gibbon et al., 1997), it is widely accepted that durations exceeding 3-7 seconds involve an additional memory process that links past 
moments with the present (Fraisse, 1984).  This further timing mechanism is thought to bind successive events in perceptual units of 2 to 3 
seconds (Block, 1990; Fraisse, 1984; Pöppel, 1978; 1997).  Pöppel terms this process the formation of perceptual Gestalts.  The wide-
ranging literature on estimations of prospective and retrospective time intervals goes beyond the scope of this thesis (see Pöppel 1999). 
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nature of the central timing machinery – the ‘internal clock’ - has been the subject of a huge body of psychological 
modelling, experimental research, and debate (see Allman et al, 2014; Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Grondin, 2014)39.  It is 
particularly important to note that, although the literature has by and large supported a pacemaker-accumulator model, much 
of the focus of experimental tasks has been on the timing of single, isolated durations in human and non-human animals 
(Hills, 2003; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006).   
Dynamic Attending Theory 
An important model of timing, that has generally been viewed to have the most targeted relevance to relative timing and 
extended rhythmic contexts, is Jones’ Dynamic Attending model (Jones, 1976; Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large, 1994), in which 
internal oscillatory mechanisms create points of attentional focus and expectation (Large & Jones, 1999; Jones & McAuley, 
2005).  This theory is not so much focused on judgments of time as on the operational side of how we and other animals 
interact in time with our environments.  Central to the theory is the view that attention is not a continuous operation but 
rather one in which we constantly build expectancies and subsequently direct efficient energy pulses towards expected 
events whilst reacting to the unexpected.  A key feature of this model therefore is that it is attentionally future-directed with 
internal predictions based upon perceived regularities and/or learned patterns of events entraining with the external world.  
Large and Jones (1999, p.123) explain succinctly that:  
The goal-oriented mechanism reflects expectancy and attentional set; it is concerned with deliberate changes in focal 
attending (e.g., Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1992).  For instance, an individual may react faster to an object in an 
attended-to-location or may be successfully instructed to ignore certain objects in a forthcoming display.  By 
contrast, the stimulus-driven mechanism reflects fast (some claim automatic) attentional shifts, usually caused by a 
single salient feature or an abrupt display change.  For instance, the abrupt onset of a non-target object may provoke 
a rapid attentional shift to it and away from a target object – (i.e. attentional capture) (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Yantis 
& Hillstrom, 1994). 
Differing models of Dynamic Attending Theory have been proposed (e.g. Large, 1994; McAuley 1995).  A full discussion of 
the different approaches is beyond our current scope.  However, they all share four fundamental concepts (see Jones 2016):  
1) Neural oscillations are self-sustaining; generating inferred expectancies over time;  2) An oscillator has an intrinsically 
stable period that is only briefly disrupted by a violation of expectation;  3) Entraining oscillations can adaptively correct 
both its phase and period in response to violations of expectancy in a stimulus;  4) Multiple related oscillations are activated 
by multiple time levels within complex metrically and rhythmically structured events. 
 
In recent years the dynamic attending theory framework has been shown to be an excellent theoretical fit with results of 
research into neural entrainment.  Stimulus events occurring at excitable phases of entrained neural oscillations are, for 
example, more likely to be detected or be responded to more quickly (Cravo et al., 2013; Schroeder and Lakatos, 2009; 
Stefanics et al., 2010). Henry and Herrmann (2014) suggest specifically that oscillations in the excitable phase of low-
frequency neural oscillations in the delta-theta range might reflect correlates of the attentional oscillation with peaks 
correlating with the attentional pulse in models of dynamic attending theory. Interestingly from a comparative perspective 
“rhythmic” sensory stimuli have been shown to correlate with entrainment of brain oscillations in humans, macaque 
monkeys, and zebrafish (Lakatos et al, 2008; Saleh, et al, 2010; Sumbre, et al, 2008). Wilson and Cook (2016, p. 3) note that 
“in macaques and humans, at least, this propagation of timing extends up to and includes the motor system”.  This is 
evidenced by decreased reaction times under conditions of rhythmic input (Lakatos et al., 2008; Praamstra et al, 2006; Saleh 
et al., 2010). 
 
Dynamic Attending Theory has been associated particularly with music as it naturally resonates with models of musical time 
(see Jones 2016) and offers a clear explanatory model for the psychology of pulse in music.  The generically increased levels 
of predictability and stability in music have also made it an ideal experimental testing ground and empirical paradigm for the 
theory.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the theory in itself seeks to explain our broad capacities to interact with the 
temporalities of our movements and environments rather than music specifically.  A key point, therefore, is that a musical 
pulse is not intrinsically separate but rather is built upon more generalisable mechanisms that are employed in a specific way 
(in particular being framed by attentional correction mechanisms discussed below).  These different models naturally suggest 
some key questions for the concerns of a comparative perspective on music: Are beat perception and interval timing 
facilitated by different neural circuits? And are they constituent processes of a wider internal clock, or are they two divergent 





                                                 
39 Incorporating arguments for shared mechanisms across perception and performance, the search for an internal clock has largely been 
dominated by the sensory-accumulator model in which pulses that are emitted regularly by a pacemaker are temporarily stored in an 
accumulator (Woodrow, 1930; Treisman, 1963; Gibbon et al., 1984; Ivry and Richardson, 1995; Meck, 2003; see Buhusi & Meck, 2005).  
Over the course of the last decade in particular the emphasis has shifted towards understanding the neural basis of and mechanism for 
interval timing (see Gibbon et al., 1997; Harrington et al., 2004; Ivry and Spencer, 2004; Merchant et al. 2013; Bahusi & Meck 2005). 
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Beat-Based Versus Duration-Based Timing 
The following section discusses evidence showing a clear neurophysiological distinction between beat-based and duration-
based timing in humans.  I will also show that relative (beat-based) timing is a clear and critical difference between our 
species and other primate species who appear to operate almost exclusively through an understanding of absolute timings.  
Finally, I present three evolutionary hypotheses (Patel & Iversen, 2014; Large et al., 2015; Honing & Merchant, 2013) for 
the emergence of beat-based timing in humans arguing that they are complementary rather than being mutually exclusive. 
 
By and large perceiving and producing musical rhythms are strongly associated with areas of the brain involved in motor 
function (see Cameron and Grahn, 2015; see below).  Neuroscientific and neuropsychological studies seem also to strongly 
suggest a difference between beat-based and non-beat based timing.  In response to rhythms that induce a beat compared to 
those that do not, the basal ganglia and supplementary motor areas are more active (Grahn & Brett, 2007; Grahn & Rowe, 
2009; Teki et al., 2011).  Conversely, during absolute timing perception and active tasks the cerebellum is more active 
(Grube et al. 2010; Teki et al. 2011).  Interestingly, in a continuous tapping task comparing beat-based and non-beat based 
rhythms, the basal ganglia’s response profile suggests a role in beat prediction, but not in beat finding (Grahn & Rowe, 
2013).   However, Kung et al. (2013) found the opposite with a different task requirement in which the contrast was between 
the initial phase of active tapping to a beat-based rhythm and listening to an isochronous pattern.  Thus it seems plausible 
that the basal ganglia are involved in both beat finding and continuation depending on the task requirements and/or 
experimental controls used. 
Dissociations are also evidenced in neuropsychological work on patients with Parkinson’s disease.  Notably this disease is 
partially indicated by compromised basal ganglia function.  Patients consistently show selective deficit in discriminating 
changes in beat-based rhythms but not non-beat based rhythm (Grahn and Brett, 2009).   Rhythmic auditory stimulation (e.g. 
Thaut et al. 2015) has also been shown to be a highly successful therapeutic tool in Parkinson’s patients and will be 
discussed further below.  A consistent contrast is that patients with cerebellar degeneration show a deficit for absolute rather 
than relative timing (Grube et al., 2010a). 
Further support for a functional distinction comes from FMRI studies of processing material that can be interpreted either 
relatively or in absolute terms.  McAuley et al. (2006) devised an interestingly ambiguous paradigmatic stimulus in which a 
periodic (600ms) beat is implied but not explicitly emphasized.  This leads to contrasting reports from participants of either 
slowing down or speeding up at the end of a row of tones, thus indicating a difference in whether the sequence was 
processed in relation to the implied beat or in terms of more absolute interstimulus intervals.  Crucially both processes were 
equally effective as researchers found no evidence that duration-based timing was less accurate or precise than beat-based 
timing.  Subsequent neuroscientific analysis (Grahn & McAuley 2009) supports the idea that different strategies are 
supported by cortical activation differences reflecting the engagement of different neural timing mechanisms.  The authors 
conclude (p. 1901) “that individual differences in behavioral bias toward beat perception correspond to activation differences 
in left cortical motor areas and insula, whereas the opposite bias is correlated with right premotor and posterior auditory 
cortex activation.” 
Overall it seems that, in the range of timings relevant to beat-based processing/entrainment, neuroscientific research supports 
the idea that the cerebellum is connected with absolute timing of subsecond intervals (Diedrichsen et al. 2003; Grube et al. 
2010a,b; Teki et al. 2011), and that corticostriatal circuits are more operational in the relative timing of suprasecond intervals 
and in beat-based perception and production (Coull et al. 2011; Grahn & Brett 2009; Grahn & McAuley 2009; Grahn & 
Rowe 2012; Meck 2005; Schwartze et al. 2011, 2012a,b; Teki et al. 2011).   
Absolute vs relative timing in primates 
It seems likely that duration-based timing mechanisms are widely shared amongst primate species but that beat-based timing 
is either unique or particularly advanced by many degrees in humans.  An important study addressing this issue was carried 
out by Zarco et al. (2009).  They showed that (after extensive training [11-25months!]) three Rhesus Macaques were able to 
produce coordinated tapping movements, matching a range of randomly presented tempi (450-1000ms), during a 
synchronization–continuation task (SCT). Analysis was collected from brief bouts in which the animals produced six 
isochronous intervals in a sequence, three guided by stimuli, followed by three internally timed (without the sound) intervals 
The macaques generally reproduced the intervals with slight underestimations in the region of 50ms and the variability 
between inter-tap intervals generally increased, as it does in humans (see below) in positive correlation to the target interval.  
Donnet et al (2014) have subsequently shown that these monkeys use an explicit timing strategy to perform the SCT, similar 
to humans (Doumas & Wing 2007), in which they produce isochronous rhythmic movements by temporalizing the pause 
between movements and not the movements’ duration.  Unlike human sensorimotor synchronization (see below), however, 
the taps of macaques typically occur about 250 ms after stimulus onset.  Thus while some predictive mechanism is suggested 
in that the figure is lower than expected reflex reactions40, it strongly suggests that the monkeys were not using an analogous 
beat-based strategy to humans.  In the strict sense of the term they were not entrained and were relying primarily on absolute 
rather than relative cues.  EEG studies on rhesus monkeys also tentatively support this distinction showing MMN (mismatch 
negativities) for violations of simple regularities but not to a musical beat (Honing et al, 2012).  Another interesting 
                                                 
40 Merchant and Honing (2014) describe some unpublished effort to lower this positive mean asynchrony following further incentives and 
claim to have been able to reduce to a following response to roughly 100ms. 
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difference to human participants on similar trials (see below) is that the macaques showed no bias toward auditory as 
opposed to visual cues for synchronization. 
Some other studies have reported sensorimotor synchronization in chimpanzees and bonobos.  However, while the studies 
are relevant and perhaps indicative of some form of oscillatory entraining mechanism, the details are less impressive than the 
article titles might suggest.  Hattori et al (2013) describe spontaneous entrainment to an auditory rhythm in a chimpanzee 
using keyboard keys.  However, only one of three animals showed any signs of entrainment and exclusively in short bursts 
when the metronomic so-called “distractor sound” was at 600ms, near the animals preferred rate of 579ms.  In other words it 
showed brief phase alignments but no evidence of consistent period correction (see below).  Large and Gray (2015) also 
report ‘spontaneous tempo and rhythmic entrainment in a Bonobo (Pan paniscus)’ – ‘Kuni’.  Whilst they analyze and report 
that entrainment episodes were highly unlikely to have occurred by chance, only 13% of 214 episodes of simultaneous 
drumming in which Kuni produced at least 12 contiguous drum strikes were significantly entrained with the metronome.  
Although, the authors used different tempi they all were very close to Kuni’s preferred (and fast!) tempo of 270bpm – 
(230bpm – 280bpm).  Once again it seems that the bonobo exhibited a degree of occasional oscillatory phase alignment 
rather than any form of consistent attentional entrainment and error correction41. 
 
The current evidence does seem to suggest some impressive absolute timing capabilities in primates similar to our own, but, 
by and large, a lack of beat-based or relative processing. Darwin most likely was at best partially right when he wrote that 
“the perception, if not the enjoyment, of musical cadences and of rhythm is probably common to all animals, and no doubt 
depends on the common physiological nature of their nervous systems” (Darwin, 1871, p. 174). 
 
Three hypotheses on the evolution of beat-based timing in humans 
Patel & Iverson’s  (2014) suggestions for the action simulation for auditory prediction (ASAP) hypothesis describe that the 
motor planning system uses “a simulation of body movement (specifically, of periodic movement patterns) to entrain its 
neural activity patterns to the beat period, and that these patterns are communicated from motor planning regions to auditory 
regions where they serve as a predictive signal for the timing of upcoming beats and shape the perceptual interpretation of 
rhythms” (p. 1).  They also make specific neuroanatomical predictions that the neural substrates of beat perception involve 
the dorsal auditory pathway, and that this might be a possible locus of neuroanatomical differences between humans and 
monkeys.  Neuroanatomically this may prove to be an interesting evolutionary suggestion, especially as it may also relate to 
vocal learning in our recent evolutionary past. However, the ASAP theory, as it stands, suffers from the fact that the music or 
beat appears, here, to exist physically before it is perceived. Music is seemingly being described as an autonomous physical 
product which, particularly in an evolutionary context, is problematic.  In this respect the theory of neural resonance may 
provide an alternative understanding of the nature of the processes which operate both in terms of perception and 
performance. 
In contrast to the ASAP hypothesis, the neural resonance approach (Large et al., 2015) makes specific predictions about the 
nature of the neurodynamic processes involved in musical rhythm perception (see Large, 2008; Large and Snyder, 2009) 
rather than the neuroanatomical locus.  It claims, in essence, a more gradual link between human and primate beat-based 
timing abilities arguing that “an oscillatory network interaction can lead to spontaneous pulse induction in complex 
rhythms—even in the most extreme case of a rhythm for which there is no energy at the pulse frequency (Large, 2010; 
Velasco and Large, 2011)” (p. 7)  This evolutionary possibility would seem to correlate with local field potential (LFP) 
studies in macaque monkeys showing beta- and gamma- band oscillations measured during synchronization-continuation 
tasks (Bartolo et al., 2014) and observations of beta oscillations in the basal ganglia during synchronization and continuation 
(Bartolo and Merchant, 2015; Merchant & Bartolo, 2017; see Merchant et al., 2015a).  Large and colleagues explain that 
these suggest differential roles in rhythmic tapping versus stimulus processing and further support their role in the striato-
thalamocortical circuit during control of rhythm.  Activation of cell populations in the premotor cortex of rhesus macaques 
that appear to be stimulus-predicting cells also appear to respond to regularly timed visual or auditory stimuli (Merchant et 
al., 2015).  The neural resonance approach currently falls short, however, of providing a definite interpretation of the 
differences between human and primate timing capacities.  They themselves acknowledge this and tentatively suggest that 
“species differences could be accommodated within a neural resonance framework, for example, simply in terms of the 
differences in auditory-motor coupling (see e.g., Merchant and Honing, 2013)” (p. 10). 
Merchant & Honing’s gradual audiomotor evolution hypothesis suggests that rhythmic entrainment (or beat-based timing) 
developed gradually in primates, peaking in humans but is present only with limited properties in other non-human primates.  
The approach highlights that macaques show equivalent temporal performance to humans in tasks that involve the 
perception and production of single intervals. For example, the authors reference Mendez et al., (2011) who showed that the 
relative psychometric threshold for the categorization of single intervals given by brief visual cues is very similar between 
humans and macaques.  They argue that as, in humans, audition dominates temporal processing (Repp and Penel, 2002; 
Bertelson and Aschersleben, 2003), it is quite possible that the human auditory system has advantaged contact to the 
temporal and sequential mechanisms working inside the mCBGT circuit and that this partially determines the excellent 
rhythmic abilities of our species.  This, as the authors, explain matches suggestions by Rauschecker and Scott (2009) that 
                                                 
41 In a recent interactional, but not necessarily “pulsed”, tapping study with chimpanzees one of four chimpanzees (Chloe) did produce 
significant convergence in both tapping tempo and timing towards those of a conspecific partner in auditory and face-to-face settings (Yu & 
Tomonaga, 2015; 2016).  Even with this individual, however, synchronization was relatively weak compared to that of humans and it is not 
entirely clear to what degree her performance was due to specifically relative processing. 
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“the privileged access of the humans’ auditory system to the sequential and temporal machinery of the mCBGT circuit 
emerged gradually in the course of evolution from precursors of the great ape lineage” (p.5).  They also cite further support 
from a study showing that the connectivity between the superior temporal auditory areas and the frontal lobe in chimpanzees 
has an intermediate level of complexity when compared with macaques and humans (Rilling et al., 2008; Petrides and 
Pandya, 2009).  It would be premature to try to conclude anything definite at this stage.  However, all three hypotheses are to 
be commended on offering clear predictions and potential routes for future experimental support or falsification. This is 
clearly an area that will be explored further in the next few years. 
 
Other less closely related species have been argued to exhibit entrainment capabilities (see below) but, despite some 
understandable excitement and interest, these need to be understood comparatively in terms of whether or not they represent 
a true analogy to how sensorimotor synchronization is psychologically manifest in our species.  Sensorimotor 
synchronization has been extensively studied for over a century (Stevens, 1886; see Repp 2005; 2013) predominantly in an 
experimental paradigm in which participants tap to match a range of metronomic and/or perturbed stimuli.  The research and 
experimental findings are of course indicative of some of the mechanisms involved in temporal coordination in music 
perception and performance.  We should be clear, however, that a full understanding of interpersonal musical entrainment 
(Bispham, 2003; Clayton et al 2005) in interactive and social contexts requires an additional understanding of our capacities 
for culture action-mirroring and intersubjectivity (see Himberg 2014; Keller et al. 2015; Nowicki et al. 2013; see below). 
Sensorimotor Synchronisation in Humans 
 
Sensorimotor synchronization describes behaviours in which we match our actions to an external source based upon 
generated expectations as to the timing of future events.  In its simplest form it describes a simple task to tap with a 
metronomic beat – a task we universally find to be straightforward and almost irresistible.  Before moving on to tasks in 
which participants match an external source, the next section describes experimental analyses of participants producing a 
simple periodic pulse.  Attentional mechanisms that afford this capacity provide a clear psychological, and behaviourally 
observable, difference between this and instances in which the biomechanical nature of a particular action in humans and/or 
other animals produces a reasonably steady “beat”.  In the following section I will present hypotheses as to how we perceive 
synchronized action and why, in sensorimotor synchronization tasks, we tend to tap asynchronously slightly ahead of the 
beat.  Understanding this is crucial to a comparative analysis of whether capacities exhibited in other species are truly 
analogous to sensorimotor synchronization in humans.  Also crucial in this respect is a full understanding of the correction 
mechanisms involved in maintaining coordination with an external source and/or interactive partner.  I will, therefore, also 
describe phase and period correction mechanisms, the latter being more cognitively challenging, subject to a degree of 
awareness and volitional control, and arguably specific, amongst communicative settings, to a musical pulse.  Finally, I will 
present analysis of documented cases of sensorimotor synchronization in the animal kingdom arguing, with reference to the 
cognitive theories and models in the preceding sections, that none provide a full psychological and behavioural analogy to 




The pioneering study into isochronous serial interval production (ISIP) was run by Stevens in 1886.   Participants were 
instructed to continue a metronomically established pulse (360ms-1500ms) and the analysis established some important 
findings.  Subjects, predictably, had no problems adjusting to the response rate of the metronome beat and could maintain it 
over extended periods.  However, this study showed considerable variability in performance and an increased variability 
with increases in temporal interval.  Stevens (1886) observed from a visual inspection of the data that variability between the 
target interval and the mean of the intervals produced by the subjects remained within about 5% of the standard deviation 
and that variability was evident on two distinct levels (Ibid).  Short-term fluctuations were characterised by a zig-zag shape 
such that two sequent variations in the same direction were rare and longer waves extending over the sequence (subsequently 




Subsequent studies have confirmed a typical standard deviation of ISIP series of between 3-6 percent of the inter-onset-
interval (IOI)42 with a variety of experimental controls and tasks affecting the levels of dispersion to some degree (e.g. Keele 
et al., 1985; Madison, 1998; Michon, 1967; Wing & Kristofferson, 1973b).  A training effect has been evidenced with 
feedback reducing dispersion by thirty percent (Nagasaki, 1990).  Nevertheless, dispersion remains reasonably substantial 
even in the case of extensive rhythmic training (Madison, 1992) and indications as to whether musicians produce less 
dispersion is mixed with some studies supporting improved periodicity (Franêk et al., 1991; Keele et al,. 1985) and others 
showing no difference (Madison, 1999; Yamada & Tsumura, 1998).  The increased interval to interval deviations with 
increases in IOI observed by Stevens as well as the ‘zig-zag shape’ – whereby an interval longer than the mean is frequently 
followed by an interval shorter than the mean – have also been further validated (Vorberg & Hambuch, 1984; Vorberg & 
Wing, 1996; Wing & Kristofferson, 1973a; 1973b).  The former has been explained as an accelerating function of the IOI 
(Fraisse, 1984) with breaks around 250ms (Wing & Kristofferson, 1973b) and 1 sec (Madison, 1998).  Madison (2000, p. 86) 
has argued that ‘the latter break is probably related to qualitative changes in performance found for other temporal tasks’ 
(Madison, 1998; Szelag, 1997).  These, he posits, may be related to a cross-modal retention or integration limit around one 
                                                 
42 Inter-onset-interval simply refers to the time between taps. It is effectively a measure of the speed/tempo of the metronome or beat. 
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second, in auditory (Crowder, 1993; Kubovy & Howard, 1976; Mates et al., 1994; Pöppel, 1996; 1997; Warren, 1993) and 
visual processing (Freyd & Johnson, 1987). 
 
The ‘zig-zag’ negative first-order correlation observation has been influentially modelled mathematically by Wing and 
Kristofferson (1973).  They supposed that a series of timed pulses are generated by an internal timekeeper.  In their model 
each internally generated interval is subject to a delay in motor implementation before the occurrence of an observable 
response.  Internally generated intervals and motor implementation delay are seen to be independent and subject to random 
variability such that, over successive responses, the observed lag-one autocorrelation is predicted.  Importantly, the model 
suggests that this occurs as a result of the two-level architecture with distinct and behaviourally dissociable random 
fluctuations in both timekeeper and motor implementation and not from some form of feedback mechanism.  Numerous 
studies each emphasising different variables such as the age of the participants, levels of ‘clumsiness’, and time perception 
as well as using a variety of effectors have supported the model (see Wing, 2002).  They have unsurprisingly shown that 
increased variance with increases in inter-tap-intervals result from variances in the internal timekeeper (Wing 1980).  
Typically, relatively short sequences have been used in support of the model in order to avoid the factor of ‘drift’ and efforts 
have been advanced to adapt the model to make explicit allowance for resultant estimator bias (e.g. Vorberg & Wing, 1996).  
Drift refers to involuntary substantial fluctuations in the mean proportional to the IOI over time – essentially a form of 
subconscious accelerando and ritardando.  It constitutes a positive higher-order dependency as several intervals in succession 
become increasingly shortened or lengthened.  Madison (1998; 2001) has notably attempted to incorporate the extent to 
which drift contributes to variability in isochronous tapping tasks.  His model of variability accounts for and distinguishes 
between negative first-order correlation and drift by subtracting a linear marked trend in a sequence from total dispersion 
and hence calculating the percentage of mean dispersion caused by drift.  Without going deeply into the mathematics 
employed (see Madison 2001 for details) it is clear that, even after subtraction of the trend (drift direction), the remaining 
variability retains positive higher-order dependence as shown by a 5 point moving average. 
 
We have effectively evolved an operationally cross-domain timing system that is sufficient for building expectancy and 
coordinating internal and external events, but without a need for absolute precision.  Crucially, the implication of an internal 
timekeeper model is that this experimental paradigm engages a process that deals with psychologically manifest timing 
mechanisms (partially shared with other primate species, see above) between actions (taps) rather than periodicities 
occurring naturally as a result of particular movement patterns43. Wallin et al. (2000) introducing the influential collection of 
chapters in The Origins of Music state that “most animals (including humans) have the ability to move in a metric, 
alternating fashion” (p. 11). They contend that “what is special about humans is not their capacity to move rhythmically but 
their ability to entrain their movements to an external timekeeper, such as beating a drum” (p. 12). This proposal will be 
debated further below but the studies of continuation tapping (‘periodic production’) show that, even lacking an external 
source to match, there are psychological models that we can subject to comparative analysis.  The most important point to 
take from the above discussion is that periodic production in nonhuman species can only be considered as being homologous 
(and of direct relevance) to these periodic processes if its behavioural correlates are not explicable solely in terms of 
biomechanical efficiencies.  A “musical” isochronous or “rhythmic” production implies reference to an external timekeeper 
and/or to an internally created and, in part, volitionally controlled attentional pulse (e.g., Drake & Bertrand, 2001). 
 
“Drumming” – in which animals strike repeatedly on hollow objects within their natural environment in communicative, 
territorial or courtship contexts - has variously been reported in many species including palm cockatoos (Wood, 1988), 
woodpeckers (Dodenhoff, Stark, & Johnson, 2001), and kangaroo rats (Randall, 1997).  In primates we have examples of 
bimanual drumming in gorillas (Schaller, 1963), chimpanzees (Goodall, 1986), bonobos (unpublished data mentioned in 
Fitch, 2006), and macaques (Remedios et al. 2009).  These are potentially of great relevance due to the relative phylogenetic 
proximity and possible homologies to human drumming in terms of the motor skills employed. In chimpanzees, drumming 
on buttress roots is exhibited predominantly by the dominant male in conjunction with displays of vocal pant-hooting.  
Communicative intent is suggested by aspects of the drumming being correlated with resting periods and the future direction 
of travel in group foraging.  The displays have also been shown to be both individually and culturally distinct (Arcadi et al., 
1998; 2004).  Remedios et al. (2009), observing social macaque groups, found that these animals also use artificial objects to 
produce salient “periodic” sounds.  They argue, following behavioural tests and a preferential looking analysis, that these 
drumming sounds attract the attention of listening monkeys similarly to conspecific vocalizations and that drumming sounds 
influenced the way monkeys viewed their conspecifics.  Their suggestion is that drumming serves as a multimodal signal of 
social dominance.  In an interesting neurological follow-on experiment (Remedios, 2010), they report further that the 
representations of both drumming and vocal sounds overlap in the caudal auditory cortex and the amygdala thus supporting a 
common origin of primate vocal and nonvocal communication systems and possibly by extension a gestural origin of speech 
and music.  However, in contrast to the human tapping experiments described above there is, to my knowledge, no evidence 
to suggest that these “drumming” episodes are motivated towards isochrony or that any resultant regularity goes beyond 
those inherent in the biomechanics of the actions involved.   
 
Another reported instance of the production of a steady beat in the animal kingdom is Asian elephants in northern Thailand 
and their participation in the ‘Thai Elephant Orchestra’. These elephants have been trained to strike percussion instruments.  
Baroni et al (2006) quantified the mean and standard deviation of the inter-beat-interval for eleven drumming sequence and 
found that the elephant’s drumming tempo was remarkably stable across sequences, ranging from 33.4 to 36.1 beats per 
minute (mean = 34.9, sd = 0.9). Temporal variability, quantified as the coefficient of variation of IBI within each sequence, 
averaged 3.5%, which, as the authors note, is lower than the variability found when humans tap at this tempo (typically 7%).  
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However, there was no evidence of the elephants adjusting to different tempi or efforts to match external stimuli.  It seems 
plausible, therefore, that this also reflects merely the animals’ preferred rate for a particular biomechanical action rather than 
an output with reference to a sustained attentionally driven pulse 
 
Sensorimotor synchronisation - A universal human skill 
 
It is crucial to note, in stark contrast to the studies of animal “entrainment” (see below), that this appears to be an absolutely 
universal skill in humans.  Individuals categorized as being “amusic” (see Peretz et al, 2002; Ayotte et al 2003; Peretz 2006) 
show fine-grained pitch perception difficulties (see chapter 3) but show a normal ability to synchronize movement to the 
beat of popular dance music as well as potential for improvement when given a modest amount of practice (Philips-Silver et 
al, 2013).  In the one reported case of “beat-deafness” the individual, in fact, showed near-normal synchronization with a 
metronome suggesting that his deficit was concerned with finding the beat in music (Philips-Silver et al, 2011) rather than 
sensorimotor synchronization per se.  Typically this ability is developed by the age of 4-6 with age-specific entrainment 
regions evidently narrower in childhood and late adulthood than in midlife (see McAuley et al, 2006).  ERP studies would 
appear to further suggest that some form of beat induction and corresponding future expectation is innately neurologically 
manifest (Winkler et al. 2009). 
 
In the much explored experimental paradigm of tapping to an isochronous and/or perturbed metronomic stimulus, 
participants naturally exhibit considerably reduced variability (Dunlap, 1910).  In some ways, presumably reflecting some of 
the difficulties in self-pacing, this task appears to be neurologically less complex than free continuation tapping (Rao et al, 
1997; Gerloff et al, 1998 Miall, 2004 cf. Jantzen et al 2004).  However, it is also necessarily dependent upon additional error 
correction mechanisms to counteract individual timing and motor variabilities and maintain perceived synchronisation 
(Mates, 1994; Schulze & Vorberg, 2001; Semjen et al., 1998).  Assuming that the inter-onset-interval (IOI) is set between 
100-170msec and roughly 1.8 seconds participants generally have no problems with this task.  It is important to note that the 
lower IOI limit seems to relate to an auditory integration window estimated in studies of the mismatch negativity (e.g. Yabe, 
et al 1997; Näätänen 1998; Yabe et al., 1998).  Musically trained individuals appear to be able to synchronise at lower IOI 
settings and may correspondingly, as Repp (2005) suggests, have particularly narrow integration windows allowing optimal 
temporal resolution of events.  It is also interesting to note that the lower synchronization threshold is about four times as 
high for stationary visual stimuli as it is for auditory stimuli (Repp, 2003).  This lower IOI limit also seems to correspond in 
music to the shortest duration of tones that can operate as individual elements in a musical rhythm (Friberg & Sundström, 
2002; London, 2002, 2012).  Generally speaking tones that are shorter than 100ms tend to be perceived as being ornamental 
in function.  Repp (2005 p. 973) summarises that the lower and upper IOI limits are musically relevant in that they coincide 
approximately with “those within which a sequence of events can be perceived to have rhythmic and metrical structure 
(Bolton, 1894; Fraisse, 1982; London, 2004)”.  Beyond these limits additional mechanisms or techniques of psychological 
amalgamation or subdivision are putatively assumed to be operational (see London 2012 for further discussion).  Crucially in 
terms of some of the later conclusions in this thesis the upper IOI limit can be seen to be connected to the perceptual present 
and the temporal capacity of working memory (see above, Pöppel, 1997; Szelag et al., 1996; Wittmann & Pöppel, 
1999/2000). 
 
  The perception of sensorimotor synchronisation – evidence from asynchronies 
 
One of the most critical and consistent features of sensorimotor synchronisation is that we tend to tap prior to the stimulus 
onset.  This is commonly termed ‘negative mean asynchrony’ (NMA) and presents evidence of a predictive mechanism and 
stable entrainment.  Although our taps precede the stimulus, we will experience our actions as being precisely aligned.  The 
reasons for this perception of synchrony has been the subject of much debate and varied hypotheses44.  
                                                 
44 The earliest suggestion was the Nerve-Conduction (Paillard-Fraisse) Hypothesis, in which the origins of NMA are seen to be in the 
integration peripheral processes.  The tactile and kinaesthetic feedback to the brain from the tap is argued to be slower than the auditory 
sensory information.  Hence the theory is that the tap has to precede the click to establish synchrony at the level of central representation 
(Aschersleben & Prinz, 1995; 1997; Fraisse, 1980; Paillard, 1949).   Supporting this hypothesis is evidence of increased NMA in foot-
tapping versus finger-tapping (Aschersleben & Prinz, 1995; Billon et al., 1996) and in studies that artificially increase and/or delay auditory 
feedback (Ascherleben, 1995, 1997; Ascherleben & Prinz, 2007; Mates & Aschersleben, 2000; O’Boyle & Clarke, 1996; Mates et al., 1992).  
Considering the varying quantitative synaptic transmissions involved, this model can also accommodate effects of the pacing signal’s 
sensory modality on the magnitude of NMA (Kolers and Brewster, 1985; Müller et al. 2001).  Significantly, however, the hypothesis cannot 
accommodate results showing the order of NMA produced by different effecting organs nor results indicating effects of practice 
(Aschersleben, 1994; 2000a; 2000b); musical expertise (Ludwig, 1992; Repp and Doggett; Repp, 1999; Krause et al 2010; Fujii et al. 2011); 
changes in the duration of the tap (Vos et al 1995); changes in the force of the tap (Aschersleben et al., 2003a; Gehrke, 1996); or the nature 
of the inter-interval space (Thaut 1997; Repp, London & Keller 2005; 2008; 2011; 2013). 
 
The Perceptual (P)-centre hypothesis proposes that perceived synchronisation occurs not at the onsets of tap and pacing signal but rather 
at their respective perceptual centres.  Effectively the longer the duration of the stimulus, the more the p-centre is shifted away from the 
stimulus onset.  Thus the hypothesis accords with a delayed p-centre in finger tapping versus the rather curt auditory clicks that are 
commonly used (Vos et al., 1995).  This hypothesis, however, fails to account for all the effects on NMA outside of the duration of the 
pacing signal. 
 
The Sensory Accumulator Model supposes that an external event has to be experienced as one neural entity.  As such it shares with the 
nerve-conduction hypothesis the notion that synchrony is fundamentally established at the level of central representation.  In contrast, 
however, it is the density of afferent neural signals generated by the physical events that determine the processing times necessary for the 
creation of the neural state.  The model describes this as an ‘accumulation function’ that determines the time elapsed between an external 
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It seems fair to say, and the view of the leading figures in this research area, that the origin of the NMA in these tasks 
remains unclear with none of the models in full agreement with all the available evidence. Nevertheless, this body of 
investigation together with the analyses of putative correction mechanisms (see below) does capture some of the mechanisms 
implicit in more naturalistic human pulse-based sensorimotor coordination and thus offers some grounds from comparative 
scrutiny in other animals (see below).  A key point to make is that none of the available models suggest anything that is 
necessarily unique to a musical pulse.  Rather, they describe more general mechanisms and processes through which we 
perceive events and our own actions as being synchronized.  Addtitionally, the theoretical models and the behavioural 
evidence of NMA is crucial in comparing putatively analogous behaviours in other species.  We should, however, also be 
very clear that they by no means represent the whole picture of how sustained periodically structured coordination is 
obtained and sustained in social and/or musical settings.  It is necessarily the case that in an interactive musical setting the 
mean asynchrony in relation to an interactively generated and shared pulse between all members of a dyadic or ensemble 
performance must in effect approach zero.  Part of this can be discussed in terms of psychological and kinesthetic training 
effects in musicians.  For example, Stoklasa et al, (2012) reported that musicians playing their own brass or string instrument 
showed an almost neglible NMA when synchronising to a metronome (–2 ms) (tapping (–13 ms)).  However, even in pared 
down tapping studies of ‘social entrainment’ we seem to rely also on a degree of interpersonal resonance, action empathy 
and/or other social cues.  Himberg (2014), for example, showed that, compared to tapping with a ‘deadpan’ metronomic 
signal or a ‘phasevar’ computer program (mimicking ‘human’ variability), two humans displayed the highest degree of 
synchronisation despite higher levels of drift and “instability”.  These results, as Himberg (Ibid) states: “are strong 
indications that the “information-theoretic” concepts and experiments on time-keeping and synchronisation only cover a 
limited range of the spectrum of human timing and entrainment abilities” (p. 176).  The social nature of a musical pulse will 
be discussed further below.   
 
Error correction in isochronous and perturbed synchronisation 
 
Sustaining regular sensorimotor synchronisation, even with an artificially isochronous pulse, requires some form of 
corrective mechanisms.  Without these, timing errors due to motor and/or internal timekeeper variance (Wing & 
Kristofferson, 1973) would simply accumulate and lead to a loss of synchrony (Hary & Moore 1985; Vorberg & Wing, 
1996).  Of course in tapping with another human or in a musical setting we are subject to further voluntary and involuntary 
fluctuations due to features of individual style (Collier & Collier, 1996; 2002)) as well as expressive and structurally 
motivated modulations of tempo and microtimings (Schaffer, 1981, 1982; Gabrielsson, 1986; Palmer, 1989; Repp, 1992; 
Iyer, 2002).  Studies using experimentally controlled perturbations to the target stimuli have provided a wealth of data and 
have been interpreted with regard to two principal models of error correction mechanisms: Dynamic systems theory and 
information-processing theory. In both cases they represent, respectively, extensions of more general models of timing 
described above.  Dynamic systems theory assumes, in accordance with Jones’ dynamic attending theory (see above) that an 
external rhythmic signal evokes intrinsic neural oscillations that entrain to periodicities in the rhythmic sequence (Large, 
2008).  As such, the mathematical modelling of corrections supposes non-linearly coupled oscillators that are described 
formally in terms of differential equations (e.g., Schöner and Kelso, 1988; Fink et al., 2000; Assisi et al., 2005).  The 
information-processing theory assumes, instead, the principles of timekeeper models.  Hence error correction is described 
according to linear autoregressive processes (e.g. Vorberg and Wing, 1996).  In general, deviations of the current tap from 
the mean inter-tap interval and mean asynchrony is seen to be proportionally related to the deviation of the inter-tap interval 
and asynchrony associated with the previous tap plus random noise (Wing and Beek, 2002).  It is possible that the two 
approaches account for different synchronization processes with each, therefore, more closely describing distinct aspects of 
the task (Torre and Balasubramaniam, 2009) or it may be perhaps more parsimonious to assume that both function as a 
general control equation for referential behavior (Pressing, 1999).  Loehr et al (2011) argue that their results of sensorimotor 
synchronization analysis in piano playing preferentially fit a dynamic model.  However, the particular choice of linear model 
(Schulze et al 2005) has been questioned given the complex nature of the music (see Repp and Su, 2013).  In general, the 
majority of the experimental research projects have assumed an information-processing approach, although increasing 
evidence of oscillatory processes at the neural level (see Large et al 2015) perhaps suggests that a dynamic systems approach 
may ultimately represent a closer analogy to the true psychological processes involved. 
                                                                                                                                                        
event and its central representation. The steepness of the accumulation function and corresponding processing time in turn depends on the 
density of afferent signals.  As such the model predicts that in a standard sensorimotor synchronisation task the NMA results from a faster 
accumulation of the auditory information than the tactile/kinesthetic information (Aschersleben et al, 2003a; Gehrke, 1995; 1996).  This 
model accommodates studies of NMA with different body parts (Wohlschläger & Koch, 2000), modifications to the amplitude and force of 
the tapping motion (Aschersleben et al., 2003a; Gehrke, 1996), and effects of training and musical expertise (Aschersleben, 1994; 2000a; 
2000b; Ludwig, 1992; Repp and Doggett, 2007; Repp, 1999; Krause et al 2010; Fujii et al. 2011).  Bialunska et al. (2011) however, showed, 
contrary to the predictions of the model, that varying stimulus intensity affected simple reaction times to unpredictable stimuli but had no 
effect on the NMA. 
 
Finally, Wohlschläger & Koch (2000) argue that NMA results from errors in time perception. They hypothesised that we structure time 
with the aid of auditory signals and bodily movements and that the simplicity of the production motions and emptiness of the IOIs employed 
in experimental settings lead to errors.  This idea is again only partially supported by the diverse studies.  It does fit with certain results 
following alterations to the kinesthetic nature of the tap (Aschersleben et al., 2003a; Gehrke, 1996).  However, studies of subdividing the 
IOI with a stable inter tap interval have produced mixed evidence (with some suggestions of a musical training effect) (Flach, 2005; Zendel, 
et al, 2011; Repp 2008; Loehr and Palmer, 2011; see Repp and Su 2013).  The predictions also fail to fully encapsulate the effects on NMA 
from changes to internal and external sensory feedback (Ascherleben, 1995; O’Boyle & Clarke, 1996; Aschersleben & Prinz, 1997; Mates & 
Aschersleben, 2000; Aschersleben et al., 2001; Cooke, et al, 1985; Cole & Sedgwick, 1992; Aschersleben, et al, 2003b),  or from changes to 
the duration of the pacing signal (Vos et al., 1995). 
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Phase correction and period correction  
 
In both models two interacting correction mechanisms are widely accepted to be independently operational: phase correction 
and period correction ((Mates, 1994a, b; Repp, 2000, 2001; Semjen et al., 1998; Vorberg & Wing, 1996; see Repp, 2005).  
Phase correction essentially adjusts for asynchronies between the last response and stimulus events assuming an unchanged 
period.  Period correction instead modifies the next target interval on the basis of discrepancies between the oscillatory or 
timekeeper interval and the last or last few interstimulus intervals, thus altering the period of the attentional musical pulse.  
Phase and period correction are seen to be behaviourally and neurologically distinct.  A combination of fMRI, EEG and 
TMS studies have documented wide subcortical and cortical networks incorporating the cerebellum, basal ganglia, premotor 
cortex, supplementary motor area, sensorimotor cortex, superior temporal gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus (see Witt et al., 
2008).  Praamstra et al (2003) attempted to explicitly identify the distinction between phase and period correction in an EEG 
study that used source localization.  They positioned the former in auditory and secondary somatosensory cortices and the 
latter in medial frontal cortex, in particular the supplementary motor area.  Different patterns of functional connectivity have 
also been shown depending on whether corrections are automatic or effortful (Rao et al., 1997; Jäncke et al., 2000; Oullier et 
al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Thaut et al., 2009; Bijsterbosch et al., 2011a,b).  This putatively corresponds to phase and period 
correction respectively (see below) and the functional distinction has noticeably also received support from an fMRI study of 
SMS with virtual partners (Fairhurst et al., 2012).    
 
According to an information-processing approach phase correction mechanisms are thought to adjust for phase errors 
between stimulus and response events by taking the consciously or non-consciously perceived phase error (e.g. asynchrony) 
between the last response and stimulus events as input and subsequently correcting the next internal timekeeper interval by 
increasing or decreasing it by some fraction of that error (for a discussion of the nature of the mechanism see Schulze & 
Vorberg, 2001).  A phase correction mechanism is generally believed to be sufficient for compensating to random motor and 
timekeeper variability and thus for maintaining synchronisation with a metronomic pulse (Pressing, 1998; Semjen et al, 
1998, Semjen et al., 2000; Vorberg & Wing, 1996).  Phase correction models have also been argued to be able to solely 
account for deliberately introduced fluctuations around a constant mean period (see Repp, 2001).  Interestingly, experience 
of participating in tapping studies, but not musical expertise, has shown to reduce the phase correction response (Repp 
2010b).  This has been viewed as improved performance in that reacting less forcefully and spreading out phase correction 
over a few taps decreases the variability of asynchronies and inter-tap intervals.  In general the length of the inter onset 
interval positively affects the size of the phase correction response (Repp 2008c; Repp 2011c)45.  Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that participants can anticipate a phase correction to expected perturbations and further reduce timing errors (Repp 
and Moseley, 2012; see Van Steen & Keller, 2013).  
 
Phase correction seems to be a predominantly automatic process. It operates by and large without awareness in participants 
and is equally effective within and beyond perceptual thresholds for detecting perturbations and/or asynchonies (Repp 2000; 
2001; Repp & Penel, 2002).  This highlights that the internal processes are directly coupled to the sensory information 
without any mediation by higher cognitive function (Repp, 2001).  As such this perception-action coupling (Kelso & Kay, 
1987) is part of a wider phenomenon of sub-perceptual guidance and evidence against a necessary conscious perceptual 
mediation between sensory input and action (Neumann, 1990).  Repp and Keller (2004) further show that phase correction is 
unaffected by a diminution of attentional resources (e.g. a concurrent mental arithmetic task) and hence, unlike period 
correction, does not appear to require attention.  Intention also, only has partial effect.  Participants instructed not to react to 
perturbations in the stimulus phase show a reduction in the phase correction response but it cannot be entirely suppressed in 
the tap immediately after the perturbation (Repp 2002a; 2002c; Repp & Keller 2004).  In perturbations below perceptual 
thresholds there is no effect of intention.  Indeed this experimental finding may be partially indicative of why unintentional 
forms of auditory, locomotive, and visual entrainment occur in naturalistic settings (Schmidt and O’Brien, 1997; Richarson 
et al, 2007; Coey et al, 2011; Demos et al, 2012; Oullier et al, 2008; Van Ulzen et al, 2010; Sofianidis et al, 2012) and also 
partially indicative perhaps of why we find it almost impossible sometimes to avoid locking-in to another’s musical beat 
(Lucas et al, 2011).  It seems, effectively, that phase correction is only subject to voluntary control if we are aware of the 
perturbation.  
 
Period correction only seems to be implicated in synchonisation tasks if the timing of the external stimulus sequence is 
modified (Repp, 2001).  Naturally phase correction alone become insufficient for maintaining synchronization when 
systematic tempo fluctuations exceed a certain threshold in relation to other parameters, most notably the base tempo (e.g., 
Takano and Miyake, 2007).  Period correction adjusts the period of the timekeeper that drives the motor activity with the 
resulting new period persisting until a further correction is applied (Repp, 2001b).  The clearest examples of period 
correction in operation are therefore to be found in tempo changes to the pacing signal.   Michon (1967) first introduced 
sudden tempo changes (of 8% or more) to isochronous sequences showing that participants were able to synchronise (to 
within pre-alteration variability levels) after 4 to 5 taps.  Michon also showed that an initial overshoot in the subsequent 
inter-tap-intervals (ITIs) was followed by an individually varying gradual approximation.  His initial mathematical analysis 
that period correction is solely responsible for tracking pulse changes has subsequently been renounced in favour of 
combined models incorporating both phase and period corrections.  The initial overshoot in correction makes perfect sense if 
we suppose that both processes independently modify the timing of the next action based on respective percentages of the 
asynchrony (Repp and Keller, 2008) or the difference between the preceding inter-onset interval and the preceding 
timekeeper interval (Hary and Moore, 1985, 1987).  Two-process error correction models that account for short-term phase 
                                                 
45 Interestingly, however, given the development trajectory of entrainment capabilities the age of the participant shows no effects (Turgeon 
et al, 2009). 
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correction and longer-lasting period correction within a single model (Mates, 1994a, b; Vorberg and Schulze, 2002; Vorberg 
and Wing, 1996; Semjen et al., 1998; Schulze et al., 2005) have variously estimated phase and period correction values 
between 0.2 and 0.8 depending on variabilities in tempo, task, and analytical approach (Repp and Keller, 2004; Fairhurst et 
al., 2012; Repp et al., 2012). 
 
The perceptual liminality of the perturbation appears to be a crucial factor.  Hary & Moore (1985, 1987a) were the first to 
employ subliminal (-1.3% (10ms)) changes to a baseline IOI of 700ms.  In contrast to supraliminal alterations, results for 
subliminal (10/20ms) step changes showed a rapid adaptation without an initial overshoot.  Hary & Moore initially proposed 
a mixed phase resetting model for this finding in which period correction occurs slowly in combination with ‘mixed 
resetting’.  This has subsequently been shown to be the formal equivalent to a phase correction model in which the current 
timekeeper interval is constantly adjusted by a proportion of the most recent asynchrony (Schulze, 1992) and has become 
widely known as a linear phase correction model (Mates, 1994; Vorberg & Wing, 1996; Pressing, 1998; Semjen et al., 1998, 
2000; Repp, 2000; 2001) (see Schulze & Vorberg, 2001 for an overview).  It is important to highlight that these, however, do 
not account for the initial ITI overshoot in supraliminal corrections and predict, therefore, that a period correction 
mechanism is additionally operational in supraliminal conditions.  Thaut, et al. (1998) supported this hypothesis in an 
experiment in which they used cosine-wave modulated metronome sequences employing both subliminal and supraliminal 
step changes.  As well as confirming the presence and absence of an initial correction overshoot in supraliminal and 
subliminal corrections respectively, they also found that asychronies returned rapidly to the pre-step change level with 
supraliminal step changes, however, only very slowly after subliminal step changes.  These results, showing that internal 
period correction increases with step change magnitude as a function of awareness, have been subsequently corroborated 
(Repp 2001b; Repp and Keller, 2004) and supported by a study exploring the potential neuroscientific correlates of this 
distinction.  Stephan and colleagues (2002) showed that while ventral prefrontal cortical areas are engaged in 
subconsciousness motor adaptations to auditory stimulus, conscious motor adaptations includes additional dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex involvement. 
 
Period correction is effectively a more challenging cognitive task.  It is largely under cognitive control, requires attentional 
resources, and relies on the conscious perception of a tempo change in the pacing sequence.  This was shown clearly in an 
important study by Repp and Keller (2004) who found that period correction is dependent upon variables of intention, 
attentional load and awareness, whereas phase correction was only affected partially by intention in supraliminal conditions 
(see above).  Thus, they argue that phase correction and period correction seem to represent independent processes of largely 
automatic action control and of intentional cognitive control, respectively (Repp and Keller, 2004).  They hypothesise that 
their findings reflect the notion that “period correction is based on a more complex form of sensory evidence – namely on a 
difference between intervals (“relative period”) – than is phase correction, which is triggered by a difference between time 
points (or relative phase)” (p. 517).  In effect they are highlighting the distinction that period correction can be characterised 
as an interval comparison - a second-order difference - whereas phase correction results from a simple phase discrepancy - a 
first-order difference.  The latter they posit “even inanimate dynamic systems can perform” (p.517).  Another way of 
explaining this idea, in the context of the effects of intention only, is given by Repp (2001b) who hypothesized that the 
differences were due to “period correction requiring memory for at least one preceding event and as such greater 
computational complexity calling for greater neural resources, thus making the process more extensive in brain space and in 
time, and hence more accessible to higher-level cognitive processes” (p. 310-311).  Extending on this in a later paper Repp 
(2004, p. 76) states that “it is likely that period correction is a specifically human ability [and] is a manifestation of the more 
general human ability to set the tempo of a rhythmic activity at will.”  
 
Of course, in real musical settings additional social and interactional capabilities are operational in achieving temporal and 
physical coordination (see below).  Nevertheless we can safely assume that these observations of two correction processes 
reflect part of the basic temporal framework for real-time interpersonal musical behaviours across cultures.  It seems entirely 
plausible that the relative reliance on these foundational mechanisms in music increases, revealed perhaps by a ‘stricter’ 
adherence to pulse, with the challenges of larger group size and lack of social sympathy, familiarity and experience (see 
below). Phase correction mechanisms can be supposed to be operational in all activities involving future-directed attending 
where expectations are constantly updated based upon asynchronies between attentional pulses and stimulus events (see 
Bispham 2006).  In contrast, period correction is almost by definition functional, specifically, within the framework of a 
sustained musical pulse. It is this latter process that arguably ties together the recent past, the psychological present, and our 
immediate expectancies into a longer phenomenological experience.  As such, I argue that it forms part of a foundation for 
the specificities and particular efficacies of music (see below). 
 
Sensorimotor synchronization in the animal kingdom 
 
It is with the above discussed literature, and ultimately also against the embeddedness of human musical pulse in movement 
and sociality (see below), that examples of animal entrainment/beat matching need to compared if we are understand 
potential cross-species analogies and/or homologies.   Alternately, proposals as to which animals exhibit “entrainment” and 
the putative relevancies to human capacity and musical capabilities risk being misunderstood and could be ultimately 
undermined by varying terminological boundaries.   Wilson and Cook (2016), for example, suggest that entrainment may be 
more widespread than we currently have evidence for and include discussions of ‘neurological plausibility’.  Nonlinear 
oscillations and neural entrainment are indeed an inherent principle of brain functioning across species and intrinsic to the 
physics of perceiving, attending and responding to auditory stimuli (Large and Synder, 2009).  They are very likely 
embedded preconditions of musical pulse and rhythm but also inherently insufficient (see Bispham 2003; 2006; Fitch, 2012).  
Fitch describes this as the “paradox of rhythm” in that ‘‘periodicity and entrainment seem to be among the most basic 
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features of living things, yet the human ability (and proclivity) to entrain our motor output to auditory stimuli appears to be 
very rare’’ (Fitch 2012, p.28).  To avoid confusion, the evidence of beat-matching in animals is, therefore, discussed below 
in terms of sensorimotor synchronization rather than entrainment more broadly. 
 
Snowball the Cockatoo and (Vocal-learning) Friends 
 
In 2006 Patel first suggested that vocal learning - the ability to accurately mimic complex, learned sounds - may have 
provided a necessary, but not entirely sufficient, precondition for the capacity for ‘beat perception and synchronization’ 
(BPS).  He built his ‘vocal learning and rhythmic synchronization’ hypothesis on the observations that BPS depends upon 
neurological circuitry used in complex vocal learning.  They both involve particular connections between the auditory and 
motor systems in both birds and humans (Doupe et al, 2005; Patel et al, 2005) and both seem to share overlapping neural 
substrates in the basal ganglia and supplementary motor areas (Jarvis, 2004; 2007; 2009; Chen et al, 2006; Grahn and Brett, 
2007).  Interestingly, the evidence suggests that vocal learning evolved independently in three distantly related groups of 
birds (parrots, songbirds, and hummingbirds) and involved similar sets of brain nuclei.  Fitch and Meitchen (2013) therefore 
argue that this represents a ‘deep homology’ – convergent evolution of similar biological mechanisms due presumably to 
genetic constraints on how a capacity can parsimoniously be manifest. An additional point of potential connection to human 
vocal learning and the motor control for human speech (and presumably music) is that the famous FoxP2 gene is also 
expressed in avian brain regions important for motor control of learned song (see Jarvis 2013; Chen et al 2013).  Patel’s 
hypothesis accommodated the fact that humans appear currently to be unique among primates in exhibiting complex vocal 
learning (Egnor & Hauser, 2004) and predicted that only species who exhibited vocal learning (e.g. parrots, dolphins, and 
seals) could potentially be capable of BPS (sensorimotor synchronisation).  Accordingly the majority of species that don’t 
exhibit vocal learning, even human pets (e.g. dogs and cats) were expected not to be capable of BPS. 
 
Subsequent internet fame for Snowball the “dancing cockatoo” seemed to support the hypothesis, as did an analysed search 
of YouTube videos.  Keywords “dance” and selected animals brought up 33 videos in which exclusively vocal mimicking 
animals (14 species of parrot and one elephant [see Stoeger & Manger, 2014]) showed evidence of entrainment (Schachner 
et al, 2009).  Of course this approach was scientifically problematic and subject to a myriad of potential selection biases (see 
Wilson and Cook, 2016).  Furthermore it was unclear whether the animals were responding to human visual cues or could 
synchronise to a range of tempi and adjust to any changes.  Snowball and 8 budgerigars have been studied under more 
experimental conditions.  In Patel et al (2009) Snowball was tested to excerpts of “Everybody” by the Backstreet Boys (a 
song he was very familiar with).  The original (tempo = 108.7 bpm) was manipulated to 10 additional tempi with maintained 
pitch (+-2.5%, +-5%, +-10%, +-15%, and +-20%. – [97.8 - 130.4 bpm]).  His performance was perhaps not as impressive as 
the initial videos suggested.  He did not consistently synchronise to the beat. However, he did exhibit statistically significant 
bouts of entrainment in 58% of trials in which he showed sustained “dancing” and with all but the two slowest tempi and 
more frequently with the faster tempi.  He showed marked preferential areas for synchronization.  The apex of headbobs 
occurred typically after the beat at an average phase angle of 3.94 (not significantly different from 0) and therefore didn’t 
exhibit the negative mean asynchrony we humans typically exhibit, but did suggest some anticipatory mechanism in that it 
was too fast to be a reaction to the stimulus.  More impressive perhaps were a group of eight budgerigars (Melopsittacus 
undulatus) who have been shown, after relatively little training, to “tap” 6 beats to acoustic and visual pulses at a range of 
tempi (Hasegawa et al, 2009).  Curiously they found slow frequencies (1200 – 1800ms) easier in terms of learning the task 
but were most accurate at faster rates (400 – 650ms).   Despite reports to the contrary in Repp and Su (2013) they also 
differed significantly from Snowball in that they typically moved ahead of the beat. As yet, to my knowledge, this is the only 
study to report experimentally on many individuals of one species synchronizing movements to a beat.  As such, budgerigars 
would definitely appear to merit further research.  
 
Ronan the Sea Lion 
 
A challenge to the vocal learning hypothesis comes from studies on a Californian Sea Lion (Zalophus californianus) – 
‘Ronan’ – a species that has not been documented to exhibit vocal mimicry.  In impressive bouts of synchronization Ronan 
entrained to five novel tempi of frequency-modulated stimuli (96 bpm, 108 bpm, 88 bpm, 132 bpm, and 72 bpm).  This 
notably included head-bobbing to experimental complex sine tones and also to the same Backstreet Boys song used in 
Snowball’s trials (notably a song with a strong, regular, and markedly overt drumbass).  His synchronization was 
unperturbed by a missing beat in the stimulus but, unlike human tappers, was generally lining up the end of his movement 
trajectory slightly behind the beat (Cook et al, 2013).  For reasons that remain unclear, Ronan was generally farther behind 
the beat for faster stimuli and farther ahead of the beat for slower stimuli and interestingly showed improvements with 
increasing familiarity with a stimulus.  A subsequent set of experiments showed some even more notable findings in that 
Ronan tracked temporal phase and period perturbations to an artificial click track, including in novel tempo conditions 
(Rouse, 2016). The authors argue that Ronan’s beat keeping across all tempi (61.818 to 125.925 bpm) and adaptations 
(±25% of the IOI) impressively fit dynamic models of co-oscillation.  Crucially for our purposes, the analysis showed 
changes in phase and tempo were matched through both phase and period adaptation.  As such it is the only documented 
case of a non-human animal exhibiting period correction in sensorimotor synchronization and challenges my and Bruno 
Repp’s suggestion that period correction is unique in humans (Bispham, 2006; Repp 2004).  However, there were also two 
important differences from human studies.  First of all, phase coupling varied with perturbation magnitude and was 
particularly increased for presumably noticeable perturbations beyond 8 %.  Secondly, the relative period adaptation was far 
lower than in human studies.   Ronan’s period coupling values did not exceed 0.2 whereas in humans it is typically varying 
values between 0.3 and 0.8 (Loehr et al., 2011).   Furthermore, rather than a single sudden shift, the tempo was shown to 
change continuously following the shift onset.  Given that description it would perhaps be interesting to explore if these 
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corrections could have also been explained within an information-processing linear phase-correction model (e.g. Mates, 
1994; see above). 
 
The origin of Ronan’s capabilities, which are not reflected in any naturalistic behaviour, remains a bit of a mystery.  Related 
pinniped species have been shown to possess considerable vocal flexibility (Sanvito, Schusterman & Reichmuth, 2007; 
Galimberti & Miller, 2007; Schusterman, 2008).  However, only one individual harbour seal, raised in an artificial 
environment, has been shown to exhibit vocal mimicry (Reichmuth & Casey, 2014).  Different species also diverged 23+ 
million years ago so it seems unlikely that there is any common genetic predisposition towards vocal learning in pinnipeds.  
Another potential candidate that may provide insight into some of the underlying mechanism is working memory.  This 
shares with sensorimotor synchronization the necessity of keeping in mind the immediate past, maintaining it in the present 
and constructing expectations of the near future.  Furthermore, it would correlate with the significance of the prefrontal 
cortex in both period correction adaptation and in working memory tasks (Stephan et al, 2002; D’Esposito and Postle, 2015).  
Notably, California sea lions have been shown to possess good visual and auditory working memory (Schusterman and 
Kastak, 2002) and pinnipeds’ auditory working memory even exceeds, in certain conditions, that of non-human primates 
(Fritz et al., 2005, Scott et al., 2012; see Ravigniani et al 2016). 
 
Synchronous chorusing and coalition signaling 
 
The avian and pinniped studies discussed were almost entirely constructed, artificial and lacking in naturalistic correlates.  
Examples of naturally occurring group periodic synchronisation and coordinated vocal displays, while lacking comparatively 
in experimental vigour, do show some consistency in terms of context and function.  These have, therefore, prompted 
speculations regarding their homological relevance to the evolution of musical pulse in human.  Merker (2000) argues, that 
as periodic group synchronicity is restricted to male sexual display in the animal kingdom, it is likely to have played a 
similar role at some point in recent (from 6-7million years ago) human evolution and supports this view with reference to 
female exogamy in humans and chimpanzees (Ember, 1978).   Documented cases include bioluminescent flashing in 
fireflies, claw waving in fiddler crabs, and ‘chorusing’ in Neotropical katydid and some frog species (see Greenfield, 1994).  
In an essentially competitive context, synchronicity is achieved either as an indirect outcome of all participants desiring to 
signal first; as a cooperative effort to maximise output and hence attract females to their group; or as an individual means of 
avoiding predators.  In all cases the synchrony is based on either sight or sound.  It is, however, achieved either by advanced 
signalling or through phase correction mechanisms, and occurs only within a narrow temporal range corresponding closely 
to each individuals ‘eigenfrequency’ for the particular action.  Additionally the ‘pulse’ does not act in any way as a reference 
point for any other action.  Thus this view does not sufficiently account for a lack of contextual, physiological or behavioural 
correlations between the examples given and synchronised behaviours in humans46 
 
Musical Pulse as Movement 
“Musicality, as the activity of a unitary “self” or “individuality” expressing motives to move, is organised in one connected 
time frame.  It cannot be synthesised or accreted in the mind from separately anarchic processes, but must have one 
coherent and orderly rhythmic foundation.  It expresses an integral stream of events in the whole brain, which conduct 
separate body parts to targets in a real or imagined space-time of experience, synchronising moves so the effects of separate 
actions can balance one another and form anticipated sequences and coincidences in space and time, as nearly faultlessly as 
possible.  The gracefulness of all we do depends on it” (Trevarthen 1999/2000, p. 160). 
 
Regardless of how we interpret Ronan’s surprisingly impressive capabilities, it seems unlikely that the behaviour has any 
great psychophysiological significance beyond the practicalities of the task.  Crucially in humans, however, a sensorimotor 
synchronization task, or more broadly entraining to a sustained pulse, connects inextricably with the fundamentals of motor 
functioning and aspects of our capacity for culture.  It is essential to an evolutionary perspective on music to appreciate that 
the capacities inherent in a musical pulse are inextricably connected and shared with those that facilitate movement and an 
appreciation of volitional and non-volitional action in time.  A musical pulse is, in essence, an extended form of dynamic 
action.  The following sections will explore how pulse and beat perception are embedded with action simulation and 
movement from early developmental stages in humans.   I will also show that pulse and beat perception share considerably 
with more fundamental mechanisms that afford smooth motion.  Therefore a key question I will address below is whether, 
and to what extent, evolutionary changes to our capacity to plan complex action sequences can account for the specificities 
of a musical pulse.  
 
                                                 
46 A related perspective on the human ability to coordinate and synchronise actions is Hagen and Byrant’s hypothesis (2003; Hagen & 
Hammerstein, 2007; see also Fessler & Holbrook, 2016) that music and dance evolved as a coalition signalling system that could reliably 
communicate coalition quality, thus permitting meaningful cooperative relationships between groups.  They argue that this capability may 
have evolved from combined territorial defence signals that are common in many social species, including chimpanzees, gibbons, lions, 
hyenas and wolves (e.g. Herbinger, Boesch, & Rothe 2001; Mitani, 1990; Heinsohn, 1997; Hofer & East, 1993; Harrington & Mech; 1983) 
and have become increasingly coordinated in humans as a signal of group cohesiveness.  While music is seemingly able to fulfil this 
function it seems unlikely that this represents the primary adaptive functionality of rhythm and entrainment.  Crucially the animals in the 
examples given do not exhibit efforts to genuinely coordinate their calls beyond being engaged over a similar time span and offering and 
reflecting encouragement to participate.  It also fails to account for the generic complexities of music, the full scope of entrainment in 
humans (ranging from group synchronicity of physicalised action to more subtle manifestations in, for example, mother-infant interactions); 
the underlying psychological mechanisms being vastly different; and/or its most prevalent contextualisation in affective interpersonal 
interaction. 
 Bispham (2018) 49 
Primarily, music fully enacted is movement both in the production and perception of action in time.  It is born of movement, 
it moves us, and compels us to move. It is essentially and universally a form of dance (Nettl, 1984, 2000; Brown, 1991). 
More precisely perhaps we should state that the culturally specific terminological boundary between music and dance 
reflects two different manifestations or individually incomplete parts of what is essentially one and the same thing.  Ancient 
philosophers already noted that “everything flows” (Heraclites; see Brandner, 2012; Todd & Lee, 2015), described speaking 
and singing as gestural motion (Aristoxenus c300BC), and music as sound and movement (Quintilianus c 300AD).  More 
recently researchers have presented further intuited descriptions of music perception being, first and foremost, audible 
human motion (e.g. Truslit, 1938; Gabrielsson, 1973; Repp, 1993; Shove & Repp, 1995; Das et al., 1999) as well as more 
mathematical models of, for example, structural variations in musical tempo being correlates of motion (e.g. patterns of 
locomotion) (Todd, 1992, 1995; Feldman et al., 1992; Kronman & Sundberg, 1997; Sundberg & Friberg, 1999).  
Undoubtedly, part of these connections relate to a coupling of perception and action (Gibson, 1966; Prinz, 1990; 2013); the 
inherently rhythmic nature of any motor action (Trevarthen, 1999); the complex amalgamations of timing, temporal 
perception, and motor skills (e.g. Ivry & Hazeltine, 1995; Wohlschläger & Koch, 2000; Schöner, 2002; Ivry and Spencer, 
2004); and our intuitive and abstracted understandings of the basic physics of motion (Newton, 1687).  Notably 
neuropsychological studies also support the existence of a common mechanism showing shared brain structures across 
temporal processing and motor output (Keele et al., 1985; Treisman et al., 1992; Coull and Nobre, 2008), as well as across 
sequencing, action and music (Janata & Grafton), and time perception and motor timing (see Schobotz, 2000; Avanzino et 
al., 2016).  It is critical to note therefore that, broadly speaking, the strong associations with movement are not solely based 




Temporal and interpersonal coordination in any rhythmic action and joint action is clearly also supported by complex pre-
motor planning in production and an understanding of the timing of motoric actions as well as the corresponding social 
motivations and goals of those participating, including ourselves (see Keller et al, 2015).  Action simulations are well 
documented sensorimotor neural processes in which those areas engaged in executing an action are reflected in “passive” 
observations (i.e. in the absence of overt movement (see Gallese et al., 2004; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Decety & Grèzes, 
2006). These motor simulations form part of our anticipatory mechanisms, generating predictions about the future time 
course of our and others’ actions (Ross et al., 2016).  They thus contribute to facilitating precise rhythmic interpersonal 
coordination in a range of interactions.  They can be modelled internally as forward, inverse and joint associations between 
efferent motor commands and afferent sensory information.  Forward models describe the causal relationship between motor 
commands and their effects on the body and environment whereas inverse models represent transformations from intended 
action outcomes to the motor commands that produce them (Wolpert et al, 2003; Tian and Pöppel, 2010).  Motor simulation 
is clearly operational in music and dance (Keller, 2008; Cross et al., 2006) with corresponding training effects on visuo-
motor (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006) and audio-motor simulation (Lahav et al., 2007) respectively.  Studies focusing on music 
show, for example, increased motor excitability while listening to a piano piece after learning to play it on the piano 
(D’Ausilio et al., 2006).  Broadly speaking it is, however, certainly not unique to music either.  Notably many neuroimaging 
studies also show evidence of motor activation while adult and even pre-verbal infant participants listen to speech (Skipper, 
et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2004; Kuhl et al. 2014). More specifically there are suggestions that speech effector muscles show 
facilitation when listening to speech (Fadiga, et al., 2002)47.  Finally it is important to note that one can take this further to 
incorporate more abstract or internalized representations of form in motion.   In a full sensorimotor perspective a perceived 
rhythm is, literally and neurophysiologically, an imagined movement.  Todd (1999; see also Todd et al., 1999), for example 
argues that the same mental processes that generate bodily movement are involved in listening to music (or perhaps 
perceiving any complex rhythmically organised sound).  In particular, he argues for a sensorimotor loop (including the 
posterior parietal lobe, premotor cortex, cerebrocebellum and basal ganglia) overlapping considerably with the mental 
structures serving timed motor action - the ‘motor circuit’.  He supposes that “if the spatiotemporal form of certain sensory 
stimuli are matched to the dynamics of the motor system, then they may evoke a motion of an internal representation, or 
motor image, of the corresponding synergetic elements of the musculoskeletal system, even if the musculoskeletal system 
itself does not move” (p.119). 
 
Beat perception as motor action in the brain 
 
Crucially for our comparative investigation of a musical pulse, a substantial body of evidence suggests that motor system 
activation in music may not merely be a reflection of sequential planning, action, suppressed movement, or abstraction.  
Even in absence of any particular shapes and enacted or imagined movements, the embedded connections between a 
sustained attentional pulse, rhythm perception, and movement seems to go to the very heart of motor and vestibular 
functioning (Thaut et al., 2015; Todd and Lee, 2015).  Neurological studies support a deep-rooted connection between a 
musical pulse and movement (and also with timing and duration perception [see Merchant et al., 2013).  Activations in 
studies of rhythm and beat perception, using even the most basic representations of a “beat”, appear consistently in areas of 
the brain associated with motor action, preparation and timing.  Specifically, perceiving and producing musical rhythms 
correlates with the supplementary motor area, premotor cortex, cerebellum, and basal ganglia (Bengtsson et al., 2009; Chen 
et al., 2008a; Grahn and Brett, 2007; Grahn and Rowe, 2013; Kung et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2004; Marville et al., 2002; 
Schubotz and Van Cramon, 2001; Ullen et al., 2003).  A particularly relevant observation from these FMRI studies is that 
                                                 
47 There are notably transparent parallels between the theories of motor simulation and mirror neurons (see Koelsch, 2012).  However, one 
interesting difference, as noted in Ross et al (2016) is that the mirror neurons associated with the ventral premotor area do not appear to be 
related directly to the more dorsal premotor areas that are associated with beat perception. 
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patients with impaired basal ganglia function due to Parkinson’s disease (characterized by severe deficiencies in motor 
functioning) show impairments in a rhythm discrimination task (Grahn & Brett, 2009).  This markedly ties in with the 
importance of the basal ganglia in beat-based versus absolute timing (see above) and discussions of rhythmic facilitation (see 
below).  It seems likely therefore, as I suggested in Bispham (2003), that a subset of the mechanisms involved in musical 
rhythmic behaviour, temporal processing and dynamic attending are involved, also, in timed, rhythmic and untimed motor 
behaviour.  A critical point, therefore, is that one can posit that the mechanisms that allow us to create a musical pulse are 
built upon (or perhaps even generative of) those mechanisms that help, architecturally speaking, to structure movement, 
balance, and the perception of complex actions in time.  In the perception of temporally structured events and action we 
decipher (mostly subconsciously) an internal organizational structure, or manifestation thereof, that affords prediction, 
efferent and afferent coordination, and a management of smooth and ballistic movement.  A musical pulse is, in effect, a 
particular form of this organizational structure, incorporating period correction and corresponding degrees of volitional 
control and an awareness of temporal framework.  
 
Pulse and movement in development 
 
Human infants also appear to possess a considerable propensity for rhythm and early connections to movement.  A concept 
of relative processing appears to be primarily salient as infants discriminate between rhythmic patterns based upon the 
relative durations of events in spite of tempo changes (Trehub, & Thorpe, 1989).  Additionally they respond to changes in 
order (Demany, McKenzie, & Vurpillot, 1977) and rhythmic groupings (i.e. Changes from a 2-2 grouping to 3-1 grouping of 
the same events) (Chang & Trehub 1977a; Lewkowicz, 2003).  However, they also detect changes to absolute durations, 
showing renewed interest in familiar rhythm at new tempos (Pickens & Bahrick, 1995) and can lose discriminatory abilities 
if rhythms are presented at much altered tempi (Pickens & Bahrick, 1997).  Interestingly, infant rhythm perception 
capabilities appear to be operational across modalities (Mendelson, 1986).   Evidence that metrical categories are in a sense 
physically embodied in infants comes from a study showing that infants will respond preferentially to metric accentuation of 
an otherwise ambiguous rhythm if they were previously bounced according to that particular metric interpretation whilst 
listening in the absence of accentuation (Philips-Silver & Trainor, 2005).  In this astutely designed study infants who were 
bounced to an ambiguous (not accented) drumming rhythm on every second beat subsequently showed greater interest to a 
duple than triple meter accented version (and vice versa).  Crucially simply watching the adult move to the ambiguous 
rhythm in 2 or 3 did not show the same effect.  Therefore, it seems that connections between pulse and movement appear to 
be established early in development.  Extensions to the original study showed parallel results in adults (Philips-Silver and 
Trainor, 2007) and demonstrated that head movements in particular were necessary for the observed effect (Phillips-Silver 
and Trainor, 2008).  The authors interpreted this as evidence of a primary influence of the vestibular system and supported 
this in a further study highlighting that the results were mirrored further using galvanic vestibular stimulation (Trainor et al., 
2009).  However, it has been suggested that the vestibular influence is perhaps not direct (Trainor, 2007; Riggle, 2009; 
Trainor and Unrau, 2009) and, in general, vestibular models of beat perception in development and maturity (Todd, 1995; 
Todd and Lee 2015) remain somewhat controversial with most researchers focusing on more ballistic accounts of the 
connections between musical pulse and movement48.  Either way, the evidence seems to have securely demonstrated that the 
connections between pulse and movement arise naturally and are already embedded in early developmental stages. 
 
Rhythmic facilitation in rehabilitation 
 
Perhaps the most insightful area of research highlighting the connections between a musical pulse and movement comes 
from studies of motor rehabilitations through rhythmic stimulation.  Thaut and colleagues (1992) first showed improvements 
in the gait of healthy individuals with “rhythmic” (an isochronous pulse) cuing.  In particular, stride symmetry and 
electromyography patterns in amplitude variability in muscle contractions across the stride cycle were shown to be markedly 
improved.  Comparing results of the differential use of metronome vs. musical rhythmic-auditory stimulation in healthy 
subjects showed greater precision with the rhythmically accentuated musical stimulation (Thaut et al., 1997).  However, the 
difference was small indicating that simply the pulse itself was responsible for the majority of the observed effect and gait 
improvements.  Subsequently, similarly positive but even more dramatic results of hemiparetic motor stability were shown 
in stroke patients (Thaut et al., 1993).  Analysis showed immediate positive modifications:  The stride lengths of the affected 
and non-affected sides became more symmetrical; hip joint range of motion of the affected/non-affected sides became more 
symmetrical; and the centre of mass vertical displacement decreased, indicating improvement in mechanical efficiency 
(Thaut et al., 1997).  Interestingly, the results were significantly superior to those achieved through physiotherapy (see also 
Thaut et al., 2007; Hayden et al., 2009).  Ensuing results with Parkinson’s disease patients were even more spectacular still.  
Dramatic improvements were evidenced immediately in synchronising step patterns to a music-based auditory rhythm and 
also in sustained results following a 3 week home-based walking program for 30min per day (Thaut et al., 1996).  The 
                                                 
48 Todd and Lee (2015) argue that dancing to music which does not have a beat counteracts oscillator theories arguing that moving to music 
with ametrical rhythms, such as recitative, plainsong or more modern ambient styles, or much music featuring a deep rubato (an expressive 
manipulation of the beat [e.g. much Romantic music]) is more likely to involve swaying the whole body along with the larger scale motions 
associated with phrasing.  They subsequently describe such swaying (and also chanting) as a form of vestibular self-stimulation and argue 
that “it is possible to associate such gestural or whole body self-motion perceptions with somatotopic maps within the medial sensorymotor 
circuits as a kind of “inner movement” in the sense of Truslit’s innere Bewegtheit” (p.19). They continue to consider that from a 
neurobiological perspective “such motional percepts may almost literally be created as was predicted by Truslit, i.e. by either indirect 
associative links of sound shapes to vestibular centres in the body maps or by direct vestibular activation of body maps by sound above the 
vestibular threshold” (p.19).  Although there are some considerable problems in describing some of the examples given as not having a beat 
it does raise the possibility that the prevalence and levels of adherence to a regular pulse in music correlates with a connection to ballistic or 
vestibular functioning respectively. 
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numbers showed roughly a 25 per cent increase in stride velocity, a 12 per cent increase in stride length, and a 10 per cent 
increase in step cadence.  The numbers are impressive.  However, it is observing the transformation from one moment to the 
next that is most striking.  It seems to suggest not just a quantitative shift, an improvement in particular data points, but 
rather an altogether more harmonious whole – a transformed holistic coordination of the whole body.  This is a shift, as 
Mithen (2005, p.151) describes, from “cumbersome, shuffling movements to a quite unexpected degree of muscle control 
and fluid motion”.  
 
These seminal studies invigorated advocacies for the role of music as a neurological therapeutic stimulus (see Thaut, 2015b; 
Mainke et al, 2016) and, in particular, the view that its structural properties can shape sensory perception linked to motor 
function (de l’Etoile, 2010; Altenmueller and Schlaug, 2013).  The findings of pulsed and music-based rhythmic facilitation 
have been extended in many further studies on hemi- paretic gait rehabilitation (Ford et al., 2007; Roerdink et al., 2007, 
2011; Thaut et al., 2007; Spaulding et al., 2013) and in the beneficial use of RAS for mobility in Parkinson’s disease (see 
deDreu et al., 2012).  Crucially, further extensions have also produced positive results in other patient groups with motor 
disabilities and also in a comprehensive range of different ballistic and smooth motor-actions.  Patients with Huntington’s 
disease, spinal cord or traumatic brain injury (Bilney et al., 2005; de l'Etoile, 2008; Adler & Ahlskog, 2000; Hurt et al., 
1998); children and adults with cerebral palsy (Peng et al., 2010;Wang et al., 2013; Ladwig et al., 2016); and cerebellar 
stroke victims (Wright et al., 2016) have all benefited from rhythmic auditory stimulation.  The actions and kinaesthetic 
markers studied have variously included kinaematic parameters of arm movements (Safranek et al., 1982), limb instability 
(Thaut et al., 2002); reaching movements (Ladwig et al., 2016); circular arm movements (Massie et al, 2009); repetitive 
cyclic motions for upper extremities; and markers of full body coordination (the latter especially in hemiparetic stroke 
rehabilitation and children with cerebral palsy) (Luft et al., 2004; McCombe- Waller et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2007; 
Altenmueller et al., 2009; Malcolm et al., 2009; Grau-Sanchez et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2010;Wang et al., 2013).  Control of 
speech has also been shown to benefit from rhythmic entrainment with demonstrable improvements in intelligibility, oral 
motor control, articulation, voice quality, and respiratory strength in patients with Parkinson’s and post-stroke aphasia 
(Wambaugh and Martinez, 2000; Thaut et al., 2001; Lim et al., 2013).  Notable, also, is the fact that the success of melodic 
intonation therapy in aphasia rehabilitation has been partly attributed to the rhythmic component (Stahl et al., 2011).  Links 
to areas of the brain implicated in motor timing are implicit in the selection of tasks, disabilities and conditions studies but 
were also made explicit in a comparative study of walking in patients with differing brain lesions (Kobinata et al., 2016).  
Rhythmic auditory stimulation resulted in improved velocity and stride length in patients with cerebellum, pons and medulla, 
and thalamus lesions – all areas heavily involved in motor planning and timing. Gait parameters in the putamen and corona 
lesion patients were, however, unaffected.   
 
Despite the increasingly overwhelming functional evidence, the neuroanatomical and neurophysiological basis for the 
improved kinematic parameters described above remain yet to be fully understood.  It seems likely, as suggested by Thaut 
and colleagues (1999), that the enhanced time information inherent in the regularity of the temporal structure of rhythm 
(pulse) serves as an optimisation function for motor planning, programming, and execution.  It serves, effectively as a 
reference point in the continuity of action in time.   Clearly a subset of the mechanisms involved in beat induction and 
dynamic attending are involved, also, in motor behaviour.  This is a crucial point highlighting, similarly to earlier sections on 
our experience of time and temporal perception, that our capacity to engage with a musical pulse did not evolve 
independently.  Rather, it is, in a very real sense, a particular extension of our fundamental capacities for perceiving action in 
time, and for movement.  It is interesting to note that the benefit level seems to increase with the severity of motor 
dysfunction, thus suggesting some kind of compensatory operation and that entraining to rhythmic stimulus provides access 
to or simulates periodic oscillations which are crucial to motor control.  However, we do not know which of these latter 
options is correct - whether the compensation occurs directly or indirectly.  Does auditory entrainment to a pulse provide 
access to periodic internal mechanisms that are not functioning naturally due to the respective motor disorders or does it 
provide external reference points as a distinct way of achieving similar results but using different pathways to those 
operational in motor functioning in normal subjects?  Either way it does seem, as proposed by Thaut (2005, p. 58), entirely 
plausible from the results of these studies that “the basic neural network underlying isochronous pulse synchronization 
consists mainly of composite motor and auditory areas with no clearly designated functionally separate area for 
synchronization”. 
 
Motor skills and beat-based timing in human evolution  
 
The above discussion on musical pulse as movement and, especially, the rhythmic rehabilitation studies raise some 
intriguing and critical questions concerning the evolution of beat-based timing and sensorimotor synchronization in humans.  
We have already seen some well-supported arguments for much tighter auditory-motor connections in humans than in other 
primates (Patel & Iverson, 2014; see above).   However, as the connections between beat-based timing and motor control 
seem to be so tightly interconnected, it remains somewhat puzzling that humans are one of the only species to show beat-
based timing and entrainment.   One possibility I suggested previously (Bispham, 2003) is that increased cognitive cross-
domain flexibility in the hominin lineage (Mithen, 1996; see Section II introduction) allowed dynamic oscillatory 
mechanisms that are fundamental to motor action in all species to be abstracted, made conscious and replicated in pulse-
based and musical contexts.  This perspective markedly does not assume that the mechanisms that serve bodily movement in 
humans are fundamentally different from those affording kinaesthetic movement in other animals and, in particular, that it 
has remained similar across primate species.  However, we should perhaps also consider the possibility that beat-based 
timing and our sense of pulse emerged exaptively in conjunction with evolutionary changes to motoric capabilities since the 
divergence from our last common ancestor.   
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One of the most notable evolutionary changes has been a move to bipedalism (see Harcourt-Smith, 2015; Klein, 1999; 
Lewin, 1999).  Trevarthen (1999) has eloquently argued for the importance of bipedalism for rhythmic capabilities in 
humans.  He states that “while walking, we freely turn and twist, glance with eyes jumping to left and right, extend waving 
limbs, make intricate gestures of the hands, talk, all in coordinated phrases of flowing rhythm’ and that ‘this moving has a 
multiplicity of semi-independent impulses, a potentiality for multi-rhythmic coordination that is surely richer than any other 
species possesses” (p. 171).  This may well be true.  However, while this could easily account for increasingly complex 
possibilities and differences in the rhythmic manifestations of action in humans, it cannot, in itself, directly explain the 
emergence of an attentional mechanism.  Primates are well known to be exceptional among mammals in terms of the 
number, extension, and complexity of motor-related areas observed in the frontal lobe.  Mendoza and Merchant (2014) argue 
that this is probably related to the wide behavioural flexibility that primates display and that “the increase in the complexity 
of the motor system has contributed to the emergence of new abilities observed in human and nonhuman primates, including 
the recognition and imitation of the actions of others, speech perception and production, and the execution and appreciation 
of the rhythmic structure of music” (p. 73).  As humans we have become, in particular, further exceptional in terms of the 
intricacies of bodily gesture (see Kendon, 2004) and have acquired substantial improvements to fine vocal and manual 
control as part of the evolutionary drives towards increased communicative and technological ability (Lieberman & Crelin, 
1972; Lieberman, 1984; Fitch 2000; Wilson, 1998).   Pre-motor planning, evidenced both in complex vocalisation and 
manual productivities is also exceptional in humans (see Morley 2015), as is a greater voluntary control over our actions and 
responsibilities (see Haggard, 2008). 
 
An intriguing possibility is that the impressive control of motor action in humans did not simply evolve qualitatively over 
time, but that it is reflected in a substantial architectural shift in the foundational mechanisms that coordinate movement.  
Donald (1991), for example, postulates a major transition in hominin cognitive evolution around -1.5 M years (coinciding 
with transition periods leading to the speciation of Homo erectus) in the form of a fundamentally new supramodal motor-
modelling capacity – mimesis49.  Boyd (2018) argues that subsequent hominin evolution research, in particular recent fossil 
and genetic evidence, more likely dates the proposed pre-linguistic mimetic mind to Homo erectus or Homo heidelbergensis, 
about 1.5–0.5 million years ago. In principle, however, the theory remains pertinent and highly influential in discourse into 
the origins of human sociality and language (e.g. Donald, 2017; Tomlinson, 2018).  A crucial property of mimesis, in stark 
contrast to the supposedly exclusively episodic memory in Apes, is the voluntary retrieval of action-models that allows us to 
rehearse and refine movements and to create models of reality that are not necessarily tied to the physical environment.  This 
early motor adapation could perhaps have encompassed an additional form of relative timing and/or a capacity to implicitly 
employ sustained ‘pulsed’ attentional reference points in modelling action.  Thus beat-based timing may have emerged 
exaptively from this50.  Increased voluntary control of action may also have played an important role in the evolutionary 
history of period correction mechanisms in sensorimotor synchronization.  Although the issue is philosophically complex 
and hard to pinpoint experimentally, Haggard (2008) explains that we can perhaps view voluntary action as one end of a 
continuum that has simple reflexes at the other end.  In voluntary action, the occurrence, timing and form are not directly (or 
perhaps only very indirectly) determined by any identifiable external stimulus.  It thus demonstrates a “freedom from 
immediacy” (Shadlen & Gold, 2004).  In terms of a musical pulse this ties in especially well with period correction 
mechanisms.  These, as described above and in contrast to those operational in phase correction, are more distinct from 
immediacy (they occur at a longer lag), cognitively complex, are correlated with an awareness of the pulsed framework, and 
are subject to attention and volitional control (Repp & Keller, 2004).  We can therefore also not discount the possibility that 
the most defining feature of a specifically musical pulse, and its capacity to act as a phenomenological bridge between the 
immediate past, present and future expectation, emerged in human evolution in conjunction with increases in the central 
executive (Norman and Shallice, 1996), sustained attention (Sarter et al., 2001), working memory (Baddeley, 2003), top-
down attention (Baluch and Itti, 2011) and the volitional control of action. 
 
Temporal Structuring in Communication 
 
As well as being embedded in motor action, a musical pulse is also, in its essence, inextricably social.  Broadly speaking 
synchronizing and entraining with others in a myriad of musical and non-musical forms seems to produce and/or be 
motivated by interpersonal interconnectedness, cooperation, and prosocialities.  These psychosocial connections and drives 
will be discussed in Chapter 4.  Here I will continue to focus more on the structural and coordinative aspects of interpersonal 
interaction.  However, this divide is rather artificial, not least in that intersubjective understanding provides considerable 
coordinative insight.  Music is, broadly contextualized, both a particular form of joint action and communicative interaction. 
In the following sections I will briefly review mechanisms by which interpersonal coordination is achieved in rhythmic 
interaction.  By no means are all of these unique to music or even directly related to specific features of a musical pulse.  As 
will be discussed and analysed, many are broadly enacted in a full range of human and non-human interactive contexts.  I 
will argue, however, that, although some forms of temporal structuring and dynamic expectancies can be discerned, a 
                                                 
49 Crucially Donald (1991) describes the considerable sociocultural implications of mimesis and argues that it is the most basic human 
thought-skill, and can account for the documented achievements of Homo erectus.  It is also critical to note that his argument posits that 
mimetic skill is dissociable from linguistic capacities and retains its own cultural and communicative usefulness (e.g. see Lewis, 2014).  It 
is, in his view, however an absolutely essential preadaptation for the later evolution of language. 
50 Donald highlights the connection to pulse by arguing that the human propensity for rhythm provides the clearest evidence for a unified 
central “controller” for body mimesis. In musical rhythm motion patterns are abstracted into a perceptual event and transferred almost 
instinctively from one skeletomuscular system to another.  However, it is according to Donald the Gestalt – the overall pattern – that is 
primary.  Thus, it is crucial to note that mimesis describes more general capacities and need not necessarily incorporate all aspects, or the 
specific features, of a musical pulse. 
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sustained attentional musical pulse is not subliminally operational in non-musical human interactions (e.g. mother-infant 
interactions, linguistic rhythm, or interpersonal turn-taking). 
 
Keller and colleagues (2015) offer a music-focused review and discussion of research into the cognitive-motor processes of 
rhythmic interpersonal coordination that enable individuals to represent joint action goals and to anticipate, attend and adapt 
to others’ actions in real time.  They argue for an inclusive model that includes social factors, shared goals and strategies, 
knowledge, and mechanisms of anticipation, adapation, and attention.  The latter three are discussed primarily in terms of the 
sensorimotor synchronisation skills discussed above and seem to be implied to relate to all forms of rhythmic joint action.  
As this chapter testifies I am not convinced that they are necessarily fully operational in non-musical contexts.  Regardless, 
however, it is clear that all the parts of the model are active in musical ensembles and most (if perhaps not all) are much 
more broadly operation in joint action.  Indeed we can posit a general tendency to rely to varying degrees on those 
architectural features that seem defining of a musical pulse – the mechanisms involved in periodic sensorimotor 
synchronisation, its sustained nature and period correction – depending inversely on the relative level of access to social cues 
and familiarities. This accords well with a widespread increase in levels of synchronisation and a strict adherence to 
periodicity with increases in ensemble size (i.e where a reliance on individual social cues becomes progressively less 
valuable and the necessity for clear architectural guideline is increased). It also resonates with the common finding across 
cultures and styles of decreased levels of precise synchrony and a less isochronous pulse in established partnerships or with 
greater familiarity with a piece or musical style (e.g. Doffman, 2017; League, 2017).  On first consideration, this may seem 
somewhat paradoxical as we often seem to assume (falsely) that higher levels of precision represent an increasingly positive 
attribute.  However, music need not be precise.  It needs to be coordinated and harmonised over a sustained period of time.  
Thus a high precision of synchronisation and a high stability of pulse can sometimes be indicative of a predominant reliance 
on the structural mechanisms of sensorimotor synchronisation where social cues and points of anticipation based on stylistic 
familiarities are less accessible.  Equally, for example, two musicians in a well-rehearsed and/or established duetting 
partnership can easily attune to each other’s actions, individual characteristics and creative goals.  They can stretch an 
underlying pulse and accommodate each other almost at will.  Alternately a mutually understood internalised pulse may 
remain psychologically stable within a group of, for instance, highly experienced jazz musicians (e.g. Doffman, 2017) even 
though some, or even all of the group are playing off and around the beat most of the time.  The ability to stray from a strict 
pulse and follow action cues, stylistic features, expressive microtimings and/or interpretations of shared goals can thus be 
enabled in music precisely because the attentional foundations of musical group coordination are very secure.   
 
In short we need to appreciate that temporal coordination in musical interaction is achieved in large part through aspects of 
our capacity for culture, our action resonances with others, empathic understandings of common history, experience and 
shared goals, and broad manifestations of intersubjective attunement.   These capacities can be accessed in any temporally 
structured joint action and/or interpersonal interaction.  The crucial comparative question then for our current concerns is 
whether the underlying and psychological coordinative structure that would appear to be indicative of a musical pulse – the 
sustained predominantly periodic pulse and its corresponding mechanisms for continued correction – is present and/or 
operational in other primate and human communicative interactions. 
 
Duetting in nature 
 
Vocal ‘duetting’ is found in many species. In particular, over 400 bird species pairs, representing 40% of bird families, 
combine to produce coordinated duets and observations in primates span all the major clades.  The temporal coordination in 
avian duets is highly diverse and variable.  As Mann (2009) reviews: “duets vary in form from loosely overlapping songs to 
highly coordinated duets where paired birds both adjust the timing and type of phrases they sing to fit those of their partner 
over the course of the duet” (p. 67).  Duet coordination therefore signals how attentive an individual is to its partner and has 
also been analysed as a form of turn-taking (in starlings in particular, see Henry et al. 2015).  In some species two birds have 
been reported to coordinate alternating calls with such precision that it is impossible to tell that two birds are involved from 
the auditory signal alone (e.g., plain wren; Mann et al., 2003). Duetting is most common in the tropics and is thought to 
relate to the fact that birds there frequently hold year-round territories and use the duets as a form of territorial advertisement 
(Farabaugh, 1982). This, in turn, is associated with birds that form long-term monogamous pair bonds. Another ffeature that 
may be associable with duetting is sexual monomorphism (similarity between the sexes).  Whether or not any of the 
naturally occurring duet coordination is achieved through truly analogous correction mechanisms to those enabling a musical 
pulse or, for example, by synchronously commencing fixed action patterns, remains unclear. The connections to bonding and 
relationship is, however, clearly an interesting analogy and one we also find in more closely related primate species who 
duet.  
 
De Waal (1988: 202-203) first described pant-hooting of captive bonobos in a way that caught the attention of researchers 
interested in comparative issues of musical capabilities.  He states that ‘during choruses, staccato hooting of different 
individuals is almost perfectly synchronised so that one individual acts as the ‘echo’ of another, or emits calls at the same 
moments as another.  The calls are given in a steady rhythm of about two per second’.  However, this was merely an 
observational account and may, therefore, have been affected by a degree of human projection.  A later study on bonobo 
distance calls only reported alternate and not simultaneous calling (Hohmann & Fruth, 1994).  It was then Geissmann (2000) 
who explicitly argued for the relevance of primate duetting to the evolution of music.  He described pant-hooting by gibbons 
(Hylobates spp.) who “produce loud song bouts that are mostly exhibited by mated and monogamous pairs. Typically, mates 
combine their partly sex-specific repertoire in relatively rigid, precisely timed, and complex vocal interaction to produce 
well-patterned duets.” (p. 103).  As in many avian species these are generally thought to be involved in territorial 
advertisement and strengthening of pair bonds. The putative rationale that this behaviour advertises pair strength to potential 
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competitors, as well as the hypothesis that it increases the cost of partner desertion is supported by the observation that 
duetting becomes increasingly well-coordinated over time and by one case documenting a certain amount of adjustment in 
the duet structure with a partner exchange (Geissmann & Ordeldinger, 1999)51.  The mechanisms used to achieve 
coordination between individuals are clearly complex and of considerable interest to studies of interaction and sociality.  
Observations would seem to suggest strong correlations between the rate of hoots, levels of kinesthetic movement and 
degrees of emotional excitement in both animals. As such, it could be argued that the pairs are interactively affecting each 
other’s emotional and physiological state within a context of social bonding and that this does mark it as being particularly 
relevant and partially analogous to a broader view on musical behaviour in humans (see Bispham 2006).  However, 
crucially, there appears to be no direct evidence for the use of an overarching temporal structure.  It is unlikely, therefore, 
that any other of the discussed behaviours represents or indicates a full analogy to a musical pulse in humans. 
 
Complex temporal structuring in the termed forms of ‘duetting’, ‘turn-taking’, ‘conversational form’ and/or ‘chorusing’ has 
since and variously been described in a full range of primate species (Mendez-Cardenas & Zimmermann, 2009; Takahashi et 
al., 2013; Müller & Anzenberger, 2002; Lemasson et al. 2011).  Interestingly, interactional rules appear to be learnt through 
parental instruction during ontogeny.  Marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) parents are understood to play a direct role in guiding 
the development of turn-taking by providing feedback to their offspring during vocal interactions (Chow et al., 2015).   
However, there appears to be no direct evidence of a wholly analogous sustained pulsed framework being necessary or 
employed in primate interaction.  Federuk et al. (2013), for example, provided some analysis on how the acoustic structure 
of chimpanzee pant-hooting facilitates chorusing in affliative chimpanzee male from two geographically distinct areas of 
Uganda.  Comparing solo and joint display they found some consistent techniques to enable, prolong, and coordinate 
‘chorusing’.  The occurrence of a ‘chorus’ was facilitated by regulations to the duration of pant-hoot phases based on others’ 
responses.  Additionally, once another had joined in the call, “the initiator seemed to adjust the duration of call phases such 
as the climax to prolong the display and to synchronise the call with the partner's” (p. 1787).  Although these are 
undoubtedly important and fascinating findings of social coordination, they are notably, and in contrast to the mechanisms 
involved in sensorimotor synchronisation in a musical pulse, structured around relatively short-term and absolute forms of 
correction. 
 
Pulse in non-musical human interaction  
 
Communicative musicality in parent-infant interaction 
 
Broadly speaking ‘pulse’ - as a reasonably regular succession of discrete vocal and/or gestural events through time - has 
been proposed to be inherent in any situation in which two or more individuals coordinate their communications, 
predictively empathise with their movements, or even just attentively spend time together.  Malloch and Trevarthen (2011) 
argue that it forms, together with ‘quality’ and ‘narrative’, a fundamental “communicative musicality” (Malloch 1999).   
This, they propose, is expressed from infancy onwards and grounds our social understandings, attachments, attunements and 
the expression of our very vitality itself (Stern, 2004).  It is, in their words, “part of a natural drive in human sociocultural 
learning which begins in infancy” (Trevarthen, 1999, p. 194) - “an expression of our human desire for cultural learning, our 
innate skill for moving, remembering and planning in sympathy with others that makes our appreciation and production of 
an endless variety of dramatic temporal narratives possible” (p. 4).  In related literature Trevarthen (2016) argues, with 
reference to his and others’ research (e.g. Papousek 1996; Stern 2010; Trehub 1990; Trevarthen 2012; 2015), that “an 
Intrinsic Motive Pulse of “life time” is the essential property of human action-with-awareness; a foundation for aesthetic 
appreciation of the intentions and feelings of effort as our bodies try to move well, and also for appreciation of the 
sympathetic expressions of moral feeling in communication with others” (p. 226).  This literature area and the many critical 
implications for understanding the motivational aspects of communication and music will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
Even, however, without delving deeper at this stage we can, I think, already see why one can expect such communicative 
musicalities to be active and of crucial importance in all human exchanges and particularly so in prelinguistic parent-infant 
interactions.    
 
Malloch (1999), inspired by finding himself wanting to tap his foot along to recordings, argues for the existence of a pulse in 
mother-infant communications - the “musical dialogue”.  He analysed spectrographic representations of recordings and 
interpreted “bar lines”.  In one case, for example, he posits that 0.68s intervals emerge as the time unit by which the baby's 
and mother's utterances may be naturally divided.  He also suggests that, in places, groups of three 0.68s intervals form a 
larger interval of 2.03 seconds which are surrounded by periods of silences.  Furthermore, he tries to show occasional 
correction intervals at 0.34s (a half subdivision of 0.68s) being used to allow parent and infant to “realign”.  He is 
suggesting, not just a pulse, but a fully metered structure with coordinative correction mechanisms and summarises his 
perspective on pulse by stating that “even such an immature human has a complex periodicity of vocal expression 
comparable with that of adult expression, and is similar to the rhythmic patterns shown by infants in spontaneous 
vocalisations weeks and months after full-term birth” (Ibid, p. 37/38). 
 
The crucial question with regards to the central goals of this thesis is whether the pulse described is an element of all human 
communication that allows coordinated companionship to arise and is particularly exploited in music (as proposed by the 
author).  Alternately is there something additional or psychologically/mechanistically distinct in a musical pulse? Although 
the musical terminology and description is intuitively appealing it seems pretty clear, in my opinion, to be the latter.  The 
                                                 
51 We should perhaps note, however, that the description of Gibbons being “monogamous” is much more loosely followed in practice than 
the term might suggest (see Reichard et al. 2016). 
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degrees of interpretative freedom in the methodological approach are considerable with bar lines neither reflecting 
consistently onsets nor perceptual centre.  Rather they represent a loosely constructed and retrospective best fit.  This should 
not minimize the findings and psychosocial implications of the analysis nor the full extent of their relevance to 
understanding aspects of musical pulse and music. However we are qualitatively too far removed, in my opinion, to 
understand pulse in music as being merely a stricter manifestation of entirely the same process described. 
 
Rhythm in linguistic interaction 
 
Rhythm in speech? 
 
The idea of an isochronous foundation in English speech dates back to the 18th century (see Abercrombie, 1967).  Pike 
(1945) and Abercrombie (1967) presented highly influential theories that languages were either stress-timed or syllable 
timed and by definition could not be both.  Speech was thereby thought to exhibit periodicity at the level of stresses or 
syllables.  Abercrombie added a functional rationale arguing that this was primarily the result of the physiological structure 
of exhalation.  However, a full half century or more of empirical investigation has clearly shown that even those languages 
viewed as being the most clear-cut manifestations of syllable- or stress-timing do not display isochronous structure on either 
count (see Bertinetto 1989; Nolan et al. 2015).  To mention but a selection of the clearest evidence, studies have variously 
shown that English stress “feet” lengthen with the number of syllables (Dauer, 1983) and have reported that stress-based and 
syllable-based languages cannot be discriminated on the basis of  the timing of interstress intervals (Roach 1982).  A theory 
of isochronous “morae” (a unit smaller than a syllable) in Japanese (Ladefoged, 1973) has also been debunked (Beckman, 
1982; Hoequist, 1983).  Experts in the field seem, therefore, to concur that ‘periodic’ (White, 2014) or ‘coordinative’ (White 
et al., 2012) rhythm is absent in speech.  Comprehensive and recent reviews conclude unequivocally that we ‘have to retreat 
from any hope that languages are rhythmic in the everyday sense of clock-rhythmic’ (Nolan and Jeon, 2015, p. 6) and that 
progress will only be made “if one thinks of [speech] rhythm as systematic timing, accentuation, and grouping patterns in a 
language that may have nothing to do with isochrony” (Patel, 2008, p.122).  Succinctly, a musical pulse is not generically 
operational in common speech. 
 
In more recent years the debate has therefore moved to whether or not the flow of speech conforms to more contrastive 
accounts in which rhythm emerges from the alternation of genrstronger and weaker elements and their relative durations (or 
even from finer grained distinctions [see Turk & Shattuck-Hufnagel, 2013]).  The most influential of the many ‘rhythm 
metrics’ or indices that have been proposed, argues that languages can be ascribed a “rhythmic class” based predominantly 
upon the duration of its vocalic and consonantal intervals.  Using a normalised ‘PVI’ equation focused on the degree of 
variability between successive acoustic segments or phonological units has been shown to form three clusters of languages 
which, in turn, appear to correspond to the three traditional rhythm classes (e.g. Ramus et al, 1999; Grabe & Low, 2002; 
Nespor et al., 2011).  This analysis has notably, for our concerns, led to some interesting comparative studies on rhythm 
perception.  Ramus et al. (1999), for example, showed that cotton-top tamarins, like human newborns, have the capacity to 
discriminate between sentences from languages that are differentiable on the basis of their “rhythm class”.  Subsequently the 
role of the rhythmic cues in distinguishing between the classes was supported by studies showing that cotton-top tamarins 
and human newborns do not differentiate between languages from within rhythmic classes (Ramus, 2002), while 5-month-
old human infants do (Tincoff et al., 2005).  However, as similar results have been found in experiments with trained rats 
(Toro, et al., 2003), it seems that the distinguishing characteristics relate to global categories of temporal structure and that 
the relevant psychological capacities evolved for general auditory purposes early within the mammalian clade.  Thus, these 
studies may be of some interest to the perception of temporally structured events in humans.  However, their relevance to 
rhythm perception is limited and any notion that they indicate an underlying attentional structure that is analogous to a 
musical pulse is certainly misplaced. 
 
More unpromisingly still there is considerable debate as to whether languages really do fall into distinct rhythmic classes or 
are really temporally and contrastively structured.  The technical particulars have been heavily criticised for being unable to 
accommodate variations in speech rate, within-speaker differences and for uncertainties in the measuring process (e.g. 
Gibbon, 2003; Knight, 2011).  Nolan and Jeon (2015) summarise that the theory effectively fails to capture the true nature of 
speech rhythm and they also note “the lack of quantitative evidence from the acoustic signal for a rhythmic dichotomy, and 
also a lack of empirical support for its reality in the perception of non-linguists and among speakers of different languages 
(Turk & Shattuck-Hufnagel, 2013; Arvanti, 2009)” (p. 3).  Answering the question as to whether we should accept that the 
relevant notion of rhythm is contrastive rhythm, and whether languages strive to achieve sequential alternation of 
prominences (albeit with less or more salient ‘prominence gradients’) they are unequivocal in their interpretation of the 
evidence stating that: “If so, we must conclude that languages are doing a pretty poor job” (p. 3).   
 
Nolan and Jeon’s (2015) view goes further than arguing that there is no teleological goal of rhythmicality in speech.  Speech 
is, they posit, “not so much arrhythmic as antirhythmic – it exhibits a “redolent, wilful and rebellious disregard for decent 
metrical principles” (p. 7).   Timing is, they argue, the servant of linguistic structure, lexical differentiation, and of the 
prominence for informational purposes and prosodic edge-marking as an aid to parsing utterances (p. 9).  As such, rhythm in 
speech is interpreted to be a constructed metaphorical representation.  Instances when speech is aligned to essentially 
rhythmic structures (such as in music) are thus by extension construed as metaphorical analogies between the rhythm of the 
target and some non-rhythmically motivated aspect of the structure of the speech.  We should, of course, be mindful of the 
fact that our capacities for creating and perceiving pulse, even a “musical pulse”, can be called upon to varying degrees in 
spoken nursery rhyme, creative and expressive poetry, or in persuasion, or inspirational oratory.  However, neither musical 
pulse, nor a full suite of its constituent capabilities, appears to be a necessary component in everyday linguistic speech. 
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    Turn-taking in conversation 
 
Another possible candidate for behavioural and/or mechanistic analogy with musical pulse is conversational turn-taking.   
Himberg et al. (2015) appear to be suggesting that turn-taking can represent a full analogy to musical pulse.   In this study 
adult pairs created 5-min stories alternately contributing one word at a time.  No instructions as to timing were given and 
they received either audio or audiovisual connection to each other.  Despite the creative challenges of the task and even 
though the rhythms were ‘unstable’ (R=0.14 for pooled data), the word rhythms were shown to be entrained (R=0.70, 
p<0.001) to a similar strength as is typically observed in experimentally guided finger-tapping tasks.  Thus, the authors argue 
that “speech seems to spontaneously induce strong entrainment between the conversation partners, likely reflecting 
automatic alignment of their semantic and syntactic processes” (p.113).  This notion accords well with an influential 
description of an oscillatory model of conversational turn-taking in which syllable production entrainment allows for 
efficient interlocutor coordination with minimal gap and overlap in talk (Wilson & Wilson, 2005; see also Takahashi et al., 
2013).  However, the nature of the task in the above study was notably artificial and imposed an unusual degree of 
regularity.  It is debatable therefore whether it reflects more naturalistic turn-taking in everyday linguistic conversation. 
 
Many authors have suggested that the capacities involved in coordinated turn-taking predated language in evolution and 
provided a necessary pre-condition for linguistic interaction to emerge (see Holler et al., 2015).  Considering the literature on 
‘duetting’ in primates (see above) it seems entirely possible that vocal turn-taking is ancestral in origin in the primate 
order52.  Levinson (2016) suggests that it can be viewed to “belong to a package of underlying propensities in human 
communication, including the face to face character that affords the use of gesture and gaze, and the motivation and interest 
in other minds – ‘the interaction engine’ (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2009)” (p.10).  In general, turns in conversation do 
indeed exhibit certain foundational charactistics (Sacks et al., 1974; Levinson & Torreira, 2015) and a remarkable 
consistency across cultures (Stivers et al., 2009).  Turns tend to be brief (roughly 2 seconds on average) with occasional 
efforts for a longer turn of narration.  Overlap between individuals (defined as an overlap less than 100ms) occurs very 
infrequently and typically accounts for less than 5% of the speech stream. The system, furthermore, easily accommodates a 
wide range in the numbers of speakers and seems to be a centrally operational and modality non-specific structure.  The 
modal gap of roughly 200ms between turns, for example, remains constant in the absence of visual information (Levinson & 
Torreira, 2015).  The general structures are, after accounting for necessary preparatory and held movements, also exhibited 
correspondingly in sign language interaction (de Vos et al., 2015).  It is also important to note that turn-taking proto-
conversations with caretakers in pre-linguistic early infancy (e.g. Bruner, 1975) show similar timings and structure except 
for exhibiting, on average, greater overlap (see Gratier, 2015).  
 
Turn-taking is notably a complex social, psychological and cognitive task, operating at the limits of human performance 
(Levinson, 2016).  The cross-linguistically consistent modal response time of 200ms (Stivers et al., 2009; Levinson & 
Torreira, 2015; Heldner & Edlund, 2010) would represent a decent, if unremarkable, reaction time for a primed single action.  
However, it is much more impressive when we consider the range of possibilities in conversation.  Preparation across 
languages begins 600 or 1000 ms before speech of a single primed or non-primed word respectively (Indefrey & Levelt, 
2004; Indefrey, 2011; Bates et al., 2003), and around 1500 ms before uttering a short clause (Griffin & Bock, 2000) (see 
Roberts et al., 2015).  Therefore, given that turns on average last only 2 seconds, responses need to be prepared already 
halfway between the start and conclusion of the conversational partner’s previous turn (Levinson & Torreira, 2015).  
 
Consequently we can safely assume that a considerable degree of temporal prediction is involved.  However, although it is 
tempting to imagine that these predictions are based on temporalities - on a pulse - it seems that other indications 
predominate.  First of all an understanding as to the function (i.e. is it a question or statement?) of the others’ speech act 
occurs within 400 ms of the beginning of the turn (Gisladottir et al., 2015; see Levinson, 2013).  It starts to trigger initial 
production processes within a further 500ms (Bögels et al., 2015; but see also Sjerps and Meyer, 2015).  Unsurprisingly the 
person planning the onset of his or her turn can also garner predictive information from the lexical, semantic, and syntactic 
structure of the partner’s utterance (Magyari et al., 2014, Garrod and Pickering, 2015).  He/she may even prime some 
educated guesses of upcoming words (Magyari and de Ruiter 2012) based largely on the semantic context (Riest et al., 
2015).  Finally, some more intrinsically temporal and prosodic cues are also available from, for example, lengthened 
syllables towards the end of a turn (Bögels & Torreira, 2015).  These processes and the many fascinating coordinative 
processes involved in turn-taking and conversation are discussed and reviewed more extensively elsewhere (e.g. Holler et 
al., 2015; Levinson, 2016).  The crucial point for our purposes, however, is that the predictive mechanisms are 
comparatively short-term with no direct evidence for a mutually understood and continuing “musical” pulse across turns. 
 
Musical Pulse and Rhythm in Development 
 
In this chapter I have deliberately focused attention on the most basic manifestation of a musical pulse and its corresponding 
mechanisms, capabilities and embedded connections.  This has been partly to constrain the boundaries of investigation but 
also to keep the discussion, as much as possible, at the level of a shared human capacity for music and away from culturally 
constructed learning and convention.  Meter is an interesting case, however, in that the principle of operating within a meter 
undoubtedly relies on established mechanisms of a musical pulse.  It is also a music-specific trait that shares some common 
ground across cultures in being interpretable at different hierarchical levels and gestalts (see London, 2012 for a full 
discussion).  That said it is also manifest in a considerable degree of cultural learning and appreciation.  Very broadly 
                                                 
52 It is a notable however that great apes seem to prioritize gestural communication systems (Call & Tomasello, 2007) and have not been 
documented in exhibiting vocal turn-taking 
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speaking, we seem to come into the world primed to adopt a complete variety of metric structures and then gradually get 
constrained by cultural experience.  Infants are already sensitive to pulse and meter in musical stimuli and will, after 
habituation to three similarly metered patterns remain attentive to a novel rhythm that embodies a different meter for longer 
than to one with a similar metric structure (Hannon & Johnson, 2005).  Their relative flexibility compared to adults was 
clearly showed in a well-designed study by Hannon and Trehub (2005a).  Adults from North America, Bulgaria and 
Macedonia were tested on their ability to distinguish between “simple” or “complex” metered Bulgarian and Macedonian 
folk tunes and meter-preserving and meter-disrupting variants.  North American adults, reflecting the dominance of simple 
meters in Western music, were unable to distinguish between meter-disrupting and meter-preserving variations on complex 
metered tunes.  Bulgarians and Macedonians, who are acculurated to both forms of meters, were successful at both tasks.  
The notion that North American adults gradually lose their ability to respond to complex meters rather than Bulgarian and 
Macedonian acquiring new skills was evident in the finding that 6-month-old infants prefer variations that disrupt the 
original meter to those that preserve it for both simple and complex meter tunes.  Culture-specific biases would seem to 
appear between months six and twelve in ontogeny as North American 12-month-old infants start to perform worse on 
complex-meter tunes (Hannon & Trehub, 2005b).  Although at this age, in contrast to adults, this can quickly be readdressed 
with exposure to Bulgarian folk tunes for 20 min daily for two weeks (Hannon & Trehub, 2005b). 
 
Similar points could perhaps be made regarding correlations between rhythmic structure and broader gestalt principles and 
auditory scene analysis capabilities from early development.  Musical rhythms can, of course, be created in an almost infinite 
variety and according to a whole world full of compositional traditions.  Some of the principles of construction might, 
however, be argued to reflect basic grouping capacities exhibited from early infancy.   4- to 6-month-old infants have been 
shown to perceptually group or phrase events in studies showing that they more accurately detect pauses after short notes 
than long notes (Trainor & Adams, 2000). They also listen to Mozart minuets for longer if pauses are injected at phrase 
boundaries (and are marked by note lengthening and falling pitch) than elsewhere (Krumhansl & Jusczyk, 1990; Jusczyk & 
Krumhansl, 1993).  Thus they would seem to have expectations as to which structural features are likely to signal phrase 
boundaries.  It is also worth noting here (although not a purely rhythmic phenomenon) that an early form gestalt formation or 
instance of auditory scene analysis (Bregman, 1990; 1993) in music is shown in a study reporting that 6- and 8-month-old 
infants find it easier to detect timing alterations within tone groups than between tone groups (Thorpe & Trehub, 1989). 
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Chapter Conclusion – A Musical Pulse 
A musical pulse is in practice, of course, more fascinating, variable, playful, and complex than the scope of the discussion 
and studies considered above.  “Finding” or expressing the beat in music involves an intricate understanding of musical 
structure – in some sense an intrinsically learned and manifest statistical analysis – and cultural knowledge and 
acculturation.    Stobart and Cross (2000), for example, reported an interesting study of the Easter Songs of Northern Potosí, 
Bolivia in which the appropriate understanding of whether the pulse was “on” or “off” the beat was entirely culturally 
contingent.  These kinds of issues are undoubtedly integral to the experience and function of music and to our understanding 
of social intentions, individualities, intrinsic learning and cultural forms.  However, here the focus has deliberately been on 
the “bare bones” – those “basic” processes and capabilities that allow us to create and interact with any musical pulse and 
thus root any particular manifestations and cultural quirks.  We can thus imagine that these reflect universal root capacities 
that underpin any engagement with pulsed music across time and cultural divides.  They are effectively the architectural 
groundwork upon which individual and cultural variabilities can be constructed. 
 
Pulse in interaction has, in some writings been described as a continuum with isochrony defining one end of the scale and 
with music positioned towards that extreme (Cross et al., 2011; Koelsch, 2012; cf. Bispham 2006). According to this view 
there is in this respect no definite distinction between music and language with areas of overlap, and transitional zones from 
isochronous to non-isochronous signals in both music and speech.  The “illusion” in which repeated speech patterns will be 
interpreted as being “musical” over time has sometimes been seen to support this nebulous divide between “pulse” in 
language and music (Deutsch et al., 2011).  However, this could also be interpreted as a parsimonious move from one mode 
of processing to another based upon the amount of inherent temporal regularity in the signal.  Describing the shift towards a 
“musical” pulse in terms of isochrony and therefore in terms of a relatively absolute physical characteristic can, I think, be 
misleading.  It reflects neither the reality nor the primary goal of a musical pulse.  As we have seen, a musical pulse can, by 
virtue of a wide range of involuntary fluctuations and social and learned cues, be both temporally flexible and “stable”.   
Thus, I would suggest, a more primal way to consider the specificities of a musical pulse is to consider the involvement of 
second-order relational processing over time, its inherent continuity, and correction mechanisms.  It is these features that 
profoundly create the stability of a musical pulse.  Relatively high degrees of behavioural isochrony are a particularly likely 
resultant attribute.  I propose therefore and conclude from the comparative discussions throughout this chapter that a musical 
pulse is distinct in the integral and particular nature of sustained attention; in its continually operational period correction 
mechanisms; a corresponding degree of volitional control; and an awareness of the underlying temporal beat.  
 
In essence a musical pulse is a particular type of attentional and temporal framework that allows the management of 
individual experience (and of smooth and ballistic fine motor timing) and a mutually manifest coordinating structure for 
interpersonal interaction.  It uniquely affords, and is most strikingly and evidently displayed in the harmonised coordination 
of action and perception in ensemble performances.  These are often described as impressive accounts of group 
synchronisation.  However, to be specific and focus discussion on the root enabling features of musical behaviour, we should 
perhaps be clear in describing action coordinated with reference to a shared and persistent attentional pulse.  The 
psychosocial, intersubjective, motivational and functional implications inherent in the specificities of a musical pulse are 
obviously intense both in terms of the flow of individual phenomenology and the social and communicative effects of 
sharing musical time with others.  These will be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
A musical pulse is a sustained, volitionally controlled, future-directed attentional pulse, within a temporal window 
of the psychological present.  It incurs awareness of a pulsed framework and is perceived unambiguously or at 
hierarchically related levels by acculturated individuals.  Furthermore, it involves engagement of the motor system 
in a way that enables management of fine and gross temporal control in ballistic and smooth movements, and 
mechanisms for period correction based upon the output of self and/or others.  
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Chapter 3 – Musical Tone 
 
This chapter mirrors the approach taken in chapter 2 in aiming to identify features that are specific to a sustained musical 
tone.  The use of pitch and tone in communication is widespread in human and non-human interaction.  I will therefore be 
aiming for a more intricate distinction in describing unique psychophysiological features of musical pitch perception and 
production.  In the opening section I offer a comparative discussion of pitch perception.  This highlights the increasing 
amount of evidence in support of the view that the most fundamental features of pitch perception are neither unique to music 
or indeed to our species.  They are, broadly speaking, widely shared with other primate species. 
 
The Psychophysiology of Pitch Perception 
 
Pitch, like pulse, is ultimately a perceptual construct.  It is relatable to physical frequency (assuming the F0 is within a range 
of about 30 Hz to 5000 Hz) but is by no means a direct perceptual correlate thereof.  It is a component in our broader suite of 
auditory scene analyses (Bregman, 1990) and, as such, one way in which we group related partials and make sense of the 
complex auditory stimuli we encounter in music, language, and in general interaction with the external world (See Darwin, 
2005 [in Plack et al. 2005]).  The functioning and physiology of the auditory system as well as models of frequency analysis 
and tonotopic coding through the basilar membrane in pitch perception are well-developed and fascinating research areas.  
Recent and extensive reviews are available in the literature (e.g. Cheveigne, 2010; Oxenham 2010; 2012; McDermott & 
Oxenham, 2008; Plack et al., 2014; Stainsby & Cross, 2016), so I will focus here on the most critical behavioural features of 
pitch perception in humans and respective comparative studies in other species, focusing particularly on primates. 
 
Philosophically speaking we do not need to assume a priori that pitch is a pertinent percept in other species.  However it 
does seem that it is indeed widely operational across taxa.  Studies of frequency discrimination liminality (FDL) in humans 
and primates, using mostly pure tone stimuli, have shown successful discrimination in chimpanzees (Kojima, 1990), Old 
World monkeys (Stebbins, 1973; Sinnott, 1985; 1987; 1992; Prosen et al., 1990) [~1.2% change in frequency], and New 
World monkeys (Capps and Ades, 1968; Recanzone et al., 1991; Wienicke et al., 2001; Osmanski et al. 2017) [~2.5%].  FDL 
is notably lowest in humans (Wier et al., 1977; Sinnott et al., 1985; 1987; 1992) [(~0.2%].  However, all species tested 
showed lower FDLs with frequencies associated with their best hearing sensitivity (e.g., Stebbins,1973; Wier et al., 1977; 
Kojima, 1990; Wienicke et al., 2001) and a correlation between low FDL and a concentration of spectral energy in that 
species’ vocalizations (see Winter et al., 1966; Newman, 2003; Osmanski et al., 2017).  This clearly suggests that pitch is 
communicatively and socially relevant in primates and that auditory perception and vocal production are evolutionarily 
interrelated (Kuhl, 1988)53. 
 
Most, but by no means all, sounds that evoke a pitch in natural settings have a harmonic spectral structure in which acoustic 
salience is concentrated at frequencies that are integer multiples (harmonics) of a common fundamental frequency (F0).  The 
purest evidence that pitch represents a perceptual construct resulting from analysis of complex physical stimuli (see 
McDermott & Oxenham, 2008) comes from well-established evidence that the percept of pitch remains stable following the 
removal of the actual physical F0.  EEG studies have shown that, in humans, the ability to find the pitch of a missing 
fundamental emerges between 3-4months (He & Trainor, 2011).  It is behaviourally well established by 7 months (Clarkson 
and Clifton, 1985; Clarkson and Rogers, 1995; Montgomery and Clarkson, 1997).  This capacity appears to be common 
across species and has been experimentally documented in birds (Cynx and Shapiro, 1986), cats (Heffner and Whitfield, 
1976), rhesus monkeys (Tomlinson & Schwarz, 1998), and chinchillas (Schofner, 2011).  Furthermore, evidence for a shared 
neurological process in monkeys and humans comes from reports of a shared specialized area for pitch processing in the 
low-frequency region of the auditory cortex (Patterson et al., 2002; Penagos et al., 2004; Bendor and Wang, 2005, 2010; 
Schneider et al., 2005; Schönwiesner and Zatorre, 2008; Puschmann et al., 2010).  Pitch-selective neurons in this region in 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) can encode the pitch of missing fundamental (MF) sounds that are spectrally outside their 
excitatory frequency response area (Bendor and Wang, 2005; 2006) and are notably sensitive to pitch salience and temporal 
envelope regularity (Bendor and Wang, 2010). 
 
In humans, a sense of pitch may also arise from stimuli with inharmonic54 components (Shouten et al., 1962), spectra 
comprised of broadband noise (Burns and Viemeister, 1976; Cramer and Huggins, 1958) and/or from a psychological 
composite of stimuli to different ears (Cramer and Huggins, 1958; Houtsma and Goldstein, 1972; Klein and Hartmann, 
1981).  More recent studies of pitch-matching and melody discrimination have also revealed that the pitch of the missing 
                                                 
53 Genetic and anatomical comparative perspectives confirm differences in the anatomical structures of the outer and middle ear between 
chimpanzees and modern-day humans consistent with co-specific vocalisations (Clark et al., 2003; Abdehak et al., 1997; Vervoort et al., 
Masali et al., 2006; Nummela, 1995).  Empirical data of hearing capabilities show distinctions between the two species.  Chimpanzees are 
optimally sensitive at 1 kHz (corresponding to the most salient information of species-specific pant-hoots) and 8kHz (Kojima, 1990).  
Human sensitivities differ in that, while chimpanzees exhibit a loss of sensitivity between 2 and 4 kHz, we maintain a high sensitivity in this 
region that contains relevant information in human vocalization (Jackson et al., 1999; Brown & Waser, 1984).  Inspired by this discrepancy 
Martinez et al (2004) analysed, using a physical model, the influence of skeletal structures on the acoustic filtering of the outer and middle 
ears in five fossil human specimens for the middle Pleistocene site of the Sima de los Huesos (SH) in the Sierra de Atapuerca, Spain.  Their 
analysis concluded that the skeletal anatomy of SH hominids of the outer and middle ear is “compatible with a human-like sound power 
transmission pattern” and clearly different from chimpanzees in the critical region of ≈ 4kHz.  Furthermore they infer that, as SH hominids 
form part of the Neanderthal evolutionary lineage (Arsuaga et al, 1997; Martinez & Arsuaga, 1998), this condition may well have been 
present in the last common ancestor of modern humans and Neanderthals – Homo antecessor (Bermudez et al., 1997). 
54 Inharmonic refers to instances in which the harmonic partials (frequencies) of a sound source are not related by small integer values (most 
likely producing a ‘rough’ sound) 
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fundamental can be extracted even when all the harmonics present are well above 5 kHz (Oxenham et al., 2011).  These and 
many other findings have largely been interpreted within general pattern matching or temporal models of pitch perception 
(see Cheveigne, 2005; 2010).  They “principally differ in the relative importance of frequency components that are resolved 
(RES) or unresolved (URS) by the auditory system” (Stainsby & Cross, 2016, p. 68 {abbreviations added}; [see also Plack 
and Oxenham, 2005; Plack et al., 2014]).55  Essentially pitch can be evoked in three ways: By the use of the lowest-
frequency component present in a harmonic sound or a pure tone (Ohm, 1843); by matching spectral harmonic templates in 
the central auditory system to the resolved components of an incoming harmonically structured sound (Goldstein, 1973; 
Shamma & Klein, 2000); or by extracting pitch from temporal interactions between unresolved frequency components 
within an auditory filter - the ‘temporal envelope’ (Schouten, 1940). Although each process reflects mechanisms that can 
operate independently, the relative strength of the perceived pitch - measured inversely as differences in the ability to 
discriminate changes in F0 (Micheyl et al., 2010) - varies56.    
 
In particular, studies of F0 difference limen (FODL) have shown that complex tones have greater pitch strength than pure 
tones (Zeitlin, 1964; Henning & Grosberg, 1968; Fastl & Weinberger, 1981; Spiegel & Watson, 1984) and even that the 
pitch strength of harmonic complex tones is unaffected by removal of the fundamental frequency (Schouten, 1938; Licklider, 
1956).  Additionally, we see a reduction in pitch strength as spectral content moves beyond the lower range of resolved 
frequencies.  Thus, in general, RES seem to dominate over URS.  We also seem to demonstrate a stronger pitch percept to 
sounds in which the RES are spectrally harmonic (Faulkner, 1985; Moore & Glasberg, 1990; Micheyl et al., 2012) and 
sounds in which the salience of temporal envelope cues in URS is high (Houtsma & Smurzynski, 1990).  As mentioned 
above much more detailed accounts are available in the literature.  However, from a comparative perspective it has been 
crucial to outline these central findings in humans as Shofner and Chaney (2013) have proposed that pitch perception in non-
human animals is much more restricted. They propose, with reference to a study on Chincillas that pitch perception results 
exclusively from temporal, rather than spectral, processing in nonhuman mammals.  This suggestion has, however, been 
strongly countered in a pertinent study by Song and colleagues (2015).  After considering differences in resolvability 
boundaries between humans and marmosets (presumably due largely to cochlear size variance [see Osmanski et al., 2013]) 
they found that this highly vocal species shares with humans all three primary mechanisms/features of central pitch 
processing discussed above.  They conclude, therefore, that marmosets and humans share similar pitch perception 
mechanisms and suggest further that these mechanisms may have emerged early in primate evolution.  As marmosets are a 
relatively distant primate cousin (with a last common ancestor circa 40 million years ago) this does seem quite plausible.  
However, we do perhaps need more similar studies on other primates to confirm this hypothesis over, for example, a 
homoplasic evolutionary scenario57.  Nevertheless, from the results of the studies mentioned above, it does seem that we can 
already be confident in accepting Song and colleagues’ conclusion (2015) that our basic psychophysiological mechanisms of 
pitch perception are, at least broadly speaking, shared with other primate species.  
 
Relative Pitch Processing  
 
This section explores the psychology of relative pitch processing.  In particular I will show that it emerges early in human 
development and is widely operational across communicative domains in humans.  However, similarly to relative/beat-based 
timing (chapter 2), it represents a stark contrast between human and non-human cognition and perception. 
 
As noted by McDermott and Oxenham (2008, p.453) “standard views of the auditory system might lead one to believe that 
absolute pitch would dominate perception”.  They note, for example, that “tonotopic representations that are observed from 
the cochlea [Ruggero, 1992] to the auditory cortex [Kaas et al., 1999] make absolute, rather than relative, features of a 
sound’s spectrum explicit”.  However, in humans, relational pitch processing is ubiquitous in perception and communication 
and is effortlessly acquired in early development.  In music, while absolute cues are certainly operational (see Loui, 2016), it 
is a relational architecture that principally and primarily characterizes global (e.g. tranposability) and local (e.g. intervals) 
pitch systems across cultures58.  It certainly, therefore, does not make sense to argue, as Mithen (2005) does, that the 
acquisition or retention of absolute pitch makes man or Neanderthal “more musical” (see Bispham, 2006a).  If anything 
precisely the opposite is the case.   
 
Despite some debate in the literature, the majority of the evidence appears to support the notion that infants prefer to process 
pitch combinations in terms of the relationships between tones rather than absolute frequency values (Trainor, 2005).  
Saffron and colleagues have, however, argued to the contrary with a series of  statistical learning studies in which infants 
                                                 
55 Resolved harmonics at those ( 5̴-10) lowest frequencies that are separated into different auditory filters and can be heard individually from 
the whole complex sound (Plomp & Mimpen, 1968). These harmonics are known as resolved harmonics (RESs). Unresolved harmonics 
conversely are those for which each auditory filter receives significant power from more than one filter.  The boundaries of RESs and URSs 
have been determined in behavioural studies (e.g. Shackleton & Carlyon, 1994; Bernstein & Oxenham, 2006). 
56 It is interesting to note that in congenital amusia, individuals have been shown to have a specific alteration in the processing of resolved 
harmonics (Cousineau et al., 2015).  Fine-grained pitch perception difficulties have also been shown to extend to 8 kHz which is notably 
beyond the typical region of musical pitch (Whiteford & Oxenham, 2017).  This study also showed some surprising deficits on amplitude as 
well as frequency distinctions. 
57 Another area that remains to be investigated comparatively, as pointed out in Patel & Demorest (2013) is the right-hemisphere bias in 
missing fundamental processing in humans (Patel & Balaban, 2001; Zatorre 1988).  Following Zatorre et al. (2002) they suggest that this 
may reflect a trade-off in specialization between the right and left auditory cortices, with enhanced spectral resolution and temporal 
resolution in the right and left hemispheres, respectively (see Pöppel, 2003).   
58 Will (1997) notes an intriguing partial exception in Central Australian songlines in which ‘intervals in the upper melodic range are shown 
to be linear shifts of intervals in the lower range’ (emphasis in the original, p.6)  
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receive continuous exposure to sequences of tones and are subsequently tested on their recognition of the most frequent 
three-tone fragments.  The key conclusions taken from these studies were that, in the presence of both relative and absolute 
cues, infants prefer absolute cues both in randomly selected twelve-tone and standard seven-note major scale samples 
(Saffron & Greigentrog, 2001; Saffron, 2003).  In the absence of absolute cues they are, however, able to learn on the basis 
of relative cues (Saffron et al., 2005).  Further evidence that infants can relate to features of absolute pitch comes from 
studies showing that seven month old infants, similarly to college students remembering soap signature tunes (Schellenberg 
& Trehub, 2003), retain absolute pitch information about unfamiliar lullabies after two weeks of exposure (Volkova, 2004 
[reference taken from Trehub & Hannon, 2006]).  We should perhaps note that the results of Saffron's studies may be 
influenced by the amusicality – structurally and timbrally - of the stimuli presented. In terms of memory for real tunes, six 
month old infants recall, after relatively minimal exposure, relative pitch features (Trainor, Wu, & Tsang, 2004) which 
indeed appear to be primarily salient (Platinga & Trainor, 2005).  In shorter-term experimental paradigms with musical 
stimuli, five to ten month old infants have been shown to treat transpositions of original melodies as familiar or equivalent 
even after limited exposure.  Similarly to results in adult studies (e.g. Trehub et al, 1987), infants respond most readily to 
changes in contour (Chang & Trehub, 1977; Trehub, Bull, & Thorpe, 1984; Trehub, Thorpe, & Morrongiello, 1987) and 
often confuse altered melodies that maintain shared pitch contours (e.g. Trehub, et al, 1987; Trehub, Thorpe & Trainor, 
1990).  Markedly the salience of pitch contour is not restricted to musical stimuli but also appears in engagement with infant-
directed speech (e.g. Fernald, 1991).  This is perhaps not surprising given that, as argued by McDermott & Oxenham (2012), 
“the difficulty in encoding intervals might simply be due to their specification requiring more information than that of a 
contour” (p. 3).  Significantly infants do seem, however, to be able to differentiate same-contour melodies consistently if the 
original melodies are based primarily upon low-integer intervals or conform to certain “grammatical” rules (Cohen et al., 
1987; Trainor & Trehub, 1993b).  
 
In stark contrast nonhuman animals have so far been shown to have, at best, very limited relative pitch capacity.  Songbirds 
rely instinctively and extensively on absolute cues in recognising sequences of tones (Hulse, 1992; Weismann et al., 2006).  
Even after vast training they make very limited use of relative cues (Hulse & Page, 1988; Page et al, 1989; Weisman et al., 
2004).  Although songbirds struggle to recognize transposed isochronous tone sequences, Bregman and colleagues (2012) 
demonstrated that European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) can be trained to recognize frequency-shifted versions of songs from 
other conspecifics.   It seems likely, however, that the birds may recognize the transposed versions of the songs on the basis 
of timbral and rhythmic relations (e.g. Hulse & Klein, 1993).  A subsequent study (Bregman et al., 2015) demonstrated that, 
in this species, small manipulations altering either pitch or timbre independently result in an inability to recognize melody. 
However, melody differentiation generalized even in the absence of pitch if the spectral shapes of the constituent tones were 
maintained.  It therefore seems likely, as proposed by Patel and Demorest (2013), that “the difficulty birds have recognizing 
transposed tone sequences reflects a general difficulty that animals have with recognizing sound sequences on the basis of 
relations between acoustic features (McDermott, 2009)” (p. 655).  This can be related to the lack of capacity in many other 
mammalian species to manipulate pitch, timbre and loudness in vocalization individually, and a corresponding lack of 
relevance in isolating these features in the assessment of conspecifics communicative signals (e.g. Bispham, 2009; Patel et 
al., 2017). 
 
One of the most significant features of relative pitch in music is that of octave equivalence – the sense that pitches separated 
by an octave (a 1:2 frequency relationship) are in some way the same.  In many cultures it comes naturally to sing in octave 
unison and the percept of octave equivalence has been demonstrated in speech (Peter et al. 2008), music (Burns, 1999; 
Thompson, 2013) and even in human infancy (Demany & Armand 1984).  That said some cultures sing more spontaneously 
in internals other than the octave59 and some studies deny equivalency in 4-9 year old children (Sergeant 1983) and non-
musicians (Allen 1967).  Thus we should, perhaps, not be too unequivocal in supposing music theoretic accounts of direct 
equivalency.   Unsurprisingly, no strong octave relevance is found in European starlings, (Cynx 1993; Hoeschele et al., 
2012).  A study on chickadees similarly suggests that, despite some seemingly positive findings, they use pitch height 
perception to classify pitches into ranges (independent of the octave) to transfer note-range discriminations from one octave 
to the next (Hoeschele, 2013).  In mammals, octave equivalence has rather unconvincingly been reported in rats (Blackwell 
and Schlosberg 1943) and, in a more significant set of studies, in rhesus macaques (Wright et al., 2000).  The latter 
reportedly retained an identity of tonal melodies (but not synthetic ‘melodies’) if, and only if, they were transposed in whole 
octaves.  Notably large stretches of training were required and we should perhaps also be cautious in interpreting the 
findings as some spectral absolute cues may have been retained in the harmonics of the keyboard voices used (i.e. a 
fundamental frequency may have been a first harmonic in transposition).   In a study of non-octave single pitch intervals in 
ferrets, substantial training was also needed to show some recognition of similarity following transposition (Yin et al., 2010).  
Again this shows that relative pitch in this species is, at best, not a natural process and highly limited.   
 
Relative pitch processing is crucial in all forms of human communication.  We can perhaps posit that music is distinct in 
organizing relative cues in discrete pitches, harmonic blending, and more fine-grained divisions (see below).  Nevertheless, 
relative characteristics are more broadly perceptually and functionally relevant from early infancy onwards.  For example, 
infant-directed speech ((Fernald et al., 1984; Papousek et al., 1985) and lullabies (Unyk, et al., 1992; Trehub et al., 1993; 
Trehub et al., 1998) consistently employ descending contours in soothing and calming (see Bispham, 2002).  In mature 
speech too, we need to express and interpret functionally significant intonational patterns or even common pitch contours 
and relations between pitches in tone languages (see Ladd, 2008).  More generally still, in relating and physically 
empathizing with others, we need to account for interpersonal differences in size, physiological structure and subsequent 
                                                 
59 Blacking (1995), for example, states that “Venda people would resist singing in unison with [him] when asked to do so, on the grounds 
that with more than one person present any good musician would prefer to sing in harmony at the interval of a fourth, fifth, or third” (p.236).   
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differences in vocal range and tessitura.  Hence pitch can perhaps be seen as another communicative cue in which relative 
processing evolved to enhance social understanding and communality.  Notably, as a group, autistic individuals attend more 
to absolute pitch cues than normal individuals.  This has been shown both in speech and music and it has been suggested that 
this is one basis of their communicative challenges in language (Heaton, 2009; Heaton et al., 2008; Järvinen-Pasley et al., 
2008; Järvinen-Pasley et al., 2008).  Relative pitch, similarly to relative/beat-based timing, appears to be a major transition 
between humans and other mammalian and primate species.  It is an essential component in the capacity to engage with a 
musical tone without being intrinsically specific to it.  It is, more broadly, a critical and generalisable feature of human 
communication.  In evolutionary terms, it seems entirely plausible, therefore, that broad relative pitch capacities initially 
evolved and developed independently of music. 
 
 Perceptual Consonance 
 
This section continues the comparative approach exploring whether the percept of consonance and dissonance is shared with 
non-human species and whether it is mechanistically distinct from perceiving degrees of timbral roughness in natural sounds.  
In particular, I will argue against the notion that music can be cross-culturally characterized by an aesthetic preference for 
consonant intervals.  Processing dissonant intervals does seem, however, to incur a greater attentional cost in humans (a 
feature not found in the relatively few available studies on non-human species). 
 
A connected perceptual concept to relative pitch processing is that of consonance and dissonance.  Typically intervals, 
presented either as melodic sequence or horizontal harmony, are described and perceived as being progressively more 
consonant as fundamental frequencies form more simpler (i.e., small-integer) ratios.  Categorical distinctions between levels 
of dissonances appear early in human development (Schellenberg & Trainor, 1996; Perani et al., 2010) and distinct neural 
responses have been observed in the inferior colliculus and the primary auditory cortex of cats and monkeys respectively 
(McKinney, et al., 2001; Fishman et al., 2001).  Behaviourally, both pigeons (Columbia livia) and Japanese macaques 
(Macaca fuscata) have been successfully trained to discriminate among chords based on sensory consonance (Brooks & 
Cook, 2010; Izumi, 2000).  Consonant intervals are often described as being more pleasant to the ear, and a desire for 
consonance has variously been argued, implicitly and explicitly, to underlie the structure of musical form and tonality.  
Indeed, if we restrict our view to Western tonal music written between c. 1650-1920 this perspective can appear to find a 
certain degree of music-theoretic, and even neuroimaging support.  Bidelman and Grall (2014) have, for example, argued 
that listeners' behavioural preferences for intervallic and chordal harmonies are well predicted based on underlying sensory 
pitch representations along the early auditory pathway (rostral brainstem and auditory nerve) (Bidelman and Heinz, 2011; 
Bidelman and Krishnan, 2009).  Even when acoustic or peripheral factors are controlled, brain activity provides, they posit, a 
sufficient basis to account for the fundamental organizational principles of tonal music (Bidelman, 2013; Bidelman and 
Krishnan, 2009; Itoh et al., 2010).  They conclude that “these studies demonstrate that nascent features of tonal structure and 
musical pitch hierarchy are present in the earliest (pre-attentive) stages of the auditory system in neurocomputations 
operating below conscious awareness” (p. 205).  This may be partially reflective of a manifestation of functional concepts of 
object and beauty in Western ‘art’ music (see Bohlman, 2000).  Even here, however, the idea is musicologically speaking 
highly problematic, not least because it is, more often than not, the interplay between relative degrees of dissonance that is 
more significant than any absolute degree of consonance (Meyer, 1956; Krumhansl, 2000; Woolhouse & Cross, 2010).  As 
we attempt to widen the scope of relevance to ethnomusicological and cross-cultural concerns, the idea falls apart 
completely (e.g. Vassilakis, 2005; Jordania, 2006).  This is important to clarify as misrepresentations of aesthetics, biology 
and consonance in music abound in the literature.  At the centre of the difficulties encountered is a need to avoid conflations 
of issues regarding spectral harmonicity, intervallic consonance, processual predispositions, biological parsimony, musical 
structure, and cultural conventions and aesthetics.  Distinctions (and partial correlations) between the above are theoretically 
well-known but nevertheless arguments, for example, regarding musical aesthetics and a biological basis for musicality still 
result from talking at cross purposes (e.g. McDermott et al., 2016; Bowling et al., 2017). 
 
Varying degrees of periodicity and roughness are inherent in the timbre of natural sounds and the organization of spectral 
harmonics.  In general communicative signals and vocalisations are most likely to exhibit high levels of harmonicity.  So it is 
perhaps not surprising that primates, being social animals, exhibit significant perceptual sensitivity to the harmonic 
relationships that define consonance as well as distinct neuronal responses (Feng & Wang, 2017; Fishman et al., 2013; 
Wang, 2013).   Some prominent theoreticians have intuited and proposed that the physical nature of harmonics, vocalization 
and sensitivities to intra-species communicative intent, may root the psychoacoustic relevance of consonance and dissonance 
in music (e.g. Rameau [see Christensen, 2004], Terhardt, 1984).  In practice, levels of spectral ‘harmonicity’ and tonal 
‘consonance’ will naturally co-occur as the harmonics of two or more natural musical tones create capricious gradations of 
auditory ‘roughness’ or ‘beating’ in the cochlear mechanism (Plomp & Levelt, 1965; Bidelman & Heinz, 2011).  However, 
in experimental settings they can be artificially separated predominantly by using sine tones and/or presenting tone 
combinations dichotomously (Houtsma and Goldstein, 1972; Bidelman and Krishnan, 2009).   Using controlled stimuli and 
methods of presentation, a connection does, nevertheless, remain partially inherent in evidence that harmonicity is correlated 
with preferences for consonant over dissonant chords (McDermott et al., 2010; Krumhansl and Cuddy, 2010).  Furthermore, 
Cousineau and colleagues (2012) showed that impairment in consonance perception commonly found in participants with 
amusia is correlated with a diminished ability to perceive harmonicity.   
 
It seems now quite clear that Helmholtz’s (1885/2013) conclusion that auditory roughness is the “true and sufficient cause of 
consonance and dissonance in music” (p. 227) is not supported by subsequent empirical evidence.   The studies cited above 
also showed that the strength of consonance preferences did not correlate to the intensity of aversion to roughness in normal 
subjects (McDermott et al., 2010).  Furthermore, despite not describing customary aesthetic considerations for consonance 
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and dissonance, amusics performed normally in terms of the perception of roughness (Cousineau et al., 2012).  Neurological 
studies also exhibit distinct correlations between tonal dissonance and roughness.  For example, lesion studies have indicated 
that the perception of dissonance and roughness can be selectively impaired independently of the other (Tramo et al., 2001).  
In this light, it is interesting to note also that human auditory cortical brain regions involved in pitch perception and those 
involved in the analysis of spectral shape have been shown to be partially separate (Norman-Haignere, et al. 2013; Warren, 
et al., 2005). 
 
The main source of confusion in comparative and cross-cultural accounts of consonance and dissonance comes from a 
conflation of processing predisposition and preference.  As humans we generally find consonant/low integer interval easier 
to produce and process (Trainor, 1997; Trainor et al. 2002; see Trainor & Corrigall, 2010).  Adults and 9 month old infants, 
for example, detect changes in repeating intervallic patterns or melodic patterns more easily if the stimulus is composed of 
consonant intervals compared to dissonant intervals (Schellenberg & Trehub, 1994).  Sensitivities to changes in tuning are 
more sensitive to consonant sequences from early on in development (Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996).  The processing 
advantages have also been shown to extend beyond the constraints of a particular task thus suggesting a greater attentional 
load in perceiving dissonant material.  Masataka and Perlovsky (2013) have, for example, shown a greater interference effect 
of dissonant stimuli and Komeilipoor and colleagues (2015) found that performance in a sensorimotor synchronization task 
was better after the presentation of consonant stimuli than after the presentation of dissonant stimuli.  Notably rats, who have 
been successfully trained to discriminate consonant from dissonant sequences but not to generalize such discrimination to 
novel chords (Crespo-Bojorque & Toro, 2015), show no evidence of a processing advantage for consonant structures 
(Crespo-Bojorque & Toro, 2016; see Toro & Crespo-Bojouque, 2017).  It would certainly be interesting to investigate 
whether primate or other more vocal/social species shared a greater ease in processing consonant stimuli.  If so it might 
suggest an evolutionary connection to spectral harmonicities found in vocal communication.  In terms of humans and music, 
these processing advantages have been argued to parsimoniously account for a statistically high use of low-integer intervals 
and, for example, certain widespread commonalities in scale structures across cultures (see Burns, 1999; Thompson, 2013; 
Brown & Jordania, 2013; Bowling, 2015; Bowling et al., 2017).  However, extending the argument to hypothesise a general 
pattern of aesthetic preference for consonance in music across styles and cultures does not inherently make sense and fits 
neither observational, music theoretic, nor experimental evidence.   
 
It is true that some studies have shown descriptions of preference for single consonant chords over single dissonant chords 
across cultures (Butler & Daston, 1968).  Furthermore it has often been argued that infants, even two-day-old infants born to 
deaf parents (Masataka, 2006), prefer consonance to dissonance (Trainor & Heinmiller, 1998; Zentner & Kagan, 1998).  
This contrasts with studies on cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and campbells monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) 
who displayed no locational preference for being near consonant versus dissonant chords or sounds (McDermott and Hauser, 
2004; Koda et al, 2013)60.  Notably, however, 6 year old human children (unlike 9 year olds) do not describe an aesthetic 
preference (Valentine, 1962).   Furthermore, Plantinga and Trainor (2014) have questioned whether infant looking times in 
the above mentioned studies necessarily indicate preference as opposed to some other form of categorical distinction.  In 
their own study with 6-month-old infants they showed that, after short exposure, infants did not show distinct behaviours to 
consonant or dissonant stimuli.  Instead the infants simply paid more attention to the stimuli with which they were more 
familiar.  An effect of familiarity, and perhaps also of a notion that dissonance is partially perceived in relation to levels of 
processing complexity/challenge, is also evident in adults whose pitch processing is facilitated by familiarity.  This, in turn, 
also affects positively the perception of a chord being consonant (McLachlan et al., 2013).  In a recent cross-cultural study 
the Amazonian Tsimane rated consonant and dissonant chords and vocal harmonies as equally pleasant despite showing 
similar discrimination abilities and aesthetic responses to familiar sounds and acoustic roughness to those found in Western 
experimental subjects (McDermott et al., 2016).  Bolivians, in turn, described some preference for consonance but to a lesser 
degree than US residents.  The authors hypothesize that these results reflect levels of exposure to Western culture and that, 
therefore, a preference for consonant chords are unlikely to reflect innate biases or exposure to harmonic natural sounds. 
 
We can perhaps posit that the percept of intervallic or harmonic consonance and dissonance is psychoacoustically active 
across musical styles and cultures.  Degrees of dissonance can reflect dramatic intent, differing regulatory needs and goals, 
compositional and performative boundaries of style, as well as individual histories and cultural tradition (Dowling & 
Harwood, 1986).  It seems an almost peculiar blind spot amongst some cognitive scientists to avoid the conclusion that high 
degrees of dissonance can be just as desirable as consonance.  To highlight just a very few examples from traditional musical 
traditions, beating overtones are actively sought out in many Middle Eastern, North Indian, and Bosnian musical cultures 
(Vassilakis, 2005) and are a necessary condition for music to be considered “lively and full” in Balinese gamelan orchestras 
(see Spiller, 2004).  Harmonising in a minor second relationship to a drone or even singing in “unison” a semitone apart are 
common techniques in North Indian ragas (Maher, 1976) or in Croatian traditional ‘ganga’ singing (Vassilakis, 2005).  
Scalar microtunings too are constructed in performance to appropriately enhance “pungency” in Anatolian Greek migrant 
communities (League, 2016).   Of course extreme dissonance also characterises much Western art music and many modern-
day styles.  The central point to be clear on from the above discussion is that, ultimately, a generalisable account of music 
needs to account for the fundamental capacities and psychophysiological relevancies of perceiving and producing pitched 
tones in fine-grained relative relationship to others, rather than any absolute values of consonance or dissonance. 
 
                                                 
60 Given the choice of approaching a visual imprinting object associated with consonant or dissonant versions of complete melodies, 
however, newly hatched domestic chicks preferentially approach the consonant version (Chiandetti & Vallortigara, 2011)  and an infant 
chimpanzee, using a computerized setup, produced consonant versions of melodies for longer periods of time (Sugimoto et al., 2010).  Thus 
other species may well be attuned to some structural consistencies related to degrees of consonance.  
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Is Pitch Perception in Music Special? – Evidence from Amusia 
 
The following paragraphs discuss the view that pitch perception in music requires more fine-grained distinctions than those 
which are operational in non-musical communicative interactions.  Very broadly speaking, impairments in fine-grained pitch 
perception do seem to have detrimental effects (albeit far less severe effects) beyond the domain of music.  A particularly 
pertinent finding from recent research into individuals with congenital amusia is that the impairment typically stems 
specifically from a lack of conscious access to perceptions of small pitch differences. 
 
Pitch clearly plays a critical role across the full breadth of human vocal interactions.  Rising and falling patterns are 
consistently functional in emotionally regulating infant arousal levels across cultures (e.g. Trehub et al., 1993; Papousek, 
1996); pitch areas are semantically functional in tone languages (e.g. Ooyang & Kaiser, 2015); and melodic contour can also 
indicate grammatical/lexical function (e.g. Burgoon et al., 2016).  Albeit less well studied, more or less intentional 
microtunings and inflections of pitch also convey a myriad of communicative information and function in music, speech and 
non-linguistic interaction (e.g. Ladd, 2008).  Any specificities of musical pitch across cultures are likely to reside in the 
stable and sustained nature of a musical tone (and corresponding correction mechanisms [see below]); the ability to match 
pitch relationally to external pitches (see below); and the relatively fine categorical distinctions between pitches in music.  
Structurally significant margins typically operate down to the level of 100cents/1 semitone or even sometimes 50cents/a 
quartertone (e.g. Dean et al., 2008) in music.  This is considerably below clearly functional contour perimeters in speech or 
parent-infant communication and below distinctions between pitch areas in tone languages (see Cross et al., 2013).  The 
crucial question then for the concerns of this thesis is whether this is reflected in some specific pitch perceptual capabilities 
for music or whether it is part of a generalised ability to handle fine-grained pitch structures in communicative contexts.  
Leading attempts to address this question have been investigations into individuals with acquired (see Clark et al., 2015) and, 
perhaps even more significantly, congenital amusia (Ayotte et al., 2002). 
 
Despite some debate on the prevalence of amusia, the validity of its diagnostic tools (Henry & McAuley, 2010; 2013; Pfeifer 
& Hamann, 2015; Vuvan et al., 2017)61, and the extent to which it generalises across cultures and boundaries of musical 
style (Cross, 2010), we can safely state that a small subset of individuals exhibit difficulties relating to our culture’s music.  
It also seems clear that the predominant underlying impairment concerns fine-grained pitch perception (see Vuvan et al., 
2015), either rooted in deficits in pitch processing (e.g. Peretz & Hyde, 2003) or pitch specific memory (Albouy et al., 2015, 
2013; Gosselin et al., 2009; Williamson et al., 2010; Williamson and Stewart, 2010).  Amusics are typically described as 
being impaired at detecting small pitch deviations both in synthetic music and in purer psychoacoustic studies.  Pitch change 
detection tasks in which participants hear an isochronous sequence of tones, for example, reveal a diminished ability in 
amusics to distinguish intervals that are smaller than two semitones (200cents)62 (e.g. Peretz et al., 2005 [70% performance 
at 25cents compared to ceiling performance in controls]).  Two-interval forced choice paradigms provide similar (albeit 
slightly more fine-grained) results (Foxton et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2010; Tillmann et al., 2009).  As a group, strong deficits 
for thresholds of minimum pitch distinctions are also statistically evident when participants are asked to perform tasks that 
require processing of pitch direction (Jiang et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2012; Williamson et al., 2012)63.  This basic 
psychoacoustic constraint is understandably more definitively ruinous in music and has been seen to explain why this 
impairment can seemingly occur in relative isolation from speech disorders (e.g. Peretz et al., 2002; see Peretz, 2006).  More 
recent reports and studies on congenital amusia have, however, revealed a more nuanced picture.   
 
The majority of the studies referenced in the previous paragraph (also Jones et al., 2009; Omigie et al., 2013) have 
documented a degree of overlap between their amusic and control groups in terms of pitch thresholds in both pitch change 
detection and/or pitch direction judgments (see Tillmann, 2016).  In other words, a subset of amusic participants exhibited 
thresholds within the normal range of controls.  Significantly, perceptual pitch processing deficits in amusics have, in recent 
years, also been reasoned to impair other linguistic and interactional functions.  Studies have highlighted deficits in 
congenital amusia (albeit less severe than those found in music) in processing functional speech intonation (question vs. 
statement [Patel, 2008]), pitch manipulated French syllables (Tillmann et al., 2011)64, in decoding emotional prosody in 
speech (Thompson et al., 2012), and also in contrasts in lexical pitch in tone languages (Mandarin or Thai; e.g. Nguyen et 
al., 2009; Tillmann et al., 2011b).  Crucially, from a comparative perspective, amusic speakers of Mandarin showed a similar 
pattern of musical impairment as Western amusics with half of the participants in a seminal study displaying impairments in 
the discrimination and identification of Mandarin lexical tones (Nan et al., 2010).  This indicated to the authors that the pitch 
disorder at the root of most congenital amusia is not specific to music or culture but is rather general in nature65.  A later 
study confirmed these findings, whilst additionally proposing significant correlations between pitch threshold and lexical 
tone perception, music perception and production, but not between lexical tone perception and production (Liu et al., 2016).  
This supports a partial dissociation between pitch perception and production (see below) and that amusia in mandarin 
                                                 
61 Considering that almost half (41%) of individuals diagnosed as amusic describe a relatively normal experience in terms of musical 
engagement and appreciation, we could perhaps even challenge the use of term itself (Omigie et al., 2012). 
62 In contrast to controls who generally perform at ceiling for intervals as low as a quarter of a semitone (25 cents) (Hyde & Peretz, 2004). 
63 In accordance with this research Patel (2008) proposed a “melodic contour deafness hypothesis” for amusia (see also Liu et al., 2012). 
64 A particularly curious finding in this study was that the amusic group performed better for syllables than tones at the smallest pitch 
changes (25 cents).  They even achieved normal performance for syllables with intermediate pitch changes (100 cents/1semitone – an 
interval they struggled with in musical contexts). 
65 A genetic basis for pitch processing deficits in amusia is also evident from studies showing strong heretability (Peretz et al., 2007 [70-
80%]) and greater similarity in scores of recognising melodic anomalies in monozygotic twins than dizygotic twins (Drayna et al., 2001; 
Seesjaarvi et al., 2016). 
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speakers is “characterised by severely impaired music perception and production, mildly impaired speech perception, and 
largely intact speech production” (ibid, p. 563). 
 
While psychoacoustic limitations and deficits of memory representation in pitch processing appear as the behavioural 
correlates of amusia, the neurologically functional root appears to go deeper.  Fundamentally, sensory information seems to 
appear normally in the brain of amusics.   Lehmann and colleagues (2015) documented gradations of auditory brainstem 
responses correlating with musical experience/ability to fine-grained pitch stimuli.  However, Peretz (2016) reasons that this 
may reflect reduced transmission of cortical efferences (Coffey et al., 2016), and otherwise we find no irregularities in 
cochlea (Cousineau et al., 2015) or midbrain functioning (Liu et al., 2015).  Furthermore, amusic individuals with a 
substantial pitch perception deficit demonstrate clusters of pitch-responsive voxels in the primary motor cortex (A1) that are 
comparable in extent, selectivity, and anatomical location to those of control participants (Norman-Haignere et al., 2016). 
 
A number of varied neuroscientific studies have now also found surprisingly normal brain activity in response to pitch 
deviations that often go unnoticed by amusic subjects.  This suggests that “the core deficit in congenital amusia resides in a 
lack of conscious access to processed pitch deviances” (Peretz, 2016 p. 859).  Peretz and colleagues (2009) presented a 
seminal study in which amusic participants demonstrated normal early right anterior negativity (ERAN) to melodic 
deviations (cf. Koelsch et al., 2011).  FMRI blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses to successively patterned 
discrete pure-tones ranging from 25 cents to 2 semitones were also similar in amusics to those from control participants 
(Hyde et al., 2010).  Both showed a positive linear correlation between BOLD responses in bilateral auditory cortices and 
increases in pitch distance.  A study of mismatch negativity (MMN) brain responses to deviants in repeated tone sequences 
also produced congruous results (Moreau et al., 2013).  In small deviations (e.g. 25 cents) amusics, as usual, reported poor 
detection but showed normal MMN brain responses.  Significantly, in amusics the smaller deviations, in contrast to their 
responses to larger pitch changes, were not followed by a typical positivity (P300/P600) associated with conscious 
recognition.  Finally a more recent ERAN study (Zendel et al., 2015), on violations of expected tonality, demonstrated an 
evoked ERAN and a similar interference effect in amusics and controls in a click-detection task.   Despite being instructed to 
ignore pitch violations both groups exhibited decreased scores for click-detection accuracy – presumably due to an auditory 
attentional “blink” (Raymond et al., 1992).  However, when explicitly focused on pitch-detection, an evoked ERAN and 
P600 was only evidenced in the control participants. This study is especially significant in suggesting that tonal knowledge 
can be implicitly acquired in amusics, albeit remaining not consciously accessible66.  The capacity to engage appropriately 
with a musical tone appears, uniquely to some extent, to be contigent upon fine-grained pitch discernments and conscious 
access to perceptual information.  The latter may relate to degrees of volitional control in music-specific pitch correction 
mechanisms (discussed below). 
 
The Psychophysiology of Pitch Production 
 
The following four sections will follow a similar structure to the preceding discussion on the psychophysiology of pitch 
perception with regard to vocal pitch production.  Fundamentally there appears to be a greater degree of dissociation 
between perception and production than was the case with pulse.  I will present a comparative analysis of the volitional 
control of individual parts of the vocal mechanism and will argue that it is particular psychological/attentional correction 
mechanisms inherent in “sensorimotor harmonisation” that are most crucial in distinguishing the production of a specifically 
musical tone. 
 
In exploring the production of pitched tones it makes sense, especially from an evolutionary perspective, to focus on vocal 
capabilities.  The most fundamental features of our vocal mechanism are shared with other species and are commonly 
operational in pre-linguistic communication, linguistic speech, and music.  It can therefore be subjected to constructive 
comparative analysis. Furthermore, singing and percussive rhythmic actions are surely the modes by which music was 
primarily enacted by our evolutionary ancestors.  They remain notably dominant in modern-day hunter gatherer societies 
(see Morley, 2013).  Some modern-day pedagogies (e.g., Kodály) even start from the premise that the human voice is the 
natural musical instrument. One could, therefore, perhaps regard melodic instruments as being, first and foremost, an 
extension of the voice.  That said, we should perhaps be careful in presuming this somewhat poetic notion too absolutely.  
There may be some important psychophysiological differences between the manifest sonic feedback from an “external” 
instrument as opposed to that from one’s own “internal” voice (see below).   
 
Evolutionary and comparative perspectives on vocal capabilities have typically concentrated on evidence for the range of 
possible vocal sounds and degrees of volitional control in humans, with theoretical discussions focused on the relevance of 
findings to both language and music.  The next few sections follow some of the principal research in these areas.  However, 
in keeping with the central focus of this thesis, I will try to highlight root capabilities that may correlate to distinctions of a 
“simple” tone being musical.  As we shall see, even the production of a single sustained fundamental frequency is not trivial.  
It necessarily requires a consistency of muscular tonus and is reliant upon an ability to generate volitionally sound that varies 
independently in loudness, pitch (F0), and timbre.  Significantly, this level of independence of acoustic dimensions in 
production appears gradually in human infant development (Wermke & Mende, 2009) and is not fully shared with other 
                                                 
66 Another way of describing this is that the abnormalities found in amusia seem to stem from a disturbed top-down feedback from the 
inferior temporal gyrus (IFG) to the superior temporal gyrus (STG).  Peretz (2016) suggests that this functionally connects to conscious 
access/experience, in that the IFG is often operational in amplifying and refining auditory processing in the STG (Optiz et al., 2002), and 
because cognitive amplification is a crucial component for both predictive coding (Garrido et al., 2009) and consciousness (Deheane & 
Changeux, 2011). 
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primates who exhibit a relatively close linear relationship in vocalization between F0 and intensity with changes to subglottal 
pressure (Demolin & Delvaux, 2006).  Many bird and mammalian species use modulations of spectral shape and pitch for 
communicative purposes and in distinguishing functional intent (e.g., Elie & Theunissen, 2016; Fitch, 2005; Pisanski, et al., 
2016; Morton, 1977).  However, as noted by Patel (2017) this does not prove that they are modulated independently in 
sequences to convey distinct types of information.  It is notable, therefore, that even voicing a single musical note is 
contingent upon complex interactions and degrees of independent control of the muscles involved in breathing and vocal 
production:  Glottal adductor and abductor muscles serve to open and close the vocal folds that regulate levels of subglottal 
pressure thus affecting F0 and intensity; pharyngeal constrictor muscles control the width of the pharynx hence altering the 
relationship of F0 and higher harmonic partials (i.e., timbral correlates); extrinsic laryngeal muscles control the vertical 
positioning of the larynx in the throat; and intrinsic laryngeal muscles modulate length, stiffness, and thickness of the vocal 
folds through contractions of the cricothyroid and thyroarytenoid muscles and, crucially, allow an uncoupling of intensity 
and F0 (Sundberg & Rossing, 1990; Titze, 1994). 
 
Given the primacy of the voice, it would be tempting to assume some form of physiological and neurological coupling of 
pitch perception and embodied vocalisation (such as we found between pulse and movement) – some form of “inner 
singing” (e.g. Janata, 2001; Kalakoski, 2001).  Indeed areas of the Rolandic operculum, in particular those areas that are 
likely to represent laryngeal and pharyngeal articulation, have been shown to be active during the emotional processing of 
instrumental musical stimuli (Koelsch et al., 2006).  Belyck and Brown (2017) also hint at some involvement of the larynx 
motor cortex in the perception of pitch and Brown and Martinez (2007) describe activations of premotor vocal areas during 
melody and harmony discrimination tasks.  However, there does seem to be, also, a considerable degree of dissociation.  
Correlations between a variety of singing accuracy and pitch perception tasks have been evidenced in some studies (e.g., 
Amir et al., 2003; Watts et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2007; Estis et al., 2009, 2011) and contradicted in others (Bradshaw &  
McHenry, 2005; Dalla Bella et al., 2007; Pfordresher & Brown, 2007; Moore et al., 2008).  We should perhaps also be 
mindful of the point that we are generally more forgiving of degrees of deviations in tuning in singing than instrumental 
music across cultures (Arom et al., 2007; Pfordresher & Brown, 2017).  Hutchins et al., (2012) revealed judgments of sung 
melodic intervals being “in tune” up to a threshold of roughly 60 cents – a difference beyond the boundary between discrete 
scalar steps67.  The evidence from studies of congenital amusics is also equivocal.  Unsurprisingly congenital amusics are 
consistently rated as poor singers (Ayotte et al., 2002).  As a group they make considerably more pitch errors in singing 
popular songs (Dalla Bella et al., 2009) or matching single pitches (Hutchins et al., 2010) than controls.  However, we also 
find individual amusics whose singing is much better than their deficits in perceptual ability would suggest (Hutchins et al., 
2010) and improvements are evident in amusics as a whole when directly imitating a model (Tremblay-Champoux et al., 
2010).  In an interesting study comparing performance on a synthesized slider versus singing, Hutchins and Peretz (2012) 
sought to uncover the cause of poor pitch singing.  Results showed that about 20% of singers had a vocal-motor control 
impairment, 35% had a sensorimotor deficit (related to timbre), and only 5% had a perceptual deficit.  Perhaps the most 
accommodating theoretical model for this and the current state of evidence is the ‘linked dual representation model’ 
proposed by Hutchins and Moreno (2013).  This predicts that vocal information can be encoded distinctly as “a symbolic 
representation, such that we gain conscious knowledge of the identifiable features of the vocal stimulus… (and) as a motoric 
representation, such that it enables reproduction, imitation, or generative production” (p. 7).   
 
Crucially lacking in these discussions is an experimental understanding of how we merge perception and production in 
harmonizing our output synchronously with others.  The following few sections will, therefore, move towards suggestions 
for a new experimental paradigm to explore ‘sensorimotor harmonisation’ and some corresponding hypotheses which I hope 
to explore in future postdoctoral work (see below). 
 
The Evolution of Vocal Capabilities 
 
There have, as will be discussed below, been substantial evolutionary changes in hominin vocal physiology with 
considerable implications for musical and linguistic capabilities.  Critically, however, evidence for increased vocal flexibility 
and fine control of sustained air pressure cannot account entirely for the specific features and capabilities inherent in the 




Much of the evolutionary literature on vocal physiology has been framed with reference to discussions on the capacities for 
speech (e.g. Fitch, 2000; Johansson, 2005).  However, evidence for phylogenetic developments of vocal physiology is 
equally relevant to music (Frayer & Nicolay, 2000), in particular singing.  In fact it is perhaps best described in terms of 
fundamental physiological features required for controlled and varied vocalizations be it linguistic, musical, or otherwise 
(Morley, 2002; see Morley 2013).  It is also worth pointing out that evidence for physiological capacities does not imply that 
the capacities were used in musical or speech-like context.  We can, however, aim to infer some comparative hypotheses and 
a time before which such behaviours were not available in our evolutionary ancestors.   
 
                                                 
67 Notably if we use microtuning in human singing rather than instrumental music it counteracts the claim by Araya-Salas (2012) that 
nightingale wren’s song cannot be considered a suitable analogy to human music on the basis of intervallic consistency being 
disproportionately variable. 
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The most crucial physiological features involved in vocal production – the larynx, tongue and supralaryngeal tract - consist 
of cartilaginous and soft tissue and hence are not preserved in the paleontological record. However, some researchers have 
inferred variously from the mandible (jaw), basicranium (bottom of the skull), hypoglossal canal (Kay, et al. 1998)68, and on 
rare occasion the hyoid bone (e.g. Arensberg et al. 1990).  Following a seminal paper by Lieberman and colleagues, it was 
widely thought that the vertical positioning of the larynx inferred from degrees of basicranial flexion – the degree of 
curvature of the underside of the base of the skull – was indicative of increasing vocal versatility.  The argument was that in 
other primates a high larynx restricts the resonance, and consequent palette of timbres, produced by the pharyngeal cavity 
(Lieberman, 1984; Budil, 1994; Duchin, 1990; Laitman & Heimbuch, 1982; Laitman & Reidenberg, 1988).  In contrast the 
human larynx descends in the course of ontogeny (Magriples & Laitman, 1987) thus connecting the upper respiratory and 
digestive tracts (Laitman, 1984) and is permanently positioned low in the throat69.  This appears to have emerged gradually 
in human evolution.   Laitman and colleagues’ (1979) examination of KNM-ER 406 (Paranthropus boisei) and Sterkfontein 
V (Australopithecus africanus) both show no basicranium flexion.  Evidence for basicranial flexion first appears with KNM-
ER 3733 (Homo ergaster) at 1.75 MYA (Ibid. 1979) and fully modern basicranium is first fully displayed in Homo 
heidelbergensis 300-400 thousand years ago.  Budil’s (1994) supralaryngeal reconstructions also concur with a view that a 
modern-day upper respiratory tract first appeared in Homo heidelbergensis and that Australopithecus retained ape-like 
characteristics.   
 
However, the inference of a constraint on vocal versatility due to a high resting larynx position has proved problematic.  It 
seems likely that the primary selective influence on basicranium flexion was increasing brain size rather than communicative 
versatility (Spoor & Zonneveld, 1998; Ross & Ravosa, 1993).  Furthermore, in fully upright hominins such as Neanderthals 
a lack of basicranial flexion is less significant with regard to supralaryngeal volume and variety of vocal production (Morley, 
2003).  Modern-day comparative evidence also contradicts the inferred constraint.  Morley (ibid.) notes, for example that 
individuals with Down’s syndrome appear not to be impaired by a high laryngeal position in terms of being able to produce a 
full range of sounds (Scothern, 1992).  Even clearer is a recent study on living macaques using x-ray videos to quantify vocal 
tract dynamics during vocalization, facial displays, and feeding (Fitch et al., 2016).  They argue that the macaque could 
easily produce an adequate range of speech sounds to support spoken language.  This conclusion has since been supported 
by Lieberman (2017; see Fitch et al., 2017) and has been taken to indicate, as hypothesised by Darwin, that the evolution of 
human speech capabilities required neural changes rather than modifications of vocal anatomy. These conclusions can 
equally be applied with respect to music/singing.  From our current perspective it is also worth highlighting that, while 
putative comparative distinctions between human and primate vocal mechanisms may affect the types of sounds that can or 
could potentially be manifest as music, it is the sustained nature of a tone that arguably makes it musical rather than degrees 
of versatility.  Of potential relevance, therefore, is a rarely mentioned physiological comparative study by Han et al., (1999) 
who show that the thyroarytenoid muscles in humans uniquely exhibit rare slow tonic muscle fibers that, unlike most 
muscles, do not twitch and sustain prolonged, stable, precisely controlled and fatigue resistant contractions.   
 
In general it seems fair to conclude, from the above discussion, that the evolution of our capacity to produce a sustained tone 
was not contingent upon changes to the fundamental vocal apparatus.  A possible exception to this is the necessary breath 
control to produce a sustained tone.  Paleoanthropological discussions on breath control have again been primarily framed 
around language.  However, a fine control of sustained air pressure is clearly also a crucial feature in singing.  Given that 
discrete pitches in music are, by definition, relatively extended utterances, it may be even more fundamental to music than 
language.  It is, most crucially, an inherent and constituent part of our capacity to produce even a simple musical tone.  Some 
researchers have suggested that the control of breath was already enhanced, compared to extant primates, in Homo ergaster 
(Frayer & Nicolay, 2000).  However, the evidence remains equivocal and contrasting interpretations regarding the 
emergence and evolutionary trajectory of breath control in the hominin lineage have been presented in the literature70. 
                                                 
68 Kay and colleagues (1998) suggested that the relative size of the hypoglossal canal reflects levels of innervation and hence fine control of 
the tongue.  They present analysis that a shift from within the range of modern Pan troglodytes and Gorilla gorilla to the range of modern 
humans occurred between Homo habilis and Homo heidelbergensis.  However these findings were undermined by De Gusta et al. (1999) 
who, with a larger data set, found that many non-human primates, as well as some A. africanus (A.L.333-45, A.L.333-105, A.L.333-114) 
and A. boisei (Omo L.338-y-6), have/had hypoglossal canal dimensions within the range of modern humans.  Additionally, an analysis of 
the hypoglossal canal volume, and the number (and size) of axons in the hypoglossal nerve, in five modern human corpses revealed no 
statistically significant results (Ibid.). 
69 According to Nishimura humans have undergone a two-part descent of the larynx. The first of which, the descent of the cartilaginous 
skeleton of the larynx relative to the hyoid bone, is they argue shared with chimpanzees but not monkeys (Nishimura et al., 2006; 2008). 
70 MacLarnon and Hewitt (1999; 2004) suggest that evidence from comparison of the vertebral canals of fossil hominids and those of 
existing primates suggests a major increase in thoracic innervation in the course of hominid evolution.  This, they argue, provided enhanced 
control of the intercostal muscles and control of subglottal pressures.  Comparing human, fossil hominids, and non-human primates, they 
note that vertebral canal dimensions correlate with dimensions of the spinal cord and that spinal cord weight and body weight generally 
relate logarithmically.  The one exception is the thoracic region.  Although thoracic spinal nerves serve many functions, MacLarnon and 
Hewitt (1999; 2004) argue that the most likely cause of the observed increase is enhanced breathing control (see MacLarnon and Hewitt 
2004 p. 192-3 for full details).  Furthermore, their analysis of fossil hominins suggests that thoracic regions of Australopithecines (AL288-1, 
Sts 14, Stw 431) and Homo ergaster (KNM-WT 15000) were, size-adjusted, within the range of extant primates.  Neanderthals (La 
Chapelle, Shanidar 2, Shanidar 3, and Kebara 2) and early modern humans (Skhul 4), on the other hand, have dimensions within the range 
of modern humans.  The case of KNM-WT 15000 (‘the Nariokotome boy’) has been the subject of some interesting and instructive debate.  
Frayer and Nicolay (2000) argue contra MacLarnon (1993) and Walker (1993) that the thoracic nerves are not the most crucial for fine 
breath control but rather that “most of the muscles involved in speck respiration are innervated by either cranial or cervical nerves” (p.226).  
They continue that, as the only vertebra preserved from KNM-WT 15000 is within modern human range, this suggests that Homo ergaster 
may have had modern-human equivalent control of breath.  A complete perspective integrating these two positions is taken by Iain Morley 
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The Neurology of Vocal Control 
 
The principal evolutionary distinctions between vocal capabilities in humans and other primates are likely to have been 
driven by neurological changes.  The following sections therefore offer a review and comparative analysis of the neurology 
of vocal control in human and non-human primates.  Behavioural studies confirm degrees of independent voluntary control 
over the articulatory mechanisms, subglottal pressure, and the laryngeal muscles in primate species.  However, the levels of 
voluntary control are qualitatively far removed from those exhibited in humans.  
 
Some paleo-neuroanatomical inferences regarding the neurology of vocal control have been suggested from available 
archaeological endocasts.  The exact degree to which one may reason brain function from the physiology determined from 
endocasts is debatable (e.g. Leakey, 1994) so we cannot perhaps expect to reveal anything with certainty.   However, from 
about 2 million years ago there does seem to have been disproportionate growth in Broca’s area starting with Homo 
habilis/Homo rudolfensis (KNM-ER 1470) (Holloway, 1983)71 and a further increase, judging by growth in the lateral tuba 
corresponding to Broca’s area, by the time of Homo ergaster (KNM-WT 15000) (Kochetkova, 1978).  This has been argued 
to relate to emerging linguistic capabilities.  However, PET studies have shown that the classic Broca’s area (Brodmann’s 
areas 44 and 45) is operational in motor functions and, in particular, motor planning72 (Peterson et al., 1988).  Brown et al. 
(2006) have supported this by showing BA 44 and 45 activation in improvising both sentences and melodic phrases.  
Additionally, the analogous area in macaque monkeys is implicated in orofacial musculature control (Petrides et al. 2005).  
So it seems likely the growth of Broca’s area indicates an increased capacity to plan and execute complex vocal patterns 
(which may well initially have been neither linguistic nor musical). 
 
More illuminating evidence of the evolutionary adaptations that have occurred with respect to the neurology of vocal 
production in humans comes from comparisons between modern-day primates and humans.  Here the key distinction, both 
behaviourally and neurologically, appears to be between instinctive utterance and volitional control.  Different authors have 
preferred different ways of describing and framing this distinction.  Hage and Nieder (2016), for example, structure their 
recent review on a dual neural network model for the evolution of speech and language in terms of a ‘primary vocal motor 
network’ (PVMN) and a ‘volitional articulatory motor network’ (VAMN).  Offering a slightly different angle, but addressing 
many of the same concerns, Owren and colleagues (2011) instead describe a distinction between ‘production-first’ and 
‘reception-first’ development in human and nonhuman primate vocalization – the latter being marked particularly as a form 
of vocal learning.  Finally another recent review paper by Gruber and Grandjean (2016) classifies emotional vocalizations in 
primates according to four dimensions of learning, control, emotion, and meaning.  These, they argue, can combine to form 
three main types of vocalization: “(a) spontaneous and uncontrolled, (b) spontaneous but controllable via voluntary 
inhibition or amplification of the call, or (c) produced intentionally by the signaler with the intent to induce an emotional 
state or a specific response in the audience” (p.187). 
 
The neurological pathways involved in involuntary emotional vocalization in primates are reasonably well understood (see 
Jurgens; 2002; 2009).  Of primary importance is a network incorporating the periaqueductal grey matter (PAG) of the 
midbrain and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).  Both of these areas produce vocalizations when stimulated electrically or 
pharmacologically (e.g. Dujardin and Jürgens, 2005).  In particular, control of laryngeal muscles is thought to involve the 
neurological pathway from the PAG via the nucleus retroambiguus to monosynaptic connections to the laryngeal 
motoneurons in the nucleus ambiguous (e.g. Vanderhorst et al., 2001).  A second neural pathway includes the primary motor 
cortex and two subcortical loops that modulate vocal motor commands from M1 and subsequently send modified motor 
programs via the ventrolateral thalamus back to M1.  This area of research is reviewed more extensively elsewhere (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2003) who insightfully argues that, in fact, both positions are valid and complementary.  His argument and conclusion is worth quoting at 
length here as it relates directly to capabilities involved in producing a simple sustained and musical tone: 
 
Whilst the thoracic intercostal nerves are indeed responsible for some control of breathing (Palastanga et al., 2002/[2006]), they 
seem to be implicated in additional fine control of a function that is principally controlled through cervical innervation.  Cases of 
spinal injury in modern humans confirm this.  Spinal injury below C6 still allows control of breathing without assistance, and 
vocalization capabilities indistinguishable from normal, except that the patient is limited in the depth of inhalation.  What the 
thoracic nerves seem to allow is control of especially prolonged vocalizations.  The duration of vocalizations can be affected in 
patients with spinal injuries below the cervical vertebrae, but the quality of such vocalisations is not affected by the loss of thoracic 
control (The PoinTIS Spinal Cord Occupational Therapy site of the SCI Manuals for Providers; pers. comm. G. C. Morley, clinical 
physiotherapist). (p. 92-93) 
 
He goes on to infer that: 
 
[i]f the cervical vertebrae of KNM-WT 15000 are indeed of modern dimensions as Frayer and Nicolay (2000) and MacLarnon 
(1993) assert, this indicates that there is no reason why we should not attribute to Homo ergaster the ability to voluntarily moderate 
its breathing sufficiently well to produce vocalisations controlled for pitch, intensity and contour. Limiting the variation in pitch 
and contour would have been the degree of development of the upper respiratory tract and, in particular, the larynx… What it may 
have lacked was the ability to produce extended voluntarily controlled vocalisations. It seems that this is an ability which has 
developed over the course of human evolution, indicated by thoracic canal innervation. (Ibid, p.93) 
 
71 This skull from East Turkana is now more commonly classified as Homo rudolfensis which is not a direct descendant in the human 
lineage (Johanson & Edgar, 1996) 
72 It was instead Brodmann’s area 47 that was implicated in semantic associations.  
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Jurgens, 2009; Gruber & Grandjean, 2017; Ackermann et al., 2014)73.  The most crucial conclusions for the principal 
concerns of this thesis are that models of non-human primate vocalisation (e.g. squirrel monkeys) appear to provide a 
suitable basis also for basic reflexive emotional utterances in humans (e.g. crying, groaning and/or laughing) (Wild et al., 
2003; Fitch, 2006; Brudzynski, 2009; Bryant and Aktipis, 2014), and also that these pathways remain operational (albeit not 
exclusively so) in more complex volitionally controlled vocalization (e.g. Schulze et al., 2005)74.  Functionally, the most 
important identified difference between humans and other primates is that in humans there is a direct connection between 
M1 and the laryngeal motoneurons in the nucleus ambiguus (Jurgens, 1976; 1994)75.  Behaviourally, this may be reflected in 
a lack of ability in nonhuman primates to volitionally decouple laryngeal motor activity from species-typical audiovisual 
displays (e.g. Knight, 1999; see below) and has been argued to support efficient voluntary control of vocalization in humans 
(Fischer & Hammerschmidt, 2011; Fitch et al., 2010; Fitch, 2011; Jarvis, 2004; Simonyan & Horwitz, 2011)76. 
 
Vocal Control in Nonhuman Primates  
 
Vocalisations by non-human primates are often thought to be predominantly innate and stereotyped calls, uttered almost 
exclusively in direct correlation of affective state (Hammerschmidt & Fischer, 2008 [in Oller & Griebel Eds.]; Jurgens, 
2002).  Congenitally deaf squirrel monkeys or those raised without auditory models, for example, develop a full species-
typical repertoire of calls and use them in appropriate motivational and social contexts (Winter et al., 1973, Hammerschmidt 
et al., 2001).   Unlike remarkable evidenced capacities in some avian species, pinnipeds, cetaceans, bats, and elephants 
(Janik and Slater, 1997; Catchpole and Slater, 2003; Ridgway et al., 2012; Stoeger et al., 2012), vocal learning and imitation 
have traditionally been assumed to be absent or at best highly restricted in great apes (Fitch et al., 2010; Lameira 2014).  It 
has subsequently been supposed that human vocal capacities have no direct ancestor in nonhuman species (Bolhuis & 
Wynne, 2009). 
 
However, increasing degrees of vocal control have been evidenced in primate studies.  Various species have, in operant 
conditioning tasks, been shown to be able to produce or inhibit vocalisation (Coude et al., 2011, Hage & Nieder, 2013, 
Sutton et al., 1973, Aitken & Wilson, 1979; Hihara et al., 2003; Koda et al., 2007; Sutton et al., 1985).   Wild chimpanzees, 
for example, can voluntarily inhibit food grunts (Wilson et al., 2007), alarm calls (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1985), greetings 
(Laporte & Zuberbuhler, 2010), and responses to unknown conspecifics (Wilson et al., 2001)77.  Many field studies also 
demonstrate non-human primates altering their species-typical vocalisations depending, for example, on the social context or 
presence of a predator (Seyfarth et al., 1980); the awareness or behaviour of others (Crockford et al., 2012; Wich & De 
Vries, 2006); other particular external events (Quattara et al., 2009); the nature of visual cues (Hage et al., 2013); or even 
intentional goals (Gruber & Zuberhuhler 2013; Townsend et al., 2014).   Furthermore, detachment between produced 
acoustic signal and physiological correlate has been observed in wild orangutans (Wich et al., 2012), as has a degree of 
functional flexibility of similar calls in wild bonobos (Clay et al., 2015; Genty et al., 2014).  Finally, a number of individual-
specific and population-specific voiced calls in great apes that do not conform to genetic and ecological divergence (e.g. 
Lameira et al., 2015) suggest to Lameira and colleagues (2016) that “vocal fold control may play indeed an active role in 
shaping the composition of the voiced repertoire of great apes” (p. 2). 
 
Hage and Nieder (2016) summarise that “results indicate that monkeys are capable of some types of vocal learning, in other 
words they are able to cognitively control the onset of their vocal output and to modify their vocal patterns within the range 
of their natural repertoire” (p. 814).   More detail and further references can be absorbed from that paper (see also Gruber & 
Grandjean, 2016).  For the purposes of this thesis, the more directly pertinent question is whether nonhuman primates can 
independently manipulate breath, supralaryngeal, articulatory and laryngeal mechanisms in vocal production? More 
                                                 
73 Zarate (2013) summarises neatly that “in humans, these networks form a tripartite hierarchy of vocal motor control (see Simonyan and 
Horwitz, 2011):  (1) the reticular formation constitutes the lowest level at which complete vocal patterns are generated; (2) the next level is  
comprised of the ACC and the PAG, which are attributed with the voluntary initiation and emotional/motivational control of vocalizations 
(Jürgens, 2002, 2009); and (3) the highest level of vocal control occurs in M1 (and its modulatory brain regions), which is  associated with 
the generation of learned vocalizations, such as speech and song (Jürgens, 2002, 2009)” (p. 2). 
74 It is important to note that so far we are describing a general functional network for human vocalization rather than attempting to highlight 
any specificities of music.  A range of tasks that have been confirmed to recruit many regions within vocal motor and sensory networks are 
selected in Zarate (2013) -  “word or letter generation (Paus et al., 1993); syllable repetition (Riecker et al., 2005); singing a note repeatedly 
(Perry et al., 1999), in a sustained fashion (Zarate and Zatorre, 2008), or while changing vowels in particular rhythms (Jungblut et al., 2012); 
repeating syllables, spoken words, and sung or hummed melodies (Özdemir et al., 2006); humming, speaking, or singing lyrics of a well-
known song (Formby et al., 1989; Jeffries et al., 2003); reciting the months of the year or singing a familiar melody (Riecker et al., 2000); 
telling a story (Schulz et al., 2005); improvising word phrases, melodies, or harmonies (Brown et al., 2004, 2006); spontaneous and 
synchronized speaking and singing (Saito et al., 2006); and singing an Italian aria (Kleber et al., 2007)” (p.4).  It seems likely therefore that 
all these capacities are built exaptively upon existing systems for vocally communicating emotional state and arousal with a heightened level 
of voluntary control in humans. 
75 In contrast with chimpanzees we also see a distinct direct monosynaptic connection between the primary motor cortex and the phonatory, 
articulatory and respiratory areas of the medulla in the brain stem (Okanoya & Merker, 2007). 
76 In a recent review article on the ‘vocal brain’ Belyck and Brown (2017) however argue that, although this connection can perhaps account 
for increased volitional control over the laryngeal muscles, it does not seem sufficient to account for the novel engagement of the respiratory 
musculature seen with LMC (Larynx Motor Cortex; see Brown et al., 2007) stimulation in humans.  They suggest that the human motor 
cortex has been evolutionarily reorganized to bring the three major components of vocalization − expiration, phonation, and articulation − 
into close proximity, thus creating a particularly efficient interaction - a “small-world architecture” (e.g. Sporns, 2006; Sporns and Zwi, 
2004). 
77 The prefrontal cortex is thought to be of primary importance (Owren et al., 2011) correlating with its supposed role in human action 
inhibition (e.g. Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). 
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precisely can they volitionally isolate handling of fundamental frequency?  Evidence collected in the last decade, 
predominantly from captive or enculturated great apes, would appear to indicate at least a partial affirmation on all of the 
above.   A latent capacity to control airflow and vocal fold adduction is evidenced in novel attention-seeking grunts in 
captive chimpanzees (Hopkins et al., 2007).  Unvoiced articulator manipulation in orangutans has been argued to provide 
some potential homology to linguistic consonants in humans (Lameira et al., 2014) and some recent studies on enculturated 
great apes would appear to suggest latent capacities to manipulate the vocal system voluntarily and thus manipulate both F0 
and acoustic formants (Taglialatela et al., 2003; Perlman & Clark, 2015; Lameira et al., 2015).  Captive orangutans have also 
been reported to imitate whistles produced by humans (Wich et al., 2009) and will socially and spontaneously match single, 
duple, and/or triple whistles correctly (Lameira et al., 2013).  Individuals produce these whistles in different ways indicating 
some independent supralaryngeal control over the muscle systems of the upper lip, lower lip and respiration.  However, 
nothing in the results indicates an attempt to match the F0 of the human whistle.  
 
In a more recent study (Lameira et al., 2016) the same authors directly challenged the assumption that great apes lacked 
direct voluntary control of the larynx.  The captive orangutans had developed an idiosyncratic - ingressively voiced - 
“wookie” vocalization which the authors argued to exhibit a unique spectral profile among the orangutan vocal repertoire.  
Intriguingly, one individual – Rocky - would spontaneously match human “wookies” with adjustments to voice frequency 
beyond the typical range of unprompted versions.  This is a critical finding both in terms of the implications of laryngeal 
control and also the relevance of frequency “matching” in an interactive setting.  However, we should note that, although 
these are not species-typical vocalisations, the individuals had been producing them for over 6 years with an unknown 
origin.  Furthermore, Rocky did not so much match the frequency of the human version as move preferentially in that 
direction.  Finally the degree of direct vocal control of the larynx is ameliorated by correlations between frequency and 
loudness and length of the call.  Thus, part of the manipulations of frequency occurred via control of the breath and 
subglottal pressure78.  This is also common in songbirds (see Amador & Margoliash, 2013) and is a characteristic of most 
human vocalization (Pabon et al., 2011).  However, we can posit that the acoustic separation of frequency from loudness and 
intensity is most pronounced in music and is reflected in a biologically uncommon disconnect between pitch and arousal 
ratings (Ilie & Thompson, 2006; Gussenhoven, 2002; see chapter 4). 
 
Clearly degrees of vocal control in humans have evolved to levels that are highly exceptional and perhaps even magnitudes 
removed from anything found in other primates.  However, our understanding and interpretations of capacities in nonhuman 
primates seems to be expanding and we can certainly already advocate that latent modern-day capacities suggest a neuro-
behavioural foundation for vocal control (and hence some crucial preconditions for the production of controlled speech and a 
sustained musical tone) in an ancient common ancestor79’80.  
 
Is Pitch Production in Music Special? - Evidence from Frequency-Shift Auditory Feedback Studies 
 
In this section I argue that, although some correction mechanisms are commonly shared with speech, specific corrections are 
operational in maintained pitch-matching in music.  Similarly to period correction mechanisms in a musical pulse, these are 
putatively neurologically distinct, subject to manipulations of intention, and incur awareness.  However, as the evidence 
currently is not conclusive I will also be proposing (further along in this chapter) a new experimental paradigm for 
investigating ‘sensorimotor harmonisation’ which I propose to pursue in future work. 
 
A crucial part of intentional vocalization is necessarily a capacity to correct for unexpected perturbations that may result, for 
example, from naturally occurring degrees of motor variance.  Just as the relative stability of pulse in music and its putative 
specificity can be explored at a deeper lever of phase and period corrections (chapter 2), it is tempting to speculate that the 
relatively sustained and discrete nature of a musical tone is also foundationally characterized by specific correction 
mechanisms81.  Correction mechanisms in engagement with musical pitch are as yet not well understood.  In particular, an 
experimental paradigm studying our musical capability to match external frequencies is almost entirely lacking in the 
literature (see below).  However, investigations with the voice feedback frequency shift paradigm on auditory control of 
voice F0 do provide some insight, avenues for inference and a structure for further hypotheses. 
 
Two of the most primary and consistent findings in studies involving continuous vocalization are evidence for opposing 
responses occurring with a short latency of 100-150 ms (Burnett et al., 1998) and subsequent following responses with a 
longer latency of 250-600 ms (Larson, 1998).  The presence of two responses was confirmed by Hain and colleagues (2000), 
who found that the direction of the second response, but not of the first response, can be modified by instruction. According 
to Donath et al., (2002) “the first response therefore indicates a negative feedback system stabilizing voice F0 automatically, 
while the second response may reflect a voluntary mechanism, which adjusts voice F0 to match an (supposed) external 
                                                 
78 Nevertheless, the authors highlight that “different wookies produced by Rocky with equal frequencies exhibited wide differences in 
acoustic power, and vice versa”… and that “these observations would have been theoretically impossible if Rocky had not exercised some 
degree of direct control over vocal fold oscillation, and instead had only resorted to abdominal action to produce modulations at the level of 
vocal fold oscillation” (p.7). 
79 In the case of orangutans this could putatively suggest capacities present in a common ancestor 10mya. 
80 Pisanski et al (2016) suggest, for example, that early capacities for voice modulation may have their origin in biologically relevant cues 
such as sex and size-exaggeration. 
81 Although this section focuses comparatively on human interactive contexts, we should note also some research showing that pitch in adult 
birdsongs is also maintained through correction.  In a study by Amador and Margoliash (2013) perturbed F0 auditory feedback in Bengalese 
finches was fully compensated for.  Output returned to baseline after the perturbation was removed, thus highlighting that the sensory target 
is a key priority in this species.   
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reference” (p. 1587).  Pertinently, studies of speech (Natke & Kalveram, 2001; Donath et al., 2002) have only shown 
opposing responses to frequency-shifted auditory feedback occurring with a latency of about 160 ms.  These responses 
typically compensate in the region of 25-50 cents only for changes of 100cents or above (see also Liu and Larson, 2007; 
Jones and Keough, 2008), suggesting perhaps that they are concerned merely with stabilizing naturally occurring variation in 
vocal motor control.  “Speech” in these early studies was prosodically uttered nonsense words (e.g. ‘ta’tataa’) and the delay 
in the corrective responses indicated that these regulate F0 at a supra-segmental prosodic level rather than on individually 
occurring voiced features within syllables.  In a follow-up study directly comparing “speaking” and “singing” (a pitched and 
sustained ‘ah’ vowel) it was found that this initial opposing response in the singing condition was stronger (roughly 60cents) 
(Natke et al., 2003)82,83.  This was thought to relate to the notion that in singing we have an internal reference F0 even in the 
absence of external influence.  However, we should also note that when pitch-shifted stimuli are presented during continuous 
speech in Mandarin and English, the initial response magnitudes are in the same range as sustained vowel sounds (50–80 
cents) (Xu et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007).  In singing a scale, where presumably the internal reference targets are entirely 
clear, most singers were reported to compensate fully for the perturbation to auditory feedback (Burnett et al., 1997; Parlitz 
and Bangert, 1998).   
 
The two responses have been suggested to be manifest neurologically in recruitment of the midbrain PAG for the early more 
automatic pitch-shift response, with areas typically involved in actions under voluntary control (e.g. auditory cortex and 
ACC) operating in the later response (see Zarate, 2013).  Due to FRMI temporal limitations activation of the PAG has not 
been determined (Zarate et al., 2010).  However, Zarate and Zatorre (2008) did find activations of the intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) and dorsal premotor cortex in a pitch-shifted singing task compared to normal singing.  This, they suggest, is linked to 
the role of the IPS in transformations of sensory input for motor preparation (Astafiev et al., 2003; Grefkes et al., 2004; 
Tanabe et al., 2005).  In contrast to these studies, Toyomura et al (2007) instructed participants to keep the pitch of the 
feedback voice constant as it was randomly manipulated in either direction.  In this task significant BOLD activations were 
not evident in the ACC, rostral cingulate zone, putamen, and superior temporal sulcus (STS).  Thus the corresponding 
differences in the task and neurological signatures to those found by Zarate and colleagues appear to reveal that these brain 
regions are specifically concerned with voluntary compensation responses.   
 
In an article published in 2009 I reasoned from the above literature and results that, in speaking, only the first involuntary 
response occurs.  I suggested that a music-specific volitionally controlled mechanism (somewhat analogous to period 
corrections to musical pulse) is operational in engagements with musical pitch (Bispham, 2009).   A following response is, 
of course, in a sense what one would expect if participants hear their voice partly as if it were an external musical source to 
match or harmonize with.  Furthermore, the slower response is necessarily contingent upon a sustained stable pitch 
production and a relational analysis of what has come before in comparison to the current production – in other words 
foundational features of a musical tone.  It is also worth noting that as we approach aspects that are perhaps specific to 
music84, or at least more pronounced in music, volitional control of structural characteristics (presumably interacting with 
awareness) become, once again, a prominent consideration85. 
 
Although this reasoning remains congruent with the most consistently reported results, we should also note some curious 
individual and task-dependent inconsistencies and some important details that remain unknown.  Although often excluded 
from the main statistical analysis, some vocal participants (and one violinist [Hafke et al., 2016]) produce an initial following 
response rather than the more common opposing reaction.  Larson and Robin (2016) argue that this relates to individual 
differences in motor control.  A laryngeal EMG study, for example, revealed distinct and particular cricothyroid muscle 
contractions enabling opposing and following responses respectively (Liu et al., 2011).  However, this does not necessarily 
explain why some individuals would operate differently.  It is also not clear what the exact percentage of individuals is who 
preferentially display following responses.  Not all pitch-shift paradigm studies report these details and those that do (see 
above; also Hain et al., 2001; Larson et al., 2007; 2008; Liu et al., 2009) report varying values between 2 and 30%.  
Presumably this relates to the differing methodologies used but this too remains to be explored further.  One probable 
hypothesis is that the magnitude of the pitch-shift stimulus change correlates positively with the percentage of following 
responses (e.g. Burnett et al., 2007).  Another curious finding that perhaps relates to this matter is that, although some form 
of initial response is automatic, we are able to follow instructions to alter voice F0 volitionally either in an opposing or 
following direction (Patel et al., 2014).  Intriguingly, the following responses, given these particular instructions, had a much 
shorter latency (approximately 150 ms) than opposing responses (approximately 350 ms) with the latter exhibiting a small 
                                                 
82 A recent study on violinists showed an almost complete compensation to perturbations in f0 auditory feedback of -48 to 48 cent.  These 
corrections, notably, also occurred below perceptual thresholds (JND) of 7 cents (Hafke et al., 2016).  It is worth noting from this study also 
that JND in violin playing was considerably lower than those reported in studies of singing (Grell et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2013; Hafke et 
al., 2013 - 10.5/15/25 cents respectively).  
83 Interestingly nearly half of amusics (4/9) compensated similarly to controls to perturbations of 25 and 200 cents (Hutchins & Peretz, 
2013).  Vocal pitch matching accuracy, but not the level of capability to perceive small pitch changes, correlated with the presence and size 
of the compensation to the perturbation. This further supports a dissociation between pitch perception and the production of pitch (see 
above) and that this initial correction mechanism occurs below conscious perceptual thresholds. 
84 Typically these studies are rarely explicitly directed towards musical production but it is, in my opinion, inherent in the task of sustaining 
a stable pitch. 
85 Although not reported in these terms another recent study also supports the idea that volitional control is related to the time-span of stable 
vocalisation/pitch.  Keough and colleagues (2013) documented that trained singers could suppress compensatory responses to auditory 
feedback manipulation (between 2 cents – 100 cents) only if they occurred 500-2500ms after vocal onset.  Earlier on (and throughout in 
non-singers) the adaptations were entirely automatic and beyond conscious control.  This may perhaps reflect a process of discrimination of 
self from non-self-vocalization (see Behroozmand et al., 2011; 2016). 
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early following response86.  Future research will hopefully shed some more light on these issues.  However, it is also perhaps 
worth stating that the experimental paradigm, especially for shifts beyond normal motor variance, is somewhat artificial and 
thus may come with some inherent limitations in terms of its wider relevance to more naturally occurring pitch corrections in 
human interaction.  Nevertheless, a music-specific pitch correction mechanism (analogous to period correction in pulse) is a 
distinct possibility (see below ‘sensorimotor harmonisation’ for further discussion). 
 
Musical Pitch in Non-musical Human Interaction   
   
In the following discussion I caution against interpreting studies of “pitch synchrony” and “tonal interaction” in spoken 
dialogue and mother-infant interactions as being a full analogy to pitch matching in music.  Methodological and analytic 
concerns with the studies are highlighted, showing that the evidence is not as strong as proposed in the articles reviewed.  
Similarly to the above discussion on correction mechanisms, I argue that a new paradigm for investigating sensorimotor 
harmonization is needed to investigate these issues further. 
 
We have explored comparatively the perception and production of pitch separately so far in this chapter.  However it is the 
intricate interplay between the two in harmonious social interaction that is so clearly exemplified in music (e.g.  Bannan, 
2012).  To talk about harmony is ultimately “to talk about the interpersonal processes of musical performance through which 
individuals volitionally and cooperatively blend musical lines in pitch-space and time” (Brown, 2007 p. 18).  In music this 
may take individual and cultural form in, for example, sustained chanting, a persistent underlying drone, “chordal” 
homophony, or in a complex polyphony of individual “voices”.  Although these may appear very diverse I would argue that 
they share a common architectural foundation.  I have suggested, just as capacities to engage with a basic musical pulse 
ground a wealth of complex rhythmic structure, that musical pitch in all forms is built upon a primary ability to produce and 
engage with a sustained stable fundamental frequency, and the ability to create or process certain relationships between 
pitches. This is built on the hypothesis that musical pitch structure worldwide — whether monotone or florid — can be 
characterized as being relationally organized with reference to sustained yet variable tonal areas (McAllester, 1971)87. This 
may appear controversial to some but, importantly, does not necessarily imply any particular form of designed tonal system 
or hierarchy.  It merely suggests that musical pitch at any given time (or possibly within breath or phrase boundaries) is 
organized relationally within a framework of a dominant pitch region or regions (Bispham, 2009)88.  Critically, in recent 
cross-cultural research, it has been shown that even in musical traditions featuring equitonic (equal-spaced) scales (e.g. East 
African Music) there is evidence to suggest that tonal centers are still perceived by idiomatic listeners  (Ross & Knight, 
2018).  Broadly speaking the harmonic blending of voice or pitch in music (excepting music that is exclusively rhythmic) is 
clearly evident and is fundamentally integral to the structural composition of musical form.  It is also this capacity and the 
structural management of pitch structure that affords harmonious and synchronised group interaction in music.  A crucial 
question, therefore, is whether pitch intervals and ‘pitch/tonal synchronies’ are similarly operational in turn-taking and/or 
overlapping non-musical interaction. 
 
“Pitch synchrony” in speech 
 
Vocal imitation and repetition of prosodic contour appears to be functional in communication and vocal development from at 
least the third month of life onwards (Gratier & Debouche, 2011).  Furthermore, emotional connotations of certain “musical” 
intervals in English and Dutch speech prosody have been argued to correlate to their most common association in modern-
day Western speech.  In particular major and minor thirds are more common in reading cheerful or sad passages respectively 
(Schreuder et al., 2005), and people re-enacting a sad utterance typically use a predominance of minor third intervals (Curtis 
& Bharucha, 2010).  In spoken dialogue we can also observe interactional pitch structuring across turns.  Boone (2003) first 
described “pitch synchrony” in an analysis of conversations between two chat show hosts.  The pitch of their speech, when 
exchanging dialogue, was described to be often matched in unison or being consonantly related.  A certain degree of 
functional intent in the quasi-harmonic structuring was suggested by the finding that an initially dissonantly related pitch was 
often chosen in interrupting and conveying disagreement.   A follow-up study using human coding (artificially corroborated) 
of pitch intervals in pre-recorded television interviews found similar results as well as a predominance of unison pitch, 
perfect fifths, and octaves between the last utterance of one person’s utterance and the first “note” of the conversational 
partner’s response (Boone et al., 2007).  Further and more focused evidence of interpersonal pitch structure correlating with 
socio-intentional function in speech has since been reported. Okado and colleagues (2012) presented results indicating that 
conversations that are primed to be agreeable exhibit more consonant intervals than those primed to be disagreeable89.  
Correspondingly in another study, comparing Spanish conversations between Chilean individuals given cause to be ‘low-
trust’ versus ‘high-trust’, the clearest distinction was that the precision with which intervals matched “musical modes” was 
                                                 
86 Another interesting finding that remains to be fully understood is that lengthy exposure to feedback that is slightly shifted over numerous 
trials can lead to more permanent adjustments even as auditory feedback is returned to normal (Jones and Munhall, 2000, 2005; Jones and 
Keough, 2008). 
87 Although I am not aware of any direct experimental evidence it is interesting to consider that, in fast-moving or florid passages, individual 
notes are likely to be too fast to be the subject for correction of discrepancies between vocal or instrumental production and an internal target 
or external reference (e.g. Lindblom and Sundberg, 2007).  Thus, we can perhaps assume that these would be formed into a larger gestalt 
with the new whole constructed in reference to a more sustained and internally manifest pitch centre.  This, in turn, perhaps suggests a more 
realistic target for adjustment. 
88 The human ability to recognise and manifest pitch centre in complex musical structures is a topic beyond the boundaries of this thesis but 
is discussed in Podlipniak (2016). He argues, with reference to the ‘Baldwin effect’ that this mental capacity emerged by joining the implicit 
recognitionn of the frequency of pitch occurrence, working memory and the emotional assessment of predicted stimuli. 
89 A particularly noteworthy finding here was that tritone relationships only occurred in the disagreeable condition. 
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higher in the high-trust condition (Robledo et al., 2016b).  Finally an analysis of question and answer dyads found that the f0 
in the final apex of the Question and the first of the Answer was more likely to correspond to Western musical interval 
categories when the Q+A pair’s turn transition was periodic than when it was aperiodic90 (Robledo et al., 2016a).  
Intriguingly, the data were determined to match more closely the equal tempered chromatic scale than other Western and 
non-Western tuning systems91 thus intimating some cross-domain enculturation and learning.  The authors concluded from 
this, in contrast to supposing temporal entrainment to “be a basic biological phenomenon essential to all types of cooperative 
joint action”, that “mutual accommodation to pitch intervals is self-evidently learned by cultural transmission” (p. 1074).  
This conclusion, however, seems starkly at odds with the cross-cultural scope of the references cited above and related 
studies in the following section on tonal synchrony.  A more likely premise is that the use of relative pitch cues and “pitch 
synchrony” form part a global capacity to structure socially intentional interaction with some culturally distinct specifics in 
terms of preferred intervals and tuning. 
 
“Tonal synchrony” in parent-infant interaction 
 
An interpersonal “tonal” pitch structure has also been proposed in parent-infant interactions both across turns and in 
overlapping vocalisations.  Van Puyvelde and colleagues (2010) analysed musically transcribed interaction periods between 
Flemish-speaking Belgian mothers and their 3 month old infants.  They proposed that, in brief sections of mutual vocalizing, 
both mother and infant adapted their utterances such that their pitches become tonally related or “synchronized”.  They 
further observed a dominance of consonant intervals that aligned with the harmonic or pentatonic series.  In a later study, 
this time using acoustic analytic measures (Van Puyvelde et al., 2015), they found a similar proportional occurrence of tonal 
interaction periods (TIP) versus non-tonal synchrony (80-85%)92 in Flemish and Mexican Spanish speakers.  This suggested 
that this feature in phases of mother–infant vocal communication occurs across cultural and linguistic divides.  Interestingly, 
in another related study, the authors also document significant relationships between tonal interaction periods and moments 
of social interaction repair and between non-tonal interaction periods and a loss of motivation and affect (Van Puyvelde et 
al., 2013).  This, as they describe, highlights a potential importance of tonal synchrony in the attentional flow and regulatory 
success of these early social engagements93.  As such they posit that it represents features of an ontogenetic correlate of an 
early phylogenetic “musilinguisitic” communicative stage in human evolution (prior to “prosodic protolanguage” [e.g. 
Brown 2001; 2017; Masataka, 2008; 2009]).  They describe it as a border zone in vocal development “being neither musical 
nor linguistic but possibly offering a starting point to develop both musical and linguistic capacities” (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2015 p. 51). 
 
The measured scope of interpretation in the preceding quotation seems appropriate.  It would, in my opinion, be premature to 
interpret the results of the previous sections on “pitch synchrony” and “tonal synchrony” as highlighting direct mechanistic 
analogies to pitch matching and harmonisation in music.  The analysis is necessarily based, variously on normalised software 
data (e.g. Praat – e.g. Robledo et al., 2016), human analysis and interpretation (Boone et al., 2007; Van Puyvelde et al., 
2010), and/or an analysis of peak and/or step accents94 (see Liberman & Pierrehumbert, 1984; e.g. Van Puyvelde et al., 
2015).  These are all valid efforts given the constraints but do come with limitations in terms of a comparative discussion on 
music.  Crucially, they all artificially “musicalize” and definitely “auto-tune” the data.  Perhaps the most critical restriction, 
however, for our purposes of identifying specificities of music is the lack of an experimental reference point for how simple 
harmonic/tuning corrections are achieved in music. Do the findings reviewed in the previous two sections describe a looser 
manifestation of analogous processes found in music or do we use distinct correction mechanisms in musical interaction as 
was suggested by the auditory feedback studies (see above)?   Contrary to suggestions made by the authors, the above 
discussion highlights that the current evidence for the former possibility is unconvincing. 
 
Sensorimotor Harmonisation – A Missing Experimental Paradigm  
 
In absolute terms we have impressive capabilities and potential to match perceived pitches.  Sundberg (1987), for example, 
showed that trained singers can match a 440Hz reference tone with an accuracy of 1Hz (≈ 4 cents).  Almost entirely not 
explored, however, are the processes with which we maintain and embody continuing pitch relations in music.  Even in the 
simplest scenario of interactively matching a single sustained pitch we must necessarily be constantly correcting for efferent 
and afferent variances.  One valuable exception to the general lack of experimental evidence is Grell et al. (2009).  In this 
study choir singers were recruited to produce an F#4 (370 Hz) to complete a major chord with an external D4 (293.7 Hz) and 
A4 (440 Hz).  Rising or descending shifts of quarter or semitones were introduced at varying points of a 5 sec sustained 
chord and were compensated for by the choristers.  The authors reported that the singers responded in the range of 197– 259 
                                                 
90 Following Ogden & Hawkins (2015) a segment was classified as periodic if the last 3 successive f0 pikes (transcribed from Praat tracker) 
differed by no more than ±15%. 
91 Crucially the small step size between intervals was analysed to not be the only influential factor in this assertion. 
92 TIPs where classified where vocal pitch accents of mother and infant are “related to their tonal center in the same way as the harmonics 
are related to their F0, without exception” (p. 47).  In my opinion this is highly problematic. Their use of the harmonic series extends to H16 
giving a total 8/12 “tonal” notes compared to the full chromatic scale for any chosen tonal centre.  Given that the choice of tonal centre is 
additionally subject to interpretative best-fit I would suggest that this analysis needs to be confirmed in comparison to a randomised control. 
93 Curiously, and in stark contrast, results from a study on psychotherapy sessions indicated that higher levels of synchrony were related to 
poorer therapeutic relationships and greater distress (Reich et al., 2014).  It is not clear why this was the case but perhaps a certain degree of 
dissonance / tension is reflective of a necessary degree of stimulation and interest (just as Robledo et al (2016) found that high levels of 
periodicity across question and answer turns was associated with low arousal). 
94 A ‘peak’ refers to a stressed syllable or an extreme edge of a variable contour, whereas ‘step’ would be classified as a longer plateau-like 
pitch period or contour with minimal fluctuation. 
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ms depending on direction and size of the pitch shifts, as well as on skill and anesthetization.  However, observations from 
individual participants also indicated a fast but imprecise reflex reaction (presumably subliminal) at 50ms and some slow 
reactions, presumably under a degree of volitional control, at 723ms and 1290ms.  These and many more details of how we 
achieve and maintain coordination of pitch frequencies remain to be confirmed, explored, and illuminated further. 
 
I suggest that much could be realised from an analogous experimental design to the ‘sensorimotor synchronisation’ 
isochronous tapping task (Stevens, 1886) for rhythm and timing research.  As we have seen in Chapter 2 (also Chapter 4) 
this seemingly simple paradigm has spawned a vast body of research that has informed our psychological and neuroscientific 
understanding of music, movement, action-perception coupling, attention, volition, interaction, sociality, empathy, co-
operation, liminal and subliminal action, and group synchronization.  I am, therefore, proposing some original pilot studies 
in which participants will be required to match a sustained external frequency (pitch) with a slider similar to that used in 
Hutchins and Peretz (2013; see above).  Other production methods to be explored could include producing a tone by drawing 
a line on a simple touchscreen device, using a tensile string, and, of course, singing.  The latter would naturally have the 
broadest interpretative scope and relevance but would also, given the degrees of variance and vibrato in singing, present the 
greater methodological and analytical challenge.  Shifts in the range of 1-50 cents95 to the target tone would be introduced 
and the first inquiry would be to identify thresholds for compensation and corresponding correction latency.  Pitch 
processing thresholds are perceptually well understood (see above) but, in parallel with the tapping paradigm, it seems likely 
that embodied correction will occur even below liminal thresholds.  On the basis of investigations with the voice feedback 
frequency shift paradigm on auditory control of voice F0 we can make some further initial suppositions and hypotheses.  For 
example, it seems plausible that involuntary responses to perturbations will occur similarly at a short latency of circa 100-
150 milliseconds and at a longer latency of circa 250-600 milliseconds with the latter being imbued with awareness and 
subject to attentional manipulations.  If this were to be the case, we could perhaps surmise that the latter, being necessarily 
based on a more sustained pitch target, reflects a specifically musical pitch correction process.  It is probably wise to resist 
temptation to think too far ahead.  However, I would like to stress that, assuming initial success in the pilot studies, this 
paradigm would be open to extensions investigating, for example, different frequency relations and thresholds in the level of 
the shift at which corrections incur conscious awareness and/or are subject to manipulations of attention and volitional 
control.  It would also be interesting to explore the human-human interactional dynamics of the task, and associations of this 
ostensibly simple task to issues such as empathy, prosociality, and cooperation, and the neuroscientific correlates. 
 
Intervals, Scales, and Tonalities 
 
In accordance with the scope of enquiry in this thesis and the intention to target mechanisms and capabilities that 
comprehensively root musical engagement we have, as in chapter 2, focused on a seemingly most architecturally 
foundational sustained tone.  I would maintain that this is necessary in order to encapsulate all instances of musical pitch 
(including, for example, monotone chanting) whilst addressing the issue in terms of musicality representing an emergent 
capacity for musicality rather than a particular cultural and learnt form.  However, certain higher-level universals in terms of 
the organization of pitch in music have been proposed in the literature (e.g. Justus & Husler, 2005; McDermott & Hauser, 
2005) These have included the presence of unequally stepped scales (Sachs, 1943; Burns & Ward, 1999); a dominance of 
and “preference” for small-integer value intervals (Dowling & Harwood, 1986); and tonal hierarchies (Castellano et al., 
1984; Krumhansl, 1990).  I agree that these features would appear to be at least near-universals. However, they are not an 
absolute requisite for pitch-based interaction to be “musical” and can also all be understood to reflect variously 
psychoacoustic parsimony, inherent processing bias, processes of enculturation, and cultural construct.  Studies on infant 
predisposition and musical development, in particular, support this assertion by indicating innate or early predispositions and 
constraints that have, variously, been argued to lie at the root of cross-cultural similarities across musical genres (e.g. 
McDermott & Hauser, 2005).   
 
A relative preponderance of low-integer intervals in music across cultures is hardly surprising given that infants and adults 
find these easier to process (e.g. Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996; see above).  It is, however, certainly neither prescriptive nor 
definitional of music’s scope.  The same can be said for Gill and Purves’s position (2009) that component intervals of the 
most widely used scales throughout history and across cultures are those with the greatest overall spectral similarity to the 
harmonic series, and Sethares’ hypothesis (2005) that tuning systems and scales co-evolved with spectral characteristics of a 
culture’s dominant instruments.  Scales are essentially a mental representation of regularity in pitch.  The abundant use of 
scales that use two or more interval sizes96 can, thus, be seen to afford an understanding of notes taking on distinct structural 
functions by relating differently to the other notes (e.g. Balzano, 1980; 1982).  Within a statistical learning framework it is, 
as Thompson (2013) explains, “unnecessary to assume there is a specialized process in the brain that categorizes incoming 
tones as members or nonmembers of a scale (e.g. Krumhansl, 1985; 1990)” (p. 127).  An interesting example of short-term 
implicit statistical learning is Loui et al. (2010) who showed rapid acquisition of grammatical structure using the artificial 
Bohlen-Pierce scale.  Over time enculturation becomes more entrenched.  Whereas infants are equally good at detecting 
changes in melodic patterns based on Western or Balinese scales, adults are much better with familiar scales (Lynch et al., 
1990).  Further evidence for a narrowing of processual flexibility comes from results indicating that infants are more readily 
able to encode musical scales accurately if the scale contains unequal interval steps (Trehub et al., 1999).  By contrast adults 
                                                 
95 It would also be interesting to explore wider intervals but I am suggesting this range initially to keep the task focused on tuning issues that 
may occur naturally in music performance rather than degrees of change that would more likely be processed as a discrete intervallic 
change. 
96 To be clear, although we can perhaps argue that all cultures use scales of this nature, not all scales used use unequal steps.  The use of 
equal-tempered whole-tone and/or chromatic in some Western classical repertoire, for example, definitely contradicts any such assertion. 
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performed equally poorly, in comparison to accuracy ratings using a familiar scale, with both unfamiliar equal step and 
unequal step scales.  Trehub and Hannon (2006, p. 81) summarise broadly that “although it is generally the case that long-
term exposure to music leads to greater specificity in the registration of contour and interval information (Fujioka et al., 
2004), musical knowledge occasionally interferes with the encoding of pitch relations, especially when the relations are 
unfamiliar or unconventional” (see also Schellenberg & Trehub, 1999). 
 
Tonal structures and hierarchies are also learned through experience97.  For example, in tonal-harmonic music psychological 
measures correlate strongly with the frequency rate and distribution of tones (see Krumhansl 2000).  In two significant cross-
cultural studies Western participants were able to extract some perceptual knowledge and experience of style-appropriate 
tonal hierarchies in North Indian music (Castellano et al., 1984) and Balinese music (Kessler et al., 1984).  A more recent 
study also found that Western participants were able to identify distinctive features of two rāgas - Tori & Multani- in 
unfamiliar Indian music (Rohrmeier & Widdess, 2017).  The most common interpretation is that listeners abstracted tonal 
hierarchies from these unfamiliar styles based on the distribution of tones in the music.  This is supported by a study using 
novel composed sequences in which results were consistent with this view (Oram & Cuddy, 1995).   
 
Just as with scales (see above) and metre (e.g. Trehub & Hannon, 2005a; 2005b; see chapter 2) comparing adult and infant 
capabilities related to melodic key membership clearly advocates enculturation to specific manifestations and a gradual 
narrowing of perceptual focus.  For example, Western adults often fail to notice alterations to a melody if the changes are 
consistent with the Western key and harmonic implications of the melody.  Infants, however, seem to be insensitive to key 
membership. They perform equally well if the changes are harmonically consistent or not and actually outperform adults on 
the harmonically consistent trials (Trainor & Trehub, 1992).  In effect the adults' acquired and culturally specific knowledge 
of tonality (e.g. Cuddy & Badertscher, 1987; Krumhansl & Keil, 1982; Lamont & Cross, 1994; Trainor & Trehub, 1994) 
hinders their ability to detect changes that do not affect their learned means of understanding the inherent structure of the 
melody.  In terms of sensitivity to more horizontal harmonic expectancies and structure, cultural learning can be evidenced 
as early as 1 year of age, if infants participate in parent-infant music classes (Gerry et al., 2012; Trainor et al., 2012), and 
develops gradually thoughout development98.  The most critical point for our purposes is that these structural connections 
and expectancies seem to be predominantly learned and, hence, are unlikely candidates for being constituent parts of a 
narrow faculty of music across cultures99.  
 
  
                                                 
97 This does not, of course, necessarily imply that the capacity to learn scalar or harmonic structure is not in some form specialized for 
music.  Consideration of this is beyond the scope of this thesis but the general opinion seems to be that this acquisition reflects broader 
capacities for implicit statistical learning (Tillmann & Bharucha, 2000; Rohrmeier & Rebuschat, 2012) and hierarchical syntactic structure 
processing (Koelsch et al., 2013) that are shared across music and language (see Rohrmeier et al., 2015). 
98 Principally, an understanding of chordal/harmonic progression appears to become accessible later in development and typically 
accumulates between about 4 and 8/11 years of age (Costa-Giorni, 2003).  Even at 4 years old we preferentially choose harmonically 
appropriate accompanying chords to familiar tunes (Corrigall & Trainor, 2010) and show sensitivity in ERP brain responses to substantial 
(but not more subtle ones that adults differentially respond to) harmonic violations (Koelsch et al., 2006; Jentschke et al., 2008).  The former 
finding may have been the result of familiarity rather than harmonic knowledge.  However, 4-5 year old children certainly seem to have 
some perceptual access to relevant implicit knowledge. They are better able to detect changes in tonal vs atonal music (Trehub et al., 1986) 
and, like adults, more consistently detect those changes that go outside an established key structure (Corrigall & Trainor, 2010).  Children 
between 5 and 7 years of age can recognize notes that violate implied harmony (Trainor & Trehub, 1994), and by 8 years of age show more 
subtle differential responses to different within-key notes that either contrast or support implied harmony (Cuddy & Badertscher 1987) .  
French and Australian children between 6 and 11 years of age have furthermore been documented to exhibit faster responses to timbral 
judgments with concordant ‘expected’ chords in simple chord sequences (Corrigall & Trainor, 2010).  This shows clearly that, even stripped 
down to a horizontal analytic outline, culturally appropriate insights of harmonic structure are implicitly active by this stage in development. 
99 For discussion on the capacity to learn implicitly musical grammars and to what extent this is shared with language see Rohrmeier & 
Rebuschat (2012). 
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Chapter Conclusion – A Musical Tone 
The psychophysiological and comparative discourse in this chapter has focused on a most plain concept of sustained pitch – 
a musical tone.  It is worth reiterating that this is by no means intended to present a reduced view of music’s many forms and 
practices.  The use of pitch in music, across composition, culture and time, is immeasurably variable and fascinating. Beyond 
the constraints of our current approach, it is ultimately a source of individual character, cultural identity, playful exploration, 
socio-intentional drive, creativity, emotional expression and regulation.  I maintain, however, that the capacity to engage 
with a “simple” musical tone universally grounds the organizational use of pitch in music100.  This applies, in principle, from 
the most unadorned use of a persistent musical drone, through to a private rendition of a folk melody, to instances of its 
fullest potential across cultures in impressive group displays of choral harmony and instrumental symphony. 
 
The comparative analysis in this chapter has, I submit, delved deeper than previous efforts to describe specific features of 
pitch in music.  Discrete tones have commonly been presented as one of the few distinguishing characteristics of music 
across cultures (Cross et al., 2013; Koelsch, 2012; cf .Bispham, 2009).   More precisely and inclusively, however, these can 
be inferred as resulting from, and being an expected acoustic correlate of, more deeply embedded processes.  A musical tone 
is inherently a sustained physical and attentional practice that is rooted in particular correction mechanisms and a degree of 
volitional control.  Initial experimental results further suggest that it is inextricably imbued with an awareness of a pitch-
structural framework.  Essentially a musical tone is neither primarily defined by, nor primarily experienced as, absolute 
values or discrete scalar steps.  It can be more or less flexibly instantiated in relation to internal or externally influenced 
expectancies.  More critical to its distinct nature than any absolute acoustic attributes or analysis is that it is understood and 
psychologically maintained in reference to explicit or implied pitch references or tonal centres. 
 
As such a stable pitch is in many ways similar to a sustained pulse. They both provide a mutually manifest focal point and 
framework for individual experience and social interaction.  In fact, although the argument took a slightly different course, 
the comparative analysis of musical tone in this chapter highlights remarkable similarities to the conclusions of chapter 2 on 
musical pulse.  In both cases relational processing is a key and pronounced (if not absolute) difference between humans and 
other species101.  Furthermore  as we approach specificities of music within human communicative repertoires, it is 
correction mechanisms that permit sustained utterance and attention, a high degree of volitional control, and an awareness of 
architectural framework that appear distinct to the context of music, whilst also being universal foundations of a capacity for 
music across cultures.  Of further critical importance is that, in both cases, it is precisely those features that distinguish the 
particular nature of individual experience with music that also afford group synchronous and harmonious interaction.  
Effectively configurations of musical pulse and musical tone provide an attentional structure for managing personal 
experience in an extended perceptual present - a continual phenomenological linking of the immediate past, the current 
moment (“now”), and future expectation – and a specific architectural framework for interpersonal communication. 
 
A musical tone refers to sustained engagement with reference to implicit or explicit stable F0 pitch areas within a 
phrase, requiring conscious access to fine-grained pitch perception.  Pitch, loudness, and timbre are independently 
variable in perception and production.  Furthermore, it involves intentionally influenced frequency correction 
mechanisms based upon a goal to maintain certain frequency relationships with the output of self and/or others. 
  
                                                 
100 To clarify this should not be understood to imply that all use of pitch in music is necessarily structurally significant.  Nor should it be 
interpreted to suggest that, that in certain instances the “musicness” of a performance cannot reside entirely in the rhythmic pulse.  As 
highlighted above (Section II – Introduction) it is my assertion in this thesis that music can be universally identified by engagement with 
configurations of musical pulse and musical tone.  One or the other could be entirely absent, but not both. 
101 Most likely this reflects and follows a wider move towards increased sociality in humans and a motivation to understand others as 
ourselves – in terms empathetically of our own psychological and physical experience. 
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Chapter 4 - Musical Motivation 
 
This chapter discusses uses and functions that are consistently the main motivational forces for engaging with music across 
cultures.  These include emotional experience, expression, and regulation; intersubjectivity; social alignment; cultural 
belonging, ritual action, and communitas.  All of these are essential to a full definition of music.  However, these intrinsic 
motivations and their dynamic correlates in sound and action are not specifically enacted in music.  As will be extensively 
discussed in this chapter, they emerge early in development and are ubiquitous features of human communication and 
culture.  Therefore, in the effort to describe motivational forces that are unique to music, I argue that musical motivation is 
distinct in the inspiration to give these central human drives a particular and extended attentional structure within the 
confines of configurations of musical pulse and tone.  Functionally, this provides extended phenomenological space, 
stability, and a degree of abstraction, intensity, and meaning, as well as providing a particular framework for interpersonal 
and group interaction and for ritual action.  The chapter starts with a brief description of motivation and then describes the 
crucial distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  The latter, almost by definition, is not specific to any given 




Motivation literally denotes a cause to move and can be defined as “a modulating and coordinating influence on the 
direction, vigor, and composition of behaviour” (Shizgal, in Wilson & Keil, 2001, p.566,).  It arises from a wide variety of 
internal, environmental, and social sources and is manifested at many levels of behavioural and neural organisation.  Broadly 
speaking, motivation is the essential catalyst to a full spectrum of human and non-human action ranging all the way from 
quasi cause and effect hormonal influences on mating patterns in female rats (e.g. Bindra, 1969; McClintock, 1984) to higher 
levels of behavioural and neural organisation where motivational states interact with cognitive processes in influencing 
behaviour and attentional foci (e.g. Simon, 1993; Shizgal, 1996).  It is inextricably linked with our emotional experience.  
Motivational states both influence emotional appraisals (e.g. Scherer, 2000) and can emerge from emotional reactions to 
stimuli in the form of modes of “action-readiness” – a physiological preparedness for context-relevant action (Frijda, 1986; 
Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001).  Some neurophysiological researchers have even suggested that the terms emotion and 
motivation reflect different positions on an intensity-graded spectrum of affect (Iverson & Fray, 1982, Simonov, 2013).   
Furthermore the term encapsulates root influences on volitional/explicit (e.g. Pally & Olds, 2000), non-volitional/implicit, 
goal-directed (e.g. Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1961) and intentional action (e.g. Bratman, 1990; 1999).  
 
Music and motivation 
 
Despite the potentially wide-ranging theoretical implications, generic discussions on universal motivating factors for music 
appear to be largely absent in musical scholarship.  Only in neurophysiological literature on music therapy do we find 
explicit reference to the need for a theoretical model of musical motivation (Unkefer & Thaut, 2005).  A conceptual model 
of the inspirational forces that prompt and sustain engagement with music is an essential step towards a complete 
understanding of the affective nature of music (see, Thaut, 2002).  Even more significantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
comparative perspectives are necessarily incomplete without consideration of motivation.  As previously mentioned, some 
researchers (e.g. Trehub & Hannon, 2006; see chapter 1; cf. chapters 2, 3) have argued that infants possess the necessary 
capabilities to engage with music and that mature musical engagement results from an additional (albeit unspecified), 
ontogentically acquired motivation.  Additionally, even if, contra to the conclusions of the previous chapters, non-human 
primates shared the necessary skills to behave or interact “musically” they may lack any instinctive reason to do so.  This 
issue should not be accorded secondary importance in anthropological/primatological comparative debates.  Arguments 
and/or empirical evidence that non-human primate species are able to perform a certain task if artificially motivated are often 
presented with the implicit implication that the behaviour in question is thus less likely to have played a uniquely significant 
role in the course of human evolution.  However, the functional/adaptive significance of any given set of behaviours is as 
much dependent on the biological and/or cultural forces that motivate a species to perform and/or sustain them in appropriate 
contexts as they are on the capabilities that underlie them.  This last statement clearly applies to musical engagement as 
much as it does to anything else.  Motivational factors are necessarily essential components of a generic and universal 
capacity for music.  In fact, it is noteworthy, that even among “amusic” individuals, who variably have difficulty processing 
the subtleties of musical pitch or in finding a beat (see chapters 2 & 3), a complete musical anhedonia remains remarkably 
scarce (Hirel et al., 2014; Mas-Herrero, 2014). 
 
Intrinsic motivation and “play” 
 
The psychological literature on motivation identifies two main forms of motivation – intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic 
motivation is described in Ryan and Deci (2000, p. 70) as “the natural inclination toward assimilation, mastery, spontaneous 
interest, and exploration that is so essential to cognitive and social development and that represents a principal source of 
enjoyment and vitality throughout life” (see also Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1993). It is clearly evident in healthy 
children’s inquisitive, curious, and playful behaviours in the absence of rewards (Harter, 1981), and is most evident when 
infants are securely attached to a parent (Bowlby, 1979). Intrinsic motivation is according to Ryan and Deci (2000, p. 71) 
“increasingly curtailed by social pressures to do activities that are not interesting and to assume a variety of new 
responsibilities” (see also Ryan & LaGuardia, 2000). The term extrinsic motivation, in contrast, refers to the performance of 
an activity in order to attain some separable outcome which in turn can be characterised as a striving for reward (approach) 
or motivation to evade punishment (avoidance) (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Elliot & Covington, 2001).  Music making can, 
of course, at times be extrinsically motivated by conformity, pride, privilege and other influences.  However, the vast 
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majority of musical engagement worldwide is intrinsically motivated – it is most commonly a positive and approached 
action. People will consistently report that their most enjoyable and meaningful musical moments have come when they felt 
they could ‘just let go’ while negative valence in music (and logically a subsequent curtailment of creativity and motivation) 
is nearly always the result of extrinsic pressures (Steptoe, 2001).  Ultimately, of course, “we wouldn’t do it if it wasn’t fun” 
(Bispham, I. personal communication). In our efforts to describe specific features of music we must therefore, almost by 
definition, focus the search on sources of intrinsic impetus. 
 
Use and Functions 
 
In a sense, uses and functions, are an explanatory level removed from the concept of motivation.  We can be intrinsically 
motivated without necessarily or consciously being driven by a functional goal.  However, motivation is also unlikely to be 
disconnected from use and/or function. The following section, therefore, briefly discusses broad cross-cultural perspectives 
on uses and functions for music.  I posit that the critical challenge for the purposes of this thesis is not to encapsulate the 
huge multitude of functions of music, but rather to address what motivates us to put any given character or social action into 
musical form. 
 
Perspectives from ethnomusicology 
 
A species’ motivational drives need not necessarily be directly reflected in a behavior’s observed physical or social value.  
Nevertheless, they are also highly unlikely to be entirely disconnected and it is most often parsimonious to describe 
motivation and function as different levels of analysis and explanation102.  Merriam (1964), following Nadel and Baker 
(1930), distinguishes between ‘use’ and ‘function’ for music.  The former, referring to the situations in which music is 
employed in human action and society, are inestimably diverse.  Functions, in contrast, are described as concerning “the 
reasons for its employment and particularly the broader purpose which it serves” (p.210).  These he lists as: 1. Emotional 
expression; 2. Aesthetic enjoyment; 3. Entertainment; 4. Communication; 5. Symbolic representation; 6. Physical response; 
7. Enforcing conformity to social norms; 8. Validation of social institutions and religious rituals; 9. Contribution to the 
continuity and stability of culture; and 10. Contribution to the integrity of society.  Nettl (1983) suggests that points 5 & 7-10 
could perhaps be conjoined into “the statement that music functions as the symbolic expression of the main values, patterns, 
or themes of a culture (1983, p.15).  Clayton (2016) consequently offers a more succinct categorization into the following 
supposedly irreducible functions: 1. Regulation of an individual’s emotional, cognitive or physiological state; 2. Mediation 
between self and other; 3. Symbolic representation; and 4. Coordination of Action103.   
 
Addressing the ‘top of the pyramid’ 
 
Nettl (2015) argues, however, that the distinction between use and function can at times be rather nebulous and proposes 
framing discussions, instead, as a metaphorical pyramid for imagining a society’s world of musical culture104.  In this 
imagined structure, uses can be seen to form the base of the pyramid, while proposed lists of functions fill the centre.  
Towards the upper end we can position statements regarding a principal function of music for any one society.  For example, 
McAllester (1954), commenting on Navajo culture, states that “many of the usual functions of music…. are subordinated to 
an all-important function of supernatural control” (p.88).  Another example is Merriam’s (1967) conclusion that for the 
Flathead Indians music functions “as a means for expressing the fact that they remain Flathead no matter what changes in 
their life have occurred” (p.158).  The very top of the pyramid - perhaps an unobtainable theoretical ideal - is “a single 
overriding function of music for all humanity under which all others are subsumed” (Nettl, p. 264).  Attempts to term a 
principal function for music across cultures have notably included Blacking’s proposal that the patterns of human interaction 
in music relate to patterns of human organization (1973); Lomax’s resolve that the most favoured songs are operational in 
reflecting and reinforcing cultural norms of behaviour (1968); and Small’s view that music “defends the central expressive 
interests of a society” (1987, p. 19).  Nettl’s own belief is that “what music ultimately does for humans, is to mediate 
between various forces: to control humanity’s relationship to the supernatural, mediating between humans and other beings; 
to support the integrity of individual social groups and mediate between them; and to mediate in ways not possible with 
speech between individual and of individuals (2015, p. 267). It does this, he suggests, by expressing the relevant central 
values of culture in abstracted form. 
 
Nettl admits, however, to being rather reluctant to suggest a single function for music.  Indeed, none of the above 
suggestions relate to all music or all it relates to.  They are also perhaps rather nebulous in character and scientifically 
speaking hard to subject to analysis and/or falsification.    It may well be, as Clayton (2016, p.56) suggests, that “music’s 
efficacy depends precisely on the indeterminacy of a single, “true” or underlying function”.  It is furthermore not clear what 
in the listed statements is thought to be specific to music.  Going back to Merriam’s list of functions, for example, none are 
necessarily specific to music and could equally apply to other arts, ritualistic activity or oratory.  A lack of musical 
specificity in describing the interminably vast multiplicity of function within and across cultures is similarly problematic in 
evolutionary debate and is reflected in the many and varied adaptive and exaptive rationales that have been proposed.  
Tomlinson (2015), for example, argues that the central problem in music-as-adaptation perspectives is that they tend to 
                                                 
102 Similarly a common function in any given culture or age may not necessarily reflect an ultimate evolutionary consequence or pressures. 
103 Another proposed list of the social functions of music is Koelsch’s proposed 7Cs (contact, cognition, co-pathy, communication, 
coordination, cooperation, and cohesion) (see 2014). 
104 He also proposes a double-sided coin metaphor to caution interpreting appropriately about a culture’s and analyst’s statements on this 
topic (Ibid, p. 265-67). 
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assume a “unilateral explanation for a manifold phenomenon” (p. 33).  Music, as described by Van der Schyff and Schiavio 
(2017), “takes on so many forms, involves such a wide range of behavior, and serves so many functions, it seems difficult to 
specify a single selective environment for it.” 
 
However, how about we try to approach the top of the pyramid from a different angle? It seems clear to me that music can 
effectively encapsulate and/or abstract all of our most central vitalities, social drives, and cultural reflections (in varying 
combinations).  It can be utterly sublime but also, at times, entirely benign.  The central question to my mind, therefore, is 
what motivates us to put any given character or social action into musical form? Does music really have any absolute and 
distinct connections to emotion, intersubjectivity, and/or cultural coordination? Why structure the “communicative 
musicalities” of our dynamic mediations with others and the flow of our individual experience around the specificities of a 
musical pulse and/or musical tone as described in the previous two chapters? 
 
Music and Emotion: A special relationship? 
 
The following sections on music and emotion focus on the available experimental evidence and theoretical models in the 
literature  The main issues discussed are how best to characterise the complex relationship between music and emotion and 
whether there is anything specific about the ways in we express and/or regulate emotional states through music.  Broadly 
speaking it seems that this is not the case.  I posit, however, that the constantly renewing and sustained nature of attention to 
emotionally charged action and sound afforded by music makes it a particularly effective means of influencing and 
stabilizing mood.  In accordance with this idea I suggest that the particular efficacies of music in terms of emotion can be 
directly related to the extended attentional focus afforded by engagement with configurations of musical pulse and tone. 
 
Music moves us because we hear human intentions, thoughts and feelings moving in it, and because we appreciate their 
urgency and harmony. It excites motives and thoughts that animate our conscious acting and appraising of reality. It 
appeals to emotions that measure the effort and satisfactions, advantages and dangers of moving in intricate repetitive ways. 
Evidently a feeling for music is part of the adaptations of the human species for acting in a human made world; part, too, of 
how cultural symbols and languages are fabricated and learned (Kühl 2007(8); Gratier & Trevarthen 2008). (Trevarthen, et 
al., 2011) 
 
A special function for music is most commonly attributed to its association with “emotion”105.  This has variously been 
expressed in the literature in terms of music being the ‘language of emotions’ (e.g. Cooke, 1959) or, somewhat similarly, in 
terms of music being particularly valuable in expressing emotions (e.g. Juslin, 2001).  Interest in these connections has 
yielded a vast body of interdisciplinary investigation and exhaustive reviews are available in the literature (e.g. Sloboda & 
Juslin 2011; Eerolo & Vuoskovski, 2013; Juslin, 2016; Swaminathan & Schellenberg, 2015).  Research strands include 
experiments, qualitative interviews; brain imaging and EEG; Field studies; questionnaires; music therapy; and ethnographic 
research; with each having provided some central and consistent findings106.  Very broadly, we do seem to have reached a 
consensus, contrary to earlier cognitivist opinions (e.g. Kivy, 1990), that “music involves true instances of emotion” 
(Sloboda & Juslin, 2001 p. 91).  Emotions in music are not distinct in self-report studies, expressive behavior, or 
physiological reactions (see Scherer, 1993) from those experienced in everyday situations.  The literature on emotion studies 
is, of course, extensive beyond the boundaries of the present discussion (see e.g. Davidson et al, 2003; Manstead et al, 2004; 
Frijda et al, 2000; and Scherer et al, 2001)107.  Nevertheless we can briefly note that emotions appear consensually to be 
characterized in terms of some key features.  These include that emotions are functional in guiding behaviour and providing 
contextually relevant goals (e.g. Keltner & Gross, 1999); have behavioural, physiological, and experiential components 
                                                 
105 Strictly speaking ‘affect’ is considered to be a more precise umbrella term for emotion, mood, feeling, arousal, and vitality (Oatley & 
Jenkins, 1996) and generally refers to the valence of an experience.   Generically speaking therefore, the term affect is most precise in terms 
of describing the “emotional experience” of musical engagement.  However, the terms seem to used interchangeably with ‘emotion’ being 
the more common in music research.   See below for further discussion. 
106 Juslin (2005, p. 99) summarises the central findings from these strands of research in a table as follows (added references are signified *):  
Experiments: Music produces differentiated effects on self-report, physiology, and behaviour (Davis & Thaut, 1989; Kallinen, 2004; 
Krumhansl, 1997; Nyklicek et al., 1997; Panksepp, 1995; Pigniatello et al., 1989; Pike, 1972; Vaitl et al., 1993; Waterman, 1996; Vaestfjall, 
2002).  
Qualitative interviews: Listeners employ music to regulate, enhance, and change qualities and levels of emotion.  They show considerable 
awareness about the music that need to hear in different situations to induce particular emotions (DeNora, 2001; Gomart & Hennion, 1999).  
Brain imaging and EEG: Listeners’ responses to music involve subcortical regions of the brain that are known from previous research to be 
involved in emotional reactions (Altenmueller et al., 2002; Blood & Zatorre, 2001;; Peretz, 2001; Schmidt & Trainor, 2001; Brown et al., 
2004*; Gosselin, et al., 2005*; Koelsch, et al., 2005*; Menon & Levitin, 2005*).  
Field studies: Music influences consumer behaviour, helping, and interpersonal attraction and conflict (Fried & Berkowitz, 1979; Honeycutt 
& Eidenmueller, 2001; May & Hamilton, 1980; North & Hargreaves, 1997; North et al., 2004; Bailey & Davidson, 2005*).  
Questionnaires: Music serves various emotional functions in everyday life: to change moods; to release emotions; as a source of comfort; to 
match current mood; as a source of enjoyment; to relieve stress, etc. (Behne, 1997; Juslin & Laukka, 2004; Panzarella, 1980; Roe, 1985; 
Sloboda, 1991; Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001; Zillman & Gan, 1997; Wells, 1990). Music therapy: Music facilitates the expression, 
identification, and experience of emotions; improves the control of one’s own emotional behaviour; helps to ‘trigger’ emotionally-laden 
memories of past events; and helps to diagnose patients’ psychiatric conditions (Thaut, 1990).  
Ethnographic research: Emotional response to music is a ‘universal’ phenomenon, typically involving the particular forms of engaging with 
music may differ from one culture to another (Becker, 2001; Blacking, 1973). 
107 For an even more wide-ranging comparative discussion of emotion and mood in nonhuman animals see Mendl and colleagues (2010) and 
Panksepp (2010) and for a recent review of the cross-species comparative neuroscience of primal affective experiences in humans and 
related animals see Panksepp (2011). 
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(Scherer, 2000); have proximal elicitors (Le Doux, 1996); involve “action tendencies” (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001)108; and 
involve mechanisms of cognitive appraisal that evaluate an organisms environment (e.g. Lazarus, 1982; Scherer. 1999).  All 
of the above have variously been accredited to listeners’ emotional responses to music.  However, some are most likely of 
greater specific relevance to the full range of world musics than others.  Appraisal processes, for example, would appear to 
be of relatively marginal significance to the intrinsic act of musical engagement.  Sloboda and Juslin (2001) instead appear 
to support a primary relevance of action tendencies arguing that “a theory of emotional responses to music in terms of 
‘musical expectations’ has clear explanatory value in relation to Frijda’s (1986) notion of emotions as a function of 
monitoring match and mismatch” (p.92).  The embodied nature of music performance and perception as well as the lack of a 
definite functional goal would also suggest that it aligns more productively with accounts of direct connections between 
action and emotion. 
 
Expression and induction in experimental research 
 
Without wishing to diminish the many forms, assumptions, and arguments that have been proposed in philosophical and 
psychological discourse on music and emotion (see Thompson and Quinto 2011), it seems fair to summarise that projects 
have focused on two broad foci of investigation: the expression and recognition of musical emotions; and the evocation and 
induction of emotions (e.g. Cochrane et al. 2013).  These can be understood as the ‘where’ and ‘how’ problems – as 
investigating musical emotions as being externally or internally manifest respectively (Schubert, 2013).  As noted in 
Schiavio et al (2016) “(t)his juxtaposition of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ points of view has resulted in several influential 
frameworks (Fabian et al. 2014; Schubert 2013); and has provided important insights across a range of musically-relevant 
domains such as music therapy (Baker et al. 2007) and music performance (Scherer and Zentner, 2001)” (p. 2).  Both have 
also provided theoretical frameworks for generating testable hypotheses and empirical results.  Research into the expression 
and decoding of emotion has most commonly been interpreted in terms of adaptations of Brunswick’s (1956) quasi-
information-transferral ‘lens’ model of communication (Juslin, 1995; 2000).  This has allowed researchers to isolate features 
of compositional technique, performance, and acoustic structure and investigate how these correlate to perceptions of 
semantically discrete emotional categories and/or dimensions of affect (e.g. arousal and valence).  In terms of the induction 
of emotion, the most comprehensive and influential framework for synthesizing theory and findings from various domains is 
BRECVEM (Juslin & Vastfjall, 2008; cf Scherer’s CPM-based approach [Component Process Model]; see Scherer 2009).  
This designates seven mechanisms through which music might induce emotions: Brain stem reflex; rhythmic entrainment; 
evaluative conditioning; visual imagery; contagion; episodic memory; musical expectance.  These are generally designated 
as being neurologically distinct and appear roughly in order of ontogenetic development and availability to consciousness 
(see Juslin & Sloboda, 2013). 
 
Despite the practical value of these models we should, however, be cautious not to assume that methodological rational and 
constraints reflect the reality of experience, motivation, and/or function.  Expanded Brunswik lens models fail to account for 
the embodied nature of emotional experience (see Maiese, 2015; 2017) and musical engagement and risk an abridged, 
verbally categorisable account of the complex phenomenology of musical affect (see Davies, 2010).  In turn, the notion of 
music ‘evoking’ or ‘inducing’ emotion connotes a slightly ethnocentric notion of a listener passively receiving music as a 
physical product.  “Music” appears to exist separately from any human action.  As noted in Schiavio et al. (2016) “(m)usic, 
indeed, is not a sentient being, which makes it difficult to imagine how it could feel and express emotions at all” (p. 3).  
Thus, this notion also cannot capture the enacted/interactional experience of music or fully reflect an evolutionary/functional 
account of communication in music (e.g. Cross, 2009; see chapter 1) nor its extension from animal models of 
communication or regulatory function in, for example, parent-infant interactions.  The implicit assumption is that music is 
not essential for human survival and well-being.  Schiavio and colleagues surmise, following a clear and comprehensive 
critique of the internal and external research foci that “the main issue that emerges here is that these approaches have 
difficulty addressing the actual experience of music, which arguably involves more than response processes, internal 
processing or detached aesthetic appraisals.  Put simply, these theories tend to suspend the actual living experience of music 
in order to explain it; and, in the process, reduce it to various categories and loci” (p. 4).   
 
 An enactive alternative 
 
They advocate instead a view on music and emotion that builds on an enactive/dynamic systems approach to the study of the 
mind and cognition (e.g. Varela et al. 2017; see also Ramachandran 2011109).  Musical emotions are thus assumed to be 
episodes of experience associated with the ongoing process of maintaining adaptive, self-sustaining, dynamical stability.  
Crucially this perspective views all musical action (including listening) as being motivated and goal-directed and hence as 
being essentially emotive/affective.  It “highlights the primordial necessity of musicality for embodied, pre-linguistic and 
emotional-empathic forms of understanding, communication and social cognition, beginning with the primordial interactions 
between infants and primary caregivers (Cross 1999, 2001; Krueger 2013; van der Schyff 2013)” (Ibid, p. 5).  As such it 
connects directly to broad perspectives on primary intersubjectivity in developing social bonds in infancy (e.g. Trevarthen, 
2002) and extends from an understanding of the interactive processes of participatory sensemaking (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo, 2007).  This argument is much more conducive to a functional evolutionary account of musicality110 and I definitely 
                                                 
108 They alter the probability of subsequent behaviour and prepare an organism for relevant action accordingly (Frijda, 1986). 
109 The latter refers to a collaborative paper that cautions against a purely mechanistic and inductive explanation of emotion in 
neuroscientific research. 
110 In a more recent paper Schyff and Schiavio (2017), extend the relevance of this perspective to an evolutionary perspective on the origins 
of human musicality.  They argue that understanding the enactive continuity between mind, culture, and biology provides a potential way 
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recommend it to be considered in full (see also Schyff & Schiavio, 2017b).  That said, it is, of course, more directly 
challenging for empirical investigation and is perhaps best utilized in interpreting and translating existing research findings 
into a more accordant understanding of a musical environment interacting with the developmental histories of the 
participants involved and a more dynamic affective-motivational process. 
 
 Music as emotion regulation 
 
Another way of understanding the functional connection of music with emotion that deserves a greater theoretical and 
empirical focus is as a means of regulation.  The concept of regulation is widespread in the cognitive sciences, including the 
domains of motivation; attention; action; and emotion (see Banfield et al., 2004).  It refers to conscious and unconscious 
processes of monitoring and corrective control through which functional systems – ranging from the molecular level through 
to social and cultural levels – are maintained in line with preferred standards (see Schore, 2003; Davidson, et al., 2002; 
Trevarthen, 2005).  Regulation has both been studied with regard to intra-individual processes – termed 'self-regulation'(see 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2016) and inter-individual processes – termed co-regulation (Fogel, 1993) and mutual regulation 
(Sroufe, 2000).  Given the general importance of regulation in cognitive and affective sciences and in particular given the 
rapidly growing field on emotion regulation (see Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007) the relative lack of a consideration 
of the regulatory nature of musical engagement seems unfortunate and is, most likely, a considerable barrier to progress in 
understanding the affective nature of music (cf. see Saarikallio, 2016).  A highly developed example of a musician's ability 
to self-regulate her affective state is reported by Damasio (2000, p.50) who recounts his meeting with the pianist Maria Joao 
Pires as follows: 
 
Some years ago, the brilliant pianist Maria Joao Pires told us the following story: When she plays, under the perfect 
control of her will, she can either reduce or allow the flow of emotion to her body.  My wife, Hanna, and I thought it 
was a wonderfully romantic idea, but Maria Joao insisted that she could do it and we resisted believing it.  Eventually, 
the stage for the empirical moment of truth was set in our laboratory.  Maria Joao was wired to complicated 
psychophysiological equipment while she listened to short pieces of our selection in two conditions: emotion allowed, 
or emotion voluntarily inhibited.  In the condition 'emotion allowed', her skin conductance record was full of peaks 
and valleys, linked intriguely, to varied passages in the pieces. Then in the condition of 'emotion reduced' the 
unbelievable did, in fact, happen. She could virtually flatten her skin-conductance graph at will and change her heart 
rate to boot.  Behaviourally, she changed as well.  The profile of background emotions was rearranged, and some of 
the specific emotive behaviours were eliminated, e.g., there was less movement of the head and facial musculature. 
 
As suggested by Joel Swaine (personal communication, 2006) this example, albeit perhaps an exceptional one, is one of 
voluntary self-regulation that is cultivated by a variety of skilled practitioners and performers, such as musicians (Persson, 
2000) and meditators (e.g. Tang et al., 2007) who develop skills that may be more broadly encapsulated as components of 
mental skills training (Connelly and Williamon, 2004).  It can perhaps act as a paradigmatic example for how music and 
musical practice can be used positively in managing individually our personal affective experience. Effectively, whilst 
welcoming the research shift towards understanding music as a social, communicative and interactive act we need to also be 
mindful of the fact that music can be an intensely meaningful individual pursuit, practice and immersion.  Contrary to recent 
suggestions (e.g. Morley, 2013; Trehub et al., 2015) I do not think, therefore, that we should accept the notion that all music 
(e.g. even private practice) is necessarily socially motivated.  That said it is very notably the same attentional architecture 
that identifies the specificity of music in individual experience that also affords group participation, synchrony and harmony 
(see below).   All musical behaviour relies on mechanisms that are inextricably embedded in systems designed for 
communication and the regulation of affect.  The sense of sociality often felt in individual practice is, therefore, not 
necessarily an imagined social ‘other’ but can perhaps be described as a state of emotional and social openness and 
interactional potential.   
 
Swaine has proposed, in efforts to develop a model of singing and emotion, that “music regulates affect and expresses a 
strategy for the regulation of affect” (CMS seminar presentation, 2006)111.  Although a different formulation this shares the 
strengths of the enactive/dynamic systems approach described above.  Regulation broadly describes the emotional effects of 
interactional and personal engagement with music without disconnecting between “listeners” and “performers”112 – the 
“where” and “how”.  It also provides consistent and functional links to relevant literatures in other disciplines.  Co-
regulation of affect is, for example, paradigmatically exhibited in the communications that occur between patient and 
therapist in music therapeutical contexts (Ansdell & Pavlicivic, 2005).  It is also widely assumed to be, throughout early 
development, the principal function underlying the interactions and protoconversations between infants and caregivers (e.g. 
Malloch, 1999) in which dynamic processes “balance changes in self-regulation against the need for collaborative 
regulations of relationships with other persons in various degrees of intimacy (Porges and Furman, 2011; Carter and Porges, 
2013)” (Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013, p. 4). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
through what they regard as a “problematic” dichotomy between adaptation and non-adaptation (see ibid). 
 
111 My understanding is that is that through the use of the term ‘strategy’ this phrase incorporates that notion that music is partially 
volitionally controlled (see chapters 2 and 3).  The term connotes a degree of stabilisation and voluntary control. 
112 As mentioned previously this distinction is cross-culturally mostly invalid and anyhow highly artificial as “passive” listening is an active 
process. 
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Music and vocal communication: A common code? 
 
The affective experience of engaging musically is, of course, highly complex and may contain some context-specific 
features or phenomenological states (see below).  However, reduced to verbalisable categories of emotion or ratings of 
affect-relevant dimensions, music seems not to be overtly distinct from other forms of human (and to a large extent 
nonhuman) communicative repertoires. It shares a common code with the wider category of vocal communication.  An 
influential and much-cited meta-analysis of 145 studies (Juslin & Laukka, 2003; also Thompson & Balkwill, 2006), confirms 
that decoding accuracy for broad emotion categories113 is above chance in music and vocal communication, and suggests that 
vocal and music “expression” involve similar structural cues such as overall F0, pitch level, rate, and intensity.  In other 
words it appears - in accordance with suggestions of a common biological grounding (e.g. Spencer, 1857; Scherer, 1995) and 
musi-language evolutionary hypotheses (see Chapter 1) - that both music and emotionally expressive speech employ aspects 
of a common motivational-structural code (Ibid).  Unsurprisingly, for example, emotions characterized by high or low levels 
of arousal (e.g. anger/happiness or tenderness/sadness) typically use fast or slow rates in music and other forms of 
communication respectively (e.g., Gagnon & Peretz, 2003; Juslin & Lindström, 2010).  Angry utterances are naturally 
delivered with high vocal intensity in speech and a correspondingly high dynamic in music.  Another foreseeable recent 
comparative finding was that speech and music expressing happiness used larger pitch intervals than those expressing 
sadness in both South Indian and Western music (Bowling et al., 2012).   
 
These basic, presumably biological and/or physically grounded, cues are available to young children and across cultures.  
They are operational in infant-directed speech and singing from infancy onwards (e.g. Trainor et al., 1997; Rock et al., 
1999).  5 year-olds, for example, perceive and effectively decode tempo as a cue to emotion (Dalla Bella et al., 2001).  
Instructed to convey emotions through singing, 5- to 8-year olds instinctively modulate basic acoustic cues such as tempo, 
pitch, and loudness in their performances (Adachi & Trehub, 1998)114.  It is presumably also these affect-structural 
correlations that allow listeners to identify emotions in music from other cultures with a reasonable level of success.  
Expressions of happiness, sadness, and anger in Hindustani (North Indian) pieces are correctly identified by non-
enculturated Western listeners (Balkwill & Thompson, 1999) and by Japanese listeners (Balkwill et al., 2004).  Conversely 
the same categories of emotion are identified above chance by the Mafa from Cameroon (with no previous exposure) in 
response to Western music (Fritz et al., 2009).  Finally, Laukka and colleagues (2013) confirmed that Indian, Japanese, or 
Swedish listeners can identify emotions expressed in Western, Hindustani, Japanese, or Swedish music.  In general, it seems 
that the expression of more ‘basic’ emotions is more likely to generalize across cultures.  In the latter study (ibid.), for 
example, results are more congruent for basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, and sadness) than for complex emotions 
such as solemnity and spirituality (Laukka, et al 2013)115.  Of course, even in the perception of basic emotions we do not rely 
solely on biological cues.  Listeners in all of the above studies performed more ‘accurately’ (i.e. their answers were more 
closely aligned to the compositional/performative intent) in identifying emotions in familiar styles of music.  This is 
presumably a result of culturally learned musical expectancies being either fulfilled or violated (Huron, 2006) and is also 
reflected in the notion that music from our own culture will tend to be more emotionally rewarding that music from a foreign 
culture.  For example, participants from rural India rate Western music as “tenser” than Indian music (Wong et al., 2009) 
while American participants conversely rate Indian music as being “tenser” than Western music (Wong, et al., 2011). 
  
A recent direct comparison of acoustic cues in music and speech in terms of valence, energy arousal, and tension arousal116 
(Ilie & Thompson, 2006) supports the conclusions of the comparative meta-analysis (Juslin & Laukka, 2003) with regard to 
intensity cues in all dimensions and the effects of rate/tempo on subjective measures of energy-arousal.  However, pitch 
shifts only affected tension-arousal ratings in musical cues and correlations between rate/tempo and measures of valence and 
tension-arousal differed between music and speech cues.  Manipulation of rate influenced valence judgments for speech, but 
not music.  The reverse was shown in terms of tension-arousal ratings.  Correlations between these cues and tension-arousal 
ratings may reflect intrinsic (and culture-specific) features of musical structure and correspondingly emergent expectancies 
and feelings of tension and release (see below).  Additionally, the evidence that valence ratings were not affected by tempo 
changes in music may be explicable in terms of them being less psychophysiologically indicative due to a greater volitional 
control and awareness of rate and tempo in music (see chapter 2).  Alternately it may be that the arousal-correlations of 
tempo in music relate also to our internal matching of action-relevant dance patterns and differing hierarchical 
interpretations of the appropriate beat level (see London et al., 2016; 2017 CMS seminar presentation). 
 
Initially more puzzling, and counterintuitive given the above discussions, however, are findings that pitch changes had 
opposite effects on valence for music and speech (increasing with pitch rises in speech and vice versa in music), and affected 
subjects’ measurement of energy-arousal only in speech.  That pitch-levels can embody a range of valence is perhaps not 
                                                 
113 Unsurprisingly, both descriptive-categorical and bi-dimensional accounts of affect in terms of arousal and valence show considerable 
correlation (e.g. Russell, 1980).  The question of which of these best describes the correlations between stimuli and reported affect remains a 
matter of considerable debate.  The evidence would appear to support a primacy of dimensional correlates (e.g. Laukka, 2004; Laukka & 
Juslin, 2005).  Following Faith and Thayer (2001) – who argue with reference to individual affective state rather than communicative 
inference – discrete emotion categories are perhaps best described dynamically as attractor fields within parameters of affect and valence. 
114 By contrast culture-specific acoustic cues to emotion such as changes in mode (major or minor) only become relevant after 6 years of age 
(Dalla Bella et al., 2001). 
115 In Balkwill & Thompson (1999) Western participants also, congruently, had difficulty recognising ‘peacefulness’ in North Indian music. 
116 The authors explicitly frame their experiments within Schimmack and Grob’s (2000) three-dimensional model of affect that integrates 
Thayer’s (1978, 1986) multidimensional model of activation with Russell’s (1980) circumplex model and arousal and valence.  As 
discussions on expectancy, “tension” and “release” in music (e.g. Meyer, 1956) are abundant (see below) this may well provide a better 
model of affect for studying musically significant affect.  However, it is as yet not common-place in the literature. 
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surprising given that high or rising pitch, for example, can signal both deference (Bolinger, 1978; Morton, 1994; Ohala, 
1994) and surprise, anger, and activity (Scherer & Oshinsky,1977) across taxa.  However, this in itself does not account for 
the differential results that appear significantly to contradict a common motivational-structural code in music and vocal 
communication.  Beyond positing the existence of domain-specific processes for decoding emotion, the authors do not 
account for these findings or the different effects on energy-arousal ratings.  One possibility is that these differences reflect 
fundamental differences in what might be termed the “production code”117 for music as opposed to speech and vocal 
communication more broadly.  Unlike speech, and certainly unlike non-human animal vocalization, instrumental and/or 
vocal music necessarily involves a high degree of independent variability of frequency, timbre, and loudness (see chapter 3 
for detail).  Hence pitch in music may be less independently indicative of arousal than elsewhere118.   
 
The specificity of “musical emotions” 
 
Despite a wealth of sentiment and anecdotal accounts that musical emotion is in some way unique or special, it has so far 
proved remarkably difficult to pinpoint an exact and specific nucleus or address why that may be the case.  Sensations of 
“peak experience” (Maslow, 1968), “flow” (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1990)119, and “shivers” or “chills” (Panksepp, 1995) have 
all been reported as commonly felt descriptors for particularly strong emotional experiences with music (see Gabrielsson, 
2001).  However, these experiences, whilst relevant and suggestive, are perhaps not the best ground for a generic 
comparative perspective on musical emotions nor are they described exclusively in reference to musical absorption.  
 
The notion that intrinsic features of musical structure, such as tonal systems (e.g. Bharucha, 1994), create expectancies based 
upon culturally constructed knowledge, statistical regularities, and “Gestalt laws” was first formulated in a theory of emotion 
in music by Meyer (1956) who related expectancies to feelings of “tension” and “release” (possibly analogous to the terms 
“mismatch” and “match”).  Since then it has received theoretical and empirical support from Narmour’s (1990) model of 
melodic expectations and Sloboda’s (1991; 1992) experiments on the relationship between structural features of music such 
as enharmonic changes or syncopations and the sensation of “chills”.  Additional support has come from physiological and 
neurological studies into “expected” and “unexpected”120 harmonic progressions showing increased electrodermal activity 
and heart rates (Steinbeis, et al., 2005) as well as activations of the orbital frontolateral cortex (OFLC)121 in response to 
“unexpected” chords.  Meyer’s theory and subsequent developments of it (e.g. Huron, 2006) would certainly appear to 
account for important aspects of musics’ relationship with emotion.  Importantly the general priniciple of implicitly learned 
expectancies could be argued to generalise cross-culturally and relate to the specific quasi-architectural features of “musical 
pulse” and “musical tone” (see Chapters 2 and 3).  However, short-term expectancies, for example, in the form of future-
directed attentional pulses (Jones, 1976), pervade all manner of ecological and social engagement (see chapter 2) and may, 
thus, again not be able intrinsically to account for a putatively specific emotion-related functionality for music. 
 
A further possibility is that a special relationship is inherent in the dynamic nature of music.  One way of interpreting this is 
that musically relevant emotions may be described in terms of ‘vitality affects’ (Stern, 1985).  Intuitively this approach 
seems relevant and certainly accords with evidence supporting common mechanisms in engagement with pulse in music and 
movement (see chapter 2).  However, it remains an empirically somewhat indeterminate term and applies broadly to the 
whole of our affective experience and communicative interactions.  A more empirically solid assertion is that musics’ 
dynamisms allow emotions to unfold and intensify over time.  A psychophysiological study (Krumhansl, 1997) investigating 
the time course of physiological responses (including cardiac, vascular, electrodermal, and respiratory functions) to 
emotionally-laden (“sad”, “fearful”, and “happy”) musical stimuli showed significant correlations between the majority of 
recorded physiological responses and time.  In support of the above hypothesis, the strongest physiological effects for each 
emotion generally tended to increase over time.  Neurological fMRI studies (Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Koelsch, Fritz, et al., 
2006) have also been thought to support the hypothesis by showing that the activity changes of neurophysiological correlates 
of emotion are increased in the second of two 30sec listening blocks as opposed to the first (see Koelsch, 2005).   
 
Another, perhaps parsimonious way of making sense of the evidence is that sustained engagement with the emotional nature 
of music does not merely intensify emotional experience but is also operational in influencing mood.  Music, in potential 
                                                 
117 Gussenhoven (2002) identifies three universal and putatively biologically functional (i.e. motivational-structural) codes in speech: The 
frequency/size code which indicates anatomically relevant information regarding the signaller; the effort code relating to degrees of energy 
expended in the production of speech; and the production code that – borrowing from Liberman’s concept of breath groups in speech (e.g. 
Liberman et al., 1970) - associates high pitch with the beginning of phrases the time.  Correlations between emotional state and the 
frequency of vocalization thus results from different levels of energy generation during exhalation phases and most likely reflects a wider 
correlation between pitch and intensity in speech (and quite possibly a highly linear relationship in non-human primate vocalisation [e.g. 
Demolin, 2006]). 
118 This may also underlie another exceptional finding that, whereas negative emotions such as fear and anger are typically expressed by 
high pitch in speech (Juslin & Laukka, 2003), lower overall pitch supposedly makes music sound less “pleasant” (Jaquet, et al., 2014), and 
that low pitches are often used to to express emotions with negative valence in music.  
119 The experience of flow is, of course, commonly described as a highly meaningful and desirable result in music.  It is certainly part of 
music’s eudemonic association with physical and mental 'well-being' (see Huppert and Baylis, 2005).  It is charactised as being a decidedly 
pleasurable state but it is not definitively distinguished in degrees of hedonic experience - rather by optimally sustained levels of 
concentration (Nakamura & Csikzentmihalyi, 2014).  This could again be argued to relate directly to the sustained attention inherent in the 
specific features of musical pulse and musical tone identified in chapters 2 & 3. 
120 To be precise these should be understood in terms of chords that violate cultural constructed statistically relevant “rules” regarding the 
“correct” progression of harmony. 
121 Koelsch (2005) explains that the OFLC is a paralimbic structure that plays an important role in the processing of emotion (p.414).  See 
Mega, Cummings, et al. (1997) for a neurological review of the limbic system. 
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contrast to other forms of adult vocal communication, is consistently and purposefully employed as a means of altering 
individual and group mood (Bailey & Davidson, 2005; DeNora, 2001; Gomart & Hennion, 1999).  In fact, one could 
feasibly make the case that this is the most prevalent use of music in society (Ibid).  Despite lacking a clear theoretical 
underpinning, music’s ability to function at this level is so well acknowledged in most areas of psychology that experimental 
paradigms regularly use music as a means of inducing particular moods in participants based solely on the assumption and 
observation that it works (see Albersnagel, 1988; Gerards-Hesse et al., 1994).  It is notable that although other forms of 
communication, of course, partially embody this regulatory function, music does appear to be particularly efficacious.  
 
Unfortunately, however, mood is all too often conflated into a general concept of affect or simply left unspecified in research 
into music and emotion. Some influential researchers have even cautioned against a distinction between emotion and mood.   
Juslin and Sloboda, for example, argue that “(i)t remains unclear whether the distinction between mood (core affect [Russell, 
2003]) and emotion, which is based more on folk theories than on scientific evidence (Beedie, et al., 2005), will survive 
closer scrutiny” (2013, p. 588)122.  However, we can quite plausibly lay a claim of experimental neurorealism to this claim 
(see Racine et al, 2005; also Gruber, 2017) and, in my opinion, it is critical that we have a music psychological framework 
for distinctly discussing mood (even if the definitional boundary may necessarily be somewhat nebulous).  Mood and 
emotion are widely differentiated by scientists and lay persons on the basis that moods last much longer; lack an identifiable 
or proximal eliciting stimulus event, are not necessarily accompanied by distinct facial expressions (e.g. Ekman & Davidson, 
1994), and in terms of their consequences and functionality (see Ketal, 1975; Beedie, et al., 2005).  With regard to the latter, 
Davidson (1994) coined the phrase “emotions bias action, whereas moods bias cognition” (p.54).  This can be understood to 
mean that, whereas emotions arise in situations where adaptive action is required, moods denote shifts in baseline ‘modes’ of 
information processing – influencing memory, decision making, and evaluative judgements (see Bless and Forgas, 2000). 
 
Sloboda and Juslin (2001) succinctly explain that “[t]hus emotions can be viewed as phasic perturbations that are 
superimposed on the tonic, affective background provided by the mood” (p.75, emphases in original).  Emotions are not 
solely elicited on the basis of intrinsic features of an action or gesture but also upon the relationship of the signal to an 
individual’s affective background - his or her mood (amongst other things).  One possibility is that the regular and sustained 
attention to emotional action and sound afforded by music is particularly conducive to influencing, stabilizing, and/or 
resetting baseline affective states (i.e., Moods [see Davidson, 1994]).  The most crucial point to highlight from the above 
discussion is that, fundamentally, music does not express, regulate, and/or enact emotion, in a way that is intrinsically 
unique.  Broadly speaking, it seems that the particular efficacies of music in terms of our emotional experience can be 
directly related to the extended attentional focus afforded by engagement with configurations of musical pulse and tone.  
Although the scope of relevance will necessarily depend on the particular content, a sustained attentional framework 
enhances, regulates, stabilizes, and heightens meaning and memory.  A similarly structured argument and conclusion can be 
made for music’s effects on other cognitive capacities, social interactions, and intersubjective dynamics.   
 
Music and Intersubjectivity: A special relationship? 
 
Intersubjectivity through interaction is another critical motivating force for music.  However, similarly to the previous 
section on music and emotion, I will argue that the way in which intersubjectivity emerges through the act of musical 
participation is not intrinsically specific to music.  The use of movement, motive, and gestural form in forming attachments 
with others is shown to characterise early interactions in human development.  Furthermore, the constituent parts of our 
generic capacity for culture, which undoubtedly are of paramount and integral significance in music, are operational much 
more broadly in human sociality (and to varying degrees in non-human primate interaction).  They, also, are an embedded 
part of, but not unique to, music.  If music appears to offer particularly potent intersubjective insight it is, I posit, a direct 
consequence of the sustained attentional framework afforded by the specific features of configurations of musical pulse and 
tone.  The section immediately following discussion on the human capacity for culture supports this further by arguing that 
music, broadly speaking, does not provide an unusual degree of shared understanding between ensemble musicians.  Finally, 
similar arguments will be made for the connections between synchronous action and social connection.  These connections, 
too, are shown to be a critical component in early parent-infant communication and to feature extensively and functionally in 
a myriad of non-musical contexts.   Once again I will argue that, if these connections are strengthened in music, it is because 
the nature of the attentional structures in music affords continually renewing and reinforcing moments of mutual emphasis 
and accord. 
 
Motive in movement and gestural form 
 
Human gestures function in the creation of a unique cultural world where motives are shared in narrations of movement 
expressive of inventions in thinking and acting – organized sequences of actions that convey original thoughts, intentions, 
imaginary or remembered experiences – that are made, not only with logical order to perform some action in the world, but 
with feeling for the drama of changing experience (Gratier & Trevarthen 2008). Gestural expressions, with their innate 
timing and combination in narrations, are the foundation for learning all the forms and values of the elaborate cultural 
rituals and the conventions of art and language (Gentilucci & Corballis 2006). Their motive processes expressed in sound 
are the primary matter of music (Trevarthen 1999; Gritten & King 2006). [Trevarthen et al., 2011 p.13) 
                                                 
122 They follow this assertion with another stating that “(i)n any case, those affective changes that listeners identify with music appear to be 
intense and short-lived, occur during (rather than after) the musical event, and produce autonomic reactions” (Ibid, p. 588). As a 
generalizable statement I would argue that this is simply false and at the very least subject to the same charges of neurorealism as the prior 
claim. 
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As humans we are constantly motivated towards achieving intersubjective belonging and forms of attachment (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995; Maslow, 1968/2013; Bowlby, 1969; 1973).  Developmental studies on attachment and aspects of "musicality" 
clearly demonstrate these facets to be inextricably linked (Beebe et. al., 2005; Trevarthen, 2005).   Intersubjective 
coordination is widely assumed to occur through multi-modally expressed gestures expressed in basic dimensions of time, 
form, and intensity (Trevarthen, 1993; 1998; Stern, 1985).  Such “communicative musicalities” support all our interactions 
from infancy onwards.  They manifest intentions in forms that can be sensed by other individuals as signs or symptoms of 
the motives that generate them (Trevarthen et al., 2011).  According to embodied and enactive models of mind and theories 
they are additionally inseparable in perception and action (Varela et al., 2017).  Thus every movement can be seen to carry 
communicative intent or potential.  We need not posit the interactive “sharing” of affect as an additional stage to our feeling 
for the process and quality of movement nor the management and regulation of personal emotional experience.  There is 
often no clear divide between actions intentioned to be communicative to an attentive other, and those that are entirely 
concerned with individual state and regulation123.  Therefore, instead of considering problematic conscious nonconscious 
divides in infantile or ancestral gesture, Trevarthen and colleagues (2011) propose that we accept “gesture and its 
communication as inherent attributes of a fundamentally social animal endowed with a single will to move” (p.15).  
Mirroring suggestions for models of animal communication (Owings and Morton, 1998; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; see 
chapter 1) they argue further that “all communicative gestures of animals – head bobbing and hand waving of lizards, 
singing of whales or nightingales, cries of migrating geese, squeaking of mice, grunts of baboons – are both self-regulatory 
(felt within the body or guided by interested subjective attention to objects and events in the world) and adapted for social 
communication, intersubjectively (Darwin 1872; Porges 2003; Rodriguez & Palacios 2007; Panksepp & Trevarthen 
2009They serve cooperative life, including adaptive engagements between species, be they predatory or mutually beneficial” 
(ibid. p. 13-14, emphasis added). 
 
Forms of intersubjectivity in infancy 
 
Albeit grounded in shared features of primate communication and understandings of animacy and intention we clearly have 
highly pronounced or species-specific motivations to share mental states, internal experience, and intentionalities – a 
capacity for culture (see below).  These manifest and develop naturally in interactions with parents from birth and are 
indicative of a fundamental and shared ontogenetically emergent human capability that is independent of language.  The idea 
of infant intersubjectivity is therefore “no less than a theory of how human minds, in human bodies, can recognize one 
another’s impulses, intuitively, with or without cognitive or symbolic elaborations” (Trevarthen, 1998 p. 17).  Ultimately 
models of intersubjectivity in infancy (e.g. Meltzoff, 2007; Stern 1985; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) extend their relevance 
into adult experience and thus go to the very heart of how we understand our feelings of self and other, human connection 
and relatedness, and human culture. 
 
Stern (1985) argues against a notion of intersubjectivity being seen as a unitary construct and proposes instead that it be 
broken down functionally into interattentionality, interintentionality, and interaffectivity. Of these he views the latter – also 
termed affect attunement (Stern, 1993; 2010) - as being “the primary medium and the primary subject of communication” 
(Stern 1985, p. 133) during the first year of life.  This is defined succinctly by Beebe and colleagues (2005) as “the cross-
modal matching of intensity, timing and shape of behavior, based on dynamic micromomentary shifts over time, perceived 
as patterns of change that are similar in self and other” (p. 47).  The infant is accordingly assumed to be able to appreciate 
crossmodal correspondences and to subsequently understand – implicitly and “automatically” - the quality of another’s inner 
feeling state and to instinctively realize if this is shared.  Following Bretherton and colleagues (Bretherton and Bates, 1979; 
Bretherton et al., 1981), Stern (1985) argues that at 9-12 months infants exhibit an axiomative change towards a discernment 
of having a mind of their own and that others have minds – quite literally a theory of mind.  A further “quantum leap” (Ibid., 
p.124) towards mature intersubjectivity occurs as the infants realizes that his/her focus of attention, feeling state, and 
intention can be shared and that his/her own attentional focus can be similar or different to that of a communicative partner.  
At this stage “a mental self and a mental other can be interfaced, aligned, or misaligned.  The partner’s alignment is now a 
direct subject in its own right.” (Beebe et al., 2005 p. 43)  As such Stern’s is essentially a view of how inner subjective states 
can be shared. “What is at stake…. is nothing less than the shape and… extent of the shareable inner universe (Stern, 1985 p. 
151). 
 
Trevarthen and Meltzoff in contrast focus initially more explicitly on the behavioural manifestation and translation of state 
and intention in motives of overt action which they view as being operational from newborns onwards.  Meltzoff’s theory 
concentrates on imitation and a perception of correspondence (Meltzoff and Moore, 1989) as a fundamental foundation for 
social cognition (Meltzoff, 2007).  This he understands to be the primary source of understanding the movements of others 
as being “like me” (Meltzoff 1985, 1990; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993) – as a social mirror124.  Trevarthen’s perspective (1993; 
1998) perhaps resonates most clearly with musical sensitivities in that intersubjective matching is understood to occur via 
innate sensitivities to the rhythmic expressions and the timings of movement forms. The intercoordination of inner 
                                                 
123 Although the neurological processes of generating sympathy and imitative resonance are not yet fully understood, neuroscientific 
research indicates clearly that intersubjective communication of intention, attention and affect, are central components of our cerebral 
physiology and functioning, enacted through some form of mirror-neuronal resonance (Gallese 2003; 2007; Gallese et al., 2004; Braten, 
2007). 
124 This notably accords with adult studies of imitation showing a correspondingly more interdependent or ‘other-focused’ information 
processing (Van Baaren et al., 2004) a heightened perception of closeness and an affordance of social connection (Ashton-James et al., 
2007) 
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psychological states between individuals is conveyed and transmitted interactively via timing, intensity and spatial 
configurations.  These are described as the “kinematic, energetic, and physiognomic parameters of others’ movements… 
transmodal features of motivation, coded as emotions” (Trevarthen 1993, p. 123)125.  Similarly to earlier discussion on 
emotion, the key point for the purposes of this thesis is that these connections between form, action, and intersubjectivity are 
not intrinisically unique to music.  Music instead presents them in a particular attentional and interactional framework.  
 
The human capacity for culture 
 
Although we may of course debate the dividing lines and have varying interpretations of the evidence, it seems reasonably 
clear that at some point quite early in human development our motivation and irrepressible facility for intersubjective 
understanding and action go beyond those exhibited by other species.  Our reality and assumed truths are markedly the result 
of shared cultural processes.  Crucially, for the concerns of this thesis, these processes are an integral and necessary part of 
music but are, as will be evident in the following discussion, broadly operational in all human interaction.  Tomasello and 
colleagues (2005) argued for a marked rather than qualitative phylogenetic shift emerging ontogenetically from dialogic 
interaction with caregivers at around 12-15 months of age in human infants126.  In particular they isolate shared intentionality 
- the ability to participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention.  Following comparative analysis they propose 
that “(h)uman children’s skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two 
ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional 
agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons” (Ibid, p.675).  
The result, they argue, is a child’s ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations and “participate in earnest in the 
collectivity that is human cognition” (ibid)127.   
 
Positing a complete lack of shared intentionality in non-human primates underestimates, in my opinion, the capacity of great 
apes (Boesch, 2005; Visco-Comandini et al., 2015; see below).  However, apart from this, the evidence from experimental 
studies on infants and primates broadly supports their hypotheses.  Tomasello and colleagues chose to structure the 
discussion according to gradually intensifying levels of understanding of intentional action.  These can be understood as 
constituent parts of a ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2011).  Whether or not a ‘theory of 
mind’ is shared with other primates depends, however, principally on where one chooses to set the bar (see Call and 
Tomasello, 1998) and therefore isolating individual components is indeed more productive for comparative analysis (see 
also [Livingstone and Thompson, 2009])128.  As testified by the evidence reviewed in the previous footnote, our capacity for 
                                                 
125 For a more comprehensive review and comparison of the models of infant intersubjectivity offered by Stern, Trevarthen, and Meltzoff 
see Beebe et al. (2005). 
126 They also argue for a generative developmental failure to acquire a full understanding of shared intentionality in autistic individuals.  For 
a more fully developed perspective I would refer readers to a more recent paper by Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt (2013). 
127 They notably extend the relevance of this perspective to an intriguing and ambitious evolutionary hypothesis arguing that “the result of 
participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of 
linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions” (Ibid., p 675). The 
peer-review section of the paper offers some lively discussion and varying opinions on this.  
128 Within a few months after birth infants appreciate biological motion (Bertenthal, 1996). They understand animate action and are widely 
interpreted to exhibit an understanding of human actions as being goal-directed by 6 months of age (e.g., see Woodward 1999).  For 
example, infants of this age expect human hands, but not resembling inanimate objects, to reach for objects they were reaching for 
previously (Woodward, 1998).  Nonhuman primates also appear to understand others as animate agents.  They are, for example, able to 
predict the behaviour of others in familiar situations and attempt to influence their behavior through communicative cues (Tomasello & Call 
1997).  In the same experimental habituation paradigm used with human infants by Woodward (1998) some monkeys expect similarly for 
people to continue to reach for an object that they have previously gazed at (Santos and Hauser, 1999).  Recent functional brain research 
offers further support showing that the primate neocortex is excited to anticipate the regulation of motor activities in accordance with their 
goals, and a multimodal perceptual monitoring of an internal simulation of the completion of the action (Fogassi et al. ,2005;  Pezzulo et al., 
2008; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009; Hesslow, 2012; Gallese and Rochat, 2013). 
 
Great apes and human infants at 9-12 months of age (but not at 6 months) additionally recognize both trying and accidental action – the 
pursuit of goals (Tomasello et al. (2003) cf. Tomasello & Call 1997).  Seminal habituation studies by Gergely and colleagues (Gergely et al. 
1995; Csibra et al. 1999, 2002) showed that infants typically habituate to the inferred target endpoint of a moving dot rather than the varying 
movement trajectories presented in the presence and/or absence of a causational obstacle.  In an interactive experimental setting, infants at 
9-18 months (but again not at 6 months) exhibit an understanding of intention in others.  They are, for instance, demonstrably less patient 
when an adult keeps a toy for himself than whilst making a well-intentioned (but unsuccessful) effort to give it over (Behne et al., 2005) and 
14- to 18- month-old infants will chose more frequently to imitate purposeful but not accidental actions (Carpenter et al., 1998).  In an 
almost direct comparison with the study by Behne and colleagues, chimpanzees gestured more and gave up efforts to receive food sooner 
when a human was unwilling to give food than when he was unable (Call et al., 2004). 
 
At least by the age of six months human infants follow the gaze of others.  At 12-months this extends to more challenging scenarios in 
which the focus of adult attention is not visible to the infant (Moll & Tomasello 2004), indicating an understanding that the adult can 
perceive and attend to something beyond the infant’s own perceptual reality (Caron et al. 2002).  Once again the same conclusion can be 
reached for great ape species.  Chimpanzees also follow conspecific gaze direction to external targets (Okamoto et al. 2002; Tomasello et al. 
1998), exhibit signs of surprise and monitoring in the absence of a relevant target stimulus (Call et al. 1998; Povinelli & Eddy 1996; 
Tomasello et al. 2001), and follow the gaze direction of humans to objects behind visual obstructions (Tomasello et al. 1999). Chimpanzees, 
but not monkey species (Hare et al., 2003) also realise the consequences of another individual’s view on their subsequent behavior in 
competitive contexts – the nature of their goal-directed action (Hare et al., 2000; 2001). 
 
Very soon after their first birthdays, infants begin to understand that, in pursuing a goal, an actor may consider a choice of plans and will 
choose particular action plans based on an evaluation of the situation and extenuating constraints.  In a rational-imitation paradigm14-
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shared intentionality and pervasive motivation to share psychological states with others are certainly pronounced and 
exceptional.  However, Tomasello and colleagues go further than this in asserting that, despite dyadic interactions 
(Maestripieri & Call, 1996) and some maternal gazing and social smiling (e.g. Mizuno & Takashita 2002) there are no 
observations of conspecific engagement in triadic protoconversations between adult apes and infants involving a shared goal 
(Bard & Vauclair 1984; Tomonaga et al. 2004)129.  However, there is at least some experimental evidence of action 
coordination in cooperative tasks in chimpanzees (Povinelli & O’Neill, 2000; Visco-Comandini et al., 2015).  The latter 
citation is particularly impressive as the task to move a common cursor on a screen necessitated the animals to modulate 
their behavior during execution and during planning.  An even more significant challenge to absolute nature of the assertion 
in Tomasello et al., (2005) however, is the view that non-human primates exhibit a considerable degree of interintentionality 
in naturalistic (perhaps context-specific) behaviours.  Boesch (2005) for example, counters that the group hunting techniques 
of the Taï chimpanzees are commensurable with the description of shared goals and intentions proposed.  The most critical 
point to note to a comparative perspective on music is that, although these components of a human capacity for culture are 
an integral part of music, they are not unique to it and are even, to varying degrees, shared with other primate species.   They 
are crucial components of a broad faculty for music but not constituent parts of a narrow faculty for music. 
 
Shared understanding in musical performance  
 
Describing interaffectivity in terms of the form, timing and intensity of gesture in sound and action – the “communicative 
musicalities” of interaction – and understanding our capacity and motivation for shared goals and intentionality one could 
perhaps expect music to provide particular or particularly intense intersubjective insight.  After all, from early development 
onwards music is predominantly a form of joint attention (e.g. Sebanz et al., 2006) and a shared intentional act130.  It is a 
space in which affective experience, regulation and all forms of intersubjectivity can be given particular focus and extended 
temporal space.  It certainly can feel through performance that we get to know our collaborating colleagues and ensemble 
especially well – that we connect through the act of music-making.  However, a particular degree of accord and shared 
reflection is not necessarily imitated in verbal accounts of musical performance.    Schober & Spiro (2014) showed 
discursive evidence from joint improvisations by professional jazz musicians that a fully shared understanding is not needed 
for joint improvisation.  Even some experienced listeners with similar musical backgrounds could at times interpret the same 
improvisations very differently (Schober & Spiro, 2016).  Performers were, however, more likely to endorse co-performer’s 
accounts of their thoughts and actions than statements about the improvised compositional structure (Pras et al., 2017).   
 
Of course any form of ensemble music-making involves an initial shared intention to perform and act with others – broadly 
speaking we share in the goal of musical performance.  However, once engaged, to what extent is intersubjective awareness 
necessary (and/or desirable) for successful and appropriate group coordination?  Keller et al., 2016 (p. 26) argue that in 
rehearsed “scored-based” music “alignment is facilitated by representations of performance goals that are shared across 
ensemble members” (emphasis added). Therefore their view is one of collaborative rehearsal that is “typically geared 
towards establishing a shared performance goal, i.e., a unified conception of the ideal integrated ensemble sound (Keller, 
2008; Williamon and Davidson, 2002)” (ibid, p. 5).  The idea of the projection of a shared and “idealized mental 
representation” (Keller, 2008) is, however, highly problematic.  It most visibly fails to generalize to an account of musical 
improvisation which Keller and colleagues (2016) seem to understand as being distinct.  They draw a line stating that “in 
freely improvised music, co-performers eschew fully preconceived goals in favour of transient shared goals that evolve 
spontaneously through mimicry and other interactive social processes during live performance” (ibid. p. 5).  However, 
improvisation is not entirely spontaneous and neither should the performance of composed “pieces” be inflexible.  Instead 
                                                                                                                                                        
month-old infants appreciate the rationality behind the choice of an actor’s action in terms of the focal intention and desired result rather 
than the specific action plan (Gergely et al., 2002).  Six domesticated chimpanzees were similarly trained to imitate a human actor’s efforts 
to operate a light or sound switch.  Like the 14 month-old human infants they ignored the awkward action plan chosen (e.g. using a foot or 
head instead of hands) if, and only if, there was an obvious physical reason/constraint (e.g. the actor’s hands were full (Buttelmann et al., 
2007; 2008).  In a later study Buttelmann and colleagues (2012) also showed that, following an unexpected event, chimpanzees could 
interpret a contextual shift in inferred human goals, even those displaced in time. 
 
Between 12 to 15 months human infants have been described as moving from a predominantly passive form of joint engagement to being 
engaged significantly in activities involving coordinated joint engagement (Bratman, 1989; 1992; Bakeman & Adamson, 1984).   They 
participate in interactions structured around coordinated action roles for achieving shared goals (Gilbert 1989; Searle 1993; 1995; Tuomela 
1995) – a shared intention.  At this stage, infants (14 months old) will prompt adults to reengage in halted shared activities, or may even 
perform an unwilling adult’s turn for them (Ross and Lollis, 1987).  In effect, they functionally appreciate the ‘other role’ in interactions and 
the potential for role reversal (Ratner & Bruner, 1978; Carpenter et al., 2005).  At 18-month-old infants will, notably, also consistently 
initiate more play with adults who imitate their actions than with those who interact without action imitation (Fawcett & Liszcowski, 2012). 
 
Infants at this age seem to have an understanding of aspects of selective attention based on an others’ prior experience (Tomasello & Haberl, 
2003).  It is also at around this age that infants first attempt to actively generate joint attention with others through gestures such as pointing 
(see Holl & Meltzoff, 2011).  Tomasello and colleagues (2005) conclude therefore that “(b)y 12 to 14 months of age, then, the triadic 
interactions child and adult around external entities appear as more “coordinated joint engagement,” (p.683) (see also Liszkowski et al.,, 
2004; 2006; Kuhlmeier et al. 2003).  Accordingly they posit that “(c)hildren are thus engaging not just in cultural learning, which depends 
on understanding others as intentional agents, but rather, by formulating joint goals and intentions, they are engaging in full-blooded cultural 
creation” . (Ibid p. 683) 
129 See Carpenter et al. (1995) for evidence of some triadic interaction, limited in the authors’ opinions in comparison to 18 month old 
human infants, between chimpanzees and bonobos in interaction with an adult human and some objects. 
130 The early significance of human intention and/or alignment is supported by evidence showing that children at 2.5–4.5 years of age are 
more likely to spontaneously synchronize with a drumbeat produced by a real person than with one produced by a computer-controlled stick 
or with a recording (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2009). 
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they simply represent differing degrees of creative freedom rather than any form of absolute distinction.  As such issues with 
the notion of a preconceived ideal apply to all music. 
 
Countering perspectives advocated in other recent research papers (Keller, 2008; Seddon & Biasutti, 2009; Biasutti, 2013) 
Schiavio and Hoffding (2015) argue that musicians playing together need not necessarily have an awareness of their co-
players’ subjective states nor an awareness of a shared common goal in order to perform131.  Neither do they view these as 
being sufficient to account for the kind of awareness required for joint musical attention132.  They structure and assess their 
assertions around interviews with members of the Danish String quartet claiming that “a pre-reflective, embodied and 
interactive layer of awareness is necessary in accounting for joint musical performance, while the presupposition of more 
reflectively demanding ‘goals’, and ‘attention’ often is not” (ibid p. 17)133.  One quotation from the interview with the cellist 
of the group stands out in particular: 
 
I think I have an idea of where I’m going and then I think … for each tone you play, you could say it such that time was 
a long, long line and you had a lot of points on the line … so for each point you advance, then … it gives … it will give 
the premise for where the next point would be because the tone itself in a sense defines the next tone and so on because 
otherwise the phrase becomes unnatural. And therefore you’re really in the tone you’re really on and then it kind of gives 
itself how the next tone will become … You need a smooth (development) and therefore each tone, each and every 
vibrato, each and every oscillation, bowing, phrasing, everything builds towards how it is going to become and it is 
impossible to predict how it will play out. It depends on what you laid as ground (Fredrik Sjölin, ibid p. 13). 
 
This descriptive quotation is, in my opinion, especially insightful and relevant.  It appears to describe the experience of 
engaging with music in direct accordance with the specificities of a basic musical pulse and tone described in chapters 2 and 
3.  We are not, at the time of musical immersion, concerned with a mental representation of others, the communication of 
particular emotional states, or the complete acoustic outcome – the final “portrait”.   Instead we are experiencing a moment – 
a psychological present that is constantly extended in relation to the timing, tuning, and dynamic form of the immediate past 
and corresponding future-directed expectations and the ongoing generation of action and attentional focus134. 
 
Synchrony, entrainment, mediated interaction, and prosociality 
 
One prominent candidate for a special connection of music among communicative contexts to intersubjectivity and 
connectedness is synchronous and/or entrained action.  Music and other forms of entrained action necessarily create 
recurring moments of synchrony and a relative proliferation of moments of shared emphasis and notice135.  In a practical 
sense interpersonal synchrony can facilitate the coordination and collective performance of certain cooperative goals (see 
Allsop, 2016).  Additionally interpersonal synchrony has intense psychosocial and implications – it both generates and 
reflects moments of interactional significance and accord.  Broadly speaking, moving in synchrony with others seems to 
encourage prosocial behavior and a sense of interpersonal connection and agreement.  For example, Gill and Borchers 
(2003) showed that moments of physical/gestural synchrony transpired at precisely the point in negotiating a joint 
architectural task when points of agreement were reached.  These moments both signalled and implicitly sealed moments of 
consensus from which the negotiating partners could move forward.  Baimel and colleagues (2015) congruently describe 
behavioural synchrony, like the human propensity for imitation, as being “part of a larger suite of processes that allow for 
effective interpersonal coordination between physical bodies and minds (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013)” (p. 4)136.  For example, 
similarly to experimental settings with music (see below), mimicking behavior has been evidenced to increase affiliation and 
                                                 
131 Keller (2008) argues that joint musical attention in partially predicated upon sensitivity to the subjective states of others and a shared 
sense of meaning.  Sedden and Biasutti similarly argue that “to reach empathetic attunement, musicians must decentre and see things from 
other musicians’ musical points of view” (2009, p. 120) (emphasis added) (quoted in Schiavio & Hoffding, 2015). 
132 An interesting suggestion made is that explicit communication and attention to co-players become more significant when the “normal 
mechanisms of co-performance are under pressure or have broken down” (Ibid p. 12).  Following earlier research by one of the authors they 
posit an inverse relation between increased absorption and attention to one’s co-players (but not, of course, vice versa) (Hoffding, 2014).  In 
a quotation that will, I believe, resonate with many experienced musicians the violinist from their study describes that “(w)hen you play the 
best, you are not communicating” (emphasis added). 
133 In a related study on dance it was suggested that coordination in salsa dancing partnerships relies primarily on synchronisation with the 
music, rather than adaptation to each other (Koehne, et al., 2016).  The partner’s coordination therefore is not seen to be reliant on a 
continual mutual exchange of “information” or the monitoring of preconceived joint action plan.  In effect the musical beat, is being posited 
as a quasi-intermediary and predictable framework (although, of course, in a natural setting this would also be co-maintained and co-
generated by [and with] the performing musicians). 
134 It is worth noting that this view and the arguments in Schiavio & Hoffding (2015) concur with recent proposals for a greater focus of 
attention on the manner in which people align words and thoughts, bodily postures and movements in our broader understanding of social 
cognition.  Social cognition, as is comprehensibly represented in a recent paper by Galetti and colleagues (2017), “concerns the graded and 
dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal” (p. 253, emphasis added). 
135 Some of the research in this section discussed sustained forms of entrainment in non-musical contexts (e.g. rocking, walking).  Typically 
these have not been analyzed in terms of phase and period correction mechanisms (see chapter 2).  It is possible, given a general lack of 
awareness of “pulse”, that continual period corrections are not similarly operational as in music.  However, if it turns out not to be case I 
would perhaps need to adjust my perspective on the specificities of a musical pulse to further state a dynamic communicative context and 
the pulse acting as a reference point for variably complex rhythmic action and/or perception rather than being barely and functionally 
instantiated. 
136 It is interesting to note that that some aspects of the significance of interactive synchrony can also be found beyond our own species.  
Synchronous surfacing in male bottlenose dolphins has, for example, been associated with alliance membership especially during bouts of 
‘intense’ social behaviour (e.g. mounting, displays, chasing) with female consorts (Connor et al., 2006) 
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induce subsequent prosocial behavior (van Baaren et al., 2003; 2004), suggesting a fundamental adaptive function in 
fostering relationships through the dynamic forms of interaction (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).  Thus if we are to posit any 
socially significant specificity for music as a form of continuously entrained action it is, yet again, likely to be rooted in the 
recurring, relatively predictable and stable nature of an underlying configurations of musical pulse and musical tone. 
 
Synchrony in infancy 
 
It has been proposed that synchrony extends an infant’s fundamental biological rhythms to social relation and connection 
(Lester et al., 1985; Wolff, 1967)137.  Feldman (2007), for example, assumes that in human infants “the capacity to engage in 
temporally-matched interactions is based on physiological mechanisms, in particular oscillator systems, such as the 
biological clock and cardiac pacemaker, and attachment-related hormones, such as oxytocin” (p. 4).  She and other authors 
on synchrony agree that one of its most primary functions is in enabling infant self-regulation through co-regulatory 
interaction with caregivers (Feldman, 2003; Field, 1994; Fogel, 1993; Tronick, 1989).  As such it is a crucial formative 
experience in the maturation of brain circuits that support social engagement between 3-6 months; it supports cognitive, 
social and emotional development and could perhaps, in absence or distortion, be indicative of forms of developmental 
psychopathology (Feldman, 2007; Johnson et al., 2005; Jaffe, et al., 2001).  The mechanisms through which biological 
synchrony promotes infant development are not yet fully understood.  However, Feldman suggests two principal 
possibilities: The first, which accords with similar findings in other mammalian species (Hofer, 1995) is that “physiological 
synchrony functions to entrain the infant’s biological rhythms, thereby providing an external regulation to the consolidation 
of cyclic physiological processes occurring in milliseconds (e.g., hearth rhythms), days (e.g., circadian rhythms), or seasons 
(e.g., seasonal hormonal release)”138 (Feldman, 2011 p. 575).  The second possibility posed (Ibid; Feldman, 2007) is that 
synchrony helps to form and consolidate a unique bio-behavioral attachment - a specific physiological and behavioural fit 
between parent and child (Barrett & Fleming, 2011) - that affords an infant’s physiological, social, and emotional growth 
(Carter et al., 2005). 
 
The first of these hypotheses is supported by a body of research that has established links between interaction synchrony and 
degrees of heart rate variability (rhythm sinus arrhythmia [RSA]) in both mothers and infants139.  Both exhibit higher levels 
of vagal-tone suppression (signifying a more adaptive autonomic response to stress) to a still-face following synchronous 
play (Moore & Calkins, 2004; Moore et al., 2009).  Likewise, recovery from the still-face correlated with maternal and 
infant RSA (Ham & Tronick, 2006) as did degrees of interactional synchrony and mother’s and infant’s RSA (Feldman, et 
al., 2010).   Feldman and colleagues (2011) extended these findings through an analysis of the second-by-second 
coordination of physiology and behavior between maternal and infant’s autonomic response and relational behaviour during 
social contact.  Their results supported a coordination of heart rhythms through episodes of interaction synchrony between 
mother and infant.  Notably, albeit perhaps not entirely surprising given the importance of breath and vocalization in 
regulation of the autonomic nervous system (e.g. Porges 2003; 2007), it was moments of vocal synchrony (as opposed to 
shared gaze or gestural synchrony) that produced the closest physiological fit between the mother and infant. 
 
Entrainment in social development 
 
Even though the capacity to actively coordinate action in reference to a musical pulse appears later in development (see 
chapter 2), sustained periods of synchrony in the form of entrained actions appear to be socially relevant even in early 
infancy.  For example, 12-month-old infants (but not 9-month-old infants) are more likely to exhibit a social preference for 
an animate toy whose chair is rocking synchronously with the infant’s own chair than one that is being rocked 
asynchronously (Tunçgenç, et al., 2015).  At 14 months infants demonstrate increased helpfulness following a physicalised 
experience of interpersonal synchrony in a musical context140 (Cirelli et al., 2014a).  In follow-up studies the infant’s 
increased prosociality, following the synchronous condition, was shown to extend to other affiliated (but non-participating) 
adults (Cirelli et al., 2016), but not towards neutral strangers who sat passively reading a book (Cirelli et al., 2014b).  Finally 
it was shown that the positive effect on infant helpfulness did not necessarily depend on the synchrony being musically 
enacted (Cirelli et al., 2017).  Rather the difference between synchronising with music or simply being bounced in synchrony 
with the experimenter but listening to nonrhythmic natural sounds was that the infants were subsequently faster to help and 
less fussy.   The music seemingly acted as a mood regulator or distractor to help keep infants happy and “allowed them to 
fully experience the effects of synchronous movement” (Ibid. p. 319). 
 
By the age of 4 these social connections are actively extended into a motivation to move in synchrony with adults in joint 
rhythmic activities or in 4-6 year olds’ peer play (Tuncgenc & Cohen, 2018). Children between 2.5 years and 4.5 years of 
age are able to interactively adjust a drumming tempo to a beat outside the range of their spontaneous motor tempo (in 
contrast to their capabilities in a simple sensorimotor synchronisation setting [McAuley et al., 2006; see chapter 2]).  
Significantly they synchronise with greater accuracy in a social condition (Kirschner and Tomasello, 2009).  However, in 
                                                 
137 We should note that “synchrony” in this context and in Feldman’s work is more loosely interpreted than it’s meaning in a musical setting.  
It refers more broadly to actions in a shared time but the implications are nevertheless highly significant in music. 
138 As noted further by the author (Ibid, p.575) the optimal organization of such biological rhythms in the first months of life has shown to 
predict the development of self-regulatory and interactive capacities across the first years of life (Feldman, 2006, 2009). 
139 Higher levels of heart rate variability (within certain limits) have been proposed to be indicative of a degree of flexibility in the 
autonomic nervous system and healthy regulatory functioning in mammals and are linked to fundamental features of social communication 
(e.g. Porges, 2003; 2007).  These correlations therefore suggest a direct influence of synchrony on the most fundamental mammalian 
mechanisms of communication and affect regulation through changes in vagal tone (see chapter 1) 
140 In these studies infants were held and bounced in a baby carrier facing toward another person who either bounced in or out of synchrony. 
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this age range neither German nor Brazilian children exhibited an increase in prosocial tendencies following a simple 
isochronous rhythmic task with another human (versus drumming along an artificial playback beat) (Kirschner & Ilari, 
2014)141.  
 
Entrainment and prosociality in adults 
 
From the preceding discussion we can clearly see that the fundamental effects and social correlates of synchrony in 
interaction are not autonomously unique to entrained actions and music.  Nevertheless the repeating pattern of synchronizing 
actions through entrainment appears to strengthen the psychosocial implications in adults in many ways.   Succinctly 
summarised by Cirelli and colleagues (2017) “adults who walk, sing, or tap together are later more likely to be cooperative, 
helpful, and rate each other as likeable. When adults walk, row, tap, dance, or sing in synchrony with one another, affiliative 
behaviors such as trust, cooperation, and ratings of likeability are encouraged” (p. 319).  In experimentally controlled studies 
with adults four key aspects of prosociality correlate with synchronous movements and vocalisations.  They appear with 
reasonable dependency, despite some inconsistent results, to increase prosocial behaviors; enhance perceived social bonding; 
improve social cognition, and to a lesser extent/less consistently increase positive affect (see Mogan et al., 2017 for a recent 
meta-analysis).  
 
Most commonly the prosocial effects of synchronisation are understood to occur, similarly to imitated movement (e.g. 
Decety & Sommerville, 2003), via a blurring of the boundaries between self and other (Hove, 2008).  In a group context this 
blurring can be interpreted to evoke a sense of “oneness” with the group (Swann, et al., 2012).  Another common 
explanation of the mechanisms involved is that we experience enhanced connection with others (Schmidt & Richardson, 
2008) by establishing a form of attentional union – we give increased attention to the social cues and actions of interacting 
partners (e.g. Macrae et al. 2008).  Extending from this idea Baimel and colleagues (2015) argue that synchrony fosters 
cooperation by exploiting our everyday social cognitive reasoning about other minds.  They posit that “by directing attention 
to others and their mental states, while decreasing the perceived psychological distance between individuals, behavioral 
synchrony makes us better able to reason about other minds and thus coordinate and cooperate” (p. 870)142.  
 
People acting in synchrony (e.g. walking, cups game, tapping) subsequently cooperate more in group economic exercises 
with others, even in situations requiring personal sacrifice and independently of generated positive emotions (Wiltermuth & 
Heath, 2009; Valdesolo et al., 2010; cf. Schachner & Garvin, 2010).  Joint tapping has also been shown to increase 
compassion and the subsequent tendency to be helpful to a “victim” in a social game situation (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2011)143 as well as to increase affiliation towards interactive partners (but not towards physically present others after simply 
synchronizing with a visual target on a computer) (Hove & Risen, 2009).  These correlations appear to work the other way 
around too and can also be functionally observed by outsiders.  For example, individuals going into a synchronisation task 
with a pro-social mindset (either by disposition of character of through priming manipulation) exhibited greater levels of 
interpersonal synchrony (Lumsden et al., 2012).  The perception of social rapport from an external (visual or auditory) 
perspective also appears to correlate with the stability of interpersonal coordination (Miles et al. 2009).  This mirrors broader 
findings that the observation of interpersonal coordination enhances the perception of commitment to joint action (Michael 
et al., 2016).  Additionally, intentionally entraining individuals are boosted in self-esteem and will experience greater self-
other overlap with their partner following periods of synchronous compared to asynchronous movement (Lumsden et al., 
2014).  Subsequent performance on a perceptual speed judgment task has also been observed in participants rocking in chairs 
                                                 
141 It is interesting and pertinent to consider this and related studies together with my proposals for the root specificities of music in terms of 
broader discussions on the relationships between musical training and the development of cognitive and social capabilities.  In contrast to 
the later study, Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) presented evidence that children who play together in a musical versus a non-musical way 
are later more helpful and cooperative with one another.  There have also been some interesting projects in natural settings showing that 
long-term group music-making interventions promotes social development and sympathy (Rabinowitch et al., 2013), even among infants 
(Gerry et al., 2012).  In the former study music interventions significantly outperformed drama and other control activities in terms of 
transferable empathic capacities.  
Nevertheless in a review of the literature, Schellenberg (2013) suggests that “nonmusical associations with music lessons appear 
to be strictly cognitive” (p. 531).  In some sense much of evidence can appear to support this position.  In a study of 6-11 years parents’ 
reports of social skills was not correlated with the duration of musical training received (Schellenberg, 2006).  Experimental studies of 1 
year and 3 years of musical training showed improvements, compared to control in social skills (Schellenberg, 2004) or self-esteem (Costa-
Giorni, 2004) respectively.  In a study of 7 and 8 year old children musically trained children performed better than untrained controls.  
However, the key finding was that the advantage disappeared when FSIQ was held constant (Schellenberg & Mankarious, 2012). Standard 
music classes taught in schools also show equivocal results (Rickard et al., 2012; 2013) 
How then can we understand this apparent disparity between studies? My understanding is that the specificities of musical pulse 
and tone (amongst other features) sustain attention and thus afford an intensity and highly conducive and memorable learning environment.  
However the scope of transferable skills and propensities depends on the content of the musical structure and training.   Notably most of the 
null findings involved music lessons taught individually.  In direct contrast the nature of the task in Kirschner & Ilari (2014) was pared 
down to simple synchronous drumming and was far less socially involved than the musical task in the earlier study with a positive result 
(Kirschner & Tomasello, 2010).  Finally a recent study provides a compelling contrast to the equivocal findings from classroom training 
showing that weekly group music classes encouraging high levels of interpersonal synchrony, showed larger boosts in self-reported 
sympathy and prosociality compared to controls (Schellenberg et al., 2015).  I would argue that the nature of musical content determining its 
transferable relevance applies also more general cognitive abilities.  This form of learning may occur by virtue of the degrees of volitional 
control and sustained attention in music via an overarching relevance to executive functioning (e.g. Moreno et al., 2011). 
142 A third perspective is that the effects of synchrony on coordination are supported by an affective channel.  Although this receives less 
support from the experimental literature its relevance may increase substantially in naturalistic and ritualistic settings (see below). 
143 However, unfortunately synchrony does not necessarily promote morally positive action. For example, synchronous activity also boosts 
compliance with requests to aggress with cooperating partner (Wiltermuth, 2012). 
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in synchrony (Valdesolo et al., 2010), as has a notable shift from self-memory advantage (in anti-phase coordination) 
towards a balance of self- and other-memory when movements were coordinated in-phase (Miles et al., 2010).  Finally, 
although not necessarily entrained, an increase in positive affect has been found to correlate with the physical and gestural 
synchronies in a study of cooperative, competitive, and ‘fun’ tasks through verbal interaction (Tschacher et al., 2014)144. 
 
Entrainment and group affiliation 
 
Crucially these various effects seem to translate and generalise beyond dyadic paradigms to group tasks and interactions.  
Indeed, some of the effects and psychosocial implications of synchrony are quite possibly magnified rather than diluted 
through group coordination.  Zimmermann & Davidson (2016), for example, showed positive effects on affiliation and on 
memory and group action video game tasks following manipulation of the synchrony of their verbal behaviour.  
Unsurprisingly behavioural synchrony between groups of people also leads to greater generosity and subsequent prosocial 
acts towards co-performers (Reddish, 2013).  This effect notably extends to passive ‘in-group’ members and those primed to 
be ‘non-group’ members (Reddish et al., 2016).  Thus, it seems that under certain intergroup contexts synchrony can lead to 
a generalized prosociality (see also Reddish et al., 2014; Tuncgenc & Cohen, 2016).  An initially counterintuitive finding 
was that, in a study of the effects of arbitrarily allocated group membership, entrainment between individuals was most 
pronounced and secure when participants interacted with a member of a different minimal group (Miles et al., 2010b).  
Although this would perhaps appear to go against the notion of a general connection between entrainment and social 
connectedness it is, according to the authors, consistent with a view that “in the absence of any disincentive to affiliate with 
dissimilar others, interpersonal coordination may act as a medium to support the reduction in intergroup differences and 
lessen social distance” (Ibid. p. 501)145.  Finally in a series of interesting experiments Baimel and colleagues (2018) argue 
that behavioural synchrony promotes ‘mentalizing’.  Following a task of moving cups in time to recordings of the American 
national anthem in small groups146 they found that synchronous conditions increased participant’s self-reported tendencies 
and abilities for considering others' mental states.  However, this effect did not afford increased accuracy in recognising the 
mental states of others.  Significantly they also presented evidence of increased mental state attribution to those participants 
with whom they had actively synchronised and decreased mental state attribution to socially non-relevant targets.  As 
summarised by the authors these results “offer some evidence that synchrony tunes our minds to the minds of others, and 
suppresses the projection of mental states to the world writ large” (Ibid. p. 288).  This would certainly appear to be a key 
mechanism underlying the efficacy of music in supporting group ritual and ceremony across cultures147.  However, 
synchrony can focus attention on the shared contents and intentions of all social interaction and on contextually relevant 
cues and meanings148.  In this regard and in the central processes that support the connections between synchrony, 
entrainment, and social connection music is, yet again, a particularly structured form rather than being intrinsically unique. 
 
Music as Group Coordination 
 
In this final section of the current chapter I will argue that music is fundamentally a form of cultural ceremony and ritual act.  
Yet again it is not, I posit, intrinsically unique in these regards. However, it is distinctive in providing an attentional structure 
that easily facilitates group participation and affords music’s efficacies of emotional regulation, intersubjectivity, interactive 
alignment, and social connectedness to be extended to the group level. 
 
From individual experience to communitas 
 
(T)he boundary between individuals and their surroundings, especially others participating in ritual with them, may seem to 
dissolve… a sense of union is encouraged by the coordination of utterance and movement demanded of congregations in 
many rituals. To sing with others, to move as they move in the performance of a ritual is not merely to symbolize union. It is 
in and of itself to reunite in the reproduction of a larger order. Unison does not merely symbolize that order but indicates it 
and its acceptance. The participants do not simply communicate to each other about that order but commune with each 
other within it. In sum, the state of communitas experienced in ritual is at once social and experiential. Indeed, the 
distinction between social and experiential is surrendered, or even erased, in a general feeling of oneness with oneself, with 
the congregation or with the cosmos. (Rappaport, 1999 p. 220) 
                                                 
144 However, highly controlled laboratory experiments of simple form of action entrainment have failed to support consistent influences on 
positive affect (e.g., Reddish et al., 2014; Schachner & Garvin, 2010; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Nevertheless, Mogan and colleagues 
(2017) maintain that it remains “strong theoretical contender” in naturalistic settings in that even a subtle effect of synchrony on positive 
affect in constrained laboratory conditions in which affective “confounds” are deliberately minimized, “would be consistent with widely 
postulated affective mechanisms at work in human rituals” (Ibid p. 14).  A recent investigation of large naturalistic groups supports this 
showing that synchrony and physiological arousal positively affect feelings of cohesion and cooperation (Jackson et al., 2018). 
145 Another possibility is that it reflects a relationship between higher degrees of afforded flexibility of pulse in more securely connected 
partnerships (see chapter 2). 
146 As there participants were Canadian this was chosen to equate to American participants listening to ‘O Canada in the study by 
Wiltermuth and Heath (2009). 
147 It seems very likely to me that similar findings and conclusions to those found in this section could also result from studying the 
psychosocial implications of simple tone matching tasks.  Extensions of the ‘sensorimotor harmonisation’ experimental paradigm proposed 
in chapter 3 could hopefully shed some more light on this in future research. 
148 Even in experimental settings synchrony notably promotes cooperation more powerfully when it is framed as a collective goal. A recent 
study by Reddish and colleagues (2013) showed that “synchrony combined with shared intentionality leads to greater cooperation than 
synchrony without shared intentionality or shared intentionality combined with asynchronous movement or vocalising” (p. 1). Synchrony, 
they posit “interacts with explicitly shared goals to support cooperative interactions” (Ibid). 
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Where music is mostly clearly distinct from other forms of communicative repertoires and contexts is in cases of group 
“synchrony” and “harmonization” – “symphonic” or “choral” performances in which all participants structure and align their 
contribution with regard to a shared musical pulse and/or musical tone/pitch centres.  It is crucially important, in my view, to 
be clear on this description.  As discussed in the previous section recent years have witnessed a focus of research on 
synchronized action with music often being viewed as a pronounced architype of group action synchrony.  However, in 
contrast to group actions such as marching, rowing, or rocking chairs, there is no restriction to produce functionally shared 
action patterns or even to articulate in shared moments of absolute synchrony.  Instead coordination in music is, in the most 
fundamental sense, structured in reference to mutually and psychologically manifest temporal and frequency-related 
frameworks.  These are undoubtedly and almost ubiquitously reflected in a shared structure of emphasis and overarching 
dynamic form.  However, ultimately these architectural roots can be operational and mutually manifest without being starkly 
physicalized (e.g. the beat may be entirely implicit) and in the absence of any directly matched actions.   
 
Another critical point to make at this point is that it is, in my opinion, the same specific features of musical pulse and tone 
that afford a particular framework for the management of personal affective experience and intersubjective interaction that 
also potentiate these impressive symphonic and/or choral displays and collaborative exchanges across cultures.  Nothing 
additional, in terms of the most basic structuring mechanisms, is required in moving from individual, to dyadic, to increasing 
group size in music-making.  One could even argue that the more challenging it is to achieve secure coordination (e.g. with 
increasing group size, or rhythmic complexity) the more exclusively we need to rely on these mechanisms and, therefore, the 
more strictly/inflexibly we adhere to a basic pulse.  By focusing participation in relation to mutually manifest pulse and tone 
we can posit that group size in a musical context can, uniquely, expand without further taxing each individual’s attentional 
load in interaction.  This is, of course, a marked difference to other forms of human communication and, in certain key 
cultural contexts in particular, provides a crucial motivational force for engaging musically.  Music’s efficacies of emotional 
regulation, intersubjectivity, interactive alignment, and social connectedness can all, with relative ease, be extended to a 
group level.  In group music-making we are therefore afforded a structured and regulated form of communitas – one that can 
be more deliberately and delicately motivated towards a sense of shared experience and time and a convergence of 




Across cultures, the psychosocial group dynamics of music are consistently at their most potent in conjunction with ritual 
activity and in the context of large-scale religious ceremony, ritual, and during the creation/reimagining of social and cultural 
truths (see e.g. Rappaport, 1999; Bohlman, 2002; see also chapter 1).  Musical “synchrony” and sacred ceremony mutually 
enhance their effects on perceptions of shared experience, feelings of “oneness”, and facilitate and intensify prosocial 
behaviors (Fischer et al., 2013)149.  Similarly to much of the preceding discussion on entrainment, ritual actions increase 
affiliation (to a greater extent than group activity alone) with in-group members from early childhood onwards (Wen et al., 
2016).  The psychological literature on rituals supports comparably three primary regulatory functions: regulation of 
emotions, performance goal states, and social connection (see Hobson et al., 2017 for review).  Group rituals and group 
music-making also can both operate across cultures at relatively low levels of intensity through to being, at times, generative 
of very high levels of affective arousal – at times the very extremes of transcendent experience150.  They extend from more 
general emotional effects of group activity, from a basic and healthy “hive” dynamic (Haidt et al., 2008) or “collective 
effervescence”151 (Durkheim, 1912; see also Ehrenreich, 2007).  Both “compel participants to feel (or “go through the 
motions of feeling”) emotions appropriate to the purposes of the occasion and ceremonial progression” (Dissanayake, 2006, 
p. 38).  They provide, not a shared experience, but certainly a convergence of affective states and attentional focus that are 
essential in facilitating the operations of cultural and religious ceremony. 
 
Both group ritual action and music are, of course, most commonly associated with religious praxis and belief152.  They are 
fundamentally and ideally suited to compliment and support the profoundly personal nature of religious practice with the 
shared communitas of ritualistic ceremony.  Like religion they operate simultaneously at the level of individual experience 
and collective cultural action and belief.   Furthermore, they can be socially facilitative in ritualistic ceremony, by virtue of a 
relative degree of transposability intentionality, at precisely those moments when verbal accounts could risk conflict or 
                                                 
149 Notably distinguishing between ‘exact’ synchrony (e.g. Buddhist unison chanting) and ‘complementary’ synchrony (e.g. Brazilian 
drumming or choral singing [in parts]) this project studied nine natural rituals.  Their statistical analysis suggested a “proximate mechanism 
by which (a) synchronous actions (b) enhance feelings of oneness (entitativity) to (c) intensify sacred values, thus (d) increasing prosocial 
behaviors” (Ibid. p. 123). 
150 In both cases, examples are of course as numerous and varied as cultures (and subcultures) across time and geographical divides.  The 
social-affective dimensions of a few selected naturally occurring religious rituals have notably and vividly been portrayed in recent 
systematic studies ethnographic records (e.g. Bulbulia et al., 2013; Fischer et al., 2014; Xygalatas et al., 2013). While well-researched 
descriptions of, for example, intense performances with positive valence among the BaYaka Pygmies of the Central African Republic and of 
the highly intense rituals, singing and trancing  found in charismatic Pentecostal Christian congregations are presented in Lewis (2013) and 
Anderson (2013) respectively.  Trehub and colleagues (2015) point out that it may be significant to an evolutionary perspective that the 
pleasure and social consequences are amplified, when music is experienced with family or peers (e.g. Boer and Abubakar, 2014). 
151 Durkheim famously described this phrase as follows: “Once the individuals are gathered together, a sort of electricity is generated from 
their closeness and quickly launches them to an extraordinary height of exaltation” (Ibid. p. 217) 
152 Indeed, in some cultures (e.g. Candomble´ Afro-Brazilian religion), music is so ubiquitously connected with religion that the same term 
covers what we would recognize as music and religion (see Bohlman, 2002).  
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paradox (Cross 2009; see Chapter 1).  Discussing music specifically Bohlman (2002, p. 5) succinctly describes that 
“[e]xamining music cross-culturally, we recognise that religious meaning accrues to music in many ways. Music may serve 
as a vehicle for shaping the voice of a deity; it may demarcate time so that it is more meaningful for the performance of 
ritual; music may provide one of many ornaments that make religious practice more attractive” (emphasis added).  It seems 
highly plausible that the extension of time and attentional emphasis afforded through the specific features of music described 
in this thesis are also operational in supporting a sustained liminal stage in ritual process and the emergence of a new social 
reality (Van Gennep, 1960; Turner, 2017). 
 
Music as ritual 
 
“[R]itual is unique in at once establishing conventions, that is to say enunciating and accepting them, and in insulating them 
from usage. In both enunciating conventions and accepting them, it contains within itself not simply a symbolic 
representation of social contract, but a consummation of social contract. As such, ritual ... is the basic social act.” 
(Rappaport 1979b, p. 197, emphasis in the original) 
 
Crucially music should not be understood as merely playing an attentional and/or affective supportive role in ceremony.  
Instead music is itself a form of ritual symbol and act.  Rappaport distinguished between ritual and drama in terms of the 
former being intended towards a causal impact on the world.  His understanding was that, whereas an actor’s role only lasts 
as long as the performance, by participating in ritual a participant is involved functionally in “the enduring order that their 
participation brings into being” (p. 136).  I would however support the view suggested in a pertinent paper by Morley (2009) 
that “there is no such thing as pure (polar) ritual or pure (polar) performance (by Rappaport’s criteria) and that the 
continuum is one only of varying relative proportions of the two, the ends of which are not absolutes” (p. 163).  He continues 
that “it is impossible to absolutely separate the two on the basis of the intended temporality of effects of the activity on the 
world, or on the temporality of the personae adopted. It is also impossible to separate the two on the basis of the extent to 
which they effect change through appeal to a supernatural agent rather than through other humans” (Ibid).  Music can, of 
course operate at both extreme ends of the spectrum.  For example at the Kaiko festival of the Maring of Papua New Guinea 
(Rappaport 1999) the dance signifies a commitment to the hosting group.  To dance is more than a symbol; it is an indexical 
indication – the pledge enacted.  Morley, following Rappaport, concludes that “[a] fundamental characteristic of ritual here 
is its ability to bring about a conventional state of affairs – to affirm, transform, or bring into being a particular natural order 
– that is, it is meant to affect the world” (Ibid p. 162). 
 
Music can also be understood as a form of ritual in an even more fundamental sense. “Ritualized” actions - highly 
stereotyped symbols (Huxley, 1914) - are common in fish and birds (Tinbergen, 1952; Lorenz 1950; 1966), and in mammals 
including nonhuman primates (Hinde 1974; Moynihan 1956).  These are typically components of a behaviour “that occurs as 
part of normal, everyday, instrumental activity—such as preening, nestbuilding, preparing to fly, or caring for young—are, 
as it were, “selected” or taken out of context, “ritualized,” and used to signal an entirely different motivation—usually an 
attitude or intention that may then influence (affect or manipulate) the behavior of another animal” (Dissanayake, 2006 p. 4).  
Following Smith (1977), Watanabe and Smuts (1999) propose three essential aspects of animal ritualization.  “First, a 
behavior that originally served a specific utilitarian function appears in a new social context. Second, in this new context, the 
behavior typically becomes simplified, exaggerated, and stereotyped. Third, the new function of the behavior has less to do 
with achieving immediate, instrumental ends than with signaling an attitude or intention that, in turn, may influence the 
behavior of another individual” (p. 100).  These ceremonial displays are also “ritualized” in the sense that they attract 
attention and influence emotions and behaviour, and also prescribe the scope of possible behavior and provide a mutually 
recognized, agreed, and formalized framework for interaction.  They can, furthermore, “literally embody in communal 
participation the mutual coordination they presuppose” (Dissanayake, 2006 p. 5).  In a series of papers Dissanayake (e.g. 
1979; 2001; 2015) has argued that human ritual ceremony and its associated culturally-constructed arts (including music) 
extend from such instinctive biological displays and that in certain contexts, therefore, the “inclination to make ordinary 
behavior extraordinary” (2006, p. 6) is part of our biological nature.  She notes, in support, “that a large proportion of the 
distinctive recombined components of human ritual ceremonies resemble (or in fact are) what we call the arts—dance and 
mime, poetic language, visual display, and “music” (song)” and that “one can view ceremonial and other arts as ordinary 
behavior (i.e., ordinary bodily and facial movements, ordinary speech, utilization of ordinary objects and surroundings, and 
ordinary prosodic vocalizations) made extraordinary through essentially the same operations or procedures as in animal 
ritualizations: formalization (stereotypy), repetition, exaggeration, and elaborations of various kinds” (Ibid, p. 6).  
Understanding music as a form of ritual in this way makes perfect sense in terms of the central arguments in this thesis.  
Music is motivated by our most central human desires and drives to communicate, experience, express and regulate 
emotions, to connect, to share goals and/or align with others,.  However there is an additional overarching motivation to 
structure these in a particular form – a form of formalization, repetition, exaggeration, and elaboration.  In the case of music, 
this form and its corresponding motivation structures human social and affective drives within an architectural form rooted 









 Bispham (2018) 94 
Chapter Summary 
 
Music is intrinsically motivated by our most central human motivations of emotional experience, expression, and regulation; 
intersubjectivity; social alignment; cultural belonging, and communitas.  It is a prominent component in our suite of 
behaviours directed towards achieving hedonic and eudaimonic well-being through meaningful personal reflection and 
socio-intentional connection; it is culturally generative and reflective, an artistic expression of individual creativity, character 
and of cultural belonging.  These motivations and their dynamic correlates are, however, not specifically enacted in music; 
they all emerge early in ontogeny and are manifest in many active and social forms in the course of human development.  
They are instead given and afforded particular space in music – a space that constantly binds from one perceptual present to 
the next; offers a constant renewal of attentional focus; provides a degree of predictable continuity; and can be interactively 
manifest in groups.  Therefore the distinct motivation for music lies in giving our central affective and socio-intentional 
drives extended phenomenological space, stability, and a degree of abstraction, intensity, and meaning and in providing a 
framework for interpersonal and group interaction and for ritual action.  
 
Music is most fundamentally motivated towards providing an extended phenomological experience, a particular 
attentional structure for the management of individual experience, and a coordinative socio-intentional framework 
for interaction affording group synchrony and an intersubjective, convergence of affect.  
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Section III – Summary and Conclusions 
 
The Narrow Faculty for Music 
 
Musical pulse, musical tone and musical motivation are respectively embedded in and have developed from our most 
foundational and central kinaesthetic, vocal, affective, and socio-intentional drives and capacities.  In terms of fundamental 
temporal and frequency based processing there seems to have been a profound, if not categorically unique shift, towards 
relative processing in our species.  Analysis of the specificities of a musical pulse and tone both focused in on correction 
mechanisms that tie the immediate dynamic past with the present moment and expected moments of future attentional 
emphasis.  Both appeared to provide an awareness of the architectural framework and, crucially, to be subject to a degree of 
volitional control.  Accordingly the specific nature of musical motivation was primarily described as a drive towards 
extending and intensifying experience and in providing an attentionally rooted structure for managing individual practice as 
well as joint action and alignment.  In comparative analysis within broad frameworks of human and animal communication, 
meaning, and emotion, the notion was thus put forward that the constituent features of the narrow faculty for music are 
proximally functional in providing an extended coordinative framework for meaningful experience, delimited social 
interaction and the efficient and appropriate regulation of affect individually and within groups.  Effectively, by directing 
and sustaining attention to the afferent and efferent significances of interaction - their dynamic affective-motivational 
processes - and making them available to our awareness, the constituent parts of our narrow faculty for music can enhance 
and stabilize their effects. 
 
More specific and extensive summaries of the individual chapters are available in the final paragraphs of each of the chapters 
respectively.  It is worth reiterating, however, why the thesis has focused in on the argument that features that are specific to 
music provide a specifically attentional and motivational framework for the management of individual experience and social 
interaction.  This follows directly from the extensive available evidence that the most fundamental architectural foundation 
of temporal structure in music (the ‘beat’) is, in essence, an internally generated attentional pulse.  It is part of wider timing 
mechanisms and our capacities to dynamically attend to events in time and to interact with the continuously moving physical 
and social world.  Future-directed expectations allow us to parsimoniously allocate attentional resouces in all areas of life 
and are a crucial social affordance in enabling all forms of interpersonal interaction.  However, my analysis suggests that a 
musical pulse is distinct, not in an absolute sense, but in the particular nature of sustained attention; its continually 
operational period correction mechanisms; a corresponding degree of volitional control; and in the awareness of the 
underlying temporal beat.   
 
Attentional structure was also shown to be crucial in describing the specificities of musical tone.  Although the link is 
perhaps less direct than with pulse, it is again correction mechanisms that afford sustained utterance and attention, a high 
degree of volitional control, and an awareness of the architectural framework that appear to be distinct to the context of 
music.  Crucially, correction mechanisms of pulse and tone are inherently a form of sustained attentional structure.  In both 
cases they involve holding in mind/attention the events of the immediate past, the current moment (“now”), and future 
expectation and continously linking them into an extended perceptual present.  Finally, attention was again central in 
describing the specificities of musical motivation in that the specific motivation for music was described as an impetus to 
give our most central socio-intentional and affective drives extended phenomenological space within the attentional 




It was not the main purpose of this thesis to enter into debates on the relative weight that should be attributed to the various 
putative evolutionary trajectories and rationales in the literature. A full generic capacity for music incorporates skills and 
mechanisms that were putatively around in the earliest jawed vertebrates some 500 million years ago (Chase, 2001).  Hence, 
one of my principal arguments is that to debate the adaptive functionality of music or its evolutionary status as an adaptation 
without first defining the matter for debate and identifying putatively its unique features is necessarily incomplete.  We risk 
falsely attributing functionalities to “music” that are in fact more precisely attributable to broader categories of relevance.  
Nevertheless the analysis undertaken does of course support some hypotheses more than others and suggests views that 
could be extended in future research and publications.   
 
First of all, having focused on the specificities of music in relative processing, correction mechanisms, awareness, and 
intention, I argue that an exaptive origin for music is entirely plausible.  The capacities that allow us to structure our 
individual actions, attention, and interactions in musical form could quite conceivably have arisen as exaptations upon a 
socially-driven move towards relational empathy (Trevarthen & Malloch, 2018); mimetic interaction (Donald, 1991); 
enhancements in the abilities to sustain attention to events—active or imaginary; to volitionally control actions (Norman & 
Shallice, 1980); to rehearse events in short-term working memory (Baddeley, 2003; see also Olson & Kawamar 1999); 
and/or the ability and/or motivation to manage the cognitive environment of others in communication (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986).  There is no definite reason to assume a biological adaptive origin for music153.   Secondly, I suggest that the 
                                                 
153 As noted in Bispham (2006) the evolutionary function of the specificities of music may also have been dependent on other species-
specific characteristics.  For example, increased infant altriciality, expanding group size, and increased sociality in the hominin lineage 
(Dunbar, 1993; Joffe, 1997) may have uniquely provided selection pressures toward the use of affective and contingent modes of 
communication, providing a necessary stepping-stone to music. (p. 131). 
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description of the specific features of music in this thesis argues against the need for a group selection model for music.  The 
features that allow a particular framework for attention and the management of individual experience are precisely those that 
afford group synchrony and harmony.  It is therefore be possible to posit an evolutionary trajectory for group music-making 
without necessarily encountering some of the problematic concerns of group-level selection models.  Contrary to 
Dissanayake’s (2006) view, music may therefore not be “the first cognitive adaptation that is not completely explainable by 
individual selection mechanisms (Brown, 2000)” and is not necessarily “an important arrow in the quiver of advocates of 
group selection arguments” (p. 6). 
 
Modern-day Implications  
 
The description of the narrow faculty for music also offers some potential insight as to generalizable mechanisms operating 
in the often rather nebulously understood “power of music” in individual therapy and cultural music-making.  Crucially, the 
central mechanisms of expressing and/or regulating emotions, of relating to others, and our drives towards feelings of 
belonging and attachment are not viewed here as being in any way distinct in music.  Instead they are given particular 
structure and substance in music.  I argue therefore that progress will come from appreciating that the specific efficacies of 
music need to be understood in terms of the transformative properties and overarching affordances of its structural roots and 
the corresponding architecture of attention involved.   In emotional music therapy, for example, we need not posit any 
disconnect from more widespread regulatory effects of interpersonal interaction.  Rather, the patient is given protracted time 
to realise some of the testing intricacies of communicative intent in abstracted form.  He/she may benefit from an attentional 
strategy that guides, stabilises and allows a degree of control over the constant flux of emotional furour and challenge.  More 
generally, and without seeking to diminish the affective nature of musical experience, I suggest that the course of argument 
in this thesis advocates that the specific features of our capacity for music need to be understood primarily in terms of issues 
of attention, focus and concentration.  These features extend enacted experience, enhance affect, and intensify meaning of 




I submit that, whether or not the reader agrees with all parts of my preceding argument, discussions of music in evolution as 
well as our support for the continuing value of music in modern-day society need to be focused on and structured in 
accordance to an understanding of the specificities of our human capacity for music – the narrow faculty for music.  Finally I 
would like to reiterate that the central propositions of this thesis - positing the specificities of music in its seemingly most 
basic firmament of a pulse, tone, and motivation - should not be understood as presenting a reductionist account of music or 
as a position that discussion on music should ever be exclusively framed in these terms.  Rather they constitute a potentiating 
space, a particular experience of action in time that affords and supports the extraordinary flexibility of dynamic form and 
function across cultures.  They afford an extended moment in which a virtually infinite variety of individual creativity, 
emotional reality and regulation, social connection, group coordination, and cultural history and reflection can be given 
stability and an intensity of focus, memory, emotion, and meaning. 
 
The constituent parts of the narrow faculty for music – musical pulse, musical tone, and musical motivation – 
provide a sustained attentional framework for managing personal experience and a coordinative structure for 
interpersonal interaction.  They extend a phenomenological present thus affording a continuing focus, and intensity 
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